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ABSTRACT 
The research investigates the discursive construction of a Turkish Cypriot national 
identity by the newspapers in North Cyprus. The aim is to discover the representation 
and reconstruction processes of national identity within the press and examine the 
various practices employed to mobilise readers around certain national imaginings. 
Therefore, as well as examining the changing concepts of Turkish Cypriot identity 
throughout history, it focuses on how these concepts have been moulded through the 
Turkish Cypriot media. Highlighting historical, political, economic and cultural factors, 
which contributed to shaping national identities, the study locates the Turkish Cypriot 
media within these relations to offer an understanding of the media environment in 
which the news texts are produced. 
Using Critical Discourse Analysis, in particular the discourse-historical approach, the 
research analyses ongoing transformations in the definition of self and `other' and the 
linguistic construction and reproduction of national identity in the news discourses. 
Focusing on three significant events that occupied the public and media agenda within 
the last decade, the news discourses are studied based on their content, strategies used in 
the production of national identity and the linguistic means employed in the process. 
With this, the nationalist tendencies embedded in news discourses as well as 
discriminatory and exclusive practices are sought out. 
Finally, the study discusses the findings such as the conceptualisation of Turkish Cypriot 
identity showed variations in time, the newspapers did not diverge from the universe of 
official discourse and rarely challenged the nationalist discourses. Yet, the newspapers 
had differences mainly based on their stance to the Cyprus issue and their definition of 
national interest and identity. The conclusions that arise from the research, one of which 
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Five months after the border in Cyprus was opened to public crossings in both 
directions, a protest took place at the main checkpoint in Nicosia. A donkey appeared 
at the Turkish Cypriot checkpoint with a fake passport that identified it as `Mr 
Cyprus'. The Turkish Cypriot police arrested three people, two Greek Cypriots and a 
Turkish Cypriot in relation to the protest. Afrika, a Turkish Cypriot daily, reported 
the incident with the headline `2 Greeks, 1 Turk and 1 true Cypriot were arrested' 
(Afrika, 23 September 2003, p. 1). By calling the donkey `the true Cypriot', Afrika 
did not insult Cypriots but mocked the nationalist idea that there were no Cypriots 
but only Turks and Greeks. The idea had found embodiment in the expression of 
Rauf Denkta§, the TRNC president at the time, who it was claimed, asserted that 
`there's only one living Cypriot in Cyprus and that is the Cypriot donkey' (caglar, 
1995)1. The protest and its coverage by Afrika are good examples of how 
problematic the self-identification of Turkish Cypriots has been. They indicate the 
ongoing struggle between different concepts of national identity such as Turkish, 
Turkish Cypriot and Cypriot as well as revealing Turkish Cypriots' search for an 
identity. Pointing to this search for identity, Cenk Mutluyakali, a journalist, also 
suggested that despite owning different identity cards throughout the years that 
identified them as one or the other, Turkish Cypriots still suffered an identity crises. 
He highlighted this ambivalent experience of Turkish Cypriots in one article with the 
question `Have you ever had a collection of identities' (Mutluyakah, 2005). 
National identity has not only been a problem in the context of Cyprus and Turkish 
Cypriots. The end of the Cold War era, globalisation and the revived tensions over 
ethnic identity raised questions about nationalism and national identity. On the one 
hand, globalisation led to an increase in the interaction of people through the 
advancement in communication technologies, travel and population movements. 
These changes not only seemed to decentre national identity and challenge 
1 In an interview in Kibns FM radio Denktab denied having said that the only true Cypriots are wild 
donkeys in Cyprus. He explained that it was the Greek Cypriot Archbishop Makarios who had used 
that expression in a news interview and that he only reiterated this story of Makarios in a conference. 
For further details see Kibris, Silahlanip, Savaciru, 22 November 2005 or 
http: //www. kibrisgazetesi. com/index. php/cat/2/news/25002/PageName/Ic Haberler. 
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established nation-states but also, by eroding traditional ways of life, made it difficult 
for individuals and groups to define themselves. On the other hand, the resurgence of 
nationalism following the end of the Cold War led to a `widespread (re)construction 
of identity based on nationality' (Castells, 2004, p. 30). The emergence of nationalism 
was not only in the form of ethnic conflicts, as seen in Eastern Europe with the fall of 
the Soviet Union, but also extreme forms of it reappeared in Europe in places like 
France, Germany and the UK (Jenkins and Sofos, 1996). In either case, national 
identity has become a key concept and a heavily politicised issue. 
Local, ethnic, or religious identities have also become an arena for identity politics 
and sometimes are seen as undermining national identity. However, national identity 
is like a `trump card' that overcomes all other identities and binds people together, 
despite their differences (Calhoun, 1997). It still plays the crucial role in identifying 
who `we' are and connects us to a place, culture and history, giving a sense of 
belonging in a world system of nations. As it is based on difference from the `other', 
depending on the context, time and the `other', national identity is constantly 
redefined and renegotiated. It is debatable whether there has ever been a homogenous 
nation but the presence of foreigners/outsiders has not only created `us' and `them' 
groups but also eroded the definition of national homogeneity revealing the hybrid 
nature of national identity. 
Nationalism and national identity, which constitute a significant part of everyday life, 
cannot be reduced to only extreme manifestations. This is where the importance of 
studying national identity derives: The banal forms of nationalism not only allow 
nationhood to be taken for granted but also shape the way people see and understand 
the world within a national frame. Thus, studying its production and reproduction 
helps to create awareness of the conflicts and tensions produced by these processes 
as well as increasing discriminatory and exclusive practices committed for the sake 
of nationalism (Wodak et al., 1999). 
The role the media play in this process is not only in the imagination and 
construction of a national identity but also in the articulation of it, which also 
influences political decision making processes. The power of the media in the 
opinion-shaping process and the ability to communicate ideas to large numbers of 
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people make the media an important participant in the production and propagation of 
national identity. However, contrary to the image of a unified nation enhanced by the 
national media, the global media provide a fragmented social and cultural world to 
both individuals and groups. The new communications technologies have not only 
disrupted the simultaneous experience shared by the members of a nation but also 
deconstructed national cultures by introducing new ones, thus bringing changes in 
the participation in public life (Morley and Robins, 1995). A resource for different 
identity discourses, the global media encouraged the questioning of the concept of 
national identity as homogenous and enacted the formation of hybrid identities. 
Yet, the media is an influential instrument in uniting people, especially dispersed 
populations, around their national and ethnic identities. A recent study showed how 
the USA government and military officials used national American core values and 
promoted a sense of national identity to mobilize public support behind the `war on 
terrorism' after September 11 attack in 2001. According to the study, the media 
contributed to attempts to create a united American nation against a demon `enemy' 
(Hutcheson et. al., 2004). In the same way, the media can also have a divisive effect 
as the discourses and representations in the media that resort to stereotyping, 
ignorance and bias can encourage intolerance towards the `other' and in some cases 
be an initiator of violence (Bromley, 1998; Howard, 2002). As seen in the examples 
of conflicts in Rwanda and ex-Yugoslavia, the media have the power to manipulate 
the concept of national identity in order to mobilise the public and lead to a violent 
conflict. The manipulation of the media for a certain political purpose can result in 
political crises and conflicts, the media being the main facilitator. At the same time, 
they can be instrumental in conflict resolution. By providing accurate and balanced 
accounts of events, as well as representing diverse views and building confidence, 
the media can contribute to the reduction or even prevention of conflict. Thus, a new 
approach called peace journalism has been developed to highlight awareness of the 
responsibility of the media in attempts at conflict resolution. 
This is why the discourses and representations of national identity in the media in 
Cyprus, where a search for a peaceful settlement continues, are important in terms of 
their practices related to nationalism. In Cyprus, the politics of identity played a 
central role in the increase of inter-communal tension and the creation of the Cyprus 
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problem. Considering the role nationalist movements and the politics of identity 
played in fuelling of the conflict between the two communities on the island and the 
creation of the Cyprus problem, the importance of the debates about national identity 
becomes clear. In the past, attempts to forge a Cypriot identity failed as the two 
communities cultivated Hellenic and Turkish national identities based on ethno- 
nationalist concepts. Changing social, political and economic conditions such as 
globalisation and population movements not only challenged the concept of a 
homogeneous Turkish Cypriot national identity but also led to a hegemonic struggle 
between different constructions of national identity. Recently, as the search for a 
solution to the Cyprus problem intensified, the question of identity became the focus 
of public debate again. Internationally and within Cyprus, there is growing 
recognition that, for a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem, there should be 
reconciliation between the island's two communities but the question is `how can 
two communities with distinct senses of national identity live under a common state'. 
Self-identification has been a problematic issue for Turkish Cypriots. The various 
terms they use to define themselves, such as Turkish, Turkish Cypriot, and Cypriot, 
sometimes used interchangeably, shows the ongoing battle for the acceptance of a 
specific identity. Each term indicates a particular conception of nation and national 
belonging that the person or the group identifies with. For example, one nationalism, 
which developed during the years of inter-communal struggle, sees Turkish Cypriots 
as part of the Turkish nation, making no distinction between Turks and Turkish 
Cypriots. Another nationalism, developed in reaction to Turkish nationalism, asserts 
cultural differences from Turks to maintain a distinctive and separate identity as 
Cypriots. This version of Cypriot nationalism is constructed mainly in opposition to 
Turks rather than Greek Cypriots. Today, `located between Turkish nationalism and 
expressions of Cypriotism' (Ramm, 2006, p. 523), both the `Turkish' and `Cypriot' 
identities are trying to establish their legitimacy and the media are one of the sites 
where the struggle has been taking place. 
As the identity issue increasingly became important among Turkish Cypriots, so its 
construction and renegotiation by the media also gained significance. For example, 
the Turkish Cypriot media have been in a key position in the formation and 
maintenance of public attitudes towards Greek Cypriots and later, as Cypriot 
5 
nationalism developed, in reaction to Turkish nationals. This is why, as the attempts 
for a settlement to the problems created by the inter-communal conflict and division 
in Cyprus continue, the role the media play in either reinforcing or lessening division 
through the construction of identities or in encouraging reconciliation or provoke 
conflict becomes significant. 
This research investigates the construction of Turkish Cypriot national identity in 
North Cyprus. It examines the changing concepts of Turkish Cypriot identity and 
focuses on how they have been moulded through the Turkish Cypriot media, 
specifically the newspapers. Considering their efficacy in the opinion-building 
process, their influence on political decision-making and the effect that may have on 
communities' perceptions of self and the `others', the main objective of the research 
is to examine the media texts to see which concept of Turkish Cypriot national 
identity they articulate and also to study the ways in which they construct it. In North 
Cyprus, the role of the media in conceptualising a national belonging has not been 
questioned extensively and studies exploring the media's relationship with national 
identity and nationalism have been minimal. This is why one of the main aims of the 
study is to contribute to the enlivened debate within the Turkish Cypriot community 
about the issues of identity, citizenship and the role of the media, rather than provide 
definite answers to the national identity problem. 
There are four hypotheses that underlie the framework of this research: The first 
assumption is that national identity is discursively constructed. Its definition changes 
depending on the national project pursued or its context of production. It is based on 
the oppositional metaphors of `us' and the `other' to create unity among the members 
of the `us- group' and assert its distinction from the `they-group'. Such 
collectivisation helps to emphasise the homogeneity of the members of the national 
community as well as assert its difference from other communities. Attributing 
certain characteristics to the `national we' while casting the `other' in a negative light 
are some of the features of the discursive construction of national identity. 
Secondly, there is not a single national identity. Since national identity is a dynamic 
concept that can shift with different circumstances and contexts, diverse concepts of 
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national identity can coexist. In the context of North Cyprus, various discourses and 
conceptualisations of national identity are in an ongoing struggle for hegemony. 
Thirdly, the media not only contribute to the production of national identity but also, 
by reproducing it everyday, naturalise the ideologies of nationalism and national 
identity. Mediation of national symbols, which are embedded in the social practices 
of everyday life, helps national identity to be internalised and taken for granted. By 
shaping national attachments into a common sense, the media also encourage a 
portrayal of nations and national identities as natural phenomena. 
Finally, the prevalence of a nationalist discourse in the media is an obstacle to 
discussion about the formation of a pluralistic and democratic society and 
citizenship. Putting communal rights ahead of individual ones leaves no space within 
the media for the constitution of a democratic concept of citizenship and different 
collective identities. Existing discourses, even the ones that claim to be anti- 
nationalist, replace one form of national identity with another. 
Taking the scholarly literature as the starting point, Chapter 1 introduces the key 
concepts and arguments to be used in the research. Outlining the definition of terms 
and the relevant theoretical perspectives aims to provide a framework for discussions 
on the concept of Turkish Cypriot national identity in the North Cyprus context. 
Divided into three parts, the first one examines the various approaches to nationalism 
and nation. Nationalism, a discursive construction, is not only an extreme 
manifestation but discernible in everyday life and integrated into daily practices. It is 
this naturalised form that hides its constructedness and strengthens the ideological 
power of nationalism. Examining the cultural and social sources of identity in the 
second part, it discusses the boundary-drawing process during the production of 
national identity. The last part of the chapter is on the role of the media in the 
conceptualisation of national identity. It looks into how the discourse and 
representations in the media contributes to the construction and renegotiation of 
national identity. 
The subsequent two chapters provide historical background to Turkish Cypriot 
identity and the Turkish Cypriot media. Chapter 2 studies the constitution of various 
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concepts of Turkish Cypriot identity over the years and the diverse means of self- 
identification that bring with them a particular national imagination. The story of the 
identity formation of Turkish Cypriots, which includes competing conceptions, is 
told in relation to both Greek Cypriots and immigrants from Turkey who are both in 
the position of the `other'. It gives a descriptive historical analysis of how Turkish 
Cypriot identities evolved and also offers an analysis of the main features of these 
identity conceptions. 
Chapter 3 focuses on an historical investigation of the role the Turkish Cypriot media 
in the construction and redefinition process of national identity. The struggle against 
the Greek Cypriot nationalist movement not only employed the media as a crucial 
instrument in disseminating the nationalist ideology and forming public support for it 
but also set the boundaries within which the news media have been operating. An 
examination of media dynamics, mostly based on the accounts of journalists and 
academics in North Cyprus, offers a picture of the factors that influence the 
conditions and practices of current news production. 
Chapter 4 outlines the methodological and theoretical guidelines of the research 
paradigm as well as describing the research tools that are used in the analysis. 
Since one of the main assumptions of the study is that national identity, a 
phenomenon taken for granted, is constructed discursively, Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA), a critical approach to discourse, is adopted as the research 
paradigm. Among various methods of the CDA, the investigation uses the 
`discourse-historical approach' developed by the Vienna School of Discourse 
Analysis. Based on the theory that situational, institutional and social contexts shape 
or affect discursive acts, this method combines historical, social-economic-political 
and linguistic perspectives to identify the relationship between texts and social 
practices (Wodak et al., 1999, Wodak, 2001b). 
The following three chapters, 5,6 and 7, test the data using the analytical tools as 
suggested by the discourse-historical approach against the hypotheses outlined. Each 
chapter, concentrating on a chosen case study, investigates the news texts to locate 
the various definitions and dimensions of national identity. Chapter 5 studies the 
discursive construction of national identity as it was reflected in news reports of the 
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border clashes between the demonstrators from both sides in 1996. Focusing on the 
themes of linguistic construction of the nation, the `us' and `them' dichotomy and 
national history, the analysis examines newspaper texts to see which concept of 
identity was articulated in relation to Greek Cypriots and mainland Turks on the 
island. 
Chapter 6 also includes an analysis of news reports of the opening of the border 
crossings. The border in Cyprus, a manifestation of separation and severance of 
communication between communities (Gumpert & Drucker, 1998), was opened in 
April 2003 for public crossings, allowing people from both communities to go to the 
`other' side they had not seen for 29 years. The concept of `home' and the 
construction of the past and common culture are some of the themes this chapter 
focuses on. 
Chapter 7 investigates attempts to open another crossing in Lokmaci, one of the 
military barricades in the divided city of Nicosia. Regarded as a symbol of the 
division, the debates concerning the opening of this crossing raised issues about the 
sovereignty of the nation, national interest and differences in the treatment of the 
`other'. The coverage of these debates in the press also holds light to the dominant 
conceptualisation of national identity and reveals whether there has been any change 
over the years. 
The concluding chapter highlights the main issues that arose during the examination 
of the data and ascertains whether the main assumptions of the study are validated. It 
presents an evaluation of the most important findings of the research which, outside 
of Cyprus, could be helpful in similar studies of national identity, especially in states 
experiencing conflict. As stated previously, rather than give definite answers to 
questions of identity, the study aims to contribute to the ongoing debate as well as 
prove a useful resource to those engaged in social policy and the development of the 
media. 
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CHAPTER 1: NATION, IDENTITY AND THE MEDIA 
This chapter discusses the working definitions related to the study as well as present 
arguments about national identity and the role of the media in the conceptualisation 
of a national identity. Divided into three sections to offer a more detailed debate on 
each issue, the first part of the chapter focuses different understandings of nation and 
nationalism and the second presents various approaches to national identity, while 
the third part studies the relationship between the media and national identity. 
Defining such key concepts and setting out the main assumptions of the study 
provides a framework for discussions of the concept of Turkish Cypriot national 
identity. 
Nationalism 
Different theories of nationalism make it difficult to study it under one general 
theory. Whether nations are invented or reconstructed based on the pre-existing 
groups are the dominating debates on nationalism. The description of what the nation 
and nationalism are and also of their origins is different for primordialists, ethno- 
symbolists and modernists. While primordialists stress the antiquity and naturalness 
of nations and see national identity as a natural part of human beings, ethno- 
symbolists highlight the role of pre-existing ethnic ties in the formation of modern 
nations. Modernists, on the other hand, believe in the modernity of nations and 
nationalism. They disagree with the idea that nations grow out of certain ethnic 
groups and instead argue that ethnicity gained significance in the age of modernism 
(Özkinmli, 2005). Furthermore, new approaches that question the absence of 
women, ethnic minorities and the everyday dimension in these theories have also 
emerged, enriching the debate on nationalism and national identity (Özkinmli, 2000). 
Highlighting the difficulties of studying nationalism under one general theory 
because of the diversity of approaches and theories on the issue, Özkinmli (2000) 
suggests focusing on the discourse of nationalism and its reproduction on a daily 
basis as the common denominator. In this research, adopting the idea of the 
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modernity of nationalism and nations, I also study them as discursive formations and 
ideological forces. 
In contrast to the arguments of primordialists or ethnosymbolists, nationalism is a 
feature of modernity and the nation state is a modem institution. The transformation 
of sovereignty from monarchs to people played an important role in the construction 
of modem states. The rise of notions such as the `will of people' and `democracy' 
not only constituted people as citizens who give nation-states their power and 
legitimacy but also replaced the power of divine right with the legitimacy of the 
people (Calhoun, 1994). Thus, as Habermas (1998) puts it, the invention of the 
nation was a catalyst in the transformation of early modem states into democratic 
republics. Belonging to a nation created solidarity and connection through a concept 
of citizenship between people who had shared no relation before and provided the 
state with a source of legitimation. Yet, despite its relationship with the `will of 
people', nationalism is not always be related to democracy. As Jenkins and Sofos 
(1996) state, albeit being linked to popular sovereignty and being an expression of 
national will, nationalism does not always represent all social identities and interests 
within the national community. Nationalism also has a potential for totalitarianism, 
which can be used to repress the diversity within the community and promote 
sameness. Calhoun (1994) also stresses that `nationalism is all too often the enemy of 
democracy rooted in civil society' (p. 325). Therefore, despite being related to 
democracy there is `nothing inherently democratic about nationalism' (Calhoun, 
1997, p. 126). 
The processes of modernity such as new communication technologies, social 
mobility, commerce, education and a changing concept of time made it easier for 
people to gain national consciousness and imagine themselves as part of a national 
community. In these `imagined communities', as Anderson (1993) describes them, 
even though members of a nation have never met each other, they have the image of 
communion in their minds. The shared image of the community is strengthened by 
the media's reflection of national histories, shared cultural symbols and language. 
Thus, the reproduction of nations or the imagining of communities is a mental act 
that requires people to believe and participate (Anderson, 1993). It is this 
psychological dimension of nations that requires the self-consciousness of being a 
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political community that constructs and strengthens nations (Reicher & Hopkins, 
2001). Renan (1990) describes this mental act as a `daily plebiscite' because a 
nation's existence depends on `consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a 
common life' (p. 19). People participate in the existence of nations by believing and 
identifying with them. Therefore, it is important that people define themselves and 
are defined by others as a `nation' (Billig, 1995). However, as Sofos (1996) points 
out, this imagination of communities is not just a mental or an intellectual exercise, 
but also a very material one as witnessed by acts of war, genocide, ethnic cleansing 
and displacement. He also argues that, rather than aiming at ethnic unity alone, 
multiculturalism, democracy and civil society could also be the goals of an imagined 
community. 
Markers such as blood, language, culture, religion or citizenship, on which national 
identity is based, influence the concept of nation and the understanding of `our' 
identity and `others' (Mansbach and Rhodes, 2007). A nation can be imagined based 
either on cultural similarities such as language, history and ethnic ties, or on political 
will, which gives the priority to citizens. In the first imagination, nation is established 
on beliefs about the characteristics of ethnic origin and the common descent of the 
community. Based on the `German model', such a nation is called Kulturnation 
(Knischewski, 1996). The second form of an imagined nation takes political 
citizenship as the basis of belonging to the nation, regardless of ethnic origin. 
Categorised as the `French model', this type of nation is named Staatsnation 
(Knischewski, 1996). Despite this common distinction, some research shows that 
such a dichotomy cannot strictly be applied to nation states (Wodak et al., 1999) as 
different forms of existing nationalisms combine cultural and political elements in 
different ways at the same time (Wodak et al., 1999, Biswas, 2002). This study also 
tests the data to find out if such a dichotomy is valid and whether such a distinction 
can be applied to nations. 
Nationalism is a discursive construction, which makes it difficult to talk about one 
form of nationalism. Depending on the political project targeted, it is constructed in 
various ways and therefore has different meanings to different members of the 
nation, sometimes conflicting with each other (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). What 
unites all these concepts of nationalisms is its discourse, which is a kind of language 
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that fosters solidarity and national identity as well as contributing to the production 
of nationalist self-understanding among the members of the community. 
Nationalistic discourse shapes the aspirations of people in terms of a nation and 
national identity and also produces nationalist thought and language (Calhoun, 
1997). Highlighting the role of nationalistic discourse in the unification process, 
Herzfeld (2005) defines it as a `doctrine of reification' (p. 117). According to 
Özkirimli (2000), there are three common characteristics of nationalist discourses: 
The first one is that the interests and values of a nation overrule all other interests 
and values. Acting like a `trump card', nationality overrides other particularistic 
identities (Calhoun, 1997, p. 126). Even though these national interests and values are 
defined as unchanging, they actually transform depending on the imagination of the 
nation. Second, a nation is the only source of legitimacy. Existing in the world of 
nations and as the symbol of peoples' will, the nation has control over economic, 
political and military relations of a community within a bounded territory and can 
justify its actions on the basis of national interest. Third, it operates through the 
binary division of `us' and `them' and defines `us' in terms of the `other'. It is this 
dichotomy that acts as a unifying process within `us' by producing a sense of 
distinctiveness from the `other'. 
Far from having a fixed meaning or being unitary, nationalism can be perceived 
either as a modernising and unifying process or as a separatist movement. It could 
even be differentiated as `good' or `bad' nationalism depending on the context 
(Calhoun, 1997). In nationalist discourses, while the nationalism of `others' is 
portrayed in terms of `irrational emotions' or as `bad' nationalism, `our' love of 
country is described as `patriotism' (Billig, 1995). Such a narrow definition of 
nationalism neither reveals its ideological power that shapes everyday life, nor takes 
`our' nationalism into account. In this projection, the power of nationalism is taken 
for granted and seen as the problem of peripheries, something that happens in 
developing countries rather than in established democracies. In contrast, loyalties to a 
nation are seen as `patriotic' and as necessary. Alternatively, the `others" struggle for 
the power of their nationalist projects is regarded as `nationalism' and something 
dangerous (Billig, 1995; Calhoun, 1997). 
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The manifestations of nationalism are not only limited to extreme conditions but are 
also integrated into daily life without being realised. An ideology that integrates 
people and helps them to join the collective life of nation, nationalism provides 
people with a specific form of reality and shapes their consciousness to see and 
interpret the world in a certain way. Thus, it makes a nation a source of identity and 
makes belonging to a nation necessary and inevitable in a world of nations 
(Pickering, 2001). The ideological power of nationalism makes nations seem as if 
they have always existed rather than being constructions. For nationalism to be 
effective, its constructedness should not be apparent but on the contrary should be 
naturalised and embedded in the routines of everyday life (Özkinmli, 2000; Billig, 
1995; Edensor, 2002). To maintain its power, nationalism should also reproduce 
itself in daily practices. Billig (1995), who describes the process as `banal 
nationalism', emphasises that certain habits, representations and practices of 
everyday life not only hide the ideological role of nationalism but also reproduces it 
as a part of everyday life. For example, by constantly flagging nationalism, the media 
and politicians remind citizens of their national identity in so many ways that it is not 
even registered. History and language are also the other elements that enhance the 
naturalisation and integration of nationalism in everyday life. Thus, embedded in the 
routines of daily life and internalised, nationalism has actually been shaped into 
common sense and a self-evident truth (Herzfeld, 2005). 
Imposing a common language, education, and military service produces standardized 
citizens for a nation and establishes a unitary image of nation (Jenkins & Sofos, 
1996). The production of this unitary image requires the subversion of the 
differences between the members of a national community and the production of a 
sense of `us' as the `same together' (Pickering, 2001). Such a construction of 
national community leads to the perception of `us' in a particular way, which is also 
useful in assuring a difference between nationals and non-nationals. Despite being 
accepted as fixed, the category definitions such as `who belongs to the nation' and 
`who doesn't' also change depending on who to mobilize and how to mobilize them 
in support of the political projects of nationalism (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Thus, 
alternative constructions coexist with the dominant nationalist interpretations and 
create tensions between the official and ordinary representations of nation. These 
counter constructions or narratives could challenge the totalising boundaries and 
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essentialist identities produced by the dominant nationalist ideologies (Bhabha, 
1994). 
The production of standardized citizens has tightened the relation between the 
concepts of `nation' and `society', ignoring cultural and ethnic diversity and leading 
to these terms being used as coterminous. Billig (1995) points at how society is 
imagined, just like a nation state, as a bounded and independent entity. He notes that 
`society .... is created in the image of the nation state' (p. 53). According to 
Calhoun 
(1997), the notions of `nation' and `people' became historically intertwined with the 
rise of claims to popular sovereignty and nation became a way of describing 
`people'. Habermas (1998) also argues that `nation' and `people' have the same 
connotation in a political community shaped by common descent or at least by 
common language, history and culture. 
Identification with nation is a crucial part of nationalism. Symbols, traditions and 
myths help people to identify themselves with a nation and also remind them of their 
nationhood. Giddens (1995) describes this emotional power of nationalism as `a 
psychological phenomenon' (p. 193) and stresses that in the contemporary world 
where traditions are shaken, feelings of commonality such as a shared language and a 
sense of belonging to a national community help to maintain ontological security. 
Identification with leadership and symbols not only provides people with security but 
creates a link with nationals and a differentiation from non-nationals as well. Thus, 
certain narratives and cultural symbols are adopted to enhance this sense of 
belonging and unity within the members of the community as well as to assert a 
cultural distinctiveness from other nations. 
Nationalism enhances the sense of continuity of its national community by linking 
the present with the past. As Bhabha (1990) puts it `nations, like narratives, lose their 
origins in the myth of time' (p. 1). The narrative of national histories constructs 
nations as entities that existed across time, regardless of whether the concept of 
nation existed or not (Calhoun, 1997). This continuity, which emphasises the 
similarities of a nation in the past and the present, strengthens the idea of an essential 
national identity. As Reicher and Hopkins (2001) state `the past is powerful in 
defining contemporary identity because it is represented in terms of a narrative 
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structure which invites those in the present to see themselves as participants in an 
ongoing drama' (p. 150). Thus, a temporal link is achieved through `structural 
nostalgia' that reconstitutes the past by highlighting the similarities between ancient 
and modern cultures (Herzfeld, 2005). The assertion of a fixed national identity not 
only conceals its modernity and constructedness but also reifies the essentialising 
strategies of nationalism. Although presented as such, nations do not have a single 
history but competing ones. The construction and reconstruction processes of 
national histories reflect the struggle for hegemony between different versions of 
nationalism. As part of the ideological power of nationalism, national histories not 
only provide continuity with the past but also act as the collective memory of a 
nation. Therefore, in the production of a collective memory, remembering is as 
important as forgetting or as Renan (1990) puts it, forgetting `is a crucial factor in the 
creation of a nation' (p. 11) because the violence utilised in the formation of a nation 
state clashes with the view of nation being given rather than created by force 
(Calhoun, 1997). 
The impact of globalisation on nationalism and nation states is still an ongoing 
discussion. On the one hand, globalisation is said to cause the demise of nation-states 
and affect their coherence. On the other hand, nationalist movements in the wake of 
the Cold War showed that nationalism is still a powerful ideology. Describing such 
nationalist movements as `forces of fragmentation', Biswas (2002, p. 185) claims that 
even though such sub-nationalism could threaten the integrity of a nation state, it also 
strengthens and reproduces the idea of a nation. The transfer of some state functions 
which had been under the control of national governments to supranational 
organisations has reinforced the argument that the sovereignty of nation states is 
diminishing with economic and cultural globalisation. Challenging this view, Biswas 
(2002) stresses that rather than undermining the power of a nation state such changes 
have created new expectations in people and may result in nation states better 
performing and meeting demands of their people. 
International recognition is another important aspect of being a nation. It is not 
enough to define itself as a nation in order to be recognised as a nation but gaining 
the acknowledgment of other nation states is also important. Joining in world affairs 
requires imagining the nation among other nations. In Billig's (1995) description, the 
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consciousness of national identity normally assumes an international context, which 
itself needs to be imagined as much as the national community does. Pointing at the 
relationship between nationalism and state, Bauman (1991) notes that `nationalism 
without the state has been as flawed and ultimately impotent as state without 
nationalism to the point of one being inconceivable without the other' (p. 64). In this 
context, the system of the world of nations could be an incentive to nationalism but 
as, Calhoun (1997) states, it could also be a constraint on it because of the 
assumption that many nation states already exist. Such an approach can make it 
difficult for a new state to achieve international recognition. 
National Identity 
Modernity has replaced identification with kinship or the local groups of pre-modern 
times, with nation states. Giddens (1991) states that modernity has broken down the 
protective framework of the social relations of traditional communities, replacing 
them with other, impersonal institutions. This should not be taken to mean that 
kinship or local communities have lost their significance. They still shape identity 
and give a sense of belonging but they no longer offer a model for identification 
(Calhoun, 1994; Moores, 2000). The time and space distanciation of modern times 
no longer ties relations to a place and hence face-to-face relations. The development 
of the media has transformed the process of identity formation by providing 
individuals with mediated images. In a way, modern times have `made the concept of 
identity distinctively problematic' (Calhoun, 1994, p. 10). It does not mean that 
identity has been questioned more in this era than previous ones, but that it has 
become more difficult to establish identity. The nation state, another modern 
institution, has become an entity on which identity can be based because it provides 
people with a way of seeing and thinking of themselves. Consequently, identities are 
primarily `anchored in national space' (Edensor, 2002, p. 1). 
National identity is a special kind of collective identity. It did not emerge as a 
criticism of institutionalism and centralisation of power and resources, but appeared 
to influence and assimilate the population to join national collectivity and unity 
(Gutierrez, 2001). Thus, it is the primary form of identity that creates coherence and 
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a sense of belonging by offering people authenticity, historical continuity and 
rootedness in a common territory (Dieckhoff & Gutierrez, 2001). 
National identity is based on the concepts of sameness and difference. It could be 
associated with togetherness, based on some commonality where collective unity is 
highlighted, or it could be established through difference to the `other'. In either 
case, the existence of the `other' is crucial in the construction of national identity 
because, like any identity, it does not exist in a vacuum but gains its meaning in 
relation to the `other' (Hall, 1996). In a way, `there can be no `us' without `them" 
(Billig, 1995, p. 78). Similar to an imagined community, national identity is an 
invented phenomenon based on establishing a difference between self and the others. 
Therefore, difference from the `other' is crucial in the definition of identity: anything 
that the `other' is, `we' are not. As Hall (1996) describes `... it is only in relation to 
the `other', the relation to what is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been 
called its constitutive outside that the positive meaning of any term - and thus its 
identity can be constructed' (p. 4). Cavallaro (2001) also draws attention to how the 
`other' not only enables an individual to build a self-image but also gives meaning to 
it by either helping or forcing it to adopt a worldview in relation to itself. 
The construction and reconstruction process of national identity involves the struggle 
between different versions of identity for hegemony. Different definitions of national 
identity are produced for different political projects. Depending on the definition of 
national interest, the categorisation of who national identity includes or excludes 
changes (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). As Evans (1996) suggests, the production of 
national identity, which is `the categorization of self or of `other', inclusion and 
exclusion is an arena of contest between competing groups and institutions within 
society' (p. 34). In other words, with changes in the concept of national identity, new 
`others' also emerge. 
National identity is not a fixed or natural thing based on some common essence, as 
the essentialist would argue, but a concept that changes with different circumstances 
and contexts. In other words, it does not mean that it is passive and determined by 
social changes but is, on the contrary, a reflexive project that also contributes to these 
transformations. In this sense, reflexivity is the use of knowledge as a constitutive 
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element, as well as being a constant revision of it (Baker, 1997). Similar to the self in 
modern times, which `has to be explored and constructed as a part of a reflexive 
process of connecting personal and social change' (Giddens, 1991, p. 32), national 
identity also has a flexible form. Yet, despite its dynamic nature, national identity 
exhibits itself as a natural and fixed phenomenon. McCrone (2002) stresses that 
individuals consider their identity as fixed and immutable in any particular time and 
context. Furthermore, they claim particular national identities in different contexts 
and over time and space. 
The notion of a dynamic national identity clashes with the concept of `authentic', 
traditional forms of identity, which emphasizes primordial ties. Essentialist 
approaches view national identity as centred, unified and fixed. Their assumption is 
that there is an underlying essence of identity that is natural and belongs to a shared 
culture. Contrary to this assumption, national identity is socially and discursively 
constructed and changes depending on the circumstances rather than being a natural 
or `given' phenomenon. Therefore, it is not tradition-bound or homogenous, but a 
phenomenon that benefits from different sources which provide for different national 
identifications. However, as Reicher and Hopkins (2001) emphasise, `national 
identity is always a project, the success of which depends upon being seen as an 
essence' (p. 222). For national identity to be effective it should not be seen as 
constructed but on the contrary, should be perceived as given or natural. This is why 
national identity is always produced as an essential and natural aspect of a nation. 
Symbols, rituals, images and spaces are the resources for the production of national 
identity. These spatial, material, performative and embodied expressions of national 
identity are interlinked with each other, constituting a supply for a sense of national 
belonging (Edensor, 2002). However, their sharedness does not guarantee a 
consensus on their meanings. Rather than providing a fixed set of ideas, these 
cultural materials can be used and interpreted in different ways and hence act as 
diverse and multiple sources for the construction of national identity. The reflexive 
nature of these cultural representations contributes to the flexible character of 
national identity as well. Their dialectic relationship means that changes in the 
meaning. of one also influence the meaning of the other. It is also that in the 
production process of a national identity, sometimes new symbols and rituals are 
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invented and circulated for members to identify with the nation and sometimes 
existing or old ones are evoked, reclaimed and reinterpreted to be embedded back 
into contemporary forms. The employment of cultural representations in the 
production of national identity depends on whether they support or undermine the 
construction of that identity. If they support it, then they are employed to essentialize 
the identity but if they undermine it then they are described as contingent factors 
(Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). 
National identity plays a crucial role in the construction of nations. An identity is 
created and imposed on people to encourage them see and think of themselves in a 
similar way. Gramsci's notion of hegemony is achieved through the ideological state 
apparatuses as suggested by Althusser (Biswas, 2002). Shaped by state, politics, the 
media and everyday social practices, national identity is learned and internalised 
during the course of socialisation. The state, especially, has a role in the construction 
of national consciousness by a common education and military. It `shapes forms of 
perception, of categorisation, of interpretation and of memory which serve as the 
basis for a more or less orchestration of the habitus which becomes the basis for a 
kind of `national common sense' through the school and the educational system' 
(Wodak et al., 1999, p. 29). Apart from daily practices, the importance of habitus 
becomes clearer in conflict situations, which makes one's group characteristics seem 
natural and inherent while the difference of the `other' group is viewed as unnatural 
and reprehensible (Mennell, 1994). 
This differentiation or creation of boundaries is an important factor in the 
construction of national identity. Imagining national identity involves considering 
who is included in the nation and who is not. As Evans (1996) points out `the 
articulation of identity is premised upon the identification of symbolic boundaries' 
(p. 33). The crucial role of boundaries, whether they are in the minds of individuals or 
apparent, is to highlight the differences and similarities between `us' and `them'. 
Constructed in relation to the `other', they help to identify the self by identifying its 
difference from the `other'. Borders contribute to the production of national identity 
`through a process of negation, the creation of coherent sense of self through explicit 
rejections and denials' (Evans, 1996, p. 33). Drawing boundaries by defining the 
criteria of inclusion and exclusion strengthens notions of purity and unity. The 
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boundaries or borders provide the members of a group with a feeling of solidarity by 
allowing them to imagine themselves as a community, distinct and separate from the 
`others'. As Goldman (1997) stresses, `a unified sense of self and nation depends on 
the exclusion or `othering' of any foreign element that disrupts that image of unity' 
(quoted in Morley, 2000, p. 3 1). Just like in the formation of national identity, the 
boundary-drawing process also uses the resources of history, roots, cultural 
traditions, symbolic images and rituals (Edensor, 2002). However, the dynamic 
nature of national identity and multiple `others' in a global world have made the 
process of boundary drawing more difficult. 
In the discursive production of national identity, the concepts of space an d time play 
crucial roles. For example, the discourse of national identity is generally rooted in a 
distant time. The primordial origins of nations that create continuity over time go 
together with their common project for the future. In the elaboration of national 
identity, the relationship between the past and the present is linked by the continual 
and selective reconstitution of traditions and social memory (Schlesinger, 1991). 
Formed as narratives, they allow the construction of national identity in a coherent 
temporal structure despite its dynamic context. Evolving around temporal axes of 
past, present and future, narratives create a biographical continuity and provide 
national identity with a collective memory as well as with a future orientation that 
represents the interests of the nation (Moores, 2000). Positioning identities in time 
and space creates a meaning and coherence as the basis of that identity and also 
allows it to presume continuity (Giddens, 1991). By arranging, interpreting, 
rearranging and reinterpreting, the past offers meaning to identity narratives as a way 
of expressing one's identity (Wodak et al, 1999). 
National identity is constructed within a bounded space that creates an attachment to 
it. As Schlesinger suggests, a nation state does not resolve the problem of how a 
national identity is constructed but limits the possible elaborations of it and the 
national space is where these elaborations take place (Schlesinger, 1991). Nations, 
surrounded and separated from other national spaces by borders, bring people who 
live in it together and give them a sense of belonging and solidarity. While a nation 
resembles a big family, national space is treated as `home' in nationalist discourses. 
Tablor's (1998) statement summarises this relationship well: `a house identified with 
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the self is called a `home', a country identified with the self is called a `homeland" 
(quoted in Morley 2000, p. 266). Thus, in many discursive constructions and 
embodiments of national identity, the notion of `home' and `nation' are used 
synonymously. The employment of the concept of `home' for `nation' not only gives 
a feeling of security and belonging but also as they are depicted as united and 
homogenous places, the construction of both involves the exclusion of anything 
foreign (Morley, 2000). 
The impact of globalisation on the nation state is one of the common debates in 
studies of nationalism and globalisation: Does globalisation lead to the demise of 
nations? Globalisation has different definitions, varying from cultural 
homogenisation to Westernisation, that highlight different aspects of it (Özkinmli, 
2005). The economic and political challenges of globalization to the state cannot be 
ignored. It can also be argued that globalisation has disrupted the idea of nation as a 
homogenous and united entity. Developments such as new communication 
technologies and increased mobility have made it difficult to base the production of 
identity on a place (Jenkins & Sofos, 1996). The formation of multi-cultural societies 
crashed the myth of pure and homogenous nations, providing sources for cultural 
hybridization. As Bhabha puts it, the juxtaposition of culture from the native locale 
and culture of the place of migration produces a `culture in-between' (Bhabha, 1996, 
p. 54) and hybrid identities become an inevitable condition. These identities 
`disassemble all forms of homogenous national identity' (Baker, 1997, p. 194). They 
also demand a new vision of that culture and national identity that includes hybrid 
identities or embraces multiple ways by which people identify themselves (Edensor, 
2002; Morley, 2000). 
As well as increasing the range of resources available for identity construction, 
globalisation also led to the emergence of multiple `others' that made the inclusion 
and exclusion process more complicated. Hence, the establishment and maintenance 
of boundaries necessary for the preservation of `national unity' have become more 
difficult. Permeable boundaries have allowed the arrival of foreigners or `others' 
easier, breaching national borders and disrupting notions of the `purity' and unity of 
nation. It was as if `all the members of the community lived in a paradisical state of 
social harmony' and that things `have changed for the worse under the influence of 
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immigrants and their alien ways' (Morley, 2000, p. 210). Therefore, in an effort to 
protect the unity of nation and national identity, nationalism increasingly articulates 
homogeneity among the members while asserting the difference and inferiority of 
`others'. 
Despite the challenges of globalisation to the state, nation is still an important source 
of political and cultural identity. Globalisation has raised questions about the power 
of national identity but, contrary to the argument that national identity is eliminated 
under the influence of globalisation, it is renegotiated and reconstructed. For 
example, the globalisation of nationalist ideas enhances the notion that nations 
should have unique and distinct identities. As suggested by Biswas (2002), `assertion 
of collective identity both as an element of, as well as in response to, globalisation is 
then more nation producing then nation destroying' (p. 194). Edensor (2002) also 
argues against the idea that globalisation is weakening national identity. Implying 
that globalisation and national identity should not be taken as binary terms but as two 
interlinked processes, Edensor stresses that lack of spatial and cultural fixedness in 
the global world reinforces a new sense of belonging. For example, faced with the 
threat of the deterritorialisation forces of globalisation, national identity reconstitutes 
itself by re-territorializing either in local or national contexts. Özlurimli (2005) also 
describes a revival of nationalism and ethnicity as being a means of countering the 
threats of globalization to national distinctiveness. 
Nations are assumed to have a distinct character that separates them from other 
nations that can be defined as the national character. National character, `a form of 
positive stereotyping, a collective `we' through an imagined personification', 
(Pickering, 2001, p. 95) not only generalises certain characteristics to the population 
in general but also represents national identity as natural or given rather than a social 
construction (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Pickering, 2001). In other words, it portrays 
the traits that are the products of social relations as the essential and natural 
characteristic, which again can be used to gain consensus for certain nationalist 
projects. Herzfeld (2005) highlights that stereotyping can be used as a homogenising 
tool or act as a `totalising iconicity' (p. 29), which helps to manage the population. 
Having deprived the `other' of certain positive properties, stereotyping could also be 
employed by the totalitarian regimes as an instrument in the repression of minority 
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groups. While stereotyping can be employed to emphasise `our' national 
distinctiveness, it can also be used to attribute prejudice to outside groups that 
justifies their exclusion (Pickering, 2001). 
National character also provides commonality and distinctiveness for the members of 
a nation in a world that consists of many nations. Even though both national identity 
and national character seem to have the same meaning, as Perry Anderson (1992) 
notes, there is a distinction between these two concepts. According to Anderson, 
character as a concept covers all the traits of an individual or a group, while identity 
as a notion involves self-awareness: 
Identity in other words, always possesses a reflexive or subjective dimension, while 
character can at the limit remain purely objective, something perceived by others 
without the agent being conscious of it. What obtains for individuals holds good for 
peoples. If national character was thought to be a settled disposition, national 
identity is a self-conscious projection (Anderson, 1992, p. 268). 
Anderson also argues that there has been a shift from the discourse of national 
character to the discourse of national identity and it was the decline of the notion of 
national character that allowed the rise of the discourse of national identity. 
Media and National Identity 
Just like nations and national identity, the development of the media cannot be 
separated from the development of modern societies. Acting as a manufacturer and 
distributor of symbolic materials, the media have transformed the individual's sense 
of self and community and restructured the ways in which individuals relate to one 
another and to themselves. However, it is not a one-way process, because as well as 
reflecting and constituting the modern society, the media were also constituted by it 
(Thompson, 1995). 
One of the important impacts of the development of the media has been a change in 
the sense of place and time. In many traditional communities, it was the shared 
experience and spatial proximity that defined the sense of belonging. With mediated 
24 
experiences, this commonality is no longer defined by a shared locale. Fostering 
relations between the absent others as if they were present and creating a co- 
existence, the media have weakened self-formation and created communities without 
a place (Thompson, 1995). As a result, now individuals can be a part of a community 
without sharing the same locale. 
An increase in mediated experiences created the conditions for temporal 
simultaneity. The temporal simultaneity of mediated experiences enhances a sense of 
co-existence even among people who are in other physical places (Giddens, 1991). It 
has `an effect of synchronisation of cultural experiences across large distances' 
especially for migrant populations (Morley, 2000, p. 168). New communication 
technologies not only create a link between the dispersed migrant populations and 
their nations but also promote a sense of belonging and social unity among its 
audience. They allow immigrants to maintain a link between their homeland and 
national identity. For example, in the case of Kurdish people, MED TV not only 
presented an opportunity for ethnic broadcasting that national regulations in Turkey 
did not allow at the time, but also created a feeling of community in the Diasporas. 
But, Bhabha (1999) raises a concern about the notion of `national temporality' by 
asking `if the virtual community shares the essential temporal structure of the 
modern nation-form and its social imaginary, then what will prevent the reproduction 
on the net of the worst excess of nationalism and xenophobia' (p. ix). 
The media transform the process of construction of self-identity by introducing new 
forms of symbolic materials. Constantly introducing new worlds, new lifestyles, 
different beliefs and cultures, the media expand and transform the resources available 
to individuals for self-formation. In a sense, `mediated experience' (Giddens, 1991, 
p. 26) or `mediated worldliness' (Thompson, 1995, p. 34) shape the individuals' 
changing sense of the world. However, it does not mean that local experiences and 
face-to-face interactions are no longer important, but that many materials that 
contribute to the sense of personal identity have become mediated (Moores, 2000). 
As well as introducing new forms of symbolic cultural materials to people's lives, 
the media also benefit from traditions, especially in the articulation of national 
identity. Like collective memory and symbols, traditions also contribute to the sense 
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of belonging, strengthening the links with the past, giving a sense of continuity and 
transmitting a national identity. Even though traditions seem to be threatened by 
modern culture, the media have reshaped the identity formation aspects of traditions. 
They have taken traditions out of face-to-face contexts and re-embedded them in new 
locales and in new contexts. By fixing them on a medium and transferring them from 
generation to generation, the mediation of traditions actually enables them to survive 
rather than lead to their demise (Thompson, 1995). The repetition or practice is an 
important factor in the lifespan of traditions, especially considering that most 
traditions are invented (Hobsbawn and Ranger, 1983). These invented traditions face 
the risk of disappearing unless they are integrated into daily life and repeated in 
everyday activities. It is important to note, however, that despite appearing to be 
fixed and unchanging, traditions are constantly negotiated and transformed. 
The formation of nations, according to Anderson (1993), happened in part as a result 
of the mass media. Print media such as fictional books and newspapers particularly, 
contributed to the rise of national consciousness and the nation as `imagined 
community'. With print media, language became standardised and gave people the 
opportunity to better understand and communicate with each other. This standard 
language, that later became `national', helped to disseminate national consciousness 
among people. Anderson also suggests that the concept of `empty time' allowed 
people to imagine the simultaneous occurrence of events across time and space. 
Knowing that the media were being consumed by the absent others led, in a similar 
way, to the imagining of a community and the conceptualisation of nation. However, 
advances in new media technologies make it necessary to extend Anderson's theory 
about the relationship between the print media and nation as the development of 
different forms of media have also contributed to the conceptualisation of nation. For 
example, broadcasting has played a crucial role in promoting a sense of national 
identity and helped to foster a sense of national unity as well as providing a focus for 
national identification (Morley & Robins, 1995; Barker, 1997). 
The media play a crucial role in defining and renegotiating a national identity by 
contributing to the process of imagination and invention of a national identity 
through the representation of cultural forms such as landscapes, everyday places, 
events, cultural beliefs, habits and routines. The articulation of national identity is 
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sustained by the dissemination of mediated images, narratives, landscapes, events, 
habits and tradition through programmes, adverts, books, films and so on. These 
forms work because they are naturalised and interwoven into the daily practices of 
life; they are embedded in the routines of everyday life and disseminated as part of 
the daily ritual. By circulating images and narratives of national cultural symbols, the 
national media also provide a base for a national identity (Edensor, 2002). Also, the 
media do not just represent a nation but also redefine it in the way they represent it. 
By articulating national cultural values and mediating national symbols embedded in 
the social routines of life, the media presents its audience with a nation in symbolic 
form. In its representation, the national media generally portray the nation as united, 
homogenous and stable, making differences based on gender, ethnicity and class 
invisible. 
The language of the media contributes to the definition of who `we' are. The usage 
of `we' in the media discourse creates a bond between the audience and the media. 
The media `use the nationalised syntax of hegemony, speaking to and for the nation' 
(Billig, 1995, p. 98), especially in the political and editorial columns of the print 
media, to enhance the sense of unity. The nationalist discourse that dominates 
particularly the foreign news creates a sense of `we'. Moreover, the structure of the 
news that separates `home' and `foreign' news also encourages the process of 
imagining a national community (Billig, 1995). In this way, the media help 
nationalism to be naturalised and internalised without being questioned. 
In contrast to the positive light shed on `us', the `others' are identified by negative 
stereotypes in the media. By giving a stereotypical representation of the `other', the 
media also provide a base for the reconstruction of `our' identity because the 
depiction of the `other' is related to `us' and how `we' define ourselves. Creation of 
`enemies' of the nation by the national media enforces ethnocentric and nationalist 
perceptions among people. Thus, with their representation of the `enemy', the media 
contribute to the construction of a nation and a feeling of unity among the members 
of the nation (Tsagarousianou, 1999). Another way of reinforcing people's attitudes 
and perceptions is disseminating old cultural myths or negative portrayals of 
minorities or neighbouring countries. As well as reinforcing the concept of `enemy', 
articulation of such representations by the media also leads to the fear of losing `our' 
27 
identity, purity and becoming a minority in `our' homeland. As a result, nationalistic 
feelings and perceptions are enhanced towards the `others'. 
The media can also be an important weapon during conflicts by provoking hatred. 
Such employment of the media was as seen in the examples of Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia. Terzis (2001) also points to how both the Greek and the Turkish 
media initiated a conflict in the Imia/ Kardak Aegean islets crisis in 1996, nearly 
bringing both countries to the brink of war. A flag had been placed on the islet by a 
Greek politician and was later removed by Turkish journalists. The story was 
reported in both countries and led to further incidents and media coverage full of 
nationalistic discourses and representations. As a result, both the Turkish and the 
Greek media increased tension between the two countries. Although the media is a 
strong instrument in shaping nationalist perceptions about the `other', the audience is 
not passively influenced by them. In receiving the message and renegotiating its 
meaning it should be noted that not everyone in the audience accepts the 
categorisation or placement of the `us' and `them' division. Some challenge the 
binary opposition constructions of the media and resist their messages. 
The media link national public life with the private lives of its citizens and mediate a 
sense of personal and collective identity. The term `public' is related to state 
activities while `private' refers to the personal relations outside the control of the 
state (Thompson, 1995). By penetrating into the private lives of people, especially 
broadcasting, the media forge `a link between the dispersed and disparate listeners 
and the symbolic heartland of national life' and have `a role in promoting a sense of 
communal identity within its audience at both regional and national level' (Cardiff & 
Scannell quoted in Morley, 2000, p. 106). With the development of the media, any 
event can be turned into a public event, even though the public is not present at the 
place of its occurrence. By demonstrating social events as public events and taking 
them into the private spheres of homes, the media are linking the national public 
sphere with the private lives of its citizens (Morley, 2000). For example, nationalist 
ceremonies, in which national identities are performed in the most recognisable 
ways, are broadcast into the homes of individuals. Repetition of these ceremonies, as 
well as their increased mediation helps them to be inscribed in the memory and 
accepted as a part of social life (Edensor, 2002). The media also connect the 
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dispersed audience together. Watching television or listening to radio can give a 
sense of unity by knowing that many others are doing the same thing at the same 
time. It helps people relate to others and produce coherence among the audience, 
contributing to a shared sense of reality (Morley, 2000). Yet, such practice is not 
only limited to broadcasting, as newspapers also provide imaginary links with other 
members of a national community (Anderson, 1993). 
The media are an arena in which different representations of `us' and `others' 
struggle for dominance. Despite the attempts of hegemonic discourse and 
representations to fix the meaning of national identity, there is an ongoing struggle 
for alternative representations and constructions of it. Even representations of the 
same national cultural forms can be used to reconstruct national identity in 
contradicting forms. The hegemonic version of national identity is reflected through 
the media because, in the public sphere, the national media represent the nation: 
Whoever is included or excluded from this public sphere is also included and 
excluded from the symbolic nation they produce. As Morley (2000) observes, `when 
the culture of that public sphere (thus of the nation) is in effect racialised by the 
naturalization of one ... form of ethnicity, then only some citizens of the nation 
find 
it a homely and welcoming place' (p. 118). 
The media have not only become global themselves but have also contributed to 
globalisation through their circulation of images and discourses. The introduction of 
new worlds, new life styles, beliefs and different cultures through the media has 
increased the range of sources for identity construction. Using globally transformed 
cultural products, people constantly define their concepts of nation and national 
identity. As well as providing multiple resources for identity formation, the global 
media also make people aware of cultures different from their own and encourage 
awareness of the `others'. Such representation of the `other' may facilitate the 
production of a national identity based on difference from the `other' as well as 
develop an understanding and tolerance towards the different `other', depending on 
how they are represented. 
It has been argued that globalisation has diminished and threatened the power of 
nation states within which the media operate. Combined with the increased mobility 
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that makes boundaries more permeable, the new communication technologies have 
brought some fear that they undermine the capacity of national states to police the 
circulation of the mediated information. The issue of controlling who crosses the 
threshold and enters the sacred space of nation and home has become more 
challenging (Morley and Robins, 1995; Morley, 2000). There is also a fear that with 
the globalisation of the media, national culture is invaded by foreign cultural factors 
and that national identity is being threatened. Yet, focusing only on the negative 
impact of media technologies on the nation and national identity, and claiming that 
nations have lost their power, is undervaluing the continuing importance of nations. 
Because, through market definitions, frequency licensing, cultural policy and 
advertising, the power of nation states still continues (Straubhaar, 2001). When 
globalisation is perceived not only as a threat to national sovereignty and national 
identities but as surpassing the regulatory capacity of nations as well, attempts to 're- 
territorialize the media' become expressions about the distinctiveness and integrity of 
regional and local cultures against the forces of globalisation (Morley &Robins, 
1995). Despite the global circulation of information, national cultural factors still 
play a role in the selection and interpretation of messages. Edensor (2002) notes that 
the globalisation of the media has not diminished the ways in which national identity 
is represented but on the contrary `has unleashed a torrent of national representations, 
comprising a welter of stereotypical portrayals and symbols as well as avenues for 
dissenting and dissonant representations' (p. 142). Audiences who receive symbolic 
forms are situated in a specific time and place, which means that the source of 
appropriation is still national. Therefore, the national media still play a central role in 
people's everyday lives. People still read national newspaper and watch and listen to 
national broadcasts. Straubhaar (2001) suggests that the ones who watch the 
globalized channels are mostly the middle and upper class elites, as the access to 
these channels is limited by economic and cultural capital. 
On the other hand, the impact of globalisation on national cultures through the media 
cannot be ignored. Even though national cultures still shape the content of their 
cultural forms, they are also affected by the spread of global models. Straubhaar 
(2001) argues that adaptation of these models to national cultures and circumstances 
results in the localisation or hybridisation of these global patterns. Using these 
patterns, new materials and symbolic resources, national producers create cultural 
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products that are adapted to national audiences. In other words, hybridization is the 
interaction of local elements with global ones to create new forms of culture: 
Sometimes the local culture only slightly adapts to foreign elements but sometimes 
the result is the extinction of local culture and language (Straubhaar, 2001). 
The global media are seen as a threat to national identities because they replace 
national identities with hybrid ones. Barker (1997) states `globalisation has increased 
the range of sources and resources available for identity constructions allowing for 
the production of hybrid identities' (p. 191). Hence, it can be argued that rather than 
threatening or leading to the demise of national identities, hybrid identities demand a 
new vision of that culture and national identity as globalisation has created 
conditions for a more inclusive version of national identity as well as making cultural 
purity a fantasy (Edensor, 2002). Therefore, a new re-articulation of national identity 
is required which will include these hybrid identities or embrace multiple ways in 
which people identify themselves. 
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CHAPTER 2: EVOLVING NATIONAL IDENTITIES 
This chapter discusses how different concepts of Turkish Cypriot identity have been 
constituted over the years. In the analysis, as well as focusing on historical factors, I 
also study the economic, political and cultural perspectives that may have produced, 
renegotiated and transformed the concept of Turkish Cypriot identity. The aim of this 
part of the study is not to discuss the existence of a genuine Turkish Cypriot identity 
but to concentrate on the process of its construction. 
Identity Definitions 
The construction of an identity is an ongoing process which becomes very clear in 
Cyprus in the different ways by which both communities refer to themselves: One 
describes itself as Greek, Greek Cypriot, Cypriot Greek or Cypriot while the other 
calls itself Turk, Turkish Cypriot, Cypriot Turk, Cypriot or, as some writers do, 
Turkishcypriot. Each term indicates a particular conception of national identity that 
the person identifies with (Ramm, 2002/2003; Papadakis, 2005) and each signifies a 
certain type of cultural and political belonging as well as a vision for the future. For 
example, while Greeks and Turks view themselves as the extension of their 
respective motherlands, Greece and Turkey, the term Cypriot refers to the idea that 
`Cyprus has its own sui generis character and thus must be viewed as an entity 
independent from both the motherlands of the two main communities' (italics in 
original) (Kahn, 2002/2003, p. 58). 
Turkish Cypriot, on the other hand, is a general term that contains these two 
oppositional terms, Turkish and Cypriot'. In some contexts, people use the term with 
a stress on Turkishness, yet in others it highlights Cypriotness. Who the `other' is 
also has an influence on its definition and meaning. For instance, Turkish Cypriots 
stress their Cypriotness in relation to mainland Turks but their Turkishness when 
1 In this study, I will use the term Turkish Cypriot, not as an indication of its preferred meaning but 
because it is the common reference in the literature about Cyprus. I will also employ the term Cypriot 
rather than Turkishcypriot because again it is a more common and widely used term. 
32 
positioned against Greek Cypriots. Even though word-by-word translation of the 
term Turkish Cypriot (which is how the community is referred to in English) is Türk 
Kibrisla, what Turkish Cypriots call themselves generally in Turkish is Kibrisla Türk 
(Cypriot Turk). Examining the meanings of both terms, one could perceive that 
Turkish Cypriot conceptualises the community as being Cypriot but characterises it 
as Turkish while the other, Cypriot Turk (or Kibrish Türk) describes itself as being 
Turkish but being from Cyprus2. Recent developments, adding to this confusing list 
of identities, have brought new identity conceptualisations as well. Now according to 
research (KADEM, 2007), rather than being a term that connotes either Turkishness 
or Cypriotness, being Turkish Cypriot or Kibrish Türk refers to a new meaning that 
consists of equal degree of Turkishness and Cypriotness which, it can be argued, 
indicates a national identity distinct from both mainland Turks and Greek Cypriots. 
On the other hand, the concept of Cypriotism is now also being expressed with a 
stress on ethnicity that shows itself especially in written literature as Turkishcypriot. 
The politics of identity has played an important role in the creation of the Cyprus 
Problem as identity has always been expressed through nationalist discourses 
(Calotychos, 1998). Attempts to construct a Cypriot identity failed as a result of 
competing nationalisms in Cyprus that did not allow the formation of a common 
Cyprus state and nationhood (Kizilytirek, 2002/2003; Kahn, 2002/2003). Despite 
having lived together for centuries, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots developed 
different and competing visions of identity and belonging that resulted in two 
conflicting visions for the future. The national/ethnic consciousness of both 
communities was cultivated by Hellenic and Turkish nationalisms and led both to see 
themselves as part of Greek and Turkish nations rather than a separate Cypriot 
nation. Nationalist narratives and ethnicization of politics over the years overcame 
the principles of tolerance and recognition of identities on which Cypriotism needed 
to be constructed (Kahn, 2002/2003). Instead, as Constantinou (2007) stresses, 
Cypriot identities are constructed in a hyphenated form which means that Cypriots 
had to become Greeks or Turks: 
2 Turkish Cypriots call Greek Cypriots Kibrulr Rum or Rum. In a similar way, in English the term 
Greek Cypriot emphasises Cypriotness but describes it as Greek. In Turkish Kibrish Rum means 
Greeks from Cyprus. For Turkish Cypriots there is also a distinction between the mainland Greeks 
and the ones in Cyprus: Greeks in Greece are referred to as Yunanli but the ones in Cyprus are called 
Rum. In this research I will translate Kibrish Rum or Rum as Greek Cypriots. 
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The most disturbing thing about being a Cypriot is that one can only be a Greek or 
Turkish Cypriot. Postcolonial Cypriot identity is quintessentially and inescapably 
hyphenated; and hyphenated across a fixed Greek-Turkish axis. Being simply and 
singly Cypriot is a constitutional impossibility' (Constantinou, 2007, p. 248). 
The organisation of public life along ethnic lines by the constitution of the Republic 
of Cyprus enhanced the institutionalisation of separate ethnic identities. Thus, as 
Constantinou (2007) maintains, modern governments and a politics based on the 
ethnic-national distinction not only made it difficult to use identities more flexibly 
but were also far from creating Cypriotness. 
Identity became a problematic issue for Cypriots with the emergence of nationalism 
in the age of modernity which, according to some scholars, provides a good example 
for the study of issues such as the different effects of modernity and the development 
of nationalism and ethnicity (Bryant, 2004; Theophylactou, 1995). Cyprus' 
encounter with modernity did not form a Cypriot identity but resulted in the 
emergence of two conflicting nationalisms with two different conceptions of national 
identity. This is why, rather than being singular, there are different approaches to and 
readings of the history of Cyprus. As one scholar describes, `there's no "history" of 
Cyprus, there are "histories"' (Nevzat, 2005, p. 28). Struggling for acceptance, both 
nations' competing histories try to tell the story of their nation in their own way. 
According to Lacher and Kaymak (2005), it is the competing and diverse 
understandings offered by the official Cyprus histories of both Turkish Cypriots and 
Greek Cypriots that actually lies at the heart of the Cyprus conflict. For example, 
claims about the existence of two national communities on the island have two 
different reference points in history: While Greek Cypriots claim a 3,000 years 
legacy to Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots take the Ottoman conquest in 1571 as the starting 
point of their history on the island (Calotychos, 1998; Bryant, 2004). Even the 
description of the Cyprus problem is different for the two communities on the island: 
Greek Cypriots emphasize the events of 1974 and present the Cyprus problem as an 
international issue in which Turkey invaded an independent state. Turkish Cypriots, 
on the other hand, claim that it is an inter-communal issue and focus their arguments 
on the inter-communal fighting in the 1960's and the Greek Cypriot nationalism 
movement called enosis (union with Greece) (Calotychos, 1998; Papadakis, 1998; 
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Anastasiou, 2002; Tocci, 2001). As the Greek Cypriots' version of history tries to 
normalize the pre-1974 era by ignoring the strife in the aftermath of independence, 
the Turkish Cypriots' version tries to legitimize the Turkish intervention as the 
logical outcome of the inter-communal violence and their sense of insecurity in 
relation to Greek Cypriots. 
Cyprus' Encounter with Modernity and Nationalism 
It was around the end of the Ottoman administration and the start of the British rule 
in 1878 that Cyprus' encounter with modernity brought many significant changes to 
Cypriots' lives. Adopting an ideology of modernization, they also developed ethnic 
nationalism. The emergence of two conflicting nationalisms and political claims as a 
result of modernity led to what Bryant (2004) describes as `ethnic estrangement' 
(p. 2). The demarcation of the communities in Cyprus as `Greeks' and `Turks' 
seemed more obvious with the nationalist imaginations developed in modern times, 
especially when they constructed each other as the enemy. 
The Ottoman conquest of Cyprus in 1571 is an important starting point in Cyprus 
history as it was with their arrival that Turks and Turkish ethnicity came to exist on 
the island (Kizilytirek, 1983; Nevzat, 2005; Beratli, 1993)3. Having taken the island 
from the Venetians, the Ottoman Empire brought a number of Turkish people to 
settle in Cyprus. By organizing a settlement programme for a large number of 
Anatolians, mainly of Turkish ethnic origin, the Ottomans introduced a Muslim 
community to the island that already had a predominantly Greek Orthodox 
community (Berath, 1993). The traditional Ottoman system was based on the millet 
system, which organized the communities according to their religious identity. Each 
millet had its own religious leader and was autonomous in administering its own 
affairs. Therefore, membership of the community and definitions of identity were 
based on religion rather than ethnicity or nationality. The identities were constructed 
as Christian and Muslim, not as Greek and Turk. 
3 For a brief timetable of events, see Appendix. 
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The change from the traditional Ottoman system to modern politics and the new 
institutional and administrative structure of the British administration had a 
transforming effect on the people of Cyprus. Replacing the existing religious 
autonomy and communal foundations with a centralized state was instrumental in the 
transformation of the identities (Pollis, 1998). First of all, the existing hierarchies 
changed: For Muslim Turks, even though the British administration of the island was 
seen as a temporary situation, it not only loosened their links with the Ottoman 
government (if not cut them completely), but also reduced them from being a 
minority that governed to a minority being governed (Nevzat, 2005). The first 
experience of this change came as the British established the Legislative Council, a 
representative body constituted of the elected members from both communities as 
well as the representatives of the British administration. Although a similar 
representative body had existed under the Ottomans and was not so extraordinary, 
according to Nevzat (2005), it made a big difference for the Muslim Turks. The 
difference was that the Ottoman council was based on equal representation of each 
community, irrespective of their numbers, while the British legislative council was 
based on the representation of the communities, not on equal basis, but on their 
proportion to the overall population. As a result, the British legislative council 
included nine Christian Orthodox and three Muslim Turks with six British members. 
`This', Nevzat states, `came as the first rude shock of British rule' (p. 117). This 
process, notes Pollis (1998), also facilitated the reformation of identities as Greeks 
and Turks to represent the interests of two communities. She claims that `this organ 
not only fostered the creation of distinct ethnic identities but ascribed to them 
political significance by structurally pitting each group against the other in 
competition for resources and power' (p. 93). 
The replacement of the Ottoman governing system with the British administration 
also forced people to redefine their allegiances and relationship to the state. The most 
important redefinition was the transformation of Cypriots from being `subjects' to 
`citizens'. The modern politics that the British introduced in Cyprus based its mode 
of legitimisation on the concept of equal citizenship. Taking part in such decision- 
making processes provided Cypriots with the self-consciousness that turned them 
into individuals and politically active citizens, as well as developing the idea of 
political autonomy (Nevzat, 2005). According to Habermas (1998), the 
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implementation of citizenship combined with membership to a culturally defined 
community strengthens social integration and paves the way towards imagining a 
national community which was also the case for the members of each of the two 
communities of the island. 
In this context, the issue of identity became increasingly problematic for Cypriots. 
As the concept of national community developed the demand to state one's 
allegiance to it increased as well. In Cyprus, this was especially the case with a sect 
called linobambakol which was Greek Orthodox but converted to Islam during 
Ottoman rule to avoid persecution and benefit from the opportunities available to 
Muslims. Even though linobambakoi (or linobambakoi) claimed to be Muslim and 
had the appearance of Turks, they practiced Christianity in secret. Not having a fixed 
religious identity led them to be called linobambakol, which meant linen and cotton. 
The shifting nature of their religious identities was mainly ignored by both 
communities, but when ethnic/nationalist claims and aspirations gained strength, the 
linobambakoi were pressured to choose an identity between Orthodox Greek and 
Muslim Turk (Gtirkan, 2006; Constantinou; 2007; Bryant, 2004). The shifting or 
perhaps ambivalent identities of linobambakoi, says Bryant (2004) `became 
important only in a period in which it was considered important for them to declare 
their "true" Greek identity through professing their "true" faith' (p. 66). 
The press and secular education in Cyprus, which were two important tools in the 
dissemination of nationalism and the imagining of a nation, developed during British 
rule. Referring to The Cyprus Blue Book of statistics in 1889-1990, Ünlü mentions 
that there were seven Greek newspapers and one Turkish newspaper being published 
in the first years of British rule (Ünlü, no date). Claude Deleval Cobham, who 
compiled and published a bibliography of Cyprus also mentioned the publication of 
47 newspapers between 1878 and 1908,28 of them being in Greek, 11 in English and 
six in Turkish (Cobham, 1908). The print media contributed to the imagining of a 
national community by creating relations with the `absent ones', encouraging a sense 
of co-existence with other members of their community. Politicians in particular 
benefited from this characteristic of the media as they needed the newspapers both to 
instruct and create a `public' for themselves in order to get support for their causes. 
37 
They took advantage of these newspapers, as the main source of information in 
Cyprus at the time, by using them to control public opinion (Bryant, 2004). 
Language was another element in the development of the national consciousness 
among Cypriots. In Cyprus, although there is no convergence between the language 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots use, language and religion were not always 
separated as distinctly. In some villages, many Muslim Turks actually spoke Greek 
as their first language. Being isolated from their ethnic community due to poor 
transportation and communication, these Muslim Turks adopted Greek as their main 
language (Nevzat, 2005; Kizilyürek & Gautier- Kizilyt rek, 2004). The domination of 
the middle class by Greek Cypriots might have also increased the economic and 
social motivation for Turkish Cypriots to use Greek (Kizilyürek & Gautier- 
Kizily(Irek, 2004). Apart from the language itself, dialects spoken on the island were 
different from the official forms of these languages. As Bryant (2004) explains, the 
Greek spoken by Cypriots was different from katharevousa, the official form of 
Greek or dhimotiki, the spoken language in Greece. In the Turkish Cypriots' case, 
even though their dialect was not too different from the language spoken in Anatolia, 
they still had difficulties with the language used for bureaucratic purposes which was 
influenced by Arabic. 
Education, which was another important tool in the dissemination of nationalism, 
went through a transformation during the British administration as well. Under the 
Ottoman Empire, lessons were conducted by religious leaders. While the content of 
education in the schools of Muslim Turks was based mostly on religion, it focused on 
national issues in the Greek Orthodox schools (Kizilytlrek, 1983). Describing the 
education as ineffective, the British administrators set out to change the content and 
context of education in Cyprus which also increased national narratives. In order to 
give children education in their own languages, teachers and teaching materials were 
brought from Greece and Turkey. The new curriculum included Greece and Turkey's 
histories and geographies which encouraged the construction of national identities 
among the Cypriot youth as Greeks and Turks. It can be argued that it was through 
education that Cypriots learned how to be Greeks and Turks or, as Bryant (2004) 
puts it, `through education Cypriots learned not how to think nationally but how to be 
nationally' (p. 127). The education in the schools of Cyprus was not just a 
nationalistic propaganda tool, but also a socialization process, which taught the 
38 
young generation to identify with their community's values and keep those values 
alive. Pollis (1998) suggests that by separating the schools for Greek and Turkish 
students and allowing these schools to recruit teachers from Greece and the Ottoman 
Empire (later Turkey), the British actually encouraged the construction and 
politicization of ethnic and national identities through education. However, as well as 
accepting that education was a prime area in which community segregation was 
institutionalized, Nevzat (2005) challenges the idea that it was the British who 
created this segregation. He argues that when the British arrived, nationalism was 
already in place and, to some extent, being disseminated through Greek Cypriot 
educational channels. 
Development of Nationalism and National Identity in Cyprus 
The changes that took place in Cyprus during its encounter with modernity were 
expressed through the medium of nationalism. Calhoun (1997) claims that 
nationalism has different dimensions: as discourse, project and evaluation. While 
nationalism produces particular versions of thought and language as discourse, it also 
sets out to advance the interests of the nation as its project. In evaluation, it fosters 
political and cultural ideologies to create a sense of loyalty and belief. In Cyprus, 
nationalism within the two main ethnic communities on the island developed as 
different discourses, projects and evaluation and failed to construct a collective sense 
of Cypriotism. Despite having lived in Cyprus together, both communities imagined 
themselves as part of other nations, namely Greece and Turkey. As Stavrinides 
(1999) explains `thus, although Andreas and All may be natives and residents of 
Cyprus and regard the island as their common homeland, they do not normally 
regard themselves as compatriots but rather as neighbours' (p. 15). Therefore, rather 
than joining together in an anti-colonial struggle for independence from British rule, 
these two communities' nationalism movements demanded enosis (unification with 
Greece) and taksim (partition) and they both struggled to integrate with their so- 
called motherlands of Greece and Turkey instead of working towards independence. 
As a result, the concept of Cypriotism did not develop among Cypriots until recent 
years. 
39 
There are many suggested reasons for the development of such nationalisms in 
Cyprus. Some explain it as the result of the foreign policy goals of countries such as 
Britain, Greece and Turkey as well as a result of Britain's colonial policies (Pollis, 
1998). It is also explained by the internal dynamics that point at the elites and leaders 
of both communities who shaped their nationalistic frameworks along with their 
nationalistic ideals (Kizilyürek, 1988). Even though the modernisation process and 
colonial policies, as well as geography, demographic changes, socio-cultural factors 
and economic factors played a role in the Cyprus conflict (Morag, 2004), they fall 
short of explaining the continuing stalemate today. Therefore, it is hard not to agree 
with Tocci (2001) who highlights irrational fear and prejudice in the communities as 
the main culprits. 
The fear and anxiety of Turkish Cypriots about being a minority in a Greek state 
developed in the form of Turkish nationalism and as a resistance to the Greek 
Cypriot nationalist movement. From the start, Turkish Cypriots opposed the enosis 
movement and were concerned that the island would be incorporated into Greece 
(Kizilytirek, 2002,2003; Beratli, 1991; Nevzat, 1005). Even though a nationalist 
consciousness among Turkish Cypriots became obvious during the 1920's, which 
suggests that they were influenced by the developments taking place in Turkey, 
nationalism was discernible among the elites even as early as Britain's arrival to the 
island. Nevzat (2005) recalls that the nationalism among Turkish Cypriots emerged 
first as the concept of an Ottoman nation and then in the wake of the Young Turk 
revolution in Turkey, as the idea of a Turkish nation. After the establishment of the 
Republic of Turkey, a strong identification with the Turkish nation took place among 
Turkish Cypriots. In other words, Turkish nationalism among the Turkish Cypriots 
was not just the consequence of the Greek Cypriot enosis demands but also the 
nationalistic movements diffusing from the Ottoman Empire, and later Turkey. In 
either case, as Kizilyiirek (2002) summarizes, Turkish Cypriots went through a 
transformation of their identity from being a `post-Ottoman' minority in isolation to 
being conscious of their Turkish identity as part of the Turkish nation. Meanwhile, at 
the time of Britain's arrival, there was already discernible nationalism among the 
Greek Cypriot elite. Influenced by the Greek Independence war against the 
Ottomans, the reconstruction of Greek religious identity into an ethnic/nationalist 
identity was already underway (Pollis, 1998). 
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The start of the First World War and the entry of Britain and the Ottoman Empire 
into the war on opposing sides created an ambivalent situation for Turkish Cypriots. 
On the one side was the administration that ruled them and on the other, the Ottoman 
Empire to whom they were still emotionally attached. With the start of the War, the 
ruling groups in particular expressed their support for and allegiance with the British 
(Kizilyttrek, 2003,1983; Egemen, 2006; Evre, 2004). Yet, the decline of the 
Ottoman Empire after the First World War brought fresh anxiety about their future in 
terms of security and at the prospect of being a minority in a Greek state, making 
them feel isolated. Meanwhile, the new generation of Turkish Cypriots who were 
influenced by Turkish nationalist ideas identified themselves with the Kemalist 
movement and were critical of the British administration (Canefe, 2007, Egemen, 
2006, Kizily(irek, 2003,2002). The emergence of a Turkish resistance movement in 
Anatolia gave them new hope. The establishment of the new Turkish state played an 
important role in the reconstruction of the identity of Turkish Cypriots, which meant 
shedding their identity as the Muslims of Cyprus and adopting an ethnic/national 
Turkish identity. Now they were not the Muslims of Cyprus but Turks (Nevzat, 
2005; Assmusen, 2004). However, they were not just adopting a national identity but 
also the Turkish nationalism that had encouraged it. 
Following the Treaty of Lausanne, the separation between the two communities 
became more apparent, leading to'the formation of two separate public spheres in 
Cyprus (Tombazos, 2003). The Treaty4 saw Turkey renounce its rights to Cyprus, 
leaving it out of the national territories of the new Turkish state, and made Turkish 
Cypriots the citizens of a British Crown Colony but attachment and identification 
with the Turkish nation continued to exist among Turkish Cypriots (Nevzat, 2005). 
The decision to follow Atattirk's project of modernization was an indication of the 
Turkish Cypriots' orientation towards Turkey. Reforms such as secularisation, the 
exchanging of the Arabic alphabet for the Latin one and the replacing of the fez with 
European-style hat were not obligatory for Turkish Cypriots, who were British 
citizens, but `Muslims in Cyprus immediately and voluntarily adopted these new 
statements of their identity, even while their presumed "brothers" in Anatolia were in 
4 The Treaty of Lausanne was signed on the 24th July 1923, but came into force on the 60' of June 
1924. 
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the throes of cultural upheaval' (Bryant, 2004, p. 233). However, even though it 
seemed that the majority in Cyprus supported Kemalist reforms (Nevzat, 2005), `as 
there was no social power enabling the adoption of these issues on behalf of its own 
class interest within the social practice of Cyprus, they merely remained as an 
ideology which excited the intellectuals' (Ya§in, 1990, p. 67). 
Meanwhile, education became one of the main centres for cultivation of a 
nationalistic ideology. When the British administration realised the role education 
played in the development of nationalism and the construction of national identities, 
there were already two fledgling nationalisms on the island. Following the 1931 
revolt, which started as a protest against a taxation proposal and later turned into a 
nationalistic demonstration for enosis, the British administration applied many 
restrictive measures to society in general such as abolishing the Legislative Council 
and bringing education under their strict control. They took sections that encouraged 
Turkish and Hellenic nationalism out of the curriculum, as well as banning the 
recruitment of teachers and importation of teaching materials from Greece and 
Turkey (Kizilyürek, 2002). 
Education had a transforming effect on Turkish Cypriots' national identity. Turkish 
Cypriots saw education as a way of improving their community, by bringing culture 
and sophistication and creating politically aware people. Thus, they adopted 
Atatürk's attempts at modernization and nationalism into the education of Turkish 
Cypriot youth (Bryant, 2004). The teachers and the teaching materials that came 
from Turkey told Turkish Cypriot youth not just about how Atatürk's reforms were 
modernizing the country but also the achievements of Turks throughout history that 
encouraged pride in being a Turk. Through such teachings of the language, culture 
and history of Turkey, a concept of nation and identity was constructed around the 
notion of Turkishness among the youth. Education facilitated the conceptualisation 
of a Turkish Cypriot identity as part of the Turkish nation, socialising the youth into 
identifying with the Turkish nation. In other words, education taught Turkish Cypriot 
youth how to be Turkish. When the British administration realised the strength of 
Turkish national sentiment in Turkish Cypriot schools they tried to stop it. As an 
example, they changed the name of Turkish Lycee to Islam Lycee in an attempt to 
prevent identification with Turkish nationalism and once again make religion and 
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tradition the focus of identity (Kizilyurek, 2002; Nevzat, 2005). Yet the 
modernisation process had already led Turkish Cypriots to shed their religious 
identity as `Muslims' and define themselves with an ethnic and secular one as `Turks 
of Cyprus' (Kizilyürek & Gautier-KizilyUrek, 2004). Even though representatives of 
the Turkish Cypriot community initially employed both terms in their official 
correspondences, they increasingly adopted the term `Turk' to refer to the 
community (Gt rkan, 2006; An, 1997)5. 
Overall, there were two important factors that shaped the nationalism movement 
among Turkish Cypriots: One of them was Turkish nationalism and the other was 
opposition to enosis (Kizilyürek, 2002). In the Turkish Cypriots' view, there were 
two ethnic communities on the island with different language, culture and religion 
from each other's but similar to the nations they belonged to. Turkish Cypriots 
believed that they belonged to the Turkish nation and that they should be a part of it. 
Hence, when it became clear with the Treaty of Lausanne that Turkey would not 
reintegrate Cyprus, some chose to emigrate there. Economic motives, insecurity and 
fear caused by the island's possible integration with Greece were among the reasons 
for the emigration, but nationalistic sentiments towards Turkey also facilitated the 
emigration of Turkish Cypriots from the island. The first Turkish consul, Asaf Bey, 
who was appointed to Cyprus in 1925, was claimed to have encouraged Turkish 
Cypriots to take Turkish nationality and emigrate to Turkey (Gürkan, 2006, Nevzat, 
2005, Kizilyiirek, 2002). Actually, from the start of the British rule, a considerable 
number of Turkish Cypriots had already emigrated to Turkey, bringing the number of 
Turkish Cypriots on the island to a considerably lower level. 
The other factor that shaped nationalism among Turkish Cypriots was the Greek 
Cypriot nationalism movement, enosis. Regarding enosis as a Greek Cypriot project 
that neither included them nor held a future for them, Turkish Cypriots opposed the 
union of the island with Greece. The sufferings of the Muslim community in Crete 
after joining Greece in 1915, and during the invasion of Izmir in Turkey in 1919- 
1922 were still fresh in the collective memories of Turkish Cypriots which made the 
idea of being part of a Greek state a source of anxiety for them (Kizilyürek, 1983; 
s The official use of the term 'Turks of Cyprus' started in the mid-1949 (An, 1997). 
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2002, Nevzat, 2005). They believed that the annexation of Cyprus to Greece would 
be the end of their community. Therefore, whenever Greek Cypriots raised such 
demands during the Ottoman time, Turkish Cypriots argued that the island should be 
returned to the Ottomans and later, with the establishment of the new Turkish state, 
they demanded that Turkey should annex the island. Otherwise, they supported 
British rule which they regarded as being better than under Greek rule (Nevzat, 
2005) , leading some to interpret this as loyalty to the British. 
The opposition to enosis not only took the shape of Turkish nationalism but actually 
they both fed on each other (Kizilyürek, 2002). By emphasizing the sameness of the 
language, religion and culture, Turkish nationalism was not just creating 
commonality among Turks but also, by reminding them of the victories of the Turks 
throughout history, it was providing Turkish Cypriots with a mythical past to be 
proud of. On the other hand, by reviving memories of Greek atrocities in Turkey and 
linking these with the Greek Cypriots' enosis campaign, this nationalism was 
creating a threat and an enemy for Turkish Cypriots to unite and fight against. So the 
adoption of Turkish nationalism not only came with its Turkish identity and its 
modernisation process but also with the notion of an enemy, the `other' that is 
required for the construction of a national identity. 
Despite the deteriorating relationship between and contradictory political demands of 
the two communities, the Greek Cypriots' armed struggle was to throw off the 
British and fulfil enosis and initially didn't include Turkish Cypriots. According to 
Stavrinides (1999), that was because `they assumed that once enosis was achieved, 
the Turkish minority would still be a Turkish minority within a Greek Cyprus, 
enjoying security and all the other acknowledged minority rights' (p. 33). However, 
this is not how Turkish Cypriots viewed the issue and the British benefited from this 
divergence. The British response to Greek Cypriot attacks involved recruiting Turks 
as an auxiliary police force to control the riots and to help them fight EOKA (Ethniki 
Organosis Kyprion Agoniston- National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), the armed 
organisation that started the struggle against the British. As a consequence, the 
relationship between the two communities deteriorated further in such a way that 
Greek Cypriots started seeing Turkish Cypriots as another obstacle in the 
achievement of their national cause. 
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Britain's suggestion of self-determination after the Second World War made Turkish 
Cypriots very uncomfortable. Self-determination would be based on the views of the 
majority and would have meant unity with Greece. When the suggestion was made, 
Greek Cypriots had already united behind the leadership of the Greek Orthodox 
Church who had transformed itself from being a spiritual to an ethnic/national 
leadership (Pollis, 1998). Compared to their neighbours, Turkish Cypriots lacked 
such leadership, unity and organisation (Gürkan, 2006, An, 1997). Increased 
nationalist sentiments combined with insecurity about the future because of Greek 
Cypriots' demands and Britain's suggestion of self-determination led to Turkish 
Cypriot leaders deciding to organise for resistance. The formation of Kibris Adast 
TürkAzinliklar Kurumu (KATAK - Association of Turkish Minorities of the Island 
of Cyprus) in 1943 that later became Kibris Türk Milli Birlik Partisi (the Cyprus 
Turkish National Union Party) was the first mass organisation of Turkish Cypriots. 
Its aim was to protect Turkish Cypriots' rights as well as to unite and mobilize them 
behind nationalistic policies. It was also to help and direct the development of the 
Turkish Cypriot community in economic and cultural issues in which, compared to 
Greek Cypriots, they had been left far behind (Gürkan, 2006). 
Meanwhile, the Turkish nationalism that developed in Cyprus was unlike the one in 
Turkey in that it had a 'pan-Turkist 6 flavour' (Yqin, 1990, p. 67). This could be 
explained by four reasons: First, it was normal for a community living outside 
national borders but adopting the identity of the Turkish nation to take it on in such a 
form. Second, the racist and chauvinist ideas that were spreading around the world 
and specifically in Turkey following the Second War World influenced Turkish 
nationalism in Cyprus. Third, the cultural and ideological sources, values and 
symbols used in Cyprus to construct a Turkish identity among Turkish Cypriots were 
mostly the same as those used by the pan-Turkist groups in Turkey. Fourth, the 
ruling groups in Cyprus used such nationalism as an ideological weapon to control 
the population (Yam, 1990). 
The Turkish Cypriots' separatist attempt came in the form of a resistance group 
called Volkan (Volcano), which later restructured and renamed itself as Tiurk 
6 Pan-Turkism is an ideology and movement that aims to unite all Turkic people (Landau, 1995). 
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Mukavemet Teckilati (TMT - Turkish Defence Organisation). Its main aim was to 
fight against Greek Cypriot nationalism and the EOKA militants whom they 
regarded as their enemy. Now there were two nationalistic groups, opposed to each 
other, on the island. 
In the meantime, Turkish Cypriots developed their national policy as taksim (the 
partition). The importance of this policy, claims Kizilyürek (1993), is that by making 
and demanding taksim, Turkish Cypriot leaders were making a decision on their 
future for the first time. He points out that until that time their demands for the return 
of the island or the continuation of the status quo were dependent on the decisions of 
other countries. Their own actions were limited to writing letters or sending 
telegrams, which didn't go further than expressing their reactions. However, with the 
separatist taksim policy, they moved to a `historical participation' level which meant 
they could make decisions on their own initiative and act accordingly rather than 
relying on others (p. 32). The establishment of TMT in line with the taksim policy 
was actually a sign of Turkish Cypriot attempts to operate in this new way. 
The establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 created a state but not a nation. 
That was because the republic was not set up as a result of both Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots' shared vision of an imagined community but was imposed as a joint effort 
by Britain, Turkey and Greece. Competing national identities had not allowed a joint 
national building process but separate ones. The lack of Cypriot nationalism did not 
support a Cypriot nation and the imagined community for Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish Cypriots had already been founded on two different notions and had taken 
two different shapes. There were no symbols of Cypriotism. Even creating a Cypriot 
flag proved to be difficult. As Ahmet An (1998) points out, Greek Cypriots protested 
against the red colour of the Turkish flag being used in the Cypriot flag while 
Turkish Cypriots made the same objection to the blue colour of the Greek flag. Thus, 
a yellow map of Cyprus on a white surface with two green olive branches was used. 
Not adopting the flag as theirs and only using it in state offices, both communities 
continued to wave the Turkish and Greek flags on their national days. A national 
anthem was never composed for the new state; instead the Greek and Turkish 
national anthems were played (An, 1998; Tombazos, 2003). Meanwhile, both 
communities had already been celebrating the national days of their motherlands and 
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continued to do so even after the establishment of the Cypriot state. The common 
element was that they both excluded each other but included two other nations, 
Greece and Turkey. Despite their co-existence, sometimes in mixed villages, the 
social, political and cultural structure of everyday life on the island was at times 
based on two separate communities and emphasised the divergences between them. 
Communication and collaboration between the two communities was actually 
prevented or made increasingly difficult by the existing political, cultural and 
educational dynamics. Having been founded on such a structure, the establishment of 
the Republic of Cyprus maintained and reinforced identities along ethnic lines rather 
than unifying and creating a Cypriot identity (Theophylactou, 1995). In other words, 
setting up a republic on the basis of two communities actually institutionalised the 
existing division (Faiz, 2003). 
Cypriotism didn't exist as an identity before 1974 and both communities described 
themselves as Greeks and Turks instead of Cypriot (Asmussen, 2004). Quoting 
Markides' social categorisation of the identities of Greek Cypriots, which he 
suggests could also be attributed to Turkish Cypriots, Asmussen (2004) notes that the 
definition of identity in Cyprus was based on family, the community of origin (or 
village) and then the nation in this order. Thus, expressions of identity would be in 
the form of a series of statements such as `I'm Yorgos of the Pantel family, I'm a 
Potamian (from the village Potamia in the Nicosia district), I'm a Greek Cypriot, and 
I'm a Greek. I'm Ahmet of the Özgür family, I'm a Potamian, I'm a Turkish Cypriot, 
and I'm a Turk' (Asmussen, 2004, p. 1135). However, in the modern era the order of 
such classification of identity has changed and the sense of belonging and the 
definition of identity aligned more with the nation than the region or the family. As 
Calhoun (1997) remarked, national identities acted as the `trump card' (p. 126) and 
overcame all other identities in Cyprus. With the emergence of national 
consciousness, national identity rather than place or kinship became the source of 
identity and solidarity. 
The Republic of Cyprus did not diminish the importance of the nationalist projects of 
enosis or taksim but only quieted them for a while. Actually, the new republic meant 
that `a number of Greeks who had led the struggle for enosis and a number of Turks 
who had led the resistance to enosis would come together to collaborate in the 
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running of the state' (Stavrinides, 1999, p. 38). On the other hand, there were some 
who advocated a more harmonious relationship and cooperation between the two 
communities. Among these were two Turkish Cypriot lawyers, Ayhan Hikmet and 
Ahmet M. Gürkan, who began publishing a newspaper called Cumhuriyet (The 
Republic) on the day the republic was declared. Their articles not only supported the 
new republic but also criticised nationalistic policies and actions in Cyprus. As a 
result of these views, they were both murdered a mere two years after the start of the 
publication. Similarly, a Greek Cypriot businessman, Nikos Lanitis, who published a 
series of articles in the English language newspaper, the Cyprus Mail, supporting the 
Cyprus state and calling for collaboration between the two communities was attacked 
for being unpatriotic (Stavrinides, 1998; An, 1998). Despite the existence of the 
Republic, there was no tolerance in either community for any ideas that diverged 
from nationalist ideals. 
Bryant (2004) agues that the combination of democracy and ethno-nationalism didn't 
work in the project of an independent Cyprus. In her view, both nationalisms were 
fundamentally democratic as they were based on popular representations but the 
political demands and guarantees that each community wanted were conflicting and 
excluding each other., The constitutional rights gained by Turkish Cypriots seemed 
unfair and undemocratic to Greek Cypriots. They believed that Turks were a 
minority and the constitution provided them with more rights than they deserved. 
The objectives of the majority were impeded because of the existing constitution. For 
the Turkish Cypriots, though, the numbers were not an issue as they were not a 
minority but equal partners of a bi-communal republic (Stavrinides, 1999). In the 
constitution, they sought certain guarantees not to be `tyrannized by the majority' 
(Bryant, 2004, p. 221). In other words, while Greek Cypriots wanted `justice' and 
Turkish Cypriots `respect', in both cases the `other' community was seen as an 
obstacle in achieving these ideals (Bryant, 2004). In the end, Greek Cypriots set out 
to change the constitution that they thought of as undemocratic. President 
Archbishop Makarios' suggestion of 13 amendments in the constitution, which 
included taking the right of executive veto away from Turkish Cypriots, was seen by 
the latter as the destruction of their constitutional rights. Turkish Cypriots first 
withdrew from the legislative and executive posts of the government and later, 
leaving their properties and jobs, moved into enclaves. Meanwhile, the inter- 
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communal violence had started leading to Turkey's planes bombing Greek Cypriot 
targets and, following a truce, the first border, which resulted from a ceasefire line, 
was drawn in Nicosia in 1964. The so-called Green Line that still acts as the buffer 
zone/ border between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots today was the first 
boundary that separated the national space of each community. 
Having separated from the Cyprus state, Turkish Cypriots set up their own 
administration within the enclaves, making them territories of a mini Turkish Cypriot 
state. Life in the enclaves meant not only geographical but also psychological 
segregation from Greek Cypriots and also from the world. When Turkish Cypriots 
withdrew to armed enclaves, communications and contact between the two 
communities became minimal as neither Greek Cypriots were allowed in the 
enclaves nor Turkish Cypriots allowed out. Being separated from Greek Cypriots by 
the enclaves gave Turkish Cypriots a sense of security and also a sense of unity and 
solidarity as well as strengthening the notion of `us' as the victims against `them' as 
the perpetrators. Little communication and contact made it difficult to see the other 
group's point of view. By defining the enclaves as their territories, Turkish Cypriots 
were involved in a process of exclusion and distinguishing who belonged to the 
nation and who didn't. As Evans (1996) suggests, once the borders are established, 
they give a sense of belonging to the group members and make it easier to impose 
unity and self-definition. They help minimise differences within the community 
while exaggerating differences from the `others' (Billig, 1995). In Cyprus, this was 
achieved by ignoring the common characteristics between the two communities 
which was simpler once both communities were separated. For the Turkish Cypriot 
leaders who were also operating the TürkMukavemet Teckilati (TMT- Turkish 
Defence Organisation), creating a unity and solidarity against Greek Cypriots was 
much easier when their community was confined within the enclaves. According to 
Yqin (1990), 
The Turkish speakers, the Muslims, the ones with a common tradition, found 
themselves coming together in the order of a military caste, surrounded by high 
barricades. They were only able to perceive themselves as members of a group, 
when they were locked up in the enclaves and doing military service. Their links 
with the outside world and even with the neighboring villages ceased. The structure 
of a closed society was firmly established. Just as in primitive tribes, they began to 
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regard their own conditions, existence and values as the centre of the world and the 
only reality (p. 60). 
Apart from its military missions, TMT also set out to change the consciousness of 
Turkish Cypriots so that they could see and define themselves as Turks. Combining 
Turkish nationalism as both an ideology and a separatist movement, TMT ran a set of 
campaigns to strengthen the concept of Turkishness amongst Turkish Cypriots. 
These `Turkifying' projects (Kizilyürek, 2002) did not intend to turn non-Turks into 
Turks but to shape Turkish Cypriots' nationalistic thinking. First of all, certain rules 
and restrictions were imposed on Turkish Cypriots with regards to their relations 
with Greek Cypriots. The `From Turk to Turk' campaign which banned any 
economic relations or trade with Greek Cypriots not only aimed to deal a blow to the 
Greek Cypriots' economy but also to create a Turkish Cypriot economy as it had 
suffered greatly since the break up of the state. Language, which is one of the crucial 
factors in the construction of a national identity, was also taken up by TMT as a 
unifying element. `Citizen speak Turkish' was a project that forced Turkish Cypriots 
to speak in Turkish, even those whose mother tongue was Greek. The rule caused 
hard times for many as not obeying it meant paying fines which forced many into 
silence (Kizilyürek, 2002, Gökceoglu, 1994). As part of these projects, the Greek 
names of villages were changed to Turkish names, and Turkey's national days were 
celebrated more vigorously (Kizilyürek, 2002; Kizilytirek & Gautier-Kizilyürek, 
2004) so that, as Billig (1995) puts it, `the national flag can be consciously waved 
both metaphorically and literally' (p. 45). Considering that the production of nations 
requires a certain psychological imagination as well as actions, these Turkifying 
campaigns were designed to instil a nationalist psyche. TMT's ideology of 
nationalism not only transformed the national identity of Turkish Cypriots but made 
it part of their everyday life and shaped it as a common sense. Having created a 
national community, TMT actually forced Turkish Cypriots into its imagined 
community by imposing a certain way of thinking and believing onto them. As Ya§in 
(1990) suggests, `the identity of Turkish Cypriot community was really formed in 
those days' (p. 60). Anyone who didn't believe in it or criticised it did not have a 
place in it. 
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While the inter-communal tension and violence continued between 1963 and 1974, 
an attempt to assassinate Archbishop Makarios, the Greek Cypriot leader, and to take 
control of the government led to Turkey's intervention on 20 July 1974 in the name 
of protecting Turkish Cypriots7. Following Turkey's military action, a mass exodus 
took place; Greek Cypriots moved to the south part of the island and Turkish 
Cypriots to the north. Negotiations since then have failed to produce a solution to the 
problem. As a result, the country has been divided and the so-called Green Line 
became the official border between the two communities. 
After the Division 
For Turkish Cypriot nationalists the Cyprus Problem was settled in 1974 with 
Turkey's military intervention. The north of the island, cleared of the majority of 
Greek Cypriots, became a home for Turkish Cypriots under Turkey's control. State 
nationalism set out to build and shape the nation socially, economically and 
culturally along the lines of Turkish nationalism. The process was carried out 
primarily through education and the media, which were under state control. For 
example, the content of education in North Cyprus was (until recently) dominated by 
the prevailing nationalistic discourses. Turkish Cypriot history books only referred to 
the atrocities of Greek Cypriots rather than positive experiences shared by both 
communities8. Other school texts have been sourced predominantly from Turkey. 
Turkish rather than Turkish Cypriot literature, geography and history have been at 
the centre of the curriculum. The media, on the other hand, were controlled by the 
state and thus were tools for spreading the nationalist ideology. 
Following the mass movement of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in 1975, the 
first wave of immigrants from Turkey came to the north. Their arrival was necessary 
to increase the population in the north and also to fill the labour gap to create a 
7 The term used to describe Turkey's military action changes according to one's political position on 
the issue. While it is `invasion' for Greek Cypriots, for Turkish Cypriot nationalists it is `liberation'. 
Intervention is the other widely used term for it (see also Killoran, 1998, p. 160). 
8 In the north of the island Cyprus history books are rewritten in 2004. Unlike the previous ones, new 
Cyprus history books do not focus only on the inter-communal conflict and the violence committed by 
the Greek Cypriot militia but includes other events and developments that were significant for Turkish 
Cypriots. 
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working economy. However, apart from the economic one, the most important 
impact of this immigration was on the development of a Cypriot identity. Since 
Turkish Cypriots identified themselves as part of the Turkish nation in relation to 
Greek Cypriots for years, immigrants were first welcomed as `our kinsmen', 
signifying a blood relation. However, having lived with them for sometime and 
having discovered some differences, the positive feelings of Turkish Cypriots 
became ambiguous. The feelings were mutual though. While Turkish Cypriots 
became aware that they were dissimilar from their Turkish `kinsmen', the 
immigrants discovered that the way Turkish Cypriots spoke, dressed and behaved 
were different from their own. Kizilyürek (2002) summarizes this process as such: 
In the mean time, union with the `kinsmen' from Turkey couldn't be achieved and 
Turkish Cypriots gradually moved from the stage of `identifying with the 
Motherland' to a new stage where they began discovering their difference. People 
coming from Turkey also didn't find their kinsmen in Cyprus as they imagined them 
in their `national fantasies'. From the Turkish they speak to their clothing, from the 
looseness of their women to impiousness, Turkish Cypriots had many manners, 
which did not look like Turkish (Kizilytirek, 2002, p. 292). 
In order to stress their separate identity from mainland Turks, Turkish Cypriots 
started highlighting certain differences, especially cultural ones. Such attempts were 
not necessary with Greek Cypriots as there were clear dissimilarities but with 
mainlanders, Turkish Cypriots needed to exaggerate ethnic distinctiveness and utilise 
cultural differences to maintain their distinction (Ladbury, 1977). In other words, 
Turkish Cypriots built upon perceived differences to establish a separate identity for 
themselves. Differences in culture and tradition ranging from clothing to perception 
of gender roles and religion caused tension between Turkish Cypriots and Turkish 
immigrants. While Turkish Cypriots saw themselves as `civilised', `educated' and 
`western' they referred to the immigrants as `uncivilised', `illiterate' and `oriental' 
(Ladbury, 1977, p. 317). 
After the first wave of immigrants, the economic crises created by the Kurdish 
conflict in Turkey and the Gulf War in 1991 affected the south eastern regions of 
Turkey and led many people from those areas to come to North Cyprus in search of 
employment. This influx of a second wave of immigrants also caused certain 
52 
resentments among Turkish Cypriots as they were seen as having a negative impact 
on the political, social and economic lives of Turkish Cypriots. Lack of accurate 
demographic information combined with misinformation and propaganda also fed 
such perceptions (Hatay, 2005). Consequently, they were blamed for taking Turkish 
Cypriots' jobs and causing unemployment among them, changing the demographic 
structure of the country and maintaining a nationalist, pro-Turkish government and 
increasing crime. The image of a `golden age' before the immigrants arrived and 
everyone lived in harmony was constructed against the negative image of today 
`when everything is held to have changed for the worse, under the influence of 
immigrants and their alien ways' (Morley, 2000, p. 215). 
Turkish Cypriots mainly refer to these immigrants as Türkiyeli, meaning people from 
Turkey, rather than using terms like `settler' or `immigrant'. Türkiyeli, although not 
derogatory, is a term that constitutes them as a homogenous group defined by their 
nationality of origin. This fails to distinguish social, cultural, ethnic or class 
differences within this heterogeneous group. In other words, Turkish Cypriots do not 
make any differentiation between Turks, Kurds or any other ethnic group but 
consider them as people from Turkey. 
Derogatory names that both communities use to refer to each other hold light to the 
ambiguous relation between Turkish Cypriots and the immigrants from Turkey. 
While Turkish Cypriots use garasakal (black beard), gaco (non-gypsy) andfica 
(seaweed) to refer to these people, mainlanders call Turkish Cypriots `English 
bastards' or `seeds of Greek Cypriots' to insult them. The word garasakal (or 
karasakal- black beard) was first associated with the Turkish military in Cyprus in 
1960's and later with all the people from Turkey. Initially, to call someone garasakal 
was not an insulting word but to the contrary was associated with respect and fear. 
But now, as an identity tag for all people from Turkey, being called garasakal is not 
a mark of respect or fear but more an expression of animosity -a derogatory word. 
It was the second influx of immigrant workers which included Kurds that initiated 
the use of gaco (gajo) andfica (or fja). Even though, gaco is a word used by gypsies 
to define non-gypsies, Turkish Cypriots paradoxically use this word to define 
immigrant workers- as `gypsies'. These workers shared the same stereotype, of being 
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dark-skinned, rough, dirty and backward, as that associated with gypsies and also 
came mostly from the south-eastern parts of Turkey where the workers often spoke 
Kurdish or Arabic which to some resembled a gypsy language. Fica, on the other 
hand, means seaweed on the shore. Long, dark brown strips offica arrive by sea, 
making the water look dirty and unpleasant. For Turkish Cypriots, the workers are 
just likefica, washing up on their shores, uninvited. Yet Faiz (2004) explains that 
these names reflect a differentiation between Turkish immigrants: garasakal used for 
Turkish people with a higher socio-economic status and gaco and fica for those with 
a lower status. By calling peoplefica and gaco, Turkish Cypriots are expressing not 
only their animosity towards them but also how they resent their presence in their 
country. 
The nationalist point of view rejects the idea of Turkish Cypriots having a separate 
national identity from Turkish people. Developed during the years of struggle against 
the Greek Cypriot enosis movement, this view makes no distinction between Turkish 
Cypriots and mainland Turks and regards Turkish Cypriots as an extension of the 
Turkish nation, with no distinct ethnic and cultural characteristics (Kizilytirek, 2002). 
The former TRNC President, Rauf Denktab became the embodiment of this 
argument, always emphasizing his Turkishness rather than his Cypriotness. In an 
infamous statement, which is attributed to him, he claimed the only true Cypriots 
were donkeys: 
I am an Anatolian child. I am totally Turk and my roots are in Central Asia. With my 
culture, my language, my history and with my whole being I am Turk. I have a state 
and a motherland. These so-called Cypriot culture, Cypriot Turk, Cypriot Greek, 
common Republic are all nonsense (... ) Cypriot Turk and Cypriot Greek simply 
don't exist nor do Cypriots. Don't dare to ask us `are you Cypriots'. This could be 
perceived as an insult and may cause misunderstandings. Why? The reason is that 
there's only one living Cypriot in Cyprus and that is the Cypriot donkey (caglar, 
1995). 
This dominant concept of Turkish identity has been challenged by a' Cypriot or 
Turkishcypriot identity (Kizilyürek, 2002, p. 290). In reaction to the hegemonic 
concept of Turkish identity, this new identity is based on the notion of a culturally 
and ethnically distinct Turkish Cypriot community. The process of its construction 
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can be described as a `transformation in terms of a re-imagining of political and 
cultural identity that challenged the previously prevailing Turkish nationalism' 
(Lacher and Kaymak, 2005, p. 147). According to Azgin (2000) its emergence was 
the result of certain social changes within the Turkish Cypriot community: First, it 
was because the self-esteem of Turkish Cypriots was restored as the danger of 
annihilation passed after 1974. Second, it developed as a reaction to the threat of 
cultural assimilation into Turkey. Third, the Turkish immigrants in Cyprus 
encouraged'the establishing of differences with them as outsiders. Finally, nostalgia 
for the past of the island had grown. In a similar way, Ya§in (1990) also underlines 
the presence of Turkish immigrants as a reason for Turkish Cypriots emphasising 
their difference as Cypriot. He also argues that as Turkish Cypriots cannot oppose 
the annexation of the island on the basis of their `Turkishness', they do that by 
emphasising their `Cypriotness' (p. 71). Thus, to stress the existence of this culturally 
and ethnically distinct community, a Cypriot cultural heritage has begun to be 
defined and reproduced. Studying the traditions, literature, art, folk dance and folk 
music of Turkish Cypriots, many cultural associations not only aim to promote their 
cultural characteristics but also resist and establish a difference to attempts at 
Turkification. 
In 1990's the Turkish Cypriot administration's lack of control over some crucial 
internal affairs, such as economy and security issues, made the TRNC's claim to 
sovereignty increasingly seem to be mere rhetoric in the eyes of the public (Lacher 
and Kaymak, 2005). However, for the nationalist government of the time `the 
impression that political authority in the TRNC seemingly does not rest in the 
sovereign will of the Turkish Cypriots was not much of a domestic problem as long 
as much of the population conceived of themselves as Turks and the will of Turkish 
Cypriots and Turks in Turkey as indivisible' (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005, p. 155). The 
combination of economic hardship with political discontent and repression as well as 
international isolation embodied this new sense of identity in a new movement called 
`This country is ours' which expressed Turkish Cypriots' demands for self- 
determination and control of their country's future. Its emergence was also an 
indication that Turkey's presence in Cyprus was no longer interpreted as being for 
the liberation and protection of Turkish Cypriots but for her own security interest 
(Lacher and Kaymak, 2005). 
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Cypriot identity is reflected particularly in Turkish Cypriot literature (Mehmet Ali, 
1990). Many works of literature written within this framework have replaced Turkey 
with Cyprus as the `motherland' and refer to Cypriots as `us' while defining Turks as 
the `other' (Yapn, 1994, p. 57). Thus, the construction of this new identity requires a 
new selection and reconstitution of the past. In the reproduction of a narrative for the 
nation, the commonalities with Greek Cypriots in culture, tradition and history are 
now emphasised under the concept of Cypriotism, excluding and marginalizing 
Turkish immigrants. In a sense, as Killoran (1998) points out, fostering an alternate 
Cypriot nationalism means that one nationalism is replaced with another one, leaving 
nationalism as an unquestioned issue. 
The 1990's were a time when identity conceptualisations were not just increasingly 
differentiated among Turkish Cypriots but were also politicised in a way that 
reflected the particular political preferences of an individual. Each identity discourse 
signified a certain political orientation (Ramm, 2006). Meanwhile, as the struggle 
between Turkish and Cypriot nationalisms continued, Turkish immigrants arriving in 
North Cyprus have become part of the identity debate. Their presence has been seen 
as a political, cultural and economic threat by some Turkish Cypriots. Yet, as Hatay 
(2005) points out, many who arrived when young have been integrated into the 
Turkish Cypriot community and retain only weak links with Turkey. This was 
especially true for Cyprus-born immigrant descendents who complained of identity 
crises. Citizens of the TRNC, these people expressed their exclusion not only by 
Turkish Cypriots but also by Turks when visiting their family in Turkey. Considering 
themselves to be Turkish Cypriots, many talked about being treated as `outsiders' in 
both places, as immigrants in Cyprus and as Cypriots in Turkey (Gildir, 2005, 
Uludag, 2005). 
It was under these circumstances that Cyprus experienced big changes. The latest 
attempt for a solution in Cyprus came in the form of a UN settlement plan in 
November 2002. Also known as the Annan plan, the plan generated discussions and 
debate over the future of the island among the communities of Cyprus. The Turkish 
Cypriot community was divided into two groups: the ones who supported the plan 
and the ones who opposed it. It was also a division between the ones who saw their 
future within the EU in a partnership with Greek Cypriots and the ones who believed 
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their future lies with Turkey. In the referendum on the plan in April 2004, the 
majority of Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of the settlement plan9. As well as being 
a sign of the transformation in their identity, the result also revealed a re-imagining 
of the community and identity based not on ethno-nationalism but on a post-national 
form of identity founded on a pluralist character (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005). 
However, Greek Cypriots' rejection of the plan failed to bring a settlement to Cyprus 
and caused disappointment among Turkish Cypriots. Having beaten the status quo 
and marginalized their nationalist leaders, Turkish Cypriots realised that their 
neighbours did not share their eagerness for reconciliation and a shared future and 
felt rejected. 
One of the most important developments, which brought big changes to Cyprus, was 
the opening of the buffer zone in April 2003. Having had minimal contact with the 
`other' community since the division in 1974, both communities flooded to the `other 
side' once the borders opened. The main incentive of both was to see the homes they 
were forced to abandon, visit their family graves and meet the people they knew in 
the past. The young generation met the `other' for the first time. However, in this 
experience with Greek Cypriots, Turkish immigrants were left out. While Turkish 
Cypriots crossed the border not just to visit but also to look for employment, benefit 
from health services and have access to travel documents to go abroad using their 
citizenship rights from the Republic of Cyprus, Turkish-origin TRNC citizens were 
confined to the north. Especially for the young generation who grew up considering 
themselves Turkish Cypriots rather than Turkish, and who also joined in and 
supported the transformation, this was a frustrating and excluding experience. They 
were being perceived and treated as outsiders by the Greek Cypriot authorities even 
though they didn't feel as such. Their Turkish Cypriot identity raised questions about 
who belonged to the Turkish Cypriot community and who didn't. 
Globalisation and the multicultural post-national European Union have also 
encouraged the questioning of an identity beyond ethnic/national identities in 
Cyprus. Technological and economic developments have provided people with 
means of re-imagining an identity beyond the national one. As identification with 
9 In the referendum 64.9% Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of the plan while 75.83% Greek Cypriots 
did against it. 
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Europe has always been a common point of both Cypriot communities, the EU has 
been regarded as a framework in which the concept of Cypriotness could be 
developed (Ramm, 2006; Ramm, 2002-2003). Both communities even used their 
Europeanness as a distinct feature that separated them from Turks and Greeks. 
According to Yqin (1998) `in the age of globalisation, it was easier for the 
intellectuals to express their belated and un-named Cypriot nationalism under the 
umbrella of European unification. In any case they believed that Cypriots are more 
European than Turks and Greeks' (p. 231). However, the accession of Greek Cypriots 
to the EU, despite rejecting a reunification proposal, caused much resentment and 
mistrust towards the European Union among Turkish Cypriots. Their continuing 
isolation in the international arena, despite the promises of support, added to their 
frustration and, it has been argued, could dampen their enthusiasm for a future within 
the EU. 
Analysis of Turkish Cypriot Nationalism and National Identity 
During the transformation of identity from Orthodox Christians and Muslims into 
Greeks and Turks respectively, two divergent national consciousnesses used different 
interpretations of history as well as the differences in language and religion, to justify 
their identity and claim on the island. Despite having conflicting demands and 
exclusionary policies, Papadakis (1998) argues that both nationalism movements in 
Cyprus are actually the reflections of each other. For example, both communities 
presented their nationalism as `patriotism', which is good and necessary, but the 
others' as simply `nationalism', which is dangerously irrational. Both nationalist 
ideologies use the same structure of creating the `other' as an unchanging evil and 
include elements of distortion and self-justification in their portrayal of the national 
self. The concept of unchanging evil not only signifies primordial links but also 
creates the impression of a continual threat, which is useful in the maintenance of the 
status quo and the justification of present actions. While Turkish Cypriot nationalists 
still talk about Greek Cypriots' demand for enosis and describe Greek Cyprus' entry 
to the EU as a disguised form of enosis, Greek Cypriot nationalists still refer to 
Turkey's expansionism ambitions. Relying on such myths, both nationalisms feed off 
each other. Bryant (2004), on the other hand, disagrees with Papadakis that these 
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nationalisms are within the same framework or are reflections of each other. Pointing 
at the differences in discourses, she categorizes the discourses of these movements as 
archaeological and genealogical. 
... Turkish Cypriots speak of their 
history in terms of contingency and forms of 
historical proof exist within what I will call here an archaeological discourse, 
attempting to secure truth by tracing causation. Their Greek Cypriot compatriots, on 
the other hand, construct an ineluctable history discussed within the framework of 
what I will call a genealogical discourse in which historical proof is aimed at 
demonstrating truths that are taken to be self evident. In genealogical discourse one 
traces links between persons and events whose relationship to each other is already 
presupposed. In archaeological discourse in contrast one attempts to construct a 
causative sequence that will explain events. In the first, one validates truth; in the 
second one uncovers truth (Bryant, 2004, p. 207). 
During the construction of national identities and national imaginations, primordial 
ties play a crucial role. Claims to ancestral territories and descent are used to create a 
historical continuity and roots as nationhood is often evoked through the language of 
kinship and ancestry (Calhoun, 1997). Portrayal of nation as being like a large family 
(assertion of blood ties or talk about how ancestors fought their enemies) is the 
distinctive characteristic of nationalistic discourse. In Cyprus, both ethnic and 
national identities are also based on the language of primordial ties. In the Turkish 
Cypriots' case, the metaphor of blood has been used as a link between the land, 
ancestors and members of the community. According to Killoran (1998), `nationality 
is inserted into the "families' shared blood", the nation's sacred soil and a national 
"family's" metaphorical genealogy' (p. 164). It is the blood shed by ancestors in the 
conquest by the Ottomans and the martyrs during the inter-communal fighting that 
gives Turkish Cypriots the right to make a claim on the land (Bryant, 2004). Blood 
shed is also a link to ancestors as `blood spilled in Cyprus was not only a 
legitimation of Turks' presence there but also expressed a spiritual kinship with the 
land' (Bryant, 2004, p. 196). In a way, blood acts as the link between the past, the 
present and the future of the community or, in other words, it is the link between the 
ancestors of the living members of the community and their children. 
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The metaphor of blood is not merely used to justify the claim to territory but also 
used to `create an ethnic distinction from the "violators" of the life source of Greek 
Cypriots' (Killoran, 1998, p. 163). The claims of purity and continuity of the `other' 
community is again challenged by blood. For example, the ethnic origin of the 
Turkish community in Cyprus has been a politically charged issue used by the 
nationalists from both communities. There have been claims by Greek Cypriots that 
Muslims were not Turkish descendants but converted Greeks, while Turkish 
nationalists set out to prove that Turkish Cypriots are descendants of the Ottoman 
Turks and not Greeks by blood (Nevzat, 2005; Killoran, 1998; Bryant: 2004). 
In the nationalistic discourse, the nation is constructed as a family and the national 
territory as a home. In such an imagination, national identity is characterized by a 
sense of belonging, security and solidarity among the family members, which come 
from recognizing the family as the nation and the territory as home (Morley, 2000). 
In Cyprus, both communities used the concepts of a national family by reflecting 
kinship relations onto a nation. In the Turkish Cypriots' case, the matrimony of land 
and the blood of the Turkish martyrs created a national family with Cyprus being the 
offspring of a Turkish nation (Killoran, 1998; Bryant, 2004). In part, because of this 
and in part to encourage Turkish Cypriots to identify their statehood with the 
statehood of Turkey (Navaro-Yashin, 2003), in nationalistic discourses Cyprus is 
always referred as the `Yavruvatan' (Babyland or infantland) and Turkey is always 
`Anavatan' (motherland). The national family is "`whole" in the marrying of the 
national father with the land and the citizens as their children' (Killoran, 2000, 
p. 138). Benefiting from this conceptualisation, a house in which a mother with her 
two kids was murdered is turned into a museum, the Museum of Barbarism, to 
symbolise the violation of the nation. This museum not only functions to enhance the 
concepts of national home and family but also to remind people of the past conflict 
and hostility (Killoran, 1998). In reaction, the discourses related to Cypriot identity 
replaced Turkey with Cyprus as the `motherland' (Ya§in, 1994). 
The constant process of selecting, arranging, interpreting, rearranging and 
reinterpreting proceeds hand in hand with the identity construction process. In the 
production and reproduction of a national identity, the dialectical relationship 
between collective remembering and collective forgetting is an important element in 
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the creation of a nation (Billig, 1995). The official history narratives presented the 
1960's as the bloodiest time in Turkish Cypriot history in the collective memory. The 
close relations and commonalities between both communities rarely occurred in 
them, limiting such points to personal narratives (Canefe, 2007). However, in 
Cyprus, the enemy is not just confined to the official history narratives but can be a 
lived experience. Individuals' personal experiences and memories have also become 
a crucial determinant in the process. While experiences based on fear usually affirm 
and support the nationalistic discourses, they can also challenge it. This is why 
according to Bryant (2004) pressurising the personal memory to conform to the 
dominant nationalistic discourse becomes a requirement for the constitution of the 
nation as personal memory also acts as the legitimator of politics. 
Different conceptualisations of Turkish Cypriot identity are in a constant process of 
construction and struggle to establish their legitimacy. Killoran (1998) argues that 
the legitimacy process `is continuously negotiated through the interweaving of the 
past with the present in a battle for control of a national popular memory, which is 
constructed reciprocally through the interaction of dominant and subordinate public 
representations of the past and private memory' (p. 161). Thus, the continual 
selection and reconstitution of the past is also linked to the present and shapes 
visions for the future. The nationalist groups constantly remind Turkish Cypriots of 
the violent past with Greek Cypriots and, claiming that their enemy's aim has not 
changed, demand the continuation of Turkey's support and protection in the future. 
On the other hand, Cypriot-oriented approaches stress the commonalities between the 
two communities and use conspiracy theories to explain the violent past. In their 
view, the future is within the EU after a settlement in Cyprus. In either case, the aim 
of both views is to create a unity behind the narratives constructed for the nation and, 
interestingly, both narratives are exclusionary. In the nationalistic ones, the 
sufferings or the point of view of the `other' (the Greek Cypriots) is absent. Thus, 
while the atrocities committed by Greek Cypriots are kept alive and reflected in the 
slogans of `We will not forget', the violent actions of Turkish Cypriots towards 
Greek Cypriots are never mentioned. On the other hand, Cypriot narratives exclude 
the Turkish immigrants. Even though some have lived in North Cyprus all their lives, 
their return to Turkey is demanded, if necessary for a settlement, as a headline in 
Afrika stated: `the settlers should be compensated and should leave' (Afrika, 25 June 
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2003, p. 1& 3). In summary, exclusive of each other, different forms of national 
identity demonstrate the highly politicised nature of the identity issue. Having 
benefited from the usual resources of identity during their construction processes, 
diverse versions of national identity compete with each other to establish themselves 
as the `real' category of self-identification. 
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CHAPTER 3: MEDIA AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 
This chapter provides a historical analysis of the role the media have played in the 
process of the construction and reproduction of Turkish Cypriot national identity. It 
also examines the media dynamics in which news texts are produced to offer a 
context for the media content. For this purpose I have conducted thirteen semi- 
structured interviews with media professionals such as journalists, editors and media 
managers as well as political figures, NGO representatives and academics through 
which I explore the factors that shape journalism in the TRNC. My aim is to provide 
an understanding of the production process of the texts I analyse in the following 
chapters. 
a. Historical Background 
The Development of the Turkish Cypriot Press 
The Turkish Cypriot press developed mainly during the British administration. Lack 
of newspapers or magazines in Cyprus throughout the Ottoman period forced 
Turkish Cypriots to send their articles and poems to publications in Istanbul. 
According to Dedecay, Vamik Efendi, a Turkish Cypriot, had one of his poems 
published in Tercüman-i Ahval, an Istanbul newspaper, as early as 1863 (Dedecay, 
1989). Soon after the commencement of British rule in Cyprus many newspapers 
began publication'. 
The first Turkish language newspaper that appeared in the record book, Cyprus Blue 
Book (1889-1990), was Saded, a weekly newspaper, published only for 16 issues 
(Dedecay, 1989; Ünlü, no date). For a long time, Saded was considered to be the first 
Turkish language newspaper but according to British Colonial Office documents, an 
earlier newspaper called Umid is thought to have been published in 1879. A study of 
1 The number of the newspapers published in the early years of the British administration is as 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
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correspondence between the Ottoman Empire and the British in 1880 revealed that 
the paper, published by Aleksan Sarrafian, an Armenian from Larnaca, might be the 
first Turkish language newspaper in Cyprus (Sonyel, 1985). This would make Saded 
the first newspaper published by Turkish Cypriots but not the first Turkish language 
one. According to these documents, the newspaper's criticisms of the Ottoman 
administration and the Sultan Abdulhamid led the Ottoman authorities to write to the 
British government requesting the closure of the paper. Following this complaint, the 
British decided to ensure the newspaper did not reach the Sultan's territories rather 
than close the paper (Sonyel, 1985). 
Apart from revealing the existence of an earlier newspaper, this correspondence also 
confirmed that newspapers printed in Cyprus were not confined only to the island but 
aimed at readers abroad as well. Especially during the Ottoman Empire, this 
interaction was not one directional as publications from the Ottoman Empire were 
also distributed in Cyprus. Thus, as well as facilitating interaction between the 
people of Cyprus and the Ottomans, these early newspapers also acted as a `channel 
of diffusion of ideas and intellectual currents' between two places (Nevzat, 2005, 
p. 184). 
The development of the press alongside a process of modernization contributed to 
the imagining of a nation and the development of a modern Turkish Cypriot society. 
By informing Cypriots of new worlds, beliefs and cultures, the print media not only 
transformed the relationship between self and the community but also shaped their 
sense of time and place by creating temporal simultaneity. Having been made aware 
of the existence of the distant others, these newspapers created a relationship 
between individuals and the rest of the members of their community that they had 
never before encountered. In the imagining of their national community, the press 
also reduced the distance and fostered a link between the communities on the island 
and other Greeks and Turks abroad. In summary, the development of the print media 
facilitated the creation of new publics. The combination of the new administration 
system the British had introduced to the island, the development of education and the 
improvement in transportation links between towns and villages also helped the 
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circulation of new ideas by the press. As Bryant points out, `the Cypriot public' was 
`a new category created only in the age of print media' (Bryant, 2004, p. 32). 
Like the spoken one, the language of the print media was an important element in the 
advancement of a national consciousness among Cypriots. As Anderson points out, 
the media contributed to the process of constructing a national identity by 
standardizing vernacular languages, which later became `national'. That is to say, 
while certain dialects were more suitable to print language and continued to exist, 
others `still assimilable to the emerging print-language, lost caste, above all because 
they were unsuccessful (or only relatively successful) in insisting on their own print- 
form' (Anderson, 1993, p. 45). In Cyprus, the situation was no different. Since early 
on, the newspapers published in Cyprus were not just confined to Cyprus but 
distributed abroad as well and so a standard version of the Turkish language had to 
be used in order to be read and understood outside the island by a wider Turkish 
readership. Thus Turkish and Greek were not only standardized as the print language 
by the media but also by becoming national languages, they encouraged a divergence 
between the two communities (Nevzat, 2005). 
Education also had an impact on the development of the Turkish Cypriot press. 
Initially, low literacy rates among the Turkish Cypriot community limited the 
number of readers of these papers to only a few intellectuals. Compared to the early 
Greek Cypriots newspapers, there were only a few Turkish Cypriot newspapers and 
they sold few copies. For example, within the first years of the arrival of the British 
there were around a dozen Greek Cypriot newspapers with a combined circulation 
rate of around 2,000 compared with only one Turkish language newspaper, Saded 
with sixty-four subscribers (Dedecay, 1989, Ünlii, no date). An increased emphasis 
on education within the Turkish Cypriot community raised interest in the press, 
which then was reflected in the circulation rate of the newspapers. The relationship 
between education and the press was not one directional though, as the press also 
showed great interest in educational matters and championed better education for 
Turkish Cypriot children. 
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An increase in the number of printing houses owned by Turkish Cypriots also 
contributed to the growth of the Turkish language press in Cyprus. Dedecay (1989) 
argues that at the turn of the century newspaper production was not considered 
different from any other printing business and both were treated as the same. This 
was partly because it was necessary to own a printing house to launch a newspaper 
and partly because newspaper publishing was not seen as a profitable business on its 
own. Zaman, the earliest newspaper to survive till today, is also the first Turkish 
language newspaper that was published in a printing house owned by Turkish 
Cypriots. Previously, Saded was published in a Greek Cypriot printing house 
(Dedecay, 1989). 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the spread of new ideas and movements in 
Cyprus played an encouraging role in the development of the Turkish language press 
which, compared with the flourishing Greek language press, was still struggling. 
With the arrival of a number of exiled Young Turks to Cyprus `who hoped to use the 
British administration and their strategic position to write critically of the sultan's 
regime' (Bryant, 2004, p. 33), the newspapers became the embodiment of new and 
competing thoughts. They propagated the ideas and movements that were also 
discussed in the clubs and coffeehouses (Bryant, 2004; Nevzat 2005). One such 
example, Krraathane-i Osmaniye or the Ottoman Club was initially a coffeehouse 
where newspapers and magazines could also be read and later was turned into a 
social club. Attended by the leading political figures and intellectuals of the time, the 
Ottoman Club provided Turkish Cypriot elite men a public sphere where they 
discussed political issues and current affairs (Fedai & Altan, 2000). In order to 
propagate their ideas, the club set up a printing house and launched Zaman. Later, 
similar publications with similar ideas followed. 
Another common aim of these publications was to protest against the Greek Cypriot 
movement enosis. Samani (1999) notes that the Turkish Cypriot press developed as a 
response to the Greek Cypriot press which was promoting enosis. Ünlü also stresses 
that one of the reasons for the establishment of the Ottoman club was a reaction to 
the pro-enosis Greek club, Kipriyakos Silagos (Ünlü, no date). 
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Despite being under British administration, the Ottomans still had the power to 
influence and control the press in Cyprus through the Ottoman Printing Law the 
British left untouched until 1930 (Dedecay, 1989). For example, when the Young 
Turks' articles, critical of the Ottoman administration and the Sultan, appeared in 
Zaman, its proprietor Haci Derviý Efendi was accused of `stain(ing) the honour of 
the State' and was sentenced to life imprisonment as well as withdrawal of his mir-i 
miran or the title of pasha by the Ottoman courts. However, in Cyprus, his sentence 
was not carried out but his title of pasha ceased to be used by the local government 
(Bryant, 2005). At a later date, Ahmet Tevfik, a prominent journalist of his time, was 
also banned from entering the Ottoman territory for publishing articles critical of the 
Sultan (Atqin, 1999)2. Again, the sentence was not carried out in Cyprus and Ahmet 
Tevfik, having ceased the publication of Akbaba, commenced another publication 
called Mirat-i Zaman (Dedecay, 1989, Ünlti, no date). 
An interesting feature of the press at the end of the century was the emergence of 
satirical publications. Two Turkish language publications, Kokonoz and Akbaba, 
published by Ahmet Tevfik, consisted mostly of political and social satires. 
Disguised as humour, they criticised the administrations in both Cyprus and the 
Ottoman Empire. Another interesting characteristic of the satirical publications in 
Cyprus, according to Bryant (2005), was that in contrast to other publications, they 
were intended to be read by Cypriots in general, both Christians and Muslims. They 
existed at a time when there was still `an obvious ambiguity regarding the boundaries 
of the community ... despite the growing politicisation of communal 
life' (p. 39) 
which also explains their extinction when nationalism took control of both 
communities. 
Turkish Cypriot resistance to British colonialism was also conducted through the 
press. It was especially reflected in disputes about the administration of Evkaf. Evkaf 
was a religious foundation that was in charge of the communal wealth of Muslims on 
the island and was regarded as an important institution by the community. The 
appointment of its administration by the British was strongly resented by some 
Turkish Cypriots, who were critical of the British influence on such an important 
2 According to some sources Ahmet Tevfik Efendi was sentenced to death (see Nevzat, 2005). 
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foundation, while the pro-British Turkish Cypriot elite supported it. The debate 
between the pro-British group and the opposition was communicated through the 
press which was also divided into two camps. Silnuhat and Seyf,, two newspapers 
opposing British influence over the Evkaf administration were engaged in a 
polemical battle with the rival papers, Mirat-i Zaman, Vatan and Kibris that 
supported the administration (Dedegay, 1989; Ünlü, no date). 
The role of Turkish language newspapers in expressing Turkish Cypriots' resistance 
to the British became clear especially in the early days of the First World War. In a 
confidential letter sent to the Secretary of State, Lewis Harcourt, on 4th September 
1914, High Commissioner Goold Adams stressed that some local Muslim 
newspapers which had a great impact on the community turned their readers against 
them when England took over two war ships under construction for the Ottomans 
(Goold-Adams to Harcourt, 4th September 1914, CO 67/ 173; Nevzat, 2005; Samani, 
1999). 
Nevertheless, the hardships brought to Turkish Cypriots by the First World War also 
affected the press as there was no Turkish language newspaper published in Cyprus 
between 1916 -1919. There are several possible reasons for the silence of the 
Turkish language newspapers: First, it could be that being at war with the Ottomans, 
the British authorities were intolerant of Turkish Cypriot support of the Ottomans 
and their expression of it in the press. Their increasing pressure on Turkish Cypriots 
and the obstruction of reporting on the progress of the war probably not only made it 
difficult for the journalists and the publishers to continue with their publications but 
might have killed their enthusiasm as well (Nevzat, 2005; Ünlü, no date). 
Second, financial difficulties and the scarcity of essential materials such as paper and 
ink might have had an impact on the closure of the Turkish language press during the 
war years. However, as Nevzat (2005) argues, this does not explain how the Greek 
language press managed to survive. 
Third, emigration that had started with the annexation of the island by Britain might 
have also reduced the readership and thus support for the press among Turkish 
Cypriots. Consequently the Turkish Cypriot newspapers found it hard to survive 
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(Ünlü, no date). Kibris, the only newspaper that existed during 1914-1915, 
complained of this lack of support in an editorial: 
On the island there are more than 15 Greek newspapers being published. They both 
meet their costs and make profit. Unfortunately, we cannot even meet our costs. Our 
friend Seyf unfortunately had to cease publication because of that. There is only one 
Turkish newspaper left on the island and that is Kibris. The condition Kibris is in is 
as stated (Kibris, 24 August 1914, quoted in Ünlii, no date). 
The fourth reason for the demise of a Turkish language press could rest with the 
leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community whom Bryant (2004) accuses of being `the 
primary cause of the death of a flourishing local press' (p. 106). According to Bryant, 
it was their demands for censorship to suppress opposing opinions that led to the 
dissolution of all Turkish language newspapers during the First World War. 
However, Nevzat (2005) disagrees with her by reminding us that rivalries and 
animosities in the community had started long before the war and resurfaced again in 
the press which emerged after it. This is why it does not explain the reason why it 
would specifically affect the press during the war years. 
Interestingly, while there were no Turkish language publications during the war, six 
emerged in Cyprus in the aftermath. Even though the censorship and the unofficial 
warnings of the British government continued, there was some relaxation in the 
British policy towards Turkish Cypriot publications (Nevzat, 2005). Thus, Dogru Yol 
was launched in 1919, followed in 1920 by Söz, Ankebut, Davul, and Vatan 
newspapers and a journal/magazine called Jr, ad. With the start of the national 
struggle in Turkey around this time, Turkish nationalism amongst Turkish Cypriots 
was openly expressed and these newspapers became the main supporters and 
disseminators of this nationalism in Cyprus. 
Despite rivalries regarding internal issues, the attitude of the Turkish language press 
towards Turkey was supportive. All of them published articles backing the Turkish 
nationalist struggle in Turkey and were instrumental in keeping nationalistic 
emotions alive among Turkish Cypriots. Among them, Söz was an especially ardent 
supporter of Turkish nationalism and was effective in upholding nationalist 
sentiments. It even received a letter of appreciation from the Director of Press and 
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Intelligence Office in Ankara in 1922 for its patriotic publications (Ünlü, no date; 
Ökstizoglu, 1990). With the second highest circulation rate of 1,200 in 1922 (Ünlü, 
no date), Söz spearheaded the spreading of nationalist ideas although other 
newspapers also had a considerable rate of circulation at the time: Both Vatan and 
Dogru Yol were 800 while Davul's was 600 (Ünlü, no date). These figures were also 
a sign of an increase in the readership of newspapers among the Turkish Cypriot 
community. 
The press had a crucial role in the transformation of Turkish Cypriots from Ottoman 
Muslims into Turks. Reporting and supporting the transformation the Turkish nation 
was going through after its war of independence in the 1920's, the press encouraged 
the adoption of Kemalist reforms in Cyprus. It introduced the symbols of Turkish 
nationalism, which helped to enhance a sense of belonging and identification with 
the Turkish nation. For example, having received a printing machine with the 
Turkish alphabet from the Turkish government, Söz contributed to the spread of the 
alphabet reform by publishing a Turkish language newspaper using the Turkish 
alphabet (Dedecay, 1989; Ünltl, no date). Later Ses, another newspaper, used the 
symbol of six arrows which represented Kemalist reforms and ideas (Dedecay, 1989; 
Ünlü, no date). Hakikat, despite being a supporter of the Evkaf administration, 
referred to the government in Turkey as `our government' and Turkey as `our 
fatherland' (Nevzat, 2005, p. 307). 
The Turkish language press was divided on the issue of the emigration of Turkish 
Cypriots from Cyprus to Anatolia that had started with the commencement of British 
rule and increased following the Treaty of Lausanne: Two nationalist newspapers, 
Dogru Yol and Sbz, were the main promoters of this emigration and, along with the 
supportof Turkish Consul Asaf Bey, they encouraged Turkish Cypriots to emigrate 
to Turkey. In contrast, Birlik was pointing at the dangers the emigration was creating 
for the Turkish presence on the island as the population of Turkish Cypriots 
dwindled over the years, threatening Turkish interests in Cyprus. Yet anyone who 
questioned the emigration was criticised for not being a nationalist (GUrkan, 2006; 
Nevzat 2005; Fedai and Altan, 2000). According to Ate§in (1999) the move was a 
sign of the transformation of identity from `Muslim' to `Turk' as those who 
considered themselves Turk chose to emigrate to Turkey. 
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The press law introduced by the British in the 1930's brought limitations for 
publishers and journalists in Cyprus. The adoption of the Newspaper, Books and 
Printing Presses Law in 1930 replaced Matbuat Nizamnamesi (the Ottoman Press 
Law), which the British, interestingly, had left in place until then. The same law had 
already been changed by the Ottomans in 1906 (Dedecay, 1989; Ünlü, no date). 
Dedecay (1989) explains that this was partly because the island was still officially 
considered to be Ottoman territory and partly because of the influence Istanbul had 
on the press in Cyprus. Following the 1931 revolt, the British took restrictive 
measures and introduced the `Newspaper, Books and Printing Presses Law' in 1934 
which increased the power of the Colonial Secretary over the press. These laws gave 
the Colonial Secretary the power to issue orders of censorship, suspension and the 
suppression of publications. They also made it obligatory to get permission to 
publish a newspaper and failing to comply with this rule would be subject to fine and 
seizure (Dedecay, 1989). Under these laws, the Turkish language press found it hard 
to exist. Birlik as well as Hakikat, a newspaper that also published articles in English 
and was a supporter of the pro-British Evkaf administration, could not survive and 
both ceased publication in 1932. Masum Millet had to close down twice throughout 
its publication life of 1931-1934. To avoid the strict censorship and the risk of being 
seized and closed down, the newspapers changed their content, reducing their 
criticism of the government. Avoiding expressing critical opinions, the newspapers 
opted for safer options and, as a result, more world news started appearing in the 
papers (Unlit, no date). 
Apart from causing the closure of some newspapers, these laws also increased the 
animosity of the press towards the British. There was already an existing anti- 
Britishness among the Turkish language press which had existed since the start of 
colonial rule. One of the earliest newspapers, Zaman had, in its first issue, stated that 
fighting against British colonialism would be one of its main functions (Altay, 1969, 
10n1ü, no date, Ismail, 1988). Criticisms of the British government on the island 
appeared in the newspapers frequently. For example, the publisher of Masum Millet 
Con Rifat who was known for his anti-Britishness (Fedai, 1986) wrote an article 
called `editorial object' in which he criticised the British government: 
This Government not only restrained but also chained the press, the freedom of 
action and of speech, interfered with our language, destroyed with a stroke of a pen 
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the religious institutions without consulting the proper Turkish Authorities and 
obtaining their consent and did not yet replace them by the new ones in the way I 
have suggested and pointed out two years ago, wanted to govern us without laws and 
rules, subjected us to treatments which can only be meted out to a primitive and 
Bedouin Clansmen, ridiculed with the Moslem rights and openly challenged our 
social honor and dignity (Masum Millet, 11 April, 1931 quoted in Fedai, 1986, p. 74). 
The dialectical relationship between the press and Turkish Cypriot society led the 
newspapers to contribute to the transformation of the collective identity as well as 
being constituted and shaped by it. The press campaigned for a Turkish education 
which was crucial in the production of a Turkish Cypriot national identity. The 
newspaper publishers, who consisted of educated people such as lawyers, doctors 
and teachers, argued for an improvement of the curriculum in Turkish schools or, in 
other words, they campaigned for a nationalist education (Nesim, 1987). Hallan Sesi, 
the longest running Turkish Cypriot newspaper, announced in its first issue that it 
would campaign for the transfer of schools to the Turkish Cypriot community 
(Halkm Sesi, 14 Mart 1942, also quoted in Ünlii, no date, p. 146). Such strong support 
for education was seen as a path to modernisation that was associated with Atatürk's 
reforms in Turkey and Turkish nationalism (Bryant, 2004). For example, Söz 
newspaper urged `Before everything a national education is necessary for us. We will 
seek the source and components of it in the motherland, in the great Turkish spirit. 
An education system will come to us from Turkey. This is how it must be' (Söz, 19 
March 1931, quoted in Evre, 2004, p. 97; also see Bryant, 2004, p. 176). 
In turn, the transformation Turkish Cypriots went through also influenced the press. 
Developed as a reaction to the Greek Cypriot, nationalist enosis movement, as well 
as the British administration, the press undertook the mission of defending the rights 
of Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus and engaging in the development of a politically and 
economically strong Turkish Cypriot community (Ünlü, no date; 
Ismail, 1988). It 
was also seen that an improvement in education standards would mean an increase in 
the readership of the newspapers, which contributed to the spread of nationalist 
thought through the people. Writing under the pseudonym `U', a woman journalist 
Ulviye Mithat complained that the literacy rate and thus the numbers of readers of 
the Turkish Cypriot newspapers were much lower than the Greek Cypriot ones (Ses, 
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14 October, 1935 cited in Azgin, 1988). It was an indication of how the matter 
concerned journalists of the time. Despite this, it should not be thought that the 
dissemination of ideas through the press was limited only to the educated as the 
literate mediated the messages of the press to illiterates as well (Bryant, 2004). 
Following the Second World War, increasing Turkish nationalism interwoven with 
Pan- Turkist ideas left no space for different imaginings of identity within the 
Turkish Cypriot community such as Cypriotism (Kizilyürek, 2002; Ya§in, 1990). In 
these circumstances, increasing cooperation between both Turkish Cypriot and Greek 
Cypriot workers and farmers within the trade unions was not welcomed from the 
nationalist point of view. They were seen as serving communism and communism 
was the enemy of Turkish nationalism. Such views found expression in the press as 
well and Türk Sözü and Sabah in particular, two newspapers with a Pan-Turkist and 
an anti-communist line, published articles critical of such activities (Ismail, 1988). 
They both were critical of Emekci, the organ of the Cyprus Turkish Workers 
Organisation. In one article, Türk Sözü rejected the idea that the Turkish worker was 
communist and explained that `communism rejects patriotism but the Turkish worker 
is a patriot' (Turk Sözü, 10 October, 1948, quoted in Ismail, 1988, p. 104). 
Nevertheless, such views were not recent as Söz had, as early as the 1930's, also 
suggested that `the communist movements in this country are being instigated by the 
Greek Cypriots' (Söz, 13 August, 1931, quoted in Nevzat, 2005, p. 329). Being a 
patriot was regarded as equivalent to being anti-communist and workers within bi- 
communal trade unions were pressured to resign. On the other hand, Emekci and 
tnkilapci, two leftist newspapers, claimed to be the voice of Turkish Cypriot workers 
and farmers and were encouraging them to organise within the trade unions to fight 
for their rights. JnIalapct, that survived only for a few months, called for both Greek 
and Turkish Cypriot workers to unite and supported the unity of both communities 
(An, 2005). Emekci, on the one hand, was critical of the Turkish Cypriot leadership 
and was engaged in constant polemic with the nationalist newspapers. 
As the Turkish Cypriot nationalist movement progressed, there was an increasing 
pressure to unite the Turkish Cypriot community behind a resistance movement 
against the Greek Cypriots. Therefore, there was no tolerance for anyone who did not 
support but criticised or opposed the nationalist movement or even conceptualised a 
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different national identity. The Turkish Cypriot nationalist group, TMT, was not only 
fighting against Greek Cypriot nationalism and the EOKA militants but also 
imposing their nationalistic aspirations on Turkish Cypriots and the press was not 
exempt from this. In 1958, Fazil Önder, the publisher of lnkrlapcr who supported a 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot united workers movement, was murdered (An, 2005). 
Four years later, Ayhan Hikmet and Muzaffer Gürkan, two lawyers who were 
publishing Cumhuriyet newspaper, were killed. Cumhuriyet, that had begun 
publication on the same day as the Republic of Cyprus was established, not only 
criticised the Turkish nationalist ideals of the Turkish Cypriot leadership but also 
called for harmonious relations between the two communities. In an article entitled 
`Cyprus belongs to Cypriots', Cumhuriyet wrote 
... the duty of every Turkish and 
Greek Cypriot is to respect the rights of the other, to 
make an independent Cyprus live and develop and work with all its effort to provide 
both communities more democratic, prosperous, happy and peaceful life. To claim 
the opposite, in our view, is not to see the reality, not to understand the reality or to 
shut eyes to the reality. In brief, Cyprus' independence is not its being annexed to 
another nation or a state but to be governed by Cypriots (Cumhuriyet, 2 January, 
1961, quoted in An, 2005, p. 168). 
Two different imaginings of national identity, Cypriot and Turkish, had found their 
expression through the print media. While Cumhuriyet defended the Republic of 
Cyprus and a Cypriot identity, Hallam Sesi and Nacak, two nationalist newspapers, 
were the voices of the Turkish Cypriot leadership who fought for taksim and did not 
believe in Cypriotness. Therefore, Cumhuriyet was engaged in a polemic with these 
papers, especially with Nacak, the unofficial organ of TMT (Dedecay, 1989; Ünlü, 
no date). 
During the inter-communal tension and conflict between 1963 and 1974, the 
community was governed by the Turkish leadership and the military, which put 
communal rights ahead of individual rights, preventing Turkish Cypriots from 
developing any civil organisation. As Kizilyürek (2005) contends, `in Cyprus, 
because of "national cause" for very long years concepts and practices such as "civil 
society", "democracy", "pluralism" were smashed' (p. 277). Lack of opposition was 
also reflected on the press and shaped it into a nationalist position. All the 
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publications during that period, such as Hallan Sesi, Mitcahit, Limasol'un Sesi and 
Zafer, were in support of the nationalist movement of the Turkish Cypriot leadership 
and TMT. Any opposition to the leadership was silenced to create a unified voice for 
the sake of the national cause or otherwise was labelled as `anti-national'. However, 
in time an opposition movement led by the students and teachers' union against the 
leadership emerged. Sava, a newspaper published by the poet Özker Yaýin during 
1968-1973, had the courage to raise a voice of opposition against the Turkish Cypriot 
leadership. By reflecting the views of the opposition movement that was already 
underway and by calling for general elections, Saval, according to some scholars, 
pioneered a change within the community (Ünlü, no date; Azgin, 1998). 
Turkish Language Press after 1974 
The division of the island led to a new order for Turkish Cypriots in the north of the 
island which also brought new roles and challenges to the Turkish Cypriot press. The 
monopolistic control of the state3 over the media served as a propaganda instrument 
for the nationalist forces. The print media especially became instrumental in different 
political and ideological struggles as politics and the press became more 
interdependent in the aftermath of 1974. Opposition to the leadership had already 
started at the grass-root level and led to the foundation of new political parties. But, 
three Turkish language newspapers, Hallam Sesi, Bozkurt and Zaman that continued 
to exist after the division of the island were supporters of the Turkish Cypriot 
leadership and did not give much access to oppositional voices. In the new multi- 
party system, to join in the power struggle politicians first needed channels of 
communication to create a `public' for themselves and to communicate their message 
to supporters. Thus, excluded from the existing public sphere of the media, the new 
parties set up newspapers that would reflect their views and policies. Such 
ideological and financial connections meant these publications or `party newspapers' 
acted as the organs of the political parties and reported events in line with the views 
of these parties. In this way, the press became (and still is) an instrument for the 
3 State refers to the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus which was proclaimed in 1975 and also Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus which was established by the Legislative Assembly of the Turkish 
Federated State of Cyprus in 1983. 
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different causes and struggles of political actors. Party propaganda appeared in both 
opposition and pro-government newspapers: the opposition printed their criticisms of 
the government disguised as news reports while the pro-government newspapers 
praised government actions in their stories. Propagating the views of the parties they 
sympathise with is still a strong characteristic of the press today. 
The Turkish Cypriot's nationalistic movement against the Greek Cypriot's enosis 
movement had been a powerful ideology in shaping and setting the boundaries 
within which the news media operated. It allowed the state to control them according 
to its own interests, which consequently excluded any oppositional voice from the 
public sphere of the media. According to the state, the struggle did not end but still 
continued under the threats of Greek Cypriots; this is why all Turkish Cypriots 
should unite behind the Turkish Cypriot leadership to present their voice as one to 
the world. In line with state policy, all the state and civil organisations were expected 
to function in accordance with the `national cause'. The `national cause' was the 
defence of the right of Turkish Cypriots to live independently from Greek Cypriots in 
their own state, one supported and guaranteed by Turkey and the presence of Turkish 
troops in the north of Cyprus. Opinions that did not comply with this view were 
regarded as undermining both the state and the nation and such opinion holders were 
branded as `traitors'. Thus, it caused the newspapers to avoid reporting issues that 
were critical of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, Turkey and the Turkish military, 
which were the main representatives of the `national cause'. The left wing 
newspapers that took an oppositional stand to the nationalist view were constrained 
by censorship or self-censorship. The support of the nationalist press behind the 
`national cause' represented the nation as united, homogenous and stable, making 
differences between members of the national community invisible, which aided the 
nation building process. 
After the division of the island, Turkish Cypriots depended on Turkey for the supply 
of manpower, the survival of the economy and for national security. This reliance 
intensified with the isolation Turkish Cypriots experienced in the international arena 
following the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983. 
Increasing interaction between the TRNC and Turkey was also reflected in the 
Turkish Cypriot press. For instance, the daily arrival of Turkish newspapers after 
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1974 diminished the impact of the Turkish Cypriot press. Better printed, more 
colourful Turkish broadsheets led to a reduction in the circulation rate of Turkish 
Cypriot ones (Ünlil, no date). There are several possible underlying reasons for this 
development: First, it could be that reading Turkish newspapers reinforced the 
identification process of Turkish Cypriots with Turkey. Second, political, economic 
and cultural changes in Turkey have always had an impact on the TRNC which led 
many to follow the news there. Another reason for the loss of the readership of 
Turkish Cypriot newspapers could also be that having listened to the news on the 
radio or television, people were not interested in reading the same stories in the 
newspaper as the print news was very similar to that broadcast. Increasing interaction 
with the Turkish news media in Turkey, sometimes in the form of training, set 
examples of journalistic practices for the Turkish Cypriot journalists and publishers. 
However, the Turkish media in general was supportive of the position of the 
`national cause' of Turkish Cypriots, regardless of their political and ideological 
position, and reproduced and maintained the nationalist ideologies and discourses 
dominant in North Cyprus. 
The lack of communication between the two communities assisted the Turkish 
Cypriot administration in maintaining a strong concept of `the enemy' in order to 
mobilise the populace against the `other' and also to build and shape a nation. 
Asserting differences from the `other' and reflecting the community as a harmonious 
one reinforces the feeling of unity among the members of the nation as well as 
strengthening ethnocentric and nationalist perceptions (Tsagarousianou, 1999). 
People on both sides of the line received information about the other through the 
media, which relied on the information provided by official sources. Thus, the 
portrayal of Greek Cypriots as an `unchanging evil' and a continuous threat was not 
difficult and helped the state to maintain and justify the status quo. A common 
practice, especially among the right-wing press, was to strengthen the stereotype 
among Turkish Cypriots that `all Greek Cypriots are bad and corrupt' by attaching 
news value to anything negative about Greek Cypriots. Papadakis (2005), pointing to 
`the news from the south' page of a right wing Turkish Cypriot newspaper, observed 
that 
Anything negative about the Greek Cypriot side was good news over here. They 
adored Greek Cypriot extremists. Any statement they found in the Greek Cypriot 
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press about Turkish Cypriots by extremists, made it to the section. If someone said 
`A good Turk is a dead Turk' not only did it become news, it was presented as a 
general Greek Cypriot outlook (Papadakis, 2005, p. 103). 
The concept of Cypriotness that developed as a challenge to Turkish nationalism was 
both a cultural and political movement. Inevitably, the press became a site where the 
struggle for domination between two different imaginings of national identity took 
place. Depending on the media producer and its position within the political 
spectrum, the representation of Turkish Cypriot identity and its `other' changed. 
While right wing pro-government newspapers such as Halkin Sesi and Birlik 
portrayed Turkish Cypriots as part of the Turkish nation and Greek Cypriots as the 
`other', the newspapers of the left wing opposition such as Yenidilzen and Ortam 
became the voice of an emerging Cypriot identity and posited Turkish immigrants as 
the `other'. On the other hand, commercial newspapers like Kibris claimed to be 
objective but actually reflected the political allegiances of their owners, which 
shifted over the years. Depending on their positions, the discourses of the 
newspapers on identity also varied. While the discourses of the nationalist papers 
were based on an essentialist Turkish national identity, in a similar manner the left 
wing newspapers highlighted the Cypriotness of Turkish Cypriots. 
In their challenge to Turkish nationalism, the left wing press adopted the methods Of 
the nationalist newspapers while emphasising Cypriotness. They portrayed Turkish 
immigrants as the new `enemy', in much the same way the right wing press has often 
cast Greek Cypriots in this role. Events involving the immigrants have been dealt 
with in a similar manner, especially by the left-wing media. The number of stories 
showing immigrants in a positive light has been minimal in these newspapers. They 
have been represented as the cause of anything that goes wrong in the country. The 
mainlanders have been portrayed as gangsters, criminals and illegal immigrants who 
brought crime and corruption to the country and threatened the `harmonious' life of 
Turkish Cypriots. Many stories constructed along the lines of `our safety in our 
country' is being threatened by `criminals from Turkey' appeared in the newspapers. 
While `they' - the immigrants from Turkey- are `gangsters, murderers, thieves', 
`we', the Turkish Cypriots, are the `victims'. Such oppositional representation has 
not only intensified the perceived differences between Turkish Cypriots and 
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immigrants generally but also created fear amongst Turkish Cypriots about security, 
the loss of their identity and self-determination. 
The transformation of identity the Turkish Cypriot community had been going 
through was clearly visible during the period in which the latest settlement plan for 
Cyprus, the Annan Plan, was debated. The arguments of pro-settlement and 
opposition groups were related through the media and the discourse of each 
newspaper changed in relation to shifts in discourses in the political arena. 
Unsurprisingly, while newspapers of the left adopted the discourse of settlement and 
described Turkish Cypriots as `Europeans', newspapers on the right argued that a 
solution and joining the EU would achieve nothing but enosis. Despite this, the 
media in the north engaged in more open debate and reflected a spectrum of opinions 
during this period. According to a study of the information environment in Cyprus 
regarding the Annan Plan, 
The Turkish Cypriot media and information environment reflected a wide variety of 
views rather than any single trend. While each media outlet eventually had clear 
leanings, each displayed a sufficient and comparable level of independence from 
official dictates (Ridder/Braden et. al, 2005, p. 4). 
The changes that occurred within social and political contexts also affected the press. 
During the ongoing hegemonic struggle, the dominant nationalist discourses were 
challenged, sometimes leading to a shift of alliance of the media organisation. Kibris 
and Kibrish, two commercial and influential newspapers changed their policy from a 
very nationalistic stance to supporting the Annan Plan. Such a change in Kibris, the 
newspaper with the highest circulation in the TRNC, was radical, as the paper was 
known for its nationalistic position regarding the Cyprus issue. Today, the discussion 
still continues about what motivated Kibris to make such a change; whether it simply 
followed the support the public gave to the plan and reflected popular feelings or, 
realising the strong support amongst its readership for the plan, decided to campaign 
for the settlement so as not to lose its readership. 
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Turkish Cypriot Broadcasting in Cyprus 
The development of national broadcasting played a fundamental role in building a 
sense of Turkish national identity among Turkish Cypriots as well as uniting them in 
the `national cause' waged against Greek Cypriots. Until recently, it enforced a 
Turkish nationalist discourse as well as sustaining an official representation of Greek 
Cypriots as the `enemy'. As opposed to the press, which developed as part of 
different political and ideological struggles, the broadcast industry, until 
commercialisation in 1997, was the main supporter of official ideologies and claimed 
to be the voice of the Turkish Cypriots. 
Broadcasting in Cyprus started during the British Colonial era with the establishment 
of the first radio station, Cyprus Forces Broadcasting Service, by the British forces in 
1948 (Dedecay, 1988). The radio produced programmes for British military 
personnel on the island as well as broadcasting in Greek and Turkish. The British 
administration later set up a radio station for Cypriots, the Cyprus Broadcasting 
Service, which began transmitting in 1953. Following the introduction of television 
broadcasts, the Cyprus Broadcasting Service became the Cyprus Broadcasting 
Corporation. In 1959 it became the official state broadcaster and its administration 
was passed to both communities in Cyprus (Sophocleous & Papademetris, 1991; 
Dedecay, 1988). Like many aspects of public life in Cyprus, the constitution of the 
new republic organised personnel and administration of the broadcasting corporation 
along the lines of ethnic proportionality. According to this, 30% of its personnel and 
administration were Turkish Cypriots and 70% were Greek Cypriots. The same rates 
also applied to the programming: 30% of the programmes were in Turkish while 
70% were 'in Greek (Dedecay, 1988). 
According to a publication by the Press and Information Office of the ROC 
concerning the mass media in Cyprus, the launch of the service received very little 
attention by the local press apart from an English language newspaper, Cyprus Mail 
(Sophocleous & Papademetris, 1991). This was partly because it-was seen as the 
propaganda instrument of the British administration. Aware of such concerns by 
Cypriots about the broadcast service, the British governor at the time assured the 
public that the service was not concerned with propaganda but, following the English 
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tradition, only aimed to inform the public (Sophocleous & Papademetris, 1991). Yet, 
at the time, a resistance movement had been launched against the British and such 
statements were not found to be convincing. Conscious of the power of radio as an 
instrument to promote the views and policies of the British throughout the island, the 
Greek Cypriot nationalist group EOKA bombed the radio station three times to 
silence it during their struggle to overthrow the British (Dedecay, 1988; Sophocleous 
& Papademetris, 1991). 
Despite all this, Dedecay (1988) argues that, broadcast in three languages, English, 
Turkish and Greek, the radio programmes became a social routine of life. Having 
already attracted Cypriots' interest, the radio broadcast mass events such as festivals, 
carnivals, fairs and other entertainment programmes, which were relevant to the 
communities in general. By turning some exclusive events into mass experiences and 
linking the national public with private lives, the radio facilitated a sense of unity 
among Cypriots which may have served the interests of the British administration. 
The early radio broadcasts in Cyprus, by uniting the dispersed members of the 
audience and giving them a sense of belonging, may have contributed to the 
construction of national unity, but for each community separately. For example, for 
Turkish Cypriots who were spread around the island and surrounded mainly by the 
Greek Cypriot community, listening to Turkish language programmes on the radio 
and imagining the other members of the community doing the same thing at the same 
time might have forged a relationship with other dispersed Turkish Cypriots and 
enhanced their sense of being a community. Following the radio programmes being 
broadcast in Greek and Turkish as well as listening to the radio programmes of the 
motherlands may also have contributed to their imagining themselves as separate 
communities. However, it should be noted that some Cypriots listened to the radio in 
each other's languages as they were bilingual or trilingual, including English. 
With the eruption of inter-communal armed conflict beginning on 21St December 
1963, Turkish Cypriots were no longer able to work for the Cyprus Broadcasting 
Corporation. Though some still went to the radio station, which was in a Greek 
Cypriot dominated area of Nicosia, for another two days (until 23`d December 1963), 
difficulties and dangers prevented them from continuing to do so (Dedecay, 1988). 
Cyprus' jointly run radio and television services were left to the control of Greek 
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Cypriots, leaving Turkish Cypriots without any means of communication. No longer 
a part of the legitimate administrative organs of the Republic and excluded from 
official communication channels, Turkish Cypriots needed an alternative means of 
communication to broadcast and promote their ideas and news. Such communication 
was also required to provide Turkish Cypriots with a means of countering the 
propaganda and misinformation spread by the Greek Cypriot run broadcasting 
services. Apart from representing the voice of Turkish Cypriots, an electronic form 
of communication was essential to preserve contact within the dispersed Turkish 
Cypriot community as their communication was constantly obstructed by Greek 
Cypriots. As Bailie and Berberoglu suggest, `during the 1963 through 1974 period it 
was necessary to create an electronic form of communication that could overcome 
the geographical boundaries faced by newspapers and surface mail because these 
forms of communication were constantly being interrupted by the Greek Cypriot 
forces' (Bailie & Berberoglu, 1999, p. 256). Another important factor in establishing 
a broadcast media was to facilitate the unity of Turkish Cypriots behind the 
leadership and the `nationalist struggle' against Greek Cypriots. 
Launched in Nicosia on the 25th December 1963, within four days of the start of the 
inter-communal conflict, the radio broadcaster was given the name of Bayrak which 
means `flag'. Yet in this case, rather than implying `flag', it was derived from the 
name given to the leader of TMT who also controlled the radio station, Bayraktar 
(Bailie & Berberoglu, 1999). Bayrak radio, that was set up and operated by civilians, 
was actually under the administration of TMT and the radio came to be known as 
`the voice of the Turkish Cypriot Mujahedin'. 
Since the transmission signal of Bayrak radio was not strong enough to reach parts of 
Cyprus beyond Nicosia and its surroundings, following Bayrak's example, five other 
radio stations were founded in the main cities of Cyprus within a year. Canbulat 
Radio was set up in Famagusta, Gazi Baffin Sesi (the Voice of Ghazi Paphos) in 
Paphos, Doganin Sesi (the Voice of Nature) in Larnaca, Lefke Sancak4 Radio in 
Lecke and Limasol Sancak Radio in Limassol. The main aims of these radio stations 
4 During the armed conflict against Greek Cypriots, TMT divided Cyprus into military zones and each 
zone was called a Sancak. The radio stations set up in these areas were known as Sancak radio 
stations. 
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was to inform, to support the ongoing conflict against Greek Cypriots, to counter 
Greek Cypriot propaganda and provide the community with a channel of 
communication. Especially in areas where communication was interrupted, these 
radio stations acted as links to the outside. For example, when Turkish Cypriots in 
Famagusta came under siege from the Greek Cypriot militia who had cut off their 
communication channels, Canbulat Radio was their only means of communication 
with the other areas (catal, 2003). Operating under the administration of TMT, these 
radio stations were part of the armed conflict against the Greek Cypriots. As Erdogan 
Erdem, who had worked on Canbulat Radio explained, the fight did not just involve 
weapons and guns but also the media as well. These radio stations had a different 
function to that of ordinary radio broadcasters, which was to work for the struggle 
and thus they were `national struggle media' (quoted in catal, 2003, p. 124). 
Like Bayrak, these radio stations were under the military administration and 
functioned as channels that carried the instructions of TMT to people at large. The 
military used these broadcasts `to organise the community around a national struggle, 
to define the boundaries of that struggle and to encourage the Turkish Cypriot 
community to work in the interests of that struggle' (Bailie & Berberoglu, 1999, 
p. 225). The aim of these stations was not only to propagate the military's views on 
the events taking place but also to create public opinion in support of these views. 
Ismet Kotak, who had a commentary programme on Canbulat Radio in Famagusta 
described the radio station as acting as an `opinion leader' (catal, 2003, p. 70). By 
contributing to the creation of public opinion in favour of the leadership, these radio 
stations legitimized the establishment and control of an authoritarian leadership over 
the public. Also, counteracting the propaganda or misinformation spread by the 
Greek Cypriot broadcasting services, these Turkish Cypriot radio stations set out to 
transmit their version of events. Another important function was to act as 
communication channels through which people sent messages to their families and 
friends and in this way linked not only people to each other but also their private 
lives with the public one. 
These stations, especially the main radio station Bayrak, used `the power of the idea 
of nation to involve people in a common sense of identity' (Morley & Robins, 1995, 
p. 91). At a time of insecurity and confusion, they acted as a symbol of security and 
83 
integration for Turkish Cypriots against the threat of the `other'. By doing this, these 
radio stations played a fundamental role among Turkish Cypriots in the 
reconstruction of national identity along the lines of Turkish nationalism. 
Consequently, apart from acting as a means of uniting the community behind the 
military, they also aimed to emphasize close links with the `motherland' Turkey. By 
evoking Turkish cultural myths, identifying the Turkish Cypriots' struggle with the 
one the Turkish nation had been through (Sayil, 2000, p. 72-73) and describing 
Turkey as the `motherland, ' the commentaries on Bayrak Radio and the other 
stations were contributing to the strengthening of the identification of Turkish 
Cypriots with the Turkish nation. At the beginning and end of their programmes, the 
radios played the Turkish national anthem and military marches (Sayil, 2000). Not 
only on Bayrak but the programmes on other stations were also instrumental in 
creating such an affiliation with Turkey. For example, Canbulat Radio had history 
programmes about the Ottoman Empire and Turkish national heroes that were 
presented as part of the history of the Turkish Cypriot community. Cultural 
programmes such as Anadolu yu Gezelim (Let's travel around Anatolia) introduced 
Turkish Cypriots to different cultural and folkloric characteristics of different regions 
in Turkey (catal, 2003, p. 73). With special live broadcasts on Turkey's national 
days, which were also celebrated in Cyprus by Turkish Cypriots, these radio stations 
helped the spread of Turkish nationalism, as well as increasing the morale of the 
community, as such representations of nationalist rallies and public rituals play a 
significant role in the assertion of national unity (Tsagarousianou, 1999). 
The radio transmissions were also instrumental in enforcing ethnocentric and 
nationalist perceptions among people. Providing a stereotypical presentation, the 
commentaries broadcast, especially on Bayrak Radio, described Greek Cypriots as 
murderous, savage and barbarous. For example, Bayrak frequently used a well- 
known poem called `hatred' which spoke of wishing to `crush the thirty thousand 
heads with a stone', ` extract with pliers the teeth of ten thousand', `throw the 
carcasses of the hundred thousand into a river' and so on (Ya§m, 1990, p. 55). Sayil's 
documentation shows the `hatred' poem amongst the poems that were read on the 
radio to maintain the morale and nationalist emotions of the public (Sayil, 2000). 
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With the end of the armed conflict in 1974, all local radio stations apart from Bayrak 
and Canbulat ceased to exist. As the Turkish Cypriot community moved from the 
south of the island to the north, the radio stations positioned in the south of the 
island, such as in Paphos and Larnaca, closed down. The radio station in Limassol 
had already stopped transmission soon after its establishment (Sayil, 2000; Dedecay, 
1988). Set up to support the Turkish Cypriots' fight against the Greek Cypriots, these 
stations had in many ways completed their mission with the end of the conflict and 
the division of the island in 1974. When Canbulat Radio ceased its broadcasting in 
mid-1970's, Bayrak became the only radio station broadcasting to Turkish Cypriots. 
Despite the end of the armed struggle, Bayrak continued to stay under military 
administration until 1976 and only then came under a civil authority (Bayrak Bayrak 
Bayrak, BRTK documentary, 1998). As television broadcasts began in 1976, Turkish 
Cypriot broadcasting organised as Bayrak Radyo Televizyon Kurumu (BRTK- 
Bayrak Radio Television Corporation), the semi-governmental broadcasting 
corporation of Turkish Cypriots. With the establishment of the TRNC, BRTK 
transformed from being `the voice of the Mujahedin' to being the `voice of the 
TRNC'. 
The ideology of `national cause', which had shaped the media during the era of 
armed conflict, still continued to be a powerful concept even after 1974. Under the 
control of the government, BRTK had the monopoly over broadcasting which also 
allowed it to become a political tool in reflecting the government's policies and 
views (Turgay, no date). Thus, BRTK became instrumental in articulating the 
Turkish nationalist discourse and spreading the nationalist ideology. Claiming to be 
the voice of the TRNC, BRTK actually became the voice of the nationalist 
government which saw Turkish Cypriots as part of the Turkish nation and excluded 
any oppositional views. As Bailie and Berberoglu (1999) argue, the combination of 
the concepts of `democracy' and `national struggle' limited oppositional voices to 
official government policies in order to create a unified, single voice to present to the 
international community. 
BRTK's monopoly over broadcasting in the TRNC ended with the Establishment of 
Public and Private Radio and Television Law in 1997. Privatisation of broadcast 
media has not only provided increased access to the media but also increased the 
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diversity of voices heard in them. However, the ideological framework of `national 
cause' still continued to define the conceptual boundaries of information gathering 
and dissemination as the commercial media owners implemented self-censorship on 
political issues regarding the Cyprus problem (Bailie & Berberoglu, 1999). 
The privatisation of the broadcast media provided different political, economic and 
social groups that had been previously excluded with a forum to join in public 
debate. The best example of this came during the coverage of the Annan Plan and the 
referendum on it. According to Ridder/Braden et. al (2005), who studied the media 
during the period that concerned the Annan Plan and the referendum, `a rich and 
diverse information environment emerged' within the Turkish Cypriot media 
landscape (p. 18). From the time the plan was leaked to the media until the 
completion of the referendum, the media were dominated by the two issues of the 
UN's settlement plan and the referendum, which was inevitable as `the discussions 
among citizens on any topic invariably turned to the Plan as it came to dominate 
mainstream discourse' (Ridder/Braden et. al, 2005, p. 24). During this period, 
especially with panel discussions, the broadcast media created a forum for diverse 
political and economic views to be debated. Their talk shows and call-in 
programmes also encouraged the audience to take part in the discussions and make 
comments, which prompted people to speak out more than in the past (Ridder/Braden 
et. al, 2005). 1 
As in the case of the print media, the allegiances of some privately owned broadcast 
media shifted from the nationalist discourse to a discourse that favoured the plan. 
Kibris FM and Kibris TV, which are part of the Kibris Media Group owned by Asil 
Nadir, as well as Genc TV, became supporters of the plan. Meanwhile, BRTK, 
having positioned itself with the `no' camp initially, changed its coverage of the plan 
to `somewhat more positive but significantly more balanced' with a government 
change and appointment of a new director (Ridder/Braden et. al, 2005, p. 20). 
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b. Journalism in North Cyprus 
This part of the study focuses on the institutional, political and economic factors that 
influence the production of news in the Turkish Cypriot media. As well as benefiting 
from the findings of other research on the issue, the investigation of media dynamics 
is also based on interviews I carried out to provide evidence of the conditions and 
practices involved in media production and also to map the reflection of power onto 
the media. 
I conducted thirteen semi-structured interviews with journalists and editors as well as 
political figures, a NGO representative and a media academic through which I 
explore the factors that shape journalism in the TRNC. Interviews were structured 
around various social determinants of the journalism as suggested by McNair (1998), 
such as professional culture and organisational determinants, political pressures, 
economic pressures, technological factors and the activities of `extramedia social 
actors' (p. 15). McNair argues that a variety of cultural, technological, political and 
economic forces in the society have a role in shaping the journalistic output and he 
proposes to study their impact on journalism. McNair's approach can be criticised for 
being very simplified in which the cultural, technological, political and economic 
factors of news production are studied exclusively of each other, as if they always 
influence the production individually and separately. Nevertheless, I adopted his 
approach in this study as it is still useful in providing a framework to describe and 
understand the social context of news production. 
The interviewees included eight journalists and editor-in-chiefs from broadcast and 
print media, one media owner, two politicians, an academic and a representative of 
an NGO working in the field of conflict resolution5. The roles and participation of 
the interviewees in the production of media texts have been determinants in the 
selection. Journalists were selected from different positions within different media 
groups with different political orientations. The newspaper owner was selected to 
provide the views of media owners and their influence on journalistic output. 
Interviewees from outside the media were selected in order to discuss their 
5 The names and the positions of the interviewees are provided in detail in the bibliography. 
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relationship with the media and the role of the media discourse in a wider social, 
cultural and historical context. The academic and the NGO representative were 
chosen on the basis of their work on the media, conflict resolution and identity 
issues. Politicians, one from the government and one from the main opposition party, 
were interviewed to find out their relationship with the media6. 
All the interviews were conducted in the workspace of the interviewees, a place the 
interviewees themselves chose. When asked where they would prefer to do the 
interview they all invited me to their offices. Questioning some of them whether they 
would feel comfortable or relaxed talking about the media and their problems in their 
work places, they were all affirmative. Apart from two politicians who wanted to 
stay anonymous, the rest of the interviewees were willing to be identified in the study 
which encouraged me to think that they were being sincere and open in expressing 
their ideas and views during the interview. They stated their belief in discussing and 
exposing the problems in the media and journalism in North Cyprus as an important 
initial step in finding solutions to their problems. Therefore, they voluntarily gave 
between one and one and a half hours of their time to answer my queries which 
included a number of questions that ranged from ownership control to political 
pressure, from the Cyprus problem to the impact of technological advances. As 
mentioned before, the purpose of the interviews was to give me an insight into the 
conditions and practices of the media that might otherwise have been difficult to 
study. 
Political Factors and the 'National Cause' 
The Turkish Cypriot media have always been a site where struggles between 
different causes and interests have taken place. The conflict with the Greek Cypriot 
nationalist movement was especially influential in shaping the journalism practiced 
in North Cyprus. The attempts of the Turkish Cypriot administration to create a 
unified voice during and after the conflict set the boundaries within which the news 
6 Two politicians I interviewed asked to remain anonymous. They were very critical of the media and 
the journalism in the country but at the same time relying on the media to make their views public, 
they were worried of a backlash from the media. 
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media operated. For example, any criticism of the policies and practices of the 
Turkish Cypriot leadership was regarded as undermining the state and national unity. 
Thus, it created media that avoided criticising certain institutions, especially the main 
representatives of the nationalist ideologies in the country such as the Turkish 
Cypriot administration, Turkish embassy and the Turkish military. The rule applied 
to both state owned media organisations such as BRTK and TiirkAjansi Kibris 
(TAK-Turkish Agency Cyprus) and to privately owned ones. 
A similar control mechanism to the ideology of anticommunism, as suggested by 
Herman and Chomsky (1988), was in play in the Turkish Cypriot media. Although it 
is strange to think that communism can be a threat now, the idea behind it is 
important because it is this ideology that `helps mobilize the populace against an 
enemy' (p. 29). It is useful in convincing people that there's a serious threat which 
helps to justify bringing some restrictions to their freedoms. In the Turkish Cypriots' 
case, the anticommunism filter was replaced with the fear of Greek Cypriots' 
domination of the island and their `never-ending' ambition of enosis. Using such 
fears and threats was a way of exercising political pressure on the media, which 
helped to control journalists, the media and, indirectly, the public. The media acted 
as a channel for communicating the messages and symbols, particularly of nationalist 
groups, to the general populace in order to `manufacture consent' (Herman & 
Chomsky, 1988). Drawing a parallel with Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda 
Model is not to ignore the other elements that the model fails to take into account, 
such as the practical and organisational factors influential in newsroom practices, but 
to highlight how powerful institutions controlled the media to mobilise support for 
their own interests. For this purpose, a mix of formal and informal means of control 
and pressure such as threats, imprisonment, the dismissal of critical journalists from 
their jobs or the loss of state advertising were used to silence journalists. For 
example, the editor in chief and a journalist from Afrika newspaper were jailed for 
criticising the president7. This does not mean that political pressure is not applied to 
journalists any more, but that, as some journalists interviewed for this study 
expressed, it is not as intense as it used to be and with the recent political changes in 
7 Sener Levent, the editor-in-chief and Memduh Ener, a journalist of Afrika newspaper were sentenced 
to six months in August 2002 for criticising the president in an article "Who is the No. 1 traitor? " The 
court appeal in October 2002 reduced their sentences to six weeks. 
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the TRNC, there is more tolerance towards journalists' criticisms. In any case, 
political pressures have influenced and shaped the journalism practiced today. 
The affiliation of a media organisation with a political party is a well-known 
characteristic of the media in the TRNC. Even though such connections are not 
always stated in the masthead of a newspaper or on the ownership documents of the 
broadcast media, the relationship is still recognised by the public. This is not only 
because their content is shaped in a similar way to the political parties they are 
affiliated with but also because it is usual for the owners and managers of these 
organisations to openly express that their policies are in line with certain political 
views they favour (catal, 2006; Hanger, 2006). In these circumstances, the main aim 
of journalism is not to inform their audience but to provide interpretation and 
commentary on events, in line with the ideology and discourse of the political party. 
Therefore, some newspapers have a number of column writers but few or no 
reporters at all. Irvan explains that while such party journalism allows the political 
parties to establish communication with their supporters, it also shapes journalism 
and news selection according to party policies (Irvan, 2006). Meanwhile, official 
media institutions such as BRTK and TAK (the state news agency) are not free from 
political circumstances either as their directors and administrative board members 
change with changes of government. 
One of the main ways of maintaining control within a newsroom is by socialisation, 
or learning and internalising the norms and policies of the institution, especially by 
new staff (Breed, 1999). In the Turkish Cypriot media, examples of this process were 
evident in state organisations such as BRTK and TAK where news reports were until 
recently checked to see if they were in line with the `national cause' (Ercakica, 
2008). Even though some journalists interviewed from these organisations reported 
no such strict control over their news output anymore, they also admitted that it is 
because they have formed their own boundaries concerning what they can say or 
write. Nezire Gürkan, a journalist working for the state news agency TAK, notes that 
experienced reporters have developed a sense of auto-control which helps them to 
decide what they can and cannot write in their news articles and that new staff learn 
to do the same, in time. She also adds that knowing such boundaries limits any 
intervention by authorities in their stories and journalistic processes (Gürkan, 
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Personal Interview, 2006). Acknowledging that the reporters within BRTK have also 
developed self-control, Tumay Tugyan, a journalist working for BRTK, explains that 
they and their news editors control and check that news reports are within the policy 
of the institution (Tugyan, Personal Interview, 2006). 
News Sources 
Governments can become a `communicator of enormous power' (Golding & 
Murdock, 1997, p. 23). By giving subsidies to media organisations, governments can 
seduce them into promoting their policies and actions. Providing the media with 
information not only reduces the effort required to discover and produce news stories 
but, for the government, it also provides a way of controlling them (Golding & 
Murdock, 1997). After 1974 in North Cyprus, a government comprised of nationalist 
forces did not just act as a regulator of information but was also a powerful source of 
it. Its control of and constraints on journalists contributed to the development of a 
journalism that relied on the government and state bureaucrats as credible sources, 
making them the primary news source of the Turkish Cypriot media. It progressed in 
such a way that the government became the main provider of the media's steady 
demand for information and news material. 
The state news agency, TürkAjansi Kibris (TAK-Turkish Agency Cyprus), plays a 
crucial role in providing news and information to the media which not only reflects 
the views of state officials but is also `approved' by them. Nezire Gürkan, a TAK 
journalist, describes the news produced by TAK as the `official news' or, in other 
words, the news that is in line with state ideology and cannot be critical of state 
policies. Gtirkan reveals that `if the president phones the news agency and asks us 
not to report some of his remarks in a speech he had delivered earlier, then we have 
to follow his request' (Gürkan, Personal Interview, 2006). 
Most, or in some cases all of the news items that appear in the news media come 
from the TAK agency. The media are heavily dependent on TAK, in part to maintain 
an image of objectivity and in part to protect themselves from criticism of bias and 
libel court cases. Reporting the officially approved news shields the media from any 
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risk of prosecution or endangering their relations with official sources. However, this 
relationship creates a bias towards authority and dominant groups. Another reason 
for using TAK's dispatches is to save time, labour and cost. Most of the news media 
use the news articles they receive from TAK rather than employing their own 
reporters, even in cases where their journalists have attended. There are only a few 
newspapers with an editorial team and a functioning newsroom with reporters which 
leads Yenidüzen's chief editor Cenk Mutluyakah to describe the TRNC as a `country 
where newspapers are published without any reporters': 
In our country, newspapers are published without a newsroom staff or reporters. 
Editors go to the newsroom in the afternoon, get all the news from TAK, change the 
headlines, use the internet to prepare a couple of more pages and fill the rest of the 
paper with opinion columns. Their journalism is totally dependent on the news 
agency. We are a country where newspapers are published without any reporters 
(Mutluyakali, Personal Interview, 2006). 
Therefore, rejecting claims of diversity, Mutluyakali argues that it is more like `an 
over abundance of newspapers rather than diversity'. He stresses that the advertising 
share of the media that have reporters and newsroom staff is the same as the ones 
that don't employ any journalists and he believes that it acts as an obstacle in the 
development of the media (Mutluyakali, Personal Interview, 2006). 
As a result of the dependence on the official news agency, the media consists of the 
same stories with the same content, with only their headlines distinguishing them. As 
a journalist describes `if you read one newspaper, it means you have read all of them' 
(Gürel, Personal Interview, 2006). The extent of the dependence of the media on 
TAK is such that, as May Cemal, the editor in chief of Hallen Sesi explains, if there 
is a mistake in a TAK story, it is repeated throughout the media (Cemal, Personal 
Interview, 2006). But what happens if a story is about an incident or an issue that the 
media organisation is critical of? Then they simply change the headline and some 
parts of the story according to their views and then publish or broadcast the rest as it 
is. There are many examples in the media where headlines and content do not match 
because the headline stresses something while the main body of the text is about 
something totally different. 
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Economic Factors 
Economic forces such as ownership and advertising also have an impact on 
journalism in North Cyprus. The ownership of the Turkish Cypriot media can be 
categorised as a combination of state, political party and private, and each shapes and 
determines the media output according to their political and economic interests. For 
example, BRTK and TAK news agency are the state organisations and until recently 
were utilized to serve the `national cause'. Kibris, the highest circulated newspaper, 
reflects the political and economic interests of its owner, a businessman. The media 
that are owned by the political parties mainly aim to provide these parties with a 
means of disseminating their political and ideological views to their supporters. 
Unsurprisingly, as media owners do not want to publish or broadcast any news that is 
not in line with their political and economic interests, they are very closely involved 
in the news production process. Levent Özadam, a print journalist who worked as a 
radio news editor at the time of the interview, noted that it is a very common process 
for the owners of the media institutions to interfere with the content of the news and 
editorial decisions in North Cyprus. He recalls many incidents of his previous boss 
going to the newsroom with some businessmen and changing the content of news 
stories and page layout Özadam himself had already edited ready for the print 
(Özadam, Personal Interview, 2006). catal, (2006) and Hanger (2006) who 
conducted two separate pieces of research into broadcast and print media in the 
TRNC, found that the owners have the last say over news output. The news staff, 
who have learned and internalised the interests of the owners, apply self-censorship 
and do not publish anything that opposes it. The aforementioned research also 
revealed that this situation is accepted as normal by some of the personnel in these 
organisations. 
The media owners can also use their media for ideological and cultural dominance to 
shape messages (Stevenson, 2002). While supporting certain ideologies and policies 
in the public sphere, they can restrict the flow of information, which is necessary for 
open debate. Having supported the nationalist ideologies and given very little space 
to opposition voices, Kibris Media Group (Ercakica, 2008), Geng TV and First FM 
shifted their allegiance from nationalist policies to ones that favoured a solution in 
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Cyprus and had a role in mobilising the public to give its support to the plan 
(RidderBraden et. al, 2005, catal, 2006; Hanger, 2006). 
The media in the TRNC is mostly dependent on advertising and compete with each 
other for market share. Thus advertising has a big impact not only on the production 
of news but also on the content of the news. For example, as Yenidilzen's chief editor 
Mutluyakali admits, it is difficult to write or say anything about a company that has 
given advertisement to the newspaper so as not to damage the financial relationship 
(Mutluyakali, Personal Interview, 2006). In a similar way, some journalists and 
editors explained to catal, (2006) and Hanger (2006) that when requested by the 
advertiser, the media would publish or broadcast information (or, in some cases, 
advertising disguised as news) for the sake of maintaining a business relationship. 
Meanwhile, the political position and views of the news media are important for 
advertisers. $ener Levent, the chief editor of Afrika newspaper, a radical left daily, 
told me that they get very little advertising from the state or from any other 
organisation because of the radical political views expressed in the newspaper 
(Levent, Personal Interview, 2006). Özal Ziya, the director of Radyo Mayis also told 
catal, (2006) that there are businesses that advertise on their radio station because 
they are sympathetic to their political views as well as ones who don't because they 
are against them. 
Professional Culture and the Production of News 
Within such a political and economic environment, journalists find it hard to fulfil 
their journalistic responsibilities properly. The intervention of owners in the private 
media and of the pro-government administration of the state-owned ones brings a 
number of limitations to their news production processes. Having internalised the 
policy of the media organisation, many journalists follow the rules and avoid 
challenging them. 
One important consequence of this is that journalists steer clear of being critical, 
especially of state institutions. According to Ibrahim Özejder, an academic in media 
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studies, the existence of a degree of criticism should not mislead people into 
believing otherwise: 
Looking at the criticisms of one radical newspaper may give the impression that 
criticism is tolerated but actually it is not. They are an isolated group of journalists 
or intellectuals who are treated as a group with worthless ideas. They are allowed to 
be critical because their readers are limited. The ones who can reach wider audience 
are prevented from doing so either by strict laws or by the boundaries formed in the 
minds of their journalists that stop them from being critical (Özejder, Personal 
Interview, 2006). 
Many Turkish Cypriot journalists and academics interviewed for this research also 
pointed to a lack of investigation and research as the main problem of journalism in 
the country. They point out that Turkish Cypriot journalists neither question nor have 
a critical approach to the issue they are working on, which reduces journalistic 
practice to merely recording what has been said. The underlying reason for such a 
lack of motivation and research among journalists could be explained in part by 
competition for market share not really creating a competition for exclusiveness and 
also in part with the journalistic practices developed in the conflict years that still 
prevail. 
Without questioning or providing tools of interpretation, the news reports are no 
different than the press releases. They also lead to speculation and the appearance of 
many texts disguised as news items that actually go no further than reporting a 
rumour. Mete Hatay, an academic and a researcher in a NGO, criticises journalists 
for asking questions within the news text itself as a means of reaching information 
easily rather than researching and reporting the answer. Highlighting it as one of the 
common practices of the Turkish Cypriot media, either as a result of lack of sources 
or time, Hatay argues that not undertaking detailed research leads to speculation 
rather than proper reporting (Hatay, Personal Interview, 2006). Ercakica (2008) also 
points at speculation as an important feature of the print media in North Cyprus and 
states that `in the Turkish Cypriot press, it is known that the texts that are printed as 
"the news" are plagiarized from other media organisations, many news texts have 
distortions which reach to the point of slander and most of the time are done for 
political gains'. 
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Questioning the underlying reasons of such a journalistic culture, the younger 
generation of journalists blame the older ones for the lack of investigation and 
critical approach among journalists in North Cyprus. They argue that the older 
generation, who are mostly in editorial and management positions today, started their 
journalism during the conflict years and therefore learned not to ask questions or 
challenge state authority. As Ekmekci, a journalist, puts it, `the older generation has 
learned journalism within a different tradition that demanded loyalty to the Turkish 
Cypriot leadership, Turkey or Turkish Military but the young generation who has not 
been through that process is more critical' (Ekmekci, Personal Interview, 2006). 
The job market in the media sector may also be influential in the journalism 
practiced today. Considering that journalism is a low-income profession (Irvan, 
2006), many journalists avoid challenging their employers so as not to risk their 
positions. As catal (2006) and Hanger's (2006) research shows, the media owners 
and managers choose to work with journalists that have similar political or 
ideological views. Anyone critical of the media organisation's policy or journalistic 
practices would either keep quiet or risk losing their position. 
Perhaps as a consequence, some journalists have become lazy. Some of those 
interviewed argued that reliance on TAK for the production and distribution of the 
news has made some journalists lazy. Gürkan stressed that some journalists made a 
habit of using the TAK dispatches even when they had attended the event themselves 
(GÜrkan, Personal Interview, 2006). Some also stated that journalists are satisfied 
with the information given to them as they often just record it without asking 
questions (Gilrel, Personal Interview, 2006; Basri, Personal Interview, 2006). 
Technological Factors 
Technological developments have also had an impact on the journalism practiced in 
North Cyprus. While a lack of technology in newsgathering led the media to focus on 
providing editorials and commentary rather than news reporting, particularly in the 
past, at present it has enabled them to publish or broadcast the news with fewer staff. 
Despite this, in a small country, where five universities teach media studies, young 
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journalist candidates feel the pressure of equipping themselves not only with 
journalistic skills but also with technological skills such as using video, editing and 
page layout to find employment in the media. 
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PART TWO 
CHAPTER 4: APPLYING CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
The underlying assumption of this thesis is that identity is socially constructed and in 
this process of construction the media play a significant role. Adopting the idea that 
symbolic constructions display an articulated structure which shapes them into truth 
within a given specific spatial-temporal setting (Thompson, 1990), I outline and discuss 
the general framework for the study of such constructions and the interpretation of their 
meaning. 
In this chapter, I first discuss the social constructionist approach as it forms the basis of 
many theories about culture and society, one of which is discourse theory. It provides 
the general framework for the development of the methods that fall under the rubric of 
critical discourse analysis. Then, drawing upon this, I explore the research 
methodologies that have developed within the broad school of critical discourse 
analysis, which provides the theoretical and methodological parameters of this study. 
Finally, I identify the particular subjects of this study, discuss the sampling logic and 
take a closer look at the appropriate research tools that are applied to the analysis of the 
data in the research. 
Social Constructionist Approach 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), the research paradigm adopted for this research, is 
based on a social constructionist approach which embraces a variety of theories about 
society and culture and recognises the social aspect of language use. Being critical of the 
concept of `objectivity' (Lichtenberg, 1996), this approach has raised questions about 
the relationship between representation and reality (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002) and 
ways of understanding the world. 
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Explaining the philosophical assumptions of the approach, Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) 
remark that representations of the world are not reflections of a pre-existing reality but a 
product of our categorisation of the world or, in discursive terms, products of discourse. 
As they note, `this does not mean that reality itself does not exist. Meaning and 
representations are real. Physical objects also exist, but they only gain meaning through 
discourse' (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 9). Therefore, the social world is not pre- 
given or determined by external forces but is socially and discursively constructed. 
Representations of reality contribute to constructing reality. 
Another assumption is that the way in which we understand the world is historically and 
culturally specific and can change over time (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002). This is to 
say, the production, circulation and reception of the meaning of symbolic forms are 
processes made possible by the rules and resources of a certain historical and cultural 
context and field (Thompson, 1990). 
The link between knowledge and social processes is also important (Jorgensen and 
Phillips, 2002). In our understanding of the world we create knowledge through social 
interaction in which we construct common truths and compete over what is true and 
false. The social construction of knowledge has social consequences because different 
social understandings of the world will lead to different social actions. Within a 
particular worldview, some forms of action will be accepted as natural while others 
regarded as unacceptable. 
The constructionist approach had a big impact on the development of theories in relation 
to language and discourse. Its view of language as a social practice and a medium 
through which meaning is produced and channelled has especially influenced cultural 
studies. Thus, many linguistic theories, such as the pioneering work of both Saussure's 
semiotic approach and Foucault's discursive approach, are all based on this broad school 
of thought (Hall, 1997). 
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The media, one of the means of producing and disseminating symbolic forms, play a 
significant role in the construction and reflection of reality. Providing a meaningful 
representation of the world and communicating it to others, the media help to naturalise 
social reality which also serves to establish and sustain power relations. Shaped within a 
certain social structure, in which the communication of symbolic forms and meanings 
are expressed, the media are one of the means through which `reality' is made apparent. 
From Language to Discourse 
As research in the fields of language, meaning and discourse has demonstrated, language 
is a way of making sense of the world, relating to it, processing its complexity and also 
internalising it (Berger, 1984, Hall, 1997, Lee, 1992). Functioning as a classificatory 
instrument, language helps in assigning conceptual categories to human experiences as 
well as imposing a `structure on our perceptions of the world' (Lee, 1992, p. 8). That is 
to say, bound up with a world-view, language constitutes and represents reality rather 
than mirroring it. As Jorgensen and Philips (2002) explain, knowledge of the world is 
not a reflection of the truth but the consequence of the categorisation of the world, and in 
relation to that, of a world-view. Language does not only transfer meaning and 
information but also constitutes our social world, identities and relations. Within a 
culture, sharing the same linguistic and conceptual categorisations helps us to see the 
world through the same conceptual map and use the same language system to 
comprehend it (Hall, 1997, Lee, 1992). Yet language is not objective but heterogeneous 
and subject to the processes of different perceptions and interpretations (Lee, 1992). 
Meaning is not inherent in things in the material world but is a result of the production 
process of individuals (Hall, 1997). 
Describing language as a `social institution' (Saussure, 1983, p. 15), it was Saussure who 
first focused on the social role of language in society. According to him and the 
structuralist model developed from his ideas, language is a system which people learn 
and internalise as part of their socialisation process to express certain concepts and ideas 
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(Hall, 1997). Therefore, to understand its role, it is important to study the internal 
relationships which give language its form and function (Lee, 1992, Ehrmann, 1970) or 
the systems of thought that shape language (Phillips, 2000). In his study of language, 
Saussure separated language into `langue' which consisted of the rules and codes of the 
language and `parole' which is the linguistic performance or the act of speaking and 
writing (Fairclough, 1989, Hall 1997). This approach views langue as the social aspect 
of the language while parole is related to the individual use that is made possible by 
these rules and codes of the language. Thus, the focus of linguistic study is the structure 
of language, as this is the part that generates meaning rather than the actual language use 
which is too arbitrary and lacks structural properties to be included in the study (Fowler, 
1991; Hall, 1997). 
The structuralist approach attracted criticism for excluding the interactive characteristics 
of language in actual use, ignoring the dynamic nature of language, and for trying to 
study language with `the law like precision of a science' (Hall, 1997, p. 35). The 
linguistic theories that developed in reaction to the structuralist approach came to regard 
language as a structure that is temporary and changeable, with meanings also changing 
according to the context in which they are used rather than being stable or fixed. The 
development of the semiotic theory of ideology (Eagleton, 1991) highlighted in 
particular how an ideological struggle takes place in language to determine meanings or 
define which linguistic norms are legitimate (Fairclough 1989). This does not imply that 
meaning is abstract or floating but, on the contrary, that it is fixed within a specific 
context and historical moment (Eagleton, 1991). The fixed meaning, such as that given 
in a dictionary, is only an indication that one of the meaning systems has gained 
dominance in the struggle (Fairclough, 1989). It is also related to the influence of 
ideology as a mechanism of power in modern societies in which language is in the centre 
of the ideological struggle (Fairclough, 1989). 
Such approaches to language and language use led to the development of the concept of 
discourse. Discourse points at the close link between language and social relations as 
well as highlighting that `language is a material form of ideology and language is 
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invested by ideology' (Fairclough, 1995, p. 73). Thus, it is a concept that relates to the 
`historical, political and cultural "fixing" of certain meanings and their constant 
reproduction and circulation via established kinds of speech, forms of representation and 
in particular institutional settings' (O'Sullivan et al, 1994, p. 93). Reflecting the social 
power within language (Eagleton, 1991) as the products of social, historical and 
institutional formations, discourses influence how an issue can be talked about. In other 
words, just as a discourse governs a particular way of talking about a topic, it also rules 
out or limits other ways. This is why Michel Foucault, who played a central role in the 
development of the concept of discourse, was interested in the production and changing 
systems of rules of discourse at different periods (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982). In his 
view, `each society has its own regime of truth, its general politics of the truth' (cited in 
Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, p. 117) in which certain discursive formations are 
considered to be `true'. This process could also be explained with the close link between 
discourse, knowledge and power as it can be argued that power governs knowledge 
through discursive practices within an institution to regulate social conduct (Hall, 1997). 
Interpreting Foucault, Hall writes `knowledge linked to power not only assumes the 
authority of `the truth' but has the power to make itself true' (Hall, 1997, p. 49, italics in 
original). 
Research Paradigm: Critical Discourse Analysis 
Influenced by the theories of Western Marxism and especially of the social and political 
thought of Althuser, Gramsci and Foucault, CDA is a critical approach (Titscher et. al. 
2000; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). Its critical attitude comes from being based on the 
ideas of the Frankfurt School which take into account the historical contexts of 
discursive interactions and argue for a link between linguistic and social structure 
(Titscher et. al., 2000). Wodak (2001 a) also adds that the notion of critical inherent in 
CDA should be understood as `having distance to the data, embedding the data in the 
social, taking a political stance explicitly and a focus on self-reflection' (p. 9). In line 
with critical thought, the underlying assumption of CDA is that as the power relations 
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that frame reality are reflected in discourse, the main aim of the analysis `is to unmask 
ideologically permeated and often obscured structures of power, political control and 
dominance as well as strategies of discriminatory inclusion and exclusion in language 
use' (Wodak et. al, 1999, p. 8). Along the lines of the social constructionist approach, 
CDA sees truth being related to power as well as being historically and culturally 
specific and contingent (Jorgensen and Philips, 2002). 
Essentially, CDA has two main concerns: on the one hand, it is primarily concerned with 
language and linguistic structure while on the other hand, it is preoccupied with the 
relationship between language use and the social context it is situated within. In other 
words, CDA does not just deal with the linguistic structure of discourses but also with 
the socio-cultural and discursive practices in which these discourses are produced and 
received. For CDA, language is a social practice, which means that it is a socially and 
historically situated and purposeful action (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Wodak 2001). 
Although it assumes that people communicate within a particular language they learned 
as part of their socialisation process, it also believes that learning and using a language 
does not just involve constructing a linguistic structure but also selecting an appropriate 
discourse according to certain circumstances and settings (Fowler, 1991; Fairclough, 
1989). Therefore, by treating discourse as a social practice, it investigates the linguistic 
character of social and cultural processes and tries to make people aware of the 
influences of language and social structure that they have been previously unaware of 
(Titcher, et. al, 2000). 
Discourses are structurally part of their contexts and therefore, contexts such as the 
social situations and structures in which discourses are produced and understood should 
also be included in the analysis of discourse (van Dijk, 1997). Describing discourse as a 
form of social practice, CDA examines the underlying structures, conventions and rules 
that discourses are related to. Yet the relationship of discourse and its context is not one- 
directional but dialectical which means that as well as constituting and shaping society 
and culture in many ways, discourse is also constituted by them. On the one hand, socio- 
cultural factors shape discourses; on the other, discourses influence social and political 
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processes and actions (Wodak et al., 1999; Fairclough, 1995). As Fairclough and Wodak 
(1997) explain 
Describing discourse as a social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a 
particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) 
which frame it. A dialectical relationship is a two way relationship: the discursive event 
is shaped by situation, institutions and social structures, but it also shapes them (p. 55). 
Within this dialectical relationship, discursive practices can be constitutive in different 
ways: First, they can produce and construct particular social conditions which may 
encourage the construction of collective identities such as national and ethnical. Second, 
they can contribute to the legitimation of the status quo by perpetuating, reproducing or 
justifying it. Third, they may be instrumental in transforming the status quo and concepts 
such as nationality and ethnicity which are related to it. Fourth, they may be effective in 
dismantling and destroying the status quo and concepts such as nationality and ethnicity 
which are related to it (Wodak et al., 1999, Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). Depending on the 
aim, discourse can adopt different strategies or practices to achieve certain political, 
social or linguistic aims. 
Developed within critical theory, CDA explores the concept of power and ideology in 
discursive acts and how these are exercised and negotiated in discourses. In its view, 
language is not powerful on its own but can be used to challenge, undermine and alter 
the power within social structures (Wodak, 2001a). Thus, CDA is interested in 
examining how discourse, using language, mediates ideology and manipulates power 
relations. According to Fairclough (1989), the relation between power and discourse has 
two dimensions, as `power in discourse' and `power behind discourse'. He explains that 
while `power in discourse' suggests that discourse could be a place where power 
relations are exercised, `power behind discourse' points at a process which shapes and 
forms relations of power. Power over discourse in the `power in discourse' indicates 
power to control and change the rules of discursive practices. Both `power in discourse' 
and `power behind discourse' mean that discursive aspects of power relations are not 
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fixed but on the contrary, its exercise within discourses is negotiated and contested 
(Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). 
Ideology, an important part of establishing and maintaining power relations, is circulated 
and reproduced through discourse (Johnstone, 2002). Embedded in language, ideology 
produces rules and conventions that promote an understanding and acceptance of the 
world. Using language, discourse presents a specific worldview in which certain actions 
and rules seem natural while others are unacceptable within that ideological discourse 
formation (Fairclough, 1995). In other words, while allowing certain perspectives and 
knowledge in particular domains of social life as legitimate, discourse excludes other 
possibilities and other perspectives from those domains. Given that discourse exercises 
power through knowledge (Jager, 2001), CDA questions the discursive formations of 
knowledge, power and ideology, especially in authoritative discourses, and uncovers the 
relationship between discourse and ideology (Johnstone, 2002). It focuses on the role of 
ideology in providing a framework for understanding the world so that it can make 
people aware of the ideological role of language and discourse by showing that 
institutions construct their own ideologies and discourses. 
Another characteristic of CDA is seeing discourse as historical. As Wodak explains, 
`every discourse is historically produced and interpreted, that is, it is situated in time and 
space; and that dominance structures are legitimated by ideologies of powerful groups' 
(Wodak, 2001a, p. 3). This is why, for discourse analysis, it is not enough to understand 
the underlying conventions and rules and consider the culture and ideology that 
surrounds it but it is also necessary to recognise what the discourse relates to in the past 
(Titscher et. al. 2000). Meyer points out that CDA is based on the assumption that `all 
discourses are historical and therefore can be understood with reference to their context' 
(Meyer, 2001, p. 15). It is also that discourses are connected to other discourses that were 
produced before them which not only creates an intertextual situation but also requires 
these discourses to be uncovered as well. 
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It can be argued that `the goal of CDA is often explicitly political' (Johnstone, 2002, 
p. 45). Its political involvement comes from its concern for social problems and how 
these problems are constituted within discourse (Scollon, 2001). As a problem-oriented 
approach, CDA doesn't just focus on language but also on the linguistic character of 
social and cultural processes and structures (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). Fairclough 
and Wodak (1997) explain that CDA's interest in social and political processes and 
movements comes from its claim that they have a partly linguistic-discursive character 
and that they generally include cultural and ideological elements. Thus, it believes that 
studying the discourses of these social and cultural representations can reveal new 
ideological attempts to establish hegemony over certain discourses. 
Unlike other discourse analysis, CDA does not have an objective stance and political 
indifference but on the contrary, has `emancipatory objectives' (Fairclough, 2001, 
p. 125) and `allies itself with those who suffer political and social injustice' (Wodak et. 
al. 1999, p. 8). It is interested in the way discourse is used in the reproduction of 
dominance, the violation of norms as well as the human and social rights of groups, 
institutions and, in some cases, nation states (van Dijk, 2001). Therefore, by choosing 
the perspective of the suffering ones and criticising unjust social conditions that have an 
effect on social practice and social relationships, CDA aims to contribute to the 
improvement of these conditions by providing alternative resources for people to tackle 
their problems (Titscher et. al. 2000; Fairclough, 2001). 
It is this committed nature of CDA that has raised questions about it being a valid tool of 
analysis. As discourse can be construed in different ways, CDA, benefiting from the 
broad contexts in which it is used, brings its own interpretation to the texts. Yet, this 
could lead it to being seen more as an ideological and biased interpretation rather than an 
analysis. Its explicit political stance that forms the basis of its examination also enhances 
the notion that its ideological commitment is an important factor in the selection of the 
texts and also in their interpretation (Titscher et. at. 2000). Acknowledging this 
criticism, Titscher et. al. (2000) points out that the results are open ended in CDA and 
that its explicit position and commitment differentiates it from other analysis. 
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Furthermore, Meyer (2001) raises the question of whether it is `possible to perform any 
research free of a priori value judgements' (p. 17) which according to CDA it is not. 
Acknowledging these debates and criticisms of CDA, there are two reasons for adopting 
it in this research: First, as CDA is suitable for use in research that explores social and 
cultural changes, it will allow observation of the shifts in the discursive construction of 
Turkish Cypriot national identity along with changes in social, cultural and historical 
contexts. The second reason is related to the nature of the phenomenon under study. The 
ideological power of nationalism has a naturalising effect on national identity, 
embedding it in daily life without it being realised. Studying a phenomenon that is taken 
for granted, such as national identity, requires a critical approach like the CDA's to 
reveal hidden power relations and ideological representations during its construction and 
renegotiation. Thus, following the CDA's approach, this study will not just examine the 
linguistic structure of the texts but will also explore the dialectical relationship between 
social-cultural factors and the discursive construction of Turkish Cypriot national 
identity. 
The Discourse-Historical Approach 
Developed by the Vienna School of Critical Discourse Analysis, the discourse-historical 
approach is a hermeneutic and interpretative way of studying discourse. Initially utilized 
to study anti-Semitism in public discourse, later the approach was applied to explore 
issues like the discursive construction of national identity and racism in general (Wodak, 
2001b; Wodak et. al. 1999, Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). Influenced by critical theory, 
Wodak (2001b) explains how the discourse- historical approach follows a complex 
concept of social critique that consists of three interconnected aspects: The first one is 
text or discourse immanent critique which aims at discovering inconsistencies, (self) 
contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas in the text or the discourse. The second one is 
socio-diagnostic critique, which is concerned with the exposure of the persuasive, 
propagandist or manipulative character of discursive practices. It analyses a discursive 
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event within the framework of a wider social context rather than just focusing on the text 
to discover the social and political aims and functions of discursive practices. In this 
type of critique, the researcher brings in background and contextual information as well 
as social and political relations and structures to the analysis (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). 
The third aspect is the prognostic critique, which is related to the ethico-practical 
dimension of discursive practice. It seeks to change and transform things by playing a 
role in finding solutions for social problems. One such example was the attempt by 
researchers to contribute to a transformation and improvement of communication by 
reducing language barriers in public places as well as providing guidelines for avoiding 
sexist language (Wodak, 2001b; Titscher et. al. 2000, Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). 
Following the principle of triangulation, the discourse-historical approach benefits from 
a variety of methodological and theoretical perspectives as well as a variety of empirical 
data and background information. Therefore, it integrates interdisciplinary perspectives 
such as historical, socio-political and linguistic, as well as using various methods of data 
collection and sets of data in the analysis (Wodak, 2001b; Wodak, et. al. 1999). Thus, 
the approach is useful in examining the interrelation of discursive and social practices as 
well as structures (Titscher et. al. 2000; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). The discourse- 
historical approach is also based on a four-level concept of context which is: 
a) The immediate linguistic text, the semantic environment of an utterance. 
b) The intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres 
and discourses. 
c) The extralinguistic social variables and institutional settings of a specific situation 
of an utterance. 
d) The broader socio-political and historical context in which the discursive practices 
are embedded or related to, such as the history of the discursive event and the history to 
which the discoursal topic is related (Wodak, 2001b, p. 67; Titscher et. al. 2000, p. 157, 
Wodak et. al. 1999, p. 9). 
Another important aspect of the discourse- historical approach is that it analyses the 
historical dimension of discursive events. The discourse-historical approach is especially 
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effective in the analysis of discourses about nations and national identities because it 
combines `knowledge about historical sources and the background of the social and 
political fields in which discursive "events" are embedded' (Wodak 2001, p. 65; Wodak 
et. al, 1999, p. 156). The approach is also useful in observing the changes particular 
discourses go through over a period of time which is one of the reasons for adopting the 
discourse- historical approach in this research. Even though the focus of this study is the 
discursive construction of a national identity by the newspapers in recent years, the 
process still needs to be located in a historical context to provide a better understanding 
of the issue. The integration of the historical dimension into the analysis also helps one 
to observe the shifts within the discourses related to national identity over the years. 
The analysis of the discourse-historical approach is three-dimensional: The first one is 
establishing the contents or the thematic areas of the discourses related to national 
identity. In this study, similar to the research Wodak et. at. (1999) conducted on the 
discursive construction of Austrian national identity, I focused on five themes: the 
linguistic construction of an essential understanding of national identity, a common 
political past, common political future, a common culture and a national space. 
The second step of analysis is to examine the discursive strategies employed in the texts. 
Wodak et. al. (1999) describes these strategies as conscious plans of action to achieve a 
certain political, psychological or other kind of objective. They listed the main strategies 
used in their data as construction, transformation, perpetuation or justification and 
dismantling or destructive strategies: Constructive strategies `construct and establish a 
certain national identity by promoting unification, identification and solidarity, as well 
as differentiation' (Wodak et. al. 1999, p. 33). Strategies of transformation, as the name 
suggests, aims at transforming an established national identity into another one. In 
contrast, perpetuation strategy attempts to reproduce or preserve, support or protect a 
threatened national identity. Justification strategies are used to justify one's actions by 
legitimising them if, and when questioned, and also maintain and defend a tainted 
common national self-perception (Wodak et, al. 1999). Finally, destructive strategies are 
ones that are employed to dismantle parts of national identity without providing a new 
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model for it. In this study, I also examine the newspaper texts to find out which 
strategies were employed in the construction of Turkish Cypriot identity. 
The third analytical unit of the discourse-historical approach is to study the forms of 
linguistic implementation employed in discursive actions. The underlying reason for 
such an investigation is to identify the linguistic means that express unity, sameness, 
difference and so on. The use of `we' is especially important in discourses about nations 
and national identity (Wodak et. al. 1999) as well as other linguistic means such as 
metonymy, synecdoche and personification. While metonymy hides responsible agents 
of an action, personification attributes a human form to a phenomenon. Synecdoche, on 
the other hand, by replacing the name of a referent with another, can intensify or 
diminish the meaning (Wodak et. al. 1999). 
Why Study Media Discourse? 
The media plays a crucial role in reflecting and constituting modern society as well as 
being constituted by it. According to Bell (1991), analysing the media language is 
important not only because the media generate much of the language that is heard in 
society but also `the media are dominating presenters of language in society at large' 
(p. 3). Their role as a manufacturer and distributor of symbolic materials and as public 
opinion-shapers make them important ideological institutions of society. Therefore, the 
media discourse is a useful resource for analysing the relations of power and control 
within society as they are also reflected in language structures within the media. A 
critical investigation into how the media operate and how they communicate to an 
audience would create an understanding and awareness of how relations and structures 
of power are embedded in the forms of everyday language. Media discourses can reveal 
how language contributes to the legitimisation of existing social relations and hierarchies 
of authority and control in society. For example, media representations may translate 
official viewpoints into public idioms (Deacon et al., 1999) and encourage the 
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legitimising of the positions of these officials, which is also a factor in sustaining the 
order of that society (Fairclough, 1995; Trew, 1979). 
The application of critical discourse analysis to media texts would show the links 
between the media texts and the socio-cultural processes in which they are produced. 
The dialectical relationship between media discourse, society and culture means that the 
media discourse not only contributes to social and cultural changes but is also 
constituted by them. According to Fairclough (1995), media texts are a `sensitive 
barometer' (p. 52) of socio-cultural changes as these changes can be found in the 
discursive practices of the media. 
The news media, which is the main concern of this research, has an ideological role 
within society as an information provider. The societal structures and ideologies that 
dominate the selection and production of the news not only help them to be naturalised 
and treated as common sense but their claim to be factual promotes the quality of their 
persuasiveness as well (van Dijk, 1988). Rather than being just the transmission of facts, 
the news is also the embodiment of the assumptions, values, beliefs and attitudes of its 
producers (McNair, 1998). However, ideological meanings are not only embedded 
within the news discourses but also in the routines of news production which lead 
journalists to adopt the frames and ideology of elite organisations, institutions and 
persons (van Dijk, 1988). As an example, linked to the configuration of power within 
society, the news media perceive some institutions such as government, the judiciary 
and the police as more important and newsworthy than others. Strengthening their 
institutional power and position, the news media accredit these sources as reliable and 
trustworthy. Thus, given that the news media's production of `reality' influences public 
understanding of the world, their attitudes and behaviour, whose reality they are 
reflecting becomes an important question in the news analysis. 
The way the news media address their audience also has an ideological impact. Rather 
than speaking directly to their audience, the news media reports events mainly through 
other institutions, groups and movements, which readers identify with or support (Trew, 
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1979). In other words, it is through these groups that the news media provide an 
interpretation of events. By providing dominant knowledge and attitude structures that 
fit with the general understanding of the social, political, cultural and economic 
structures of society, they treat them as common sense rather than raise questions about 
them. However, this should not be misinterpreted to mean that there is only one way of 
understanding and interpreting events; on the contrary, the news media act as a site of 
struggle between different understandings and interpretations for ideological hegemony 
in which the dominancy of ideas changes over time. 
Methods and Research Tools 
The main concern of this research is the discursive construction of national identity 
through the newspapers in North Cyprus; yet it is also interested in how these different 
and sometimes conflicting concepts of national identity are being imposed, legitimised 
and maintained by the news media. Therefore, it questions the strategies the news media 
employ to maintain and reproduce naturalized concepts of national identity. Analyzing 
the mediation of national identity, the study attempts to reveal the ideological 
assumptions, relations of power and control that underlie the media representation and 
discourse of national identity in the TRNC. Following CDA's idea that the media texts 
and society have a dialectical relationship in which texts shape society and culture as 
well as being shaped by them, the research explores the relationship between discursive 
acts and the construction of national identity through the media. For example, studying 
the discursive construction of national sameness and difference, as Wodak (2001) 
suggests, shows how the discursive construction of national identity leads to the political 
and social exclusion of some groups and exposes the discursive process of creating 
`others' in relation to the construction of `us'. 
So far, the study has focused on the development of Turkish Cypriot identity and the 
Turkish Cypriot media in order to provide a broader socio-political and historical 
context for the discursive practices that are under investigations. The other three 
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contexts, as suggested by the discourse-historical approach, will be taken into account 
during the analysis of each case. The previous two chapters, which studied identity and 
media issues, benefited from an interdisciplinary approach that combined historical and 
socio-political perspectives using the data derived from various methods of data 
collection such as archival research and interviews. The interviews conducted in the 
context of news production are especially enlightening about the institutional settings of 
the discourses analysed. 
The rest of the research will focus on the data collected by carrying out an analysis of 
selected case studies. As Titscher et. al. (2000) explains, `case studies aim to analyse a 
phenomenon very precisely and every unit of investigation as an entity itself' (p. 43). 
Multiple case studies, as will be the case in this research, are not aimed at developing 
statistical generalisations but theoretical ones, as well as examining the relationship 
between them based on the similarities or differences. The case studies chosen for this 
research are the newspaper coverage of three politically and culturally significant events 
for Turkish Cypriots in the last 12 years. The use of `significant' is to indicate that these 
events occupied the agenda of Turkish Cypriots and led to many heated public and 
media debates. Focusing only on these recent years is not to deny the idea that the 
construction of national identity is an ongoing process, but to reflect the changes and the 
hegemonic struggles in the conceptualisation of a national identity within the Turkish 
Cypriot community that began around the mid-1990. 
Among the daily newspapers published in the TRNC today, three of them, Kibris, 
Hallen Sesi and Yenidüzen are included in the study to note their reflection of Turkish 
Cypriot identity in their news reports. These newspapers were chosen because they 
reflect a broad spectrum of opinions in North Cyprus and are the three newspapers that 
have had long and steady publication lives. Hallen Sesi (The voice of people) is the 
longest surviving Turkish Cypriot newspaper, having begun publication in 1942. During 
the conflict with the Greek Cypriots, the newspaper played a key role in the promotion 
of Turkish nationalism. Yenidüzen, (New Order) began in 1975 as the publication of the 
left wing CTP (Republican Turkish Party), which favours a solution to the Cyprus 
114 
problem based on a federation with Greek Cypriots. Kibris (Cyprus), on the other hand, 
is a commercial newspaper with the highest circulation in the TRNC. 
Three case studies selected for the research are based on the newspaper reports of three 
events. The analysis covers a period of a week before and a week after the main event to 
include enough time to reflect the views of the newspapers and also to limit the 
timeframe of the study as the newspapers in some cases continued reporting on the 
issues for a longer period. 
The first case study is about the demonstration by a group of Greek Cypriot 
motorcyclists at the buffer zone in Cyprus in August 1996 that turned into violent 
clashes between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots and resulted with the death of two 
Greek Cypriot civilians. I have chosen this event to see how the three newspapers 
articulated conceptualisations of a national identity in relation to Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish nationals in North Cyprus. 
The second event is the opening of the border that separates the two communities on the 
island in April 2003. It enabled the members of both communities to cross to the `other' 
side for the first time since the division of the island in 1974 and meet the people they 
had regarded as the enemy for years. This section questions the concept of border to find 
out who was included or excluded in the reproduction of the national community by the 
newspapers. 
The third case study is about the removal of a footbridge in January 2007 which was 
initially erected to act as a crossing point and link the divided city of Nicosia. The 
footbridge, that attracted the criticism of the Greek Cypriot government when it was first 
built, caused a rift between the civil authority and the Turkish military in the north of the 
island when the Turkish Cypriot government wanted it to be removed. This part of the 
research focuses on the articulation of national identity in the debates surrounding the 
footbridge. 
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I have selected the newspaper coverage of these events to examine, not only because 
they occupied the media's agenda and created debate amongst Turkish Cypriots but also 
because of the relevance of these news texts to the construction of national identity. 
Along with Turkish Cypriots, the events also involved Greek Cypriots and Turks which 
is useful in the investigation of how oppositional metaphors were used in the 
construction of national identity and how the description of the `other' was employed in 
`our self-perception'. Bearing in mind that the media and society have a dialectical 
relationship, the existing prejudices and stereotyping within the society might be 
reflected in the construction of the media texts as well as the media playing a role in 
constructing those prejudices and stereotypes. A discourse analysis of these texts may 
also provide evidence of how national identity was constructed through these prejudices 
and stereotypes towards neighbouring nations as well as through the self-perceptions of 
the Turkish Cypriots. 
Exploring shifts in the concept of national identity within the media as a result of the 
ideological struggle will be another purpose of the analysis. Having discussed the idea 
that ideologies not only naturalise and turn some discourses into common sense but also 
give them meaning as though they had been permanently in place, the analysis will test 
the role of the newspaper texts in providing such a perception of national identity. Also 
accepting that meanings are not fixed but bound to change over time as a result of 
struggles for hegemony, which is an important characteristic of discursive practice 
(Deacon et al., 1999), the news texts are examined to find out if and what changes there 
are in the newspapers' discourses and representations of Turkish Cypriot identity. 
Research Limitations 
In this research I focus only on newspaper reports and exclude broadcast ones for two 
reasons: First, broadcasting was under state monopoly until 1997 when 
commercialization of broadcasting was first allowed. When the border incidents took 
place in 1996, there was only the state broadcasting corporation, BRT, to cover the 
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incidents. Analyzing only BRT's news reports would only have provided me with the 
discourse related to the official concept of national identity and not other discourses. 
Secondly, the lack of broadcast news archives in the TRNC inevitably limits my 
research to only the analysis of newspaper coverage of the events. Even if I wanted to 
extend my research to broadcast and benefit from their news reports as well, I would not 
be able to find all the relevant broadcast coverage of the events under study. Insistence 
on carrying out such research would have risked the reliability and validity of the study. 
The research is also limited to news reports and excludes all other types of texts such as 
editorials (including opinions columns). News reports and editorials have different 
functions as well as different production and reception processes: While news articles 
are regarded as informative and just giving the facts, editorials are seen as evaluative 
texts that include opinion. I am aware that this is a problematic approach, as news 
articles do not consist of objective facts but feature the opinions, values and beliefs of 
their producers as well. Despite that, in general the news is considered and understood to 
provide information about events and is accepted to be true or close to the truth and that 
attributes to them a persuasive function (van Dijk, 1988) which is why I have decided to 
concentrate only on such texts. 
The main limitation of the study is related to me being a native Turkish Cypriot. As well 
as possessing the necessary linguistic skills, I believe I have an intimate knowledge of 
society, history and cultural resources that allows me to study the issue. On the other 
hand, I am aware that having been through the socialisation process of this community, 
through its educational system and other processes, this might lead to preconceptions 
about the issues under study, even at the subconscious level. Therefore, I cannot claim a 
socially neutral stance and not bring my own values and evaluations to the research. Yet, 
adopting CDA's philosophical assumptions, I make every effort to create the distance 
necessary to study the naturalised or common sense understandings of a phenomenon 
such as national identity. I am not questioning the ideological aspects of a discursive 
event to seek truth but to reveal how the claims to truth could be used to reproduce the 
power relations in the discourses surrounding national identity in North Cyprus. I 
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believe I will be able to maintain a critical attitude to interrogate the discourse related to 
national identity as reflected in the newspapers. 
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CHAPTER 5: BORDER CLASHES IN CYPRUS IN 1996 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the newspaper coverage of two demonstrations organised by 
Greek Cypriots at the border in Cyprus in August 1996. These were the two most 
violent incidences between the two communities since the division of the island in 
1974 as they resulted in the death of two Greek Cypriot demonstrators and had a 
significant impact on relations between North and South. 
The analysis focuses on the news texts to see how three different newspapers 
articulated conceptualisations of a national identity in relation to Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish nationals, who were also present at the clashes that occurred during the first 
demonstration. Through critical discourse analysis, the research aims to examine 
how the newspapers referred to different groups involved in the incidents. The 
analysis also enables one to compare the differences and similarities in the discourses 
within the Turkish Cypriot press. 
The Setting - Brief Description of the Context within Which the Border Clashes 
Took Place 
In protest at the division of the island a group representing the organization of Greek 
Cypriot motorcyclists, accompanied by supporters affiliated to European 
motorcyclist organizations, decided to break through the buffer zone into the Turkish 
Cypriot area. They started their rally in Berlin on 2°d August 1996 and planned to 
finish in Cyprus on l la` August 1996. The motorcyclists called their demonstration a 
`peaceful anti-invasion activity' and claimed that their protest was for a `borderless 
world' (Kibris, 11 August, p. 2). A photograph in Kibris newspaper showed one of 
the motorcyclists wearing a t-shirt with a logo that said `a world without borders' in 
English and Greek (Kibris, 7 August, p. 1). 
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On 11th of August 1996, the day the motorcyclists' demonstration was supposed to 
take place, the Greek Cypriot Motorcyclists Federation announced that it had 
cancelled the rally following pressure from the Greek Cypriot government, citing 
reasons of security. Yet, some Greek Cypriot demonstrators remained undeterred and 
after congregating at the border, crossed the buffer zone into Turkish Cypriot 
territory. Meanwhile, a sizeable group of protestors from the Turkish Cypriot side 
had also gathered at the border to stage their counter demonstration against the Greek 
Cypriot demonstrators and also to prevent them from breaking into Turkish Cypriot 
territory. When the Greek Cypriot protesters attempted to cross the buffer zone, the 
demonstrators from both sides clashed. One Greek Cypriot, Tassos Isaac, was kicked 
and beaten to death by a mob of men from the north. Some of these men belonged to 
Turkish ultra nationalist groups such as Ülkücü (Idealist)'. Originating in Turkey, the 
group had a pan -Turkist ideology and was largely supported by nationalist groups in 
the TRNC. It was reported in the media that around 150 supporters of this group had 
arrived in the TRNC in order to join the demonstration (Halkin Sesi, 13 August, p. 3; 
Yenidüzen, 13 August, p. 5; Kibris, 13 August, p. 4). 
On 14th August, the day of Isaac's funeral, another demonstration was staged at the 
Turkish Cypriot border, which resulted in the death of another Greek Cypriot, 
Solomos Spiro Solomou. Having passed the UN buffer zone and reached the Turkish 
Cypriot side, Solomou climbed a flagpole in an attempt to lower the Turkish flag. He 
was shot dead by the military forces from the north. Both incidents increased the 
tension between the two communities. 
In 1996, the Green Line acted as a barrier not just for crossing but also for 
communication between both communities. People on both sides of the Line got the 
news about the `other' through the media, which relied on the information provided 
by official sources. The Turkish Cypriot media received the news about the `other' 
through TAK which monitored and distributed the news from the Greek Cypriot side. 
BRTK also regularly listened to Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation's radio station to 
follow the news there. 
Olküca (Idealist) or Ulkil Ocaklari is an organization with a pan-Turkist ideology. Pan-Turkism, on 
the other hand, is an ideology and movement that aims to unite all Turkic people (Landau, 1995). 
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At the time, the government in North Cyprus was comprised of nationalist forces and 
this was reflected in its ideology and practices as well as its media and 
communication policies vis a vis the Greek Cypriots. It remained opposed to any 
contact with Greek Cypriots and advocated keeping the status quo on the island as 
divided into two separate states. In state pronouncements and policies, no distinction 
was made between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks. 
The left opposition parties, on the other hand, such as Cumhuriyety! Turk Partisi 
(CTP- the Republican Turkish Party), supported a solution to the Cyprus problem 
with Greek Cypriots and criticised Turkey's power and control over North Cyprus. 
They also spearheaded the new identity of Cypriot (or Turkishcypriot), which not 
only asserted distinct Cypriot ethnic and cultural characteristics but also did so by 
specifically emphasizing its difference from Turkishness. 
Despite its claim to be a legal state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
(TRNC), the state in the north, was not granted recognition from the international 
community. Actually, the establishment of the republic had a negative impact as it 
provoked economic sanctions being brought against the country. As a consequence, 
North Cyprus became more dependent on Turkey. In this context, its borders became 
a way of emphasising and legitimising the existence of the TRNC, if not for the 
international world, at least to its own people. 
The Position of the Newspapers 
The data for this case study consists of around 170 news texts from three daily 
newspapers Kibris, Hallen Ses, and Yenidazen. Most of these texts were the same as 
each other, yet were counted separately as they appeared in each newspaper. Apart 
from representing a different spectrum of opinion, these newspapers also had the 
highest circulation figures between the seven daily and three weekly newspapers 
published in the TRNC in 1996 (Azgin, 1998). Taking the motorcyclists' rally as the 
main event, the analysis only includes the newspapers between 4-18 August 1996, 
which limits the research to the reports a week before and a week after the 
demonstration. 
121 
Kibris, with the highest circulation in North Cyprus, supported the nationalistic 
conservative policies of the government in 1996. It gave the widest coverage to the 
Greek Cypriot motorcyclists' attempt to cross the border and on some days the 
stories were extremely long. For instance, the day after the motorcyclists' 
demonstration, the related stories filled a full five pages of the newspaper. 
Hal/an Sesi also supported the nationalist government and its policies at the time. Its 
coverage of the incidents that took place at the border had many similarities with 
Kibris' coverage. 
Yenidüzen, the newspaper of the left-wing main opposition party, the Republican 
Turkish Party (CTP), unlike the other two newspapers analysed, did not print any 
stories about the motorcyclists' planned action until 7th August 1996. Even then, the 
story appeared on the second page instead of the first, another distinction from the 
other two as they usually reported similar issues on their front pages. 
Analysis of Journalistic Practices and the Structure of the News 
The majority of the reporting during the period chosen consisted of public 
statements, press releases, press conferences and interviews given to the newspapers 
by the government and military authorities, political parties and civil organisations. 
They mainly covered the Greek Cypriot authorities having been called to cancel the 
motorcyclists' demonstration and the fact that the security forces in the TRNC had 
taken all the necessary precautions to protect its borders. They also posited the idea 
that the demonstration would not help in finding a peaceful solution to the Cyprus 
Problem. The statements from the representatives of the United Nation and other 
countries also appeared in these newspapers, expressing their anxiety before the 
incidents and their condemnation afterwards. The news from the foreign media 
(especially the Greek Cypriot media) was another source that the Turkish Cypriot 
media used to report the developments but only the stories that supported the 
political line of the newspapers were included as a way to increase or confirm the 
truthfulness of the newspapers' views. For example, Kibris used a Reuter's news 
dispatch in which the details of the incidents that led to Solomou's death were given 
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great scrutiny in order to justify the position and actions of the Turkish Cypriot 
authorities (Kibris, 15 August, p. 4). 
Even though the appearance of a variety of sources in the papers can be interpreted 
as a reflection of a diversity of opinions and discourses in the society, their treatment 
within the newspapers is also important. For example, there were many examples of 
the newspapers reporting some aspects of the events while ignoring others or 
including certain parts of public statements they agreed with but at the same time 
avoiding those they did not. Another characteristic of the news during the period 
studied was that it dominantly reflected the views of state officials which reduced the 
newspapers to secondary definers of the events rather than being the primary ones 
(Hall et al, 1978 and also in Tumber, 1999). The process not only reproduced these 
sources as the natural authorities but reconstituted their discourses and 
representations as the norm without leaving space for the other or challenging ones. 
Tsagarousianou (1999) cautions that reduced diversity within national politics 
restricts the possibility of representation and identity negotiations separate from 
official definitions. Pointing at the example of the Greek mass media, 
Tsagarousianou notes that when combined with restricted access to the media, `the 
systematic publicizing of official definitions of the situation and of nationalist 
discourse have achieved the closure of the universe of political discourse in general' 
(p. 188). 
There were many identical stories in the three newspapers which could be explained 
by two reasons: They all employed the same news dispatches from the news 
agencies, especially TAK and with very little editing and they all benefited from the 
same press releases or written statements from various groups and organisations in 
the production of their news articles. They published these press releases and 
statements with little or no editing due, perhaps, to the lack of sufficient staff, time or 
resources. This practice created an intertextual relationship which led to the 
publication of many press releases and announcements disguised as news as well as 
embedding their discourses into the news. As a result, the contents of the newspapers 
were very similar in general to each other. Often, the only differences in these 
newspapers were the headlines. Headlines can generally be described as summaries 
of the news texts (van Dijk, 1988) but in the case of the Turkish Cypriot newspapers 
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they reflect the position of the paper in relation to the issues raised in the stories. In 
Kibris and Hallan Sesi there were some identical headlines such as: `The UN is 
anxious' (Hallan Sesi, 9 August, p. 1) `Anxiety in the UN' (Kibris, 9 August, p. 1), 
`They've gone crazy (or insane)' (Hal/an Sesi, 15 August, p. 1 & Kibris, 11 August, 
p. 1), `We break the hands reaching out to the flag' (Hal/an Sesi, 16 August, 199: 1 & 
Kibris, 16 August, 199: 1). `They just don't learn' (Hallern Sesi, 18 August, 199: 1 & 
Kibris, 15 August, 199: 1). As the similarities of the headlines suggest, the 
representation and the news discourses in Kibris and Hallen Sesi showed strong 
resemblances in general. They both reflected the events from a nationalist framework 
and adopted the nationalist discourse that was dominant at the time. Yenidüzen, on 
the other hand, showed some deviance from the dominant discourse with its 
reconstruction of the events, the selection of words and themes in its reports. 
Censorship by the state authorities was another factor that shaped the news texts 
during this period. Yenidüzen revealed that journalists had been warned that some 
censorship should and would be applied to their news reports on the day of the 
motorcyclists' demonstration at the border. According to the newspaper, the 
authorities had cautioned journalists, saying that `friends, on this special day not 
everything can be filmed or written. This is a rule. Don't forget that we have the 
names of each one of you' (Yenidüzen, 12 August, p. 3). Yet, the newspaper did not 
disclose the identity or the status of the authority that had issued the warning. The 
only clue was that it happened as journalists gathered in front of the TRNC Public 
Information Office (functioning under the Prime Minister's Office), as they waited to 
be taken to the border to report the events. Also telling was that journalists travelled 
to the border in military vehicles, implying that their newsgathering practices were 
limited and scrutinized by army officials. Stressing that this information was not 
included in the `official news bulletins of both sides', Yenidiizen proposed credibility 
by suggesting that it was not following the censorship threat (Yenidüzen, 12 August, 
p. 3). Whether it followed it or not, the report implied that certain controls and 
restrictions might have been applied to journalists on other similar occasions. 
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Discourse Analysis 
Among the themes discussed in the methodology chapter, the news texts analysis 
showed that the themes of understanding nation, the representation of `us' and `them' 
and the collective past mostly appeared in the news texts. The essentialist 
understanding of Turkish Cypriot identity was embedded in the articles. The themes 
of common culture and common future occurred less often in the news discourses. 
On the Understanding of Nation and National Consciousness 
The news articles that were analysed showed that people living in the north of the 
island were identified by various references such as Turkish Cypriots, Turks and 
Turks of Cyprus, depending on the context and the `other'. In relation to Greek 
Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots were referred to as `Turks', `Turkish Cypriot community' 
or `Turkish side' in all three newspapers. The term `nation' didn't appear in any of 
the news reports. Whether Turkish Cypriots were referred to as a separate national 
entity was also ambiguous in the texts, especially in Kibris and Halkan Sesi. The 
demarcation between Turkish Cypriots and Turks as separate nations rarely appeared 
in these newspapers as the terms `Turks' and `Turkish Cypriots' were used 
interchangeably to refer to Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, it was difficult to establish 
whether or not they were seen as a separate nation from the Turkish one. In some 
cases it was not even clear if the term `Turk' also referred to Turkish Cypriots or just 
mainland Turks. Reporting that `Greek Cypriots exhibited animosity again towards 
Turks during Solomou's funeral' (Hallen Sesi, 17 August, p. 1), Hal/an Sesi left it 
ambiguous whether `Turk' included Turkish Cypriots or Turkish nationals or both. In 
another example, reporting on a speech Turkey's Foreign Minister Tansu tiller 
delivered in North Cyprus, Hal/an Sesi employed the term `Turkish' to refer to the 
youth there: `Calling out to the Turkish youth on the island not to get provoked, 
tiller said.... ' (Halkin Sesi, 16 August, p. 1). This ambiguity actually reinforced the 
connection between Turkish and Turkish Cypriots not as two separate nations but as 
a united one. A similar practice was also discernible in Yeniditzen. Referring to the 
territory on the north of the island as `Turkish territory', Yeniditzen reported that 
Solomou had `crossed to the Turkish territory and attempted to haul down the 
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Turkish flag' (Yenidüzen, 15 August, p. 1). It showed that having internalised the 
identity of Turk in relation to Greek Cypriots Yenidazen also treated the 
interchangeable use of these concepts of identity as normal. 
Along with the references to national identity, cultural symbols were also used to 
enhance the categorisation of Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks into one group. 
The national flag was one such example. Without making any distinction between 
the Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot flags, Kibris referred to both as `our' flag. This 
was especially clear in the news texts regarding the shooting of Solomos Solomou, 
when he had attempted to bring a Turkish flag down at the border. Kibris described 
the action as lowering `our flag down' (Kibris, 15 August, p. 1) even though the 
concerned flag was a Turkish flag rather than a Turkish Cypriot one. The underlying 
reason could be that representing the two flags as equivalent moderated the paradox 
of having two state structures for the members of one nation. The word `our' was 
used to show the harmony and cooperation between Turkey and the TRNC as well as 
to help Turkish Cypriots identify with Turkish identity. It was also used as a 
synonym describing the people on the north of the island as Turkish, without making 
a distinction between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks. In contrast to Kibris, 
both Hallan Sesi and Yenidüzen described the flag as the `Turkish flag' (Hallan Sesi, 
15 August, p. 1; Yenidüzen, 15 August, p. 1). 
Kibris and Halkin Sesi benefited in particular from constructive strategies such as the 
strategy of unification to categorise Turkish Cypriots and Turkish people within the 
same group by emphasising common ancestry. The use of family metaphors 
reinforced the relationship between Turkey and the TRNC as similar to the one 
between `mother and baby'. Family metaphors are useful to assign certain rights and 
responsibilities to parents and also justify the dependence of the baby/child to the 
mother (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Thus, portraying Turkey as the `motherland' 
(anavatan) imbued some rights to it over the `babyland or infantland' (yavruvatan) 
as well as assigning some responsibilities regarding its security. Reporting on a 
speech delivered by the Turkish Foreign Minister Tansu tiller in the TRNC, Kibris 
edited her words as `tiller ... emphasised the 
determination of the motherland 
Turkey to protect the rights of Turks in Cyprus' (Kibris, 16 August, p. 1). The 
statement not only reconstructed the relationship between two states along the 
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`mother-baby' discourse but also emphasised the `mother's responsibility for 
protection of the `baby'. Yet, it was vague whether it was hers or the paper's choice 
to use the term `motherland' as the news report of the same speech in Halkm Sesi did 
not include the term `motherland' but used `Turkey' instead (Hallen Sesi, 16 August, 
p. 1). Yenidüzen, on the other hand, did not even include the statement in its news 
article but published tiller's photo on its front-page with a caption that said 
`Mother's Cyprus landing' (Yenidüzen, 16 August, p. 1). The term `landing' likened 
her arrival in North Cyprus, along with a crowd of bureaucrats and journalists after 
the conflicts with the Greek Cypriot demonstrators, to a military action and evoked 
the one in 1974. The word `mother' replaced the term of `motherland' or Turkey and 
helped to personify Turkey with the image of its female foreign minister. 
A similarly gendered representation of the nation was embedded in the news texts 
during the period studied. Although the demonstrators were not specified as `men' in 
the texts, the photographs of the events showed only men as the demonstrators. The 
overall coverage of the events reflected only the men's point of view and the idea of 
women being involved in the incidents was treated as a divergence from the norm. 
For example, when the group of motorcyclists, who had set off from Berlin, arrived 
in South Cyprus, Kibris published a photo of a young woman to highlight the 
presence of women among the motorcyclists as something unusual (Kibris, 11 
August, p. 1). As the motorcyclists' rally was considered a violent and battle-like 
event, normally associated with men, the demonstrators being male was treated as 
normal. 
The inclusion of women in the representation of the events was mostly as `mothers'. 
According to Kibris and Halkin Sesi, TRNC President Denkta§ warned that Greek 
Cypriot mothers should worry about the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists' attempt to 
enter the country with force and without permission (Kibris, 6 August, p. 4; Halkin 
Sesi, 6 August, p. 4) as their children would be punished if they did so. The voices of 
women were included in the reports when a women's group made an appeal to 
mothers from both communities to stop their children from joining in the rally 
(Kibris, 8 August, p. 3; Yenidüaen, 8 August, p. 6). On another occasion, a woman was 
included in the news reports when a Greek Cypriot woman was shot and injured 
during the second border incident. Kibris reported that the woman was a mother who 
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had gone to the conflict zone to get her son out of the area, which suggested that she 
was not a demonstrator. The shooting of this woman was singled out in the reports 
even though nine Greek Cypriot demonstrators and two United Nations soldiers were 
also injured. As the source of the information was given as Reuters it is not clear 
whether it was Reuters that highlighted this woman's case or Kibris that chose to 
focus on it. 
There was an emphasis on an ethnic community of common origin and descent rather 
than citizenship in the news discourses, which indicated that the nation was 
conceptualised as a Kulturnation. The newspapers characterised the nation as 
`Turkish', implying a common history and ancestry as the basis for national 
membership of the nation. Kibris even reproduced the first border incident as a clash 
between the `aggressive Greek Cypriots and our people of the same race' (Kibris, 12 
August, p. 2). The statement not only highlighted the existence of Turkish 
demonstrators at the rally but also justified their presence as part of the `we group'. 
The concept of a nation based on the political will of citizens or Staatsnation 
appeared less in the news texts. Citizens were included in the newspapers to give 
their opinions but the term `citizen' was used to distinguish ordinary people from the 
state authorities rather than stress the status of their belonging to the nation. In a way, 
even though the concept of Staatsnation existed in the news, the emphasis was more 
on Kulturnation. 
The representation of the nation in the media involves representing boundaries which 
mark the inclusion and exclusion, or who belongs, to the nation. The inclusion and 
exclusion process, which is embedded in the news discourse, is not fixed but shifts 
depending on the national identity projects. Differences in the conceptualisation of 
national identity employ different categories, which involve different social actors in 
the `we' group and `they' group (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). Yet, although the 
group inclusion and exclusion dynamics change, the strategies and linguistic means 
that are employed can be similar. Kibris was full of examples of linguistic means of 
creating a `national we' through the usage of `we', `our' and `us' that excluded the 
`outsiders' or `them'. For example, expressions such as `our troops at the border' 
(Kibris, 11 August, p. l), `our soldiers and our citizens are guarding the border' 
(Kibris, 12 August, p. 2), `yesterday they came to our border again' (Kibris, 15 
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August, p. 1) contributed to the imagining of a `national we'. Similar references 
appeared less in Hallan Sesi but it supported the `us' and `them' division in a 
different way. The newspaper had a page that consisted of a selection of news from 
the Greek Cypriot press, which generally portrayed the south part of the island as a 
place full of crime, fraud and people who hated Turks and Turkish Cypriots. 
Separating the news reports from the north and the south of Cyprus not only 
enhanced a differentiation of Turkish Cypriots from Greek Cypriots but also 
encouraged them to imagine themselves as a national community within its bounded 
territory. 
The categorisation of `us' and `them' were different in Yenidüzen from the other two 
newspapers and was reflected in its discourse on borders. In its reports, while `us' 
referred to the people who supported a peace process in Cyprus, `them' were the 
nationalistic fanatics who opposed a solution in Cyprus, regardless of whether they 
were Turkish Cypriots or Greek Cypriots. It depicted both border incidents as the 
actions of `fanatics' rather than defining them as Turkish Cypriots or Greek Cypriots. 
Running the headline `the result of fanaticism' the day after the motorcyclists' 
demonstration (Yenidüzen, 12 August p. 1), it described the people involved at the 
clashes as `the instruments of the chauvinist groups who do not want a solution in 
Cyprus' (Yenidüzen, 11 August p. 1). For Yenidüzen, the physical borders were not 
regarded as the mark of exclusion or inclusion since there were people who belonged 
to the `we-group' and `they group' from both sides of the island. Instead, there were 
ideological and political borders between those in favour of a solution in Cyprus and 
those supporting the status quo. 
Unlike Kibris and Hallam Sesi, national security and territorial integrity were not the 
main themes in Yenidüzen. The statements made by the Turkish military authorities, 
whose duty was defined as being to guard the national border, appeared on the front 
pages of Kibris and Halkin Sesi. In contrast, they received very little coverage in 
Yenidüzen and did not appear on its front pages. Instead, the themes of peace or a 
need for a peaceful solution to the Cyprus Problem were frequently employed in the 
articles. The difference shows that rather than supporting the nationalistic view, for 
which the boundaries acted as a separation line between `us' and the `outsiders' (or 
Greek Cypriots), Yenidiüzen imagined Cyprus as one country but divided. 
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Adopting a `we' discourse in the news texts also helped to strengthen the relationship 
between the media and the audience by reducing the distance between them. The 
national media not only symbolize the nation but also in some ways construct it. By 
speaking for and to the nation, the media represent the nation as well as depicting 
what is to be represented (Billig, 1995). Frequently using the deictic expression of 
`we' in their reports, Kibris and Halkin Sesi claimed to be speaking to and for the 
nation they represented. The metonymic realisation of `we' referred to both the 
newspaper itself and also to the society it addressed. The strategy not only forged a 
national `we- group' but also represented its interests and affairs. Halkin Sesi claimed 
to voice the emotions and thoughts of the nation in its headlines. With the headline 
`Come and let's see what happens' (Hallern Sesi, 11 August, p. 1), the newspaper 
challenged the `other' on behalf of the people. When it said `Our attention is fixed on 
tomorrow' (Hallen Sesi, 10 August, p. 1) it meant that as the whole nation `we' are 
waiting to see what will happen the next day. Finally, by stating that `Motorcyclists 
can never cross (the border)' (Halle n Sesi, 7 August, p. 1), Halkin Sesi claimed to 
reflect the determination of the nation. 
In some cases there was confusion about whose views the newspapers were 
reflecting and who the `we' referred to. For example, quoting the Turkish Foreign 
Minister Tansu tiller at the time, Halkin Sesi wrote: 
A message from Turkish Foreign Minister Tansu tiller to the Greek Cypriot 
Adminstration 
WE DON'T LET THE BORDER TO BE PENETRATED 
`If the TRNC borders are made to be unrecognisable whatever's necessary will be 
done' (Hallan Sesi, 13 August, p. 1). 
In this case, it is not clear who `we' refers to; whether the words about not letting the 
border be broken-through belonged to tiller or the newspaper was ambiguous. While 
introduced as a message from Ciller, `We don't let the border to be penetrated' was 
not in quotation marks, the statement following it was. Quotations from legitimate 
and powerful sources increase the dramatic dimension of the news events and 
strengthen their rhetorical function and effect (van Dijk, 1988). As Tuchman (1999) 
describes, quotations are `a form of supporting evidence' (p. 301). Using quotations 
allow people to distance themselves from participating in the story and let the facts 
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speak for themselves (Tuchman, 1999). Yet, that was not the case with Hallan Sesi. 
Using the marks in one part of the headline to attribute those words to tiller but not 
in others can be interpreted as the statements without marks belonging to the 
newspaper. In this context, rather than establishing a distance from the statement, the 
use of quotation marks actually reduced the distance between the views expressed by 
the speaker and the newspaper. In other words, it showed the newspaper's support 
and agreement with tiller's statement as well as presenting it as the united opinion 
of an `us' that included Turkey as well. 
In Yenidüzen's headlines, the expression of a `national we' was not as readily 
emphasised. Instead the newspaper addressed its readership as if it were advising 
them on to how to behave in these extraordinary circumstances: `invitation to 
common sense' (Yenidüzen, 10 August, p. 1), `do not get provoked' (Yenidüzen, 11 
August, p. 1). Its tone was more like a lecture to them: `this was what was expected' 
(Yenidüzen, 9 August, p. 1) `Tension is disaster' (Yenidilzen, 13 August, p. 1). In its 
representation of the nation, rather than merely speaking on behalf of Turkish 
Cypriots, the newspaper pointed at both communities together. The expressions `the 
Greek and Turkish communities living in Cyprus' (Yenidüzen, 10 August, p. 1) and 
`both communities are tense' (Yenidüzen, 10 August, p. 1) are other examples which 
highlighted commonalities between both communities. 
Apart from emphasising the unity of `us', national symbols were also used to 
enhance the differences from Greek Cypriots. The employment of flags was one such 
example: The Greek Cypriot demonstrators were shown carrying the national flag of 
the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) and Greece while the Turkish Ulkücil (Idealist) 
demonstrators were depicted with their flags composed of their symbols of three 
crescents or a grey wolf. Kibris reported that the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists were 
carrying `the flag of the ROC that they had demolished in 1963' (Kibris, 10 August, 
p. 2). The photos of them with ROC's flags in their hands frequently appeared in the 
newspaper. Greek and ROC national flags were also positioned together, just as the 
Turkish and Turkish Cypriot ones were. On the day of the motorcyclists' 
demonstration, Hallen Sesi predicted that the demonstrators would carry `the flags of 
Greek Cyprus, Greece and the European Union' (Hallern Sesi, 11 August, p. 3). In a 
similar way, reporting Solomou's funeral, the newspapers highlighted that a Greek 
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(not a Greek Cypriot) flag was wrapped around his coffin (Hal/an Sesi, 17 August, 
1997, p. 1; Yenidüzen, 17 August, 1997, p. 5) and that there was no `Cypriot' flag at 
the funeral (Yenidüzen, 17 August, 1997, p. 5). Yenidüzen also pointed out that during 
Isaac's funeral ceremony at the border, Greek Cypriot demonstrators placed a flag, 
combining the Greek and ROC flags on the spot where Isaac was killed. This flag 
was described as a 'Greekified Cyprus flag': `the flag is interesting. It is made up of 
a Greek flag attached on to the upper left corner of a big ROC flag' (Yenidüzen, 15 
August, p. 3). It was again Yenidüzen that drew attention to the flags the Idealists 
carried: `fanatics who carried three crescents and grey wolf flags with Turkish and 
TRNC flags and equipped with all kinds of sharp instruments... ' (Yenidüzen, 12 
August, p. 3). 
The newspapers frequently benefited from the ideology of consensus (Fowler, 1991; 
Hartley, 1982) to show the nation as united without any dissidents. The news reports 
in Kibris and Halkin Sesi reflected a homogenous, condemnatory and unopposed 
response to the incidents. Kibris combined all the statements and announcements 
from a range of civil society organisations and political parties in one story, which 
filled nearly two full pages. In Hallen Sesi, the treatment of such information varied: 
In some cases it gathered all the relevant information into one story and other times 
published them separately. To stress intra-national unity, though, it positioned 
opposing views next to each other. For example, by juxtaposing the statements by 
Mehmet Ali Talat, CTP (a left-wing party) leader and the ultra-nationalist right wing 
group Ülkücü close to each other twice, the newspaper gave the impression that all 
the political views were in harmony on the issue of the motorcyclist demonstration. It 
helped to reinforce and justify the nationalist views and discourses (Hallan Sesi, 8& 
11 August, p. 1). The picture of a united Turkish Cypriot nation was also achieved by 
publishing the views of people on the issue as a separate feature, even though only 
those supportive of the actions and policies of the Turkish Cypriot authorities were 
included. Presenting these opinions as the general view of Turkish Cypriots, the 
papers depicted a nation without dissidents (Kibris, 4 August p. 7& 11 August p. 7). 
The opposition to the official discourses rarely appeared in any of the newspapers. 
The Greek Cypriot motorcyclists' demonstration was described not just as an attack 
on `the national borders', which symbolised the Turkish Cypriots' `sovereignty', but 
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also on the national space they consider as their `homeland'. As Billig (1995) points 
out, imagining a nation requires imagining a community of people with its national 
space (p. 74). The national space that was referred to was not just a piece of land but 
had `become homeland through Turkish Cypriots' blood, hard work and struggles' as 
a military official stated (Kibris, 4 August, p. 1). In a similar way, Hallan Sesi 
stressed that `the borders of this homeland were drawn with blood' (Hallen Sesi, 4 
August, p. l). The accounts of such statements made the demonstration at the border 
appear to be an attack on `the TRNC's borders and its territorial integrity' (Kibris, 12 
August p. 1). The discourses in these texts also depicted the bordered territory of the 
TRNC as a homeland that was sacred and thus should be protected from the intrusion 
of the `others'. The emphasis on its existence and its continuity, especially when 
attacked by the `enemy', helped people to participate in its existence by believing 
and identifying with it. Considering that one of the founding myths of the TRNC was 
the need for security and safety from Greek Cypriots, an emphasis on their continued 
threat contributed to people's imagining themselves as a national community within a 
protected, bordered territory. Offering a different perspective, the homeland for 
Yenidüzen was Cyprus as a whole. There were references to `our Cyprus' 
(Yenidüzen, 8 August, p. 6), `in our small island' (Yenidüzen, 10 August, p. 1), `the 
small island in the middle of Mediterranean' (Yenidüzen, 10 August, p. 1) which 
suggested that Cyprus as a whole was imagined as a `homeland'. Therefore, the 
events were reconstructed in the news reports not as an intrusion to `our borders' but 
as the actions of a group of fanatics who were working to maintain the status quo and 
destroy efforts to find a peaceful solution on the island. 
Related to the discourse on the impassibility of borders, Kibris and Hallan Sesi 
enhanced the idea that the integrity and security of the national territory was the 
responsibility of its military and police forces. Such thinking stressed the existence of 
the TRNC as a legitimate nation state and also naturalised and justified the use of 
violence by the state. Reporting on their front pages a statement by the Cyprus 
Turkish Peace Forces Commander Kundakci, `no one can cross our borders with 
motorcycles. Whoever attempts it will be punished and necessary actions will be 
taken' (Kibris & Hal/an Sesi, 4 August, p. 1), both newspapers, Kibris and Hallen 
Sesi reinforced the idea of nation state having the capability for violence within its 
boundaries. Kibris also reported, again on its front page, that the troops at the border 
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were given orders to shoot anyone attempting to violate it (Kibris, 7 August, p. 1). 
Thus, based on this notion that nations have the right to use violence within their 
boundaries, the deaths of two Greek Cypriots were normalised. Employing strategy 
of justification, the killings of two Greek Cypriots were shown in reaction to the 
violation of `our national borders and symbols' (Kibris, 12 August p. 1 & 15 August 
p. 3). 
Yenidüzen stressed that, rather than the security forces of the state, it was the Turkish 
nationalist group Ulkücü (Idealist), with the permission of the military authorities, 
who used force at the border during the first demonstration. Thus, Yenidüzen did not 
justify the killing of Isaac as a `patriotic act' but on the contrary, described it as 
`lynching'. It described Isaac being beaten to death with iron bars by `angry 
Ülkilcüler2' when his foot got caught in the barbed wire as he tried to get out of 
Turkish Cypriot territory (Yenidüzen, 12 August, p. 2). Defining Solomou's death as 
the result of another action of fanatic Greek Cypriots, the newspaper wrote in a photo 
caption that it was `as if he was sent to death on purpose to scatter seeds of animosity 
between the two communities. What fanatics wanted happened and he died' 
(Yenidüzen, 15 August p. 1). At the same time, it described his attempt to snatch the 
Turkish flag as an `ugly behaviour' (Yenidüzen, 15 August p. 1) which meant that 
Yenidüzen also criticised his action from a nationalistic point of view. Its 
representation of the incident did not deviate from the dominant nationalist one as it 
also treated it as common sense that the flag and border were national symbols of 
sovereignty and unity and thus they should be respected by everyone. Halkin Sesi 
also based its report on a similar discourse and process of justification: `they've gone 
crazy: the young Greek Cypriot who dared to bring down the Turkish flag paid for 
his madness with his life when he was shot' (Hal/an Sesi, 15 August p. 1). The 
newspaper not only described the attempt to bring the flag down as madness but 
justified the killing for it. 
The metaphor of blood was employed frequently during the period studied to remind 
readers of the martyrs and blood shed in the past to justify the right to claim the 
territory as homeland. Describing the homeland in this way also legitimised the 
2 In Turkish suffix `-1er' makes the word plural. 
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violence committed for the sake of protecting it. For example, Hal/an Sesi defended 
Solomou's death in the following way: `the consequences of attacking our borders 
which have been watered by blood of martyrs and our moon and crescent flag have 
once more been confirmed' (Halkin Sesi, 15 August, p. l). Kibris also employed the 
metaphor of blood in its reflection of the incidents at the motorcyclists' 
demonstration in its headline `blood flowed'. However, the expression of `blood 
flowed' did not reveal much about whose blood it was and who was responsible for 
it. Even though it published a photo of Tassos Isac on its front page next to the 
headline, 'blood' did not just refer to his but also to the Turkish Cypriots and Turkish 
demonstrators who were injured during the clashes (Kibris, 12 August p. 1). Showing 
pictures of 'our' victims who had been injured while acting `patriotically' was an 
attempt to moderate the starkness of the death of one of the 'other'. In Yeniditzen, the 
image of `bloodshed' was employed as a setback to the national project it favoured, 
which was the co-existence of both communities in a unified Cyprus. It attributed the 
blame for the bloodshed to the groups that it jointly called `fanatics' and 
`chauvinists' in both communities: `Was the fanatics' show of strength and vulgar 
propaganda worth the blood shed and turning the two communities' hopes of peace 
to a state of hopelessness' (Yenidilzen, 12 August, p. 3)? `People want to see peace 
flowers not blood on the border' (Yenidazen, 12 August, p. 3). 
The name of the state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), was 
mentioned in all the news texts of the analysed newspapers. Its national autonomy, 
independence and the impassibility of its borders were emphasised throughout the 
period studied. The Greek Cypriot motorcyclists' demonstration was portrayed as an 
`attempt to violate the TRNC borders' which was a way of confirming the existence 
and legitimacy of the TRNC, a nation state that was not recognised by the 
international world. Nations cannot be thought of in isolation but have to be 
imagined as part of the international world which is made up of nations (Billig, 
1995). By reporting the remarks made by state officials and the military authorities 
that the TRNC national borders should not be breached without permission, Kibris 
presented the TRNC as a legal nation state that was part of the international world 
rather than excluded by it. It quoted a legitimate source, the TRNC's London 
Representative Hakki Müftüzade in an interview with BBC radio: 
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The TRNC state will take the necessary precautions with its police and courts just 
like any other country would against the people who try to break through the borders 
illegally. When motorcyclists come, they will be caught, arrested and appear in 
court. This is what our rules require (Kibris, 8 August p. 3). 
Halkin Sesi also quoted TRNC President Denktab, who said that the TRNC police 
would treat the motorcyclists the same way as the Greek Cypriot administration 
would have if a thousand motorcyclists from the north went to the south without any 
legal permission to enter the country (Halkin Sesi, 6 august, p. 2). The claim that `any 
other country would have behaved the same way in a similar situation' enhanced 
attempts to legitimise the nation state and also justified the use of the police force 
against the demonstrators. 
While the name of the Turkish Cypriot state, the TRNC, was emphasised frequently, 
the name of the state in the south did not appear in the news texts. Rather than using 
its internationally recognised name, the Republic of Cyprus, it was simply described 
as `the Greek Cypriot Administration' or `the Greek Cypriot side'. Having 
withdrawn from all the administrational and governmental positions of the republic 
in 1963, during the inter-communal conflict, the official national policy of Turkish 
Cypriots was to consider the Republic of Cyprus as an illegitimate republic. 
Therefore, the TRNC authorities refuse to use its official name. Having adopted and 
integrated the official discourse on this issue, none of the newspapers used the 
`Republic of Cyprus' or described the administration as the `government' in the 
period studied. Unanimously, they all described it as the `Greek Cypriot 
administration'. Predictably, the president of the Republic of Cyprus was also not 
referred to as the `president' but simply as `the Greek Cypriot leader'. In contrast, the 
TRNC president was the `President' and there was no need to mention the name of 
the TRNC to state that the Foreign Minister was the TRNC's minister. It was because 
unless stated otherwise, the context of the news texts are understood to be the nation. 
Readers assume that the story that they are reading concerns their nation or happened 
within its boundaries (Billig, 1995). This is one of the ideological roles the media 
play in daily flagging the nation. 
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The news texts, especially in Kibris and Hallan Sesi, had an interdiscursive 
relationship with military discourses. Many news articles were constructed around 
the topic of national security at the border and adopted militaristic or war 
terminology. For example, `order to shoot', `the troops at the border are on alert' 
(Kibris, 7 August, p. 1), `our soldiers will fire' (Kibris, 7 August, p. 1), `Ulkilciiler 
(Idealists) and university students battled at the front line' (Kibris, 12 August, p. 4) 
were some of the militaristic expressions that were adopted within the news reports 
in Kibris. Similar terminology also existed within Hallan Sesi which reported that 
`the military was on alert' (Hallam Sesi, 13 August, p. 1), `hot conflict' (Hallan Sesi, 
11 August, p. l), ) and `turned into a battlefield' (Hal/an Sesi, 12 August, p. 1). Having 
depicted the clashes as a `battle', Yenidazen also employed expressions such as 
`major battle' and `battlefield' in its news texts (Yenidilzen, 12 August, p. 1). 
As well as referring to the events at the border using war terminology, the news 
discourse in Yenidiken focused mainly on the theme of `peace'. It framed both 
demonstrations as blows to the attempt for a peaceful settlement in Cyprus. Both 
border incidents were presented as the consequence of the continuing Cyprus 
problem and the lack of a permanent solution on the island. The differences in the 
frameworks of the newspapers were especially clear in the news texts about the 
statement given by the Turkish Foreign Minister tiller in North Cyprus following 
the flag incident at the TRNC border. While both Kibris and Halkin Sesi chose to use 
an aggressive and nationalist quote from tiller as the headline, `we break the hands 
extending to the flag' (Kibris & Hallan Sesi, 15 August, p. 1), Yenidiizen's headline 
for the same event was, `Call for peace from tiller'. Yenidüzen restructured tiller's 
statement in the form of messages to the UN General Secretary, the Greek Cypriot 
administration and Greece, the fanatics, the Greek Orthodox church, Europe and the 
TRNC government to work for peace in Cyprus (Yenidiizen, 16 August, p. 1). 
Positive Self and Negative `Other' Representation 
The choice of words and the linguistic construction of `we' and `they' groups can 
change, depending on the definition of the `national interest'. While the `we' group is 
portrayed as representing and defending the interests of the nation, the `other' group 
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is depicted as opposing it (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). Therefore the discursive 
construction of `us', and the `other' with negative attributes, maintains the binary 
opposition, which may contribute to the enforcement of conflict rather than 
reconciliation. The media's representation can in this way also influence peoples' 
attitudes and views. Kibris and Halkin Sesi's news discourses were based around the 
concepts of `Turkish Cypriots and Turks' versus the `Greek Cypriot motorcyclists or 
Greek Cypriots'. In this construction `us' did not just refer to Turkish Cypriots but 
Turks as well. In other words, while Turks and Turkish Cypriot were in the 'we- 
group', Greek Cypriots and sometimes Greeks were in the `other' group. The 
production of the concept of `we' indicated sameness and the idea of being together. 
Discriminatory and nationalist discourses use the strategy of dissimilation, which 
constructs the `other' in a negative way and portrays it as `a deviance from a 
preferred norm' (Wodak et al., 1999, p. 33). Both, Kibris and Hal/an Sesi produced 
Turkish Cypriot national identity mostly on the basis of differentiation from the 
`other'. This is not to deny that they did not enforce the concept of a Turkish Cypriot 
identity with an emphasis on Turkishness but to note that the focus was more on the 
portrayal of the `other' rather than `us'. In the reports included in the study, the 
negative description of the `other' was employed in opposition to the positive 
production of Turkish Cypriot identity. While describing `them' with negative traits 
such as `mad', `fanatic' and `provocateur', both newspapers constructed `us' as the 
opposite; `peaceful', `patriotic', and `with common sense'. The demonstration by a 
group of Greek Cypriot motorcyclists was defined as `madness', while the killing of 
two Greek Cypriot civilians was justified as a necessary and patriotic action. The 
negative representation of the `other' and the positive representation of `us' were 
extended to Turkey's and Greece's policies on Cyprus as well. One of Halkin Sesi's 
headlines was as follows: 
HERE IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TURKISH AND GREEK MENTALITY 
THEY JUST DON'T LEARN 
While tiller gave messages of peace, Simitis exhibited an aggressive attitude 
(Halkin Sesi, 18 August, p. 1). 
In the overall coverage, the blame for the events was put on to the `other'. Even the 
responsibility for the bloodshed was shifted onto Greek Cypriots. For example, 
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showing a photo of motorcyclists carrying the flag of the Republic of Cyprus, Kibris 
wrote in its caption, `fanatic Greek Cypriot motorcyclists who caused the bloodshed' 
(Kibris, 12 August p. 2). Halkin Sesi also pointed at the Greek Cypriot demonstrators 
as the cause of death rather than `our' demonstrators. According to the paper, Isaac 
was killed during the clashes that had started as the Greek Cypriot demonstrators 
crossed the Turkish Cypriot border (Hallten Sesi, 12 August p. 2). It also focused on 
the negative actions of Greek Cypriots rather than Turkish Cypriots. 
In a different approach from the others, Yenidüzen did not differentiate `us' and 
`them' on the basis of nationality but on the political views and ideological positions 
in relation to the Cyprus problem; that is to say, whether they supported the idea of a 
peaceful settlement in Cyprus or the continuation of the status quo. The `other' group 
included `fanatic' Greek Cypriots and `fanatic' UIkücü militants (Yenidiüzen, 12 
August, p. 2). Referring to the Turkish Ülkücü demonstrators, the paper commented 
that `the other day fanatical and chauvinist Greek Cypriot protestors found exactly 
whom they wanted to see along the borders' (Yenidüzen, 13 August, p. 8). 
Categorising both in the `other' group, the paper portrayed both in a negative light. 
For example, it described the Greek Cypriot demonstrators as `a handful of 
adventurers' (Yenidüzen, 10 August, p. 1), `the cause of lack of tranquillity in Cyprus' 
(Yenidüzen, 11 August, p. 3), `untethered' (Yenidüzen, 12 August, p. 3), who `try to 
deal a blow to peace' (Yenidüzen, 12 August, p. 2), `crossed the buffer zone like 
crazy' (Yenidüzen, 12 August, p. 2) and `stoned the security forces like savages' 
(Yenidüzen, 12 August, p. 2). Their ultra nationalist positions were illustrated in a 
similar way: `fanatic Greek Cypriot demonstrators who want to bomb the roads to 
peace and to reinforce lack of solution in Cyprus' (Yenidüzen, 15 August, p. 1) and 
also `the ones who became an instrument to the chauvinist groups who do everything 
to reinforce lack of solution in Cyprus' (Yenidüzen, 12 August, p. 1, ). Meanwhile, 
Yenidiizen's approach to the Turkish ultra nationalist Mica group was no different. 
Critical of the idea that 2,500 motorcyclists from the group intend to go to North 
Cyprus from Turkey to launch a counter motorcycle demonstration, the newspaper 
wrote in its headline `As if this were the only thing missing' (Yenidüzen, 10 August 
p. 4). Another article reported that ÜIkücü groups threatened the TRNC police 
because of the motorcycle ban issued on the day of the demonstration (Yenidüzen, 9 
August p. 3). While no criticism of ülkücü groups appeared in the other two 
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newspapers, Yenidiizen condemned their actions as much as or more so than the 
Greek Cypriot motorcyclists'. The photos of the clashes in Yenidazen were not only 
of Greek Cypriots but were mainly of Ülkiicü groups with Turkish flags or the flags 
of their groups. Showing disapproval of them, it published a photo of a group of men 
posing for the camera with the following caption: 
Joyful as if going for a Sunday out, to the beach or on a picnic ... No one could tell 
the difference if they didn't carry stones, iron bars or chains instead of picnic basket. 
Some even brought their children with them.... but after such activities blood, tears 
and even war can follow. Shouldn't someone have told this to them (Yenidiizen, 13 
August, p. 8)? 
Employing such a negative description of these groups was to differentiate and 
distance Turkish Cypriots from such nationalist Turkish groups. Therefore, 
Yenidüzen stressed that these groups were from Turkey or of Turkish origin: `the 
group consisting of Mücü from Turkey' (Yenidüzen, 12 August, p.! ), `the groups 
which 80 % consisted of Turkish Mlkücü' (Yenidüzen, 12 August, p. 2). 
In Kibris and Hallen Sesi, a negative portrayal and attributes was not just directed at 
the demonstrators but to the whole Greek Cypriot population. Generalising them as 
`Greek Cypriots' rather than describing them as the `Greek Cypriot motorcyclists' or 
`demonstrators', these newspapers attributed negative characteristics to the Greek 
Cypriot population in general. The term `Greek Cypriot motorcyclists' that the 
newspapers had been using until the day of the rally was replaced with the general 
term, `Greek Cypriots' on the day of the demonstration. This could be partly because 
the demonstration was not the one that the Greek Cypriot Motorcyclists Federation 
had organised, as it had been cancelled, but the one that was adopted by other Greek 
Cypriot demonstrators. Still, such discourse defined the demonstrators not as a 
marginal group but as the representative of the Greek Cypriot community in general. 
Following the incident, both papers described them as `insolent' (Kibris, 12 August 
p. 3) `aggressive' (Kibris, 12 August p. 2), `brain washed' (Kibris, 15 August p. 1) or 
`fanatics' (Hallam Sesi, 17 August, p. 4) and `obsessed with crossing the border' 
(Hallan Sesi, 11 August, p. 1). 
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Apart from their personality, their actions were also attributed with negative features: 
the demonstration of the motorcyclists was a `fiasco' and `brought the island to the 
threshold of war again'. They also `exhibited Turkish animosity again' (Hallan Sesi, 
17 August, p. l). The word `again' indicated repetition of such behaviour that also 
helped to naturalise it as if all Greek Cypriots were anti-Turks. During the period 
studied, in contrast to the depiction of a united Turkish Cypriot nation, Greek 
Cypriots were `divided into two groups' (Kibris, 8 August p. 3; Halkin Sesi, 14 
August, p. 6) and `scared' (Kibris, 11August p. 2). In Hallan Sesi, juxtaposed next to 
the announcement of a military official who stated that whoever crossed the border 
would be punished, there was another story: `as 11"' August, the day of the Greek 
Cypriot motorcyclists' demonstration approached, they started getting scared' 
(Hallen Sesi, 4 August, p. 1). Who was `getting scared', the general public or the 
motorcyclists, was not clear and did not matter for the newspaper, as the concerned 
party was the `other' group. Referring to Greek Cypriots with derogatory names and 
attributing negative characteristics to them was part of the predicational strategy that 
the newspapers employed which aimed not only to aggregate the nationalist hysteria 
amongst Turkish Cypriots against them but also justified and legitimized their 
exclusion and being cast as the `enemy'. 
Yenidüzen, on the other hand, was careful to differentiate the Greek Cypriot 
demonstrators from the general Greek Cypriot public by frequently describing them 
as `a group of fanatics' or a `handful of adventurers'. Avoiding stereotyping all 
Greek Cypriots by representing them all the same as each other, the paper attempted 
to stress the diversity within the Greek Cypriot community. In other words, 
Yenidazen's discourse was based on the notion that not all Greek Cypriots were like 
the demonstrators who expressed their hatred towards Turkish Cypriots: the general 
population were not the `enemy' but just like `us', Cypriots, with whom `we' want to 
live in peace, which emphasised a Cypriot-oriented identity rather than a Turkish 
one. 
Europeans who had joined the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists were also cast as the 
`other' but their representation was more moderate than the Greek Cypriot ones. As 
Reisigl and Wodak (2001) point out, there is a hierarchy within the `other' groups. 
The derogatory terms that were employed to refer to the Greek Cypriots were not 
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used for the Europeans. Only Yenidüzen reported that `some Europeans who are 
bought by Greek Cypriots' (Yenidüzen, 12 August, p. 2) also joined in the 
demonstration. Kibris simply described them as `some Europeans accompanying the 
Greek Cypriot motorcyclists'. It estimated their numbers as being `around 200' in 
comparison to `7 thousand Greek Cypriot motorcyclists'. Later in the article, the 
newspaper stated that there were `180 Europeans' accompanying the Greek Cypriot 
motorcyclists (Kibris, 10 August, p. 4). After the demonstration, when the European 
Motorcyclists Union asked for permission to cross to the north, Kibris again 
emphasised their Europeanness: `European motorcyclists asked for permission to 
cross to the TRNC' (Kibris, 12 August, p. 5). Yenidüzen, on the other hand, 
generalised them as the `motorcyclists': `motorcyclists asked for permission but 
could not get it' (Yenidüzen, 12 August, p. 4). 
There was also a self-glorification in the news reports throughout the period studied. 
Benefiting from the topos of comparison and difference that implies that `they are 
inferior compared to us' (Wodak et al., 1999, p. 38), the construction strategy draws a 
positive identity of `us' in relation to the negative features of the `other'. Therefore, 
while the Greek Cypriot authorities and their policies were reported in a negative 
light as `war seeker', `hostile' and `provocateur' in Kibris and Hallan Sesi, the 
actions of the Turkish Cypriot authorities were referred to as `peace oriented', 
`resolute' and as a `stern response'. After the incidents, the TRNC President Denktab 
was reported to have invited the Greek Cypriot leader Clerides back to the 
negotiating table for a peaceful settlement (Halle n Sesi, 17 August, p. 4), which 
portrayed him as a peace oriented leader. In the overall reconstruction of the 
developments, the `we' was depicted as the group who tried to keep the peace while 
the `other' exhibited hostility. 
In the positive presentation of `us', the killings at the border were pictured as the 
consequence of Greek Cypriot provocation and their wrongdoings and both incidents 
were justified as patriotic acts by `us'. According to Hallan Sesi, people were 
influenced by what they had seen on the television: 
As the Greek Cypriots who had started fire in the buffer zone increased their 
provocations, the emotions of people who had been watching the events on the 
television, especially live on the Greek Cypriot television channels, became highly 
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aroused and started flowing to the place where events were taking place. Greek 
Cypriots who jumped over the barbed wire to the Turkish area encountered the 
reaction of the people first rather than the Security Forces (Halkin Sesi, 12 August, 
p. 2). 
The clashes between the demonstrators from both sides were shown as between the 
`aggressive Greek Cypriots and our citizens' or `people' in the paper. Yenidiizen also 
used exactly the same information, which shows that they both benefited from the 
same sources or, having received the same information as a press release or news 
agency dispatch, copied it without making any changes. In either case, they found it 
acceptable to use it in their coverage of the events. 
Another example of the positive representation of `us' was showing how the TRNC's 
nationalist President Denktab and Ülkücü groups were sorry about what had 
happened. Reflecting a press conference organised by the latter, Kibris used the 
headline `Idealists are sorry as well' (Kibris, 14 August, p. 4). Considering that 
headlines express the major topic of the text (van Dijk, 1988), there was a 
contradiction in the headline and the news text. According to the text, even though 
Ulkücü groups had expressed their sadness about the death of a Greek Cypriot, they 
had also stressed that they would repeat their actions if the same things happened 
again. In contrast to the headline, the main news text was about justifying their 
presence at the demonstration and rejecting their responsibility for the killing (Kibris, 
14 August, p. 4) rather than expressing their consolation. Yenidüzen, as opposed to 
the others, highlighted different aspects of the press conference. According to the 
paper, Erhan Ankli, the leader of one of the ülkücü groups at the press conference, 
supported the claims of Simerini and Mahl, two `fanatic right wing Greek Cypriot 
newspapers', that Turkish Cypriots who worked on the Greek Cypriot side were 
responsible for Isaac's death, not Ülkücü groups. The paper's headline was `fanatic 
Ankle took refuge behind the fanatic Greek Cypriots' (Yenidüzen, 14 August, p. 6). 
The statement was also a good example of Papadakis' (1998) argument of how 
nationalists on both sides of the border fed off of each other's extremism in Cyprus. 
The attempts of the Greek Cypriot administration to stop the motorcyclists from 
entering the buffer zone just before the demonstration were not regarded as sincere 
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by Kibris and Hallen Sesi. Very critical of the administration and the Greek 
Orthodox Church, both newspapers blamed them for the incidents. Ha1Mn Sesi 
stressed that these attempts by the Greek Cypriot administration were only `for 
show' (Halkin Sesi, 11 August, p. 1). According to the paper, 
The Greek Cypriot administration, on the one hand, by using the television channels 
and the print media is provoking the motorcyclists to break through the TRNC 
borders and go to Kyrenia but on the other hand, is trying to give foreigners the 
impression that it is not approving this action (Hal/an Sesi, 8 August, p. 1). 
Printing a photo of the Greek Cypriot leader Glafkos Clerides and a Greek Orthodox 
priest holding a motorcycle, Kibris presented them as `here are the ones who provoke 
the Greek Cypriot youth' (Kibris, 15 August, p. 5). Previously, both newspapers had 
already included articles about the Greek Cypriot President Glafkos Clerides 
criticising the motorcyclists' demonstration plan: `if the determination of the state of 
our national cause is left to the motorcyclists or other groups, Cyprus will end up in 
disaster' (Kibris, 6 August, p. 4). In Hal/an Sesi the same expression was reflected 
with some sarcasm: `if our national cause is left to the motorcyclists ... god help 
Cyprus' (Halkin Sesi, 6 August p. 6). Highlighting these phrases, both newspapers 
aimed at giving the impression that even their own leader was mocking the 
motorcyclists' action. Yet, nearly a week later, they blamed the Greek Cypriot leader 
for encouraging the motorcyclists. 
Yenidazen, on the other hand, depicted the Greek Cypriot authorities as anxious and 
trying to discourage the demonstrators. The first story Yenidilzen reported on the 
issue was actually how the Greek Cypriot authorities would use violence against the 
motorcyclists if necessary (Yenidiizen, 7 August p. 2). The same story appeared in the 
other two newspapers without much emphasis while in Yenidazen it appeared on a 
black background to attract more attention. Yenidüzen also published a statement by 
the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Glafkos Clerides, asking the motorcyclists 
not to cross the border (Yeniditzen, 11 August p. 3). On the day of the motorcyclists' 
demonstration, the newspaper wrote that the demonstrators `first had attacked 
Clerides and then the TRNC border' (Yenidazen, 12 August, p. 1). Carrying more 
news from the southern part of the island in comparison to the other two newspapers, 
Yenidazen also gave a perspective on what was happening there. For example, it 
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reported that the Greek Cypriot police had tried to barricade all the roads that led to 
the Turkish Cypriot side showing that they were also trying to stop the demonstrators 
(Yenidüzen, 12 August, p. 6). A news story about a motorcyclist appearing in court in 
the south for attacking a Greek Cypriot police officer also appeared in Yenidüzen, 
which indicated that the other side was punishing some of its nationals for breaking 
the law. With such stories, Yenidüzen provided a picture of Greek Cypriots not so 
evil and anti-Turk as the others did. 
The criticisms by the Greek Cypriot press of their own government were used in the 
negative representation of the `other'. Any Greek Cypriots' self-criticism for not 
doing enough to prevent the incidents were included in the news articles while no 
such criticism towards the Turkish Cypriot authorities was reported in the Turkish 
Cypriot newspapers. Stating that some Greek Cypriot newspapers were very angry at 
their own administration, Kibris reported that Simerini, a Greek Cypriot daily paper, 
used the words, `we disgraced ourselves' in its news article referring to the conduct 
of the motorcyclists and the Greek Cypriot government (Kibris, 13 August, p. 5). 
Similar criticisms that appeared in the international press were also adopted in the 
same way to justify the Turkish Cypriots' position. However, no such criticism 
regarding the conduct of the Turkish Cypriot authorities were included in the news 
texts. Moreover, criticisms directed at both sides were given as if they were only 
directed at the Greek Cypriot side. Kibris ran an article with a headline that said `the 
bloody incidents at our borders attracted the reaction of the world: the Greek Cypriot 
administration is guilty' (Kibris, 13 August, p. 4). The synecdoche of the `world' 
actually consisted of Turkey's Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, the UN's 
Cyprus Representative, the Nicosia Ambassador of the United States and the French 
Foreign Ministry. In contrast to the headline, the content of the text included 
condemnation of both sides for the border incidents rather than pointing the finger 
only at the Greek Cypriots. The same story was reported in Halkin Sesi with a similar 
headline `the statements of the UN and France: the responsible ones are Greek 
Cypriots' (Hal/an Sesi, 13 August, p. l). Kibris also published a report prepared by 
the United Nations Peace Forces about the events on 11th August 1996 with a 
headline `the Greek Cypriot police was ineffective'. The headline did not give any 
indication that as an account of the UN report, the news text also mentioned that the 
Turkish Cypriot police was criticised for allowing some Turkish Cypriot 
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demonstrators equipped with iron and wooden bars into the military area to clash 
with the Greek Cypriot demonstrators (Kibrzs, 15 August, p. 5). 
What the demonstrators from both sides would carry or carried was another issue that 
the newspapers focused on to negativize the `other'. Hallan Sesi announced 
beforehand the things that the Greek Cypriot demonstrators would carry when they 
broke through the border: the flags of Greek Cyprus, Greece and the European Union 
and chains (Hallcin Sesi, 11 August, p. 3). It seemed as though flags were categorised 
as dangerous items along with chains. In Yenidiizen, the items carried by Ülkücil 
groups were stressed more than the Greek Cypriot demonstrators': stones, iron bars, 
chains, sticks, mace and firearms (Yenidazen, 12 August, p. 1). The paper also 
emphasised Isaac's murder weapon as being an iron bar (Yeniduzen, 12 August, p. 1). 
To increase the effectiveness of their news, the newspapers used strategies that 
would promote their political positions and ideological beliefs. They reorganised the 
statements and opinions of reliable sources and sources that were regarded as the 
`other' or the opposition to fit in with the newspaper's views. They gave 
advantageous treatment to some while ignoring others. For example, Yenidazen 
published only a short extract from a long statement made by Bülent Ecevit, who was 
Turkey's Prime minister in 1974 during Turkey's intervention in Cyprus and was 
still seen as the authoritative voice on national policy on the island. The extract the 
paper used was the part in which he had criticised the presence of Turkish ülküca 
groups in North Cyprus during the demonstrations (Yenidilzen, 15 August, p. 5). The 
rest of his statement, in which he justified the presence of the Turkish military in the 
north of the island, was excluded from the text. As mentioned before, the Turkish 
Foreign Minister tiller's speech was also restructured to fit the political framework 
of the newspapers. 
By putting the blame for the death of two Greek Cypriots on the Greek Cypriot 
administration, Kibris and Hallam Sesi used a strategy of justification in their news 
discourses which helped to downplay the negative actions of the `we-group' in both 
incidents. For instance, there was very little reference to the circumstances and 
details of Isaac's death even though Solomou's was detailed. This could be because 
Solomou's action was seen as more unacceptable and could be more easily justified 
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compared to the circumstances in which Isaac was killed for his attempt to enter the 
Turkish Cypriot territory. In Solomou's case, he not only breached the border but 
also tried to haul down the flag. Therefore, in Kibris only two news texts appeared 
regarding Isaac's death: one was quoting from an interview given to the Greek 
Cypriot television channels by a friend of Isaac's (Kibris, 12 August, p. 3). The other 
referred to the autopsy results which stated that Isaac had died as a result of blows to 
the head. Kibris and Halkm Sesi printed a statement by the TRNC's Foreign Minister 
that announced that `the findings of the coroner confirm that the young man, of 
whose death we are very upset, was beaten as he crossed the barbed wires' (Kibris, 
15 August, p. 3 & Hallam Sesi, 15 August, p. 2) but included no further explanation. 
As discussed before, his death was seen as a consequence of the patriotic action of 
the `national we group' as he broke through `our barbed wire', meaning the border. 
There was no indication from the state authorities whether the responsible ones 
would be found and punished. Interestingly, none of the newspapers raised the issue, 
but reported only that the Greek Cypriot government would demand an international 
arrest warrant for Isaac's murderers (Kibris, 14 August, p. 4 & Hallan Sesi, 14 
August, p. 2). 
In a similar way, in Yenidüzen's coverage of the events, the `we' group, that is to say 
the presence of the Turkish Cypriots at the first border clash, was downplayed. 
Despite emphasising the negative actions of Ülkiicü groups at the border, Yenidüzen 
made no reference to Turkish Cypriots', as if there were none there. According to the 
newspaper, 80% of the demonstrators were stated to be Turkish (Yenidiizen, 12 
August, p. 1) but without mentioning where the remaining 20% came from or 
whether it consisted of Turkish Cypriots. 
The negative actions of `us' were also mitigated. As part of this strategy, the news 
texts of both killings were constructed with passive sentences without referring to 
those responsible. There was no mention of the Turkish demonstrators killing Isaac 
in Kibris and Halkin Sesi. In a news article in Kibris, he was simply defined as `the 
dead demonstrator' (Kibris, 14 August p. 4) without specifying who had killed him. 
None of the newspapers asked such questions. Kibris and Hal/an Sesi used passive 
sentences in their coverage of Solomou's death as well: `Solomon Solomou (26) who 
climbed the flag pole in an attempt to bring down our flag was shot dead' (Kibris & 
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Halkin Sesi, 15 August, p. l). The passive sentence again hid those responsible for his 
death which mitigated the actions of the `we-group'. The responsibility for what 
happened was also Solomou's, according to the papers: `he paid for the attack to the 
Turkish flag and its borders with his life' (Hal/an Sesi, 15 August, p. 1) because 
`when the crazy Greek Cypriot youth did not turn back despite all the warnings, our 
security forces had no choice but to shoot him' (Kibris, 15 August, p. 2). In contrast 
with the other two, Yenidilzen announced the ones responsible for the killings. In 
Isaac's case it pointed at the Turkish rioters and described his death by `angry 
Idealists' who hit him with iron bars. In Solomou's killing, it identified the 
responsible one as the Mobile Strike Force (Yenidüzen, 15 August, p. 1 &2). Yet, 
Yenidazen also frequently benefited from the use of metonyms and personification 
that hid the actions of the responsible ones. For example, the blame for what 
happened was put on `fanaticism', a vague term that actually pointed at the 
nationalists without being specific. There were also personifying expressions such as 
`fanaticism left one dead behind it' (Yenidilzen, 15 August, p. 2) or `fanaticism is 
crying for "blood more blood" but pro-peace, intellectual people of Cyprus say "that 
is enough"' (Yenidüzen, 15 August, p. 2). 
Another strategy of discrediting the `other' was reporting everything it had said as a 
claim or mere suggestion rather than a definite statement. Therefore, verbs such as 
`claimed', `alleged' and `suggested' were employed when a statement from the 
`other' was included in the text. In contrast, the statements by Turkish or Turkish 
Cypriot authorities carried more definite verbs such as `said', `told' or `did'. Such 
linguistic practice attributes `truthfulness' to the actions and statements of `our' 
authorities while casting doubt and raising questions about the `others". The practice 
was clear in all the three newspapers including Yenidiizen. One explanation for it is 
that most of the news from the Greek Cypriot side was written and distributed by 
TAK, which had adopted the official nationalistic discourse and the same was 
utilized by the newspapers. 
The employment of quantification, another discursive strategy for intensifying or 
weakening the effect of the news (Fowler, 1991) was common in the three 
newspapers. Apart from the countdown of the days to the demonstration, there was a 
constant use of numbers in relation to the number of demonstrators. Large, rounded 
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figures were embedded in the news discourses. Emphasising the number of the 
members of the Greek Cypriot Motorcycle Federation as `7,000', especially Kibris 
and Hal/an Sesi might have aimed to escalate the fear and tension amongst Turkish 
Cypriots (Kibris, 11 August, p. 2; Hal/an Sesi, 11 August, p. 3) who in return would 
justify the actions of the security forces. Depending on the construction of `us' and 
`them', the numbers of the demonstrators varied. Initially Kibris gave the impression 
that all seven thousand members of the federation would join the demonstration 
(Kibris, 10 August, p. 4). Having stated the same number for the members of the 
federation, Hallan Sesi later challenged this number with the figures released by the 
Turkish Cypriot authorities as `2,500- 3,000' (Hallen Sesi, 11 August, p. 3). 
Yenidazen did not mention the number `7,000' but announced that `200 
motorcyclists from 17 countries' were arriving in South Cyprus for the 
demonstration, as reported on the CyBC radio station (Yenidüzen, 10 August, p. 5). 
Similar strategies were adopted in relation to the Olkücü demonstrators. Although it 
appeared in the newspapers that `2,500 motorcyclists from Turkey would come', 
(Halkan Sesi, 10 August, p. 2; Kibris, 10 August, p. 5; Yenidiizen, 10 August, p. 4), 
later the number was reported to be `150' (Hallen Sesi, 13 August, p. 3; Yenidüzen, 
13 August, p. 5; Kibris, 13 August, p. 4). Having stressed that there were `thousands' 
of Ülkücii demonstrators at the demonstration (Yenfdüzen, 12 August, p. 3), 
Yenidüzen later published the same news article as the others stating that only `150' 
of them arrived in North Cyprus (Yenidüzen, 13 August, p. 5). It meant that the 
newspaper was either contradicting its previous report or that there were many 
Ulkücü sympathisers living in the TRNC, as only 150 of them were from Turkey. 
The number of `thousands' was based on Yenidüzen's own reporter while the source 
of the figure 1150' was not clear. However, considering that the same figure appeared 
in all the newspapers, it probably came from an official source or the news agency 
and all three newspapers printed it without questioning. 
On the day of the demonstration, the number of the demonstrators from both sides 
also varied according to the newspapers. Yenidüzen stated that `very few 
motorcyclists but lots of militants' from the Greek Cypriot side were involved in the 
event (Yenidilzen, 12 August, p. 2). The newspaper was not specific about the Greek 
Cypriot demonstrators but emphasised the number of Olkücii demonstrators at the 
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border as having increased from `around 500' to `thousands' (Yenidilzen, 12 August, 
p. 3). Kibris, on the other hand, reported that `around 500' Greek Cypriot 
demonstrators entered the buffer zone but then quoted one of the Greek Cypriot 
demonstrators estimate of the figure as `around 200' (Kibris, 12 August, p. 3). While 
the number of Greek Cypriot demonstrators in the first rally was not stated in Hallern 
Sesi, in the second one it appeared as `hundreds' (Halkm Sesi, 15 August, p. 2). 
The Construction of Collective History 
History and collective memory are the other important ingredients in the production 
of national identity. They create a narrative that allows people in the present to 
become a part of it. The continuity they produce establishes the character of national 
identity as essential and the status quo as the expression of that identity (Reicher & 
Hopkins, 2001). In the news discourses of Kibris and Hallan Sesi, history was used 
to generate continuity between the past and the present. There were constant 
references to the 22°d anniversary of Turkey's military intervention in the island, 
which is called the 2°d Peace Operation. Both the Ist and 2°d Peace Operations are 
considered by Turks and Turkish Cypriots to be a time in history when Turkey 
liberated Turkish Cypriots from the Greek Cypriots' atrocities and gave them the 
opportunity to live as a separate community in the north of the island. On the 
commemoration day of the 2nd Peace Operation, which was also the day Solomou 
was shot dead, Hallan Sesi published a story with a headline that said `no return to 
the past'. The story evoked the atrocities committed by the Greek Cypriot militia 
groups against Turkish Cypriots and suggested that Turkey's second operation, 
which began on 14th August 1974, saved their lives. Even though the headline was in 
quotation marks there was no indication of whose words they were. Only when one 
reads the text does it become clear that it was a summary of the statements made by 
state officials to commemorate the importance of the day (Hallan Sesi, 14 August, p. 
10). In contrast, there was no reference to the 2nd Peace Operation in Yenidazen. The 
only reference made to 1974 was to note that the motorcyclists' demonstration forced 
the island to live through the uneasiest 22 days since 1974 (Yenidilzen, 15 August, 
p. 3). 
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Collective memory was also used to construct Turkish Cypriot identity through the 
negative representation of the `other'. For example, two days before the 
motorcyclists' demonstration, Kibris and Hallen Sesi published news stories about 
the 32nd anniversary of the commemoration of the people who had died during the 
fighting against Greek Cypriots in Erenköy, a village in the north east of the island 
which is now under the control of the Turkish military. Juxtaposed, just under the 
main story of `Anxiety in the UN' regarding the motorcyclists' attack on `our' 
borders, a photo in Kibris showed a family looking sad with some flowers in their 
hands in front of a gravestone. Next to the photo, on a red background with white 
font colour (also the colours of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot flags), the headline 
said `we commemorated our martyrs who made history with their blood in Erenköy' 
(Kibris, 9 August, p. 1). By reminding the readers of the suffering of the `we' group 
in history, the newspaper evoked the negative acts of the `other' in the past which 
also acted as part of the collective history. The combination of articles that Kibris 
had been publishing, about the Greek Cypriots' possible attack on `our' borders and 
the memory of Turkish Cypriots who had been killed by them, was used to give the 
impression that Greek Cypriots continued their ambition of Enosis and that the 
Turkish Cypriots' struggle against them carried on. For example, instead of referring 
to the Greek Cypriot president with his status at the time, the newspaper described 
him as `one of the leaders of the EOKA organisation that had caused bloodshed in 
Cyprus' (Kibris, 5 August, p. 1). The strategy of emphasising the continuity between 
then and now was again employed to show the Greek Cypriot authorities' intentions 
as unchanging and anti-Turk. In other words, the construction of national identity 
through the collective history was carried out with the demonisation of the `other'. 
The commemoration ceremony of Erenköy martyrs was reported on page six by 
Yenidüzen, unlike the other newspapers that published it on their front pages 
(Yenidüzen, 8 August, p. 6). 
In summary, constant reconstruction and evocation of the past in the present 
encouraged the interpretation of present events from the perspective of the past. The 
actions and intentions of the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists were used to draw 
similarities with the actions of Greek Cypriots during the conflict years and this was 
employed to support the arguments of the nationalist groups who defended the status 
quo. For example, Denkta§, the TRNC President of the time, was quoted in Kibris as 
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saying `If they do such things while the Turkish soldier is here I wonder what they 
would do if they were not' (Kibris, 12 August, p. 2). The view reinforced the need for 
the presence of the Turkish military in North Cyprus and naturalised the dependence 
of Turkish Cypriots' security on the Turkish army. 
`No return to the past' was also emphasised in the arguments that involved Kyrenia 
(Girne), a town on the north coast of the island where mainly Greek Cypriots lived 
until the separation of the island. The Greek Cypriot's desire to return to Kyrenia has 
always been interpreted by nationalist Turkish Cypriots as a desire to return to the 
pre-1974 state. As this period symbolises a time when both communities lived 
together without the division and the presence of the Turkish military, this is 
regarded as unacceptable, especially by the nationalist groups in North Cyprus. 
Therefore, the pronouncement of the president of the Greek Cypriot Motorcyclists 
Federation that `our last stop will be Kyrenia' was not welcomed and was treated 
with sarcasm as an unbelievable claim: `they claim to be going to Kyrenia' (Kibris, 
10 August, p. 1). A day earlier, Hal/an Sesi also ran a similar story using the same 
tone in its report about the motorcyclists' intention of going to Kyrenia if the Greek 
Cypriot administration allowed them (Hallan Sesi, 9 August, p. 1). Kibris' headline 
for the same story was `on with Kyrenia dream' (Kibris, 9 August, p. 5). No news 
stories related to Kyrenia appeared in Yenidazen. 
The collective history was also employed in relation to cultural symbols. The day 
before the demonstration, Kibris published a photograph showing a motorcyclist with 
the national flag of the Republic of Cyprus and wrote `the Greek Cypriot 
motorcyclists are not neglecting to carry the flag of the Republic of Cyprus that they 
demolished in 1963' (Kibris, 10 August, p. 4). Even though the Republic of Cyprus 
still functions as a legitimate state within the international world, for Turkish Cypriot 
nationalists the republic ceased to exist when Turkish Cypriots stopped being a part 
of it. 
The past was also employed to establish certain characteristics and actions of the 
`other' as a trait that extended to the present. Kibris reminded its readers that the 
preceding year the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists had set some fields on fire and 
stoned the soldiers of the United Nations and Turkish Security Forces (Kibris, 4 
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August, p. 3). In a similar way, Hal/an Sesi, in its description of a Greek Cypriot 
daily, highlighted the close relations of its owner with the Greek Cypriot nationalist 
organisation, EOKA, as if it were relevant: `according to MAHL, the newspaper 
owned by Sampson from EOKA.... ' (Hallan Sesi, 14 August, p. 1). Yenidilzen's use 
of this strategy was against the Ülkiicil leader Erhan Ankh. Reminding readers of a 
previous statement in which he remarked that `the Turkish Cypriot leftists should be 
shot like dogs', Yenidiben employed it to reinforce his image as a violent fanatic 
(Yenidazen, 14 August, p. 6). 
Conclusion 
At times of crises or conflict, people rely heavily on the media for information. As 
the media have the power to influence people's perceptions of important political 
issues, the representation of conflict within the media are of paramount importance. 
Framing an issue in a specific way, that is to say the selective processing of 
information in a way that would lead to a certain interpretation may contribute to the 
maintenance of conflict. The analysis revealed that the newspapers played an 
important role in the discursive construction of a Turkish Cypriot national identity. 
Benefiting from nationalist representations and the discourses of nationalist state 
representatives at the time, including the government, the president and the military, 
the newspapers not only legitimised and established them as the authority but also 
reinforced the tension and perpetuated the conflict between the two communities. 
That is not to say that they created the tension, as the elements of the conflict already 
existed, but to argue that they contributed to the aggravation and continuation of it. 
The three newspapers analysed in this chapter had nationalist discourses and used a 
nationalist framework to represent the events. Kibris and Halkin Sesi, in a similar 
way adopted the dominant official nationalist discourse in their articles, which 
constructed the `other' as homogenous and evil with the aim of depriving Turkish 
Cypriots of their independence. Apart from their nationalistic position, the 
resemblance between the two could be explained as the result of their close 
relationship with the military and governmental sources, which were the main 
information source on these issues and events. Giresun (2001), who studied Kibris' 
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news discourse for the same period, argues that corporate interests could also have a 
role in determining whose discourse should be represented. Having interviewed a 
number of journalists from Kibris, he concludes that it was in line with corporate 
interests to reproduce the dominant official nationalist discourse. 
Yenidazen's discourse of the events was different from the other two as there was 
some resistance to the hegemonic nationalistic discourse as well as attempts to 
replace it with a Cypriot oriented one. This could be because of its affiliation with a 
political party that promoted good relations with the Greek Cypriot community. Thus 
it repeated `peace' in its discourse and also pointed to a common future in contrast 
with the other two who focused on memories of the past. Yet, Yenidiizen also was not 
free from nationalist discourses, especially when it employed the official discourses 
which carried a nationalist framework. 
The analysis of the data confirmed that the reproduction of identity in the news texts 
was not singular but context bound. Depending on the setting and the `other', two 
main concepts of national identity existed, which were in constant struggle for 
domination. Although both called themselves Turkish Cypriot, one emphasized 
Turkishness and the other Cypriotness. However, in the news discourses Turkishness 
was stressed more as most of the stories positioned Greek Cypriots as the `other'. 
Even Yeniditzen, that articulated a Cypriot oriented identity, used Turkish identity in 
relation to the Greek Cypriot demonstrators, particularly in the second border 
incident. 
The linguistic construction of national identity benefited from the use of the deictic 
expression of `we' to emphasise unity which was maintained by the oppositional 
metaphors of `us' and `them'. However, `us' and the `other' changed depending on 
the national identity projects and similarities and differences were drawn into 
different groups. The newspapers contributed to the imagining of a national 
community by asserting differences from the `other' and reflecting the community as 
a united one. While self-representation of the `we' group was positive, the `other' 
was constantly attributed with negative features and derogatory names. Constant use 
of negative images and stereotypes for Greek Cypriots reinforced their perception as 
the `enemy' in a way that dehumanised them. Simplification of the conflict to the 
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binary opposition of `us' versus `them' also depicted each group as homogenised and 
excluded different views and perspectives within them. 
Interchangeable use of the terms `Turkish Cypriot' and `Turk' made it difficult to 
establish whether Turkish Cypriots were referred to as a separate entity. Using the 
strategy of unification, especially Kibris and Halkin Sesi categorised Turkish and 
Turkish Cypriots together as one nation. Despite its opposition, a similar 
collectivisation also existed in Yenidiizen which signified that it was a norm difficult 
to break. The characterisation of the nation as Kulturnation was also dominant in the 
news discourses. Even if some features identified with Staatsnation were present in 
the reflection of the events, the nation was usually reconstructed on the themes of 
common history and ancestry with mainland Turks. 
The inclusion and exclusion process was achieved through various discursive 
strategies and linguistic means. The use of the deictic expression of `we' and 
references to national symbols such as `our borders', `our flag' and `our territory' 
contributed to the imagining of the nation as `homeland'. Representation of 
homeland as being under attack from an `enemy' that is real and threatening was also 
employed to stress the unity of the nation against it. As Tsagarousianou (1999) points 
out, the media construct the nation and its enemies through the enactment of public 
rituals such as nationalist demonstrations and create a moral panic through particular 
means of representation of the enemy. Kibris and Hallan Sesi's discourses assisted 
the creation of such moral panic which supported the sense of togetherness and also 
the negative perception of the `other'. 
Stressing the state name, the TRNC, acted as a persuasive feature of the legality of a 
nation state that had not gained international recognition. It also justified its right to 
use violence for the sake of protecting the homeland which legitimised the death of 
two members of the `other'. Respect for the flag and the border were treated as 
common sense as none of the newspapers analysed in this study criticised Solomou's 
death or raised questions as to why the Turkish Cypriot authorities did not stop him 
in another way. Significant lack of criticism contributed to the naturalisation of the 
Turkish nationalistic notion that the Turkish border and flag cannot be treated with 
contempt and that they are worth killing and dying for. In other words, these 
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newspapers acted for and became one of the nationalising institutions by contributing 
to the continuity of nationalist mythologies. 
Finally, the nationalist discourses reproduced the myth of unity rather than 
encouraging identity negotiation. Therefore, the dominance of the nationalist 
discourses in the newspapers did not allow room for diverse and challenging 
discourses in the representation of these two nationalist demonstrations. Nationalist 
discourses not only perpetuate, reproduce and justify a social status quo and the 
national identities related to it (Reisig & Wodak, 2001) but also leave no public 
space for the negotiation of other identities. Lack of alternative discourses and 
representations contribute to the construction of a national identity that does not 
include diverse and plural understandings (Tsagarousianou, 1999). The process of 
reinforcing binary divisions and the demonization of the `other' also creates 
obstacles to the formation of a pluralistic and democratic society and citizenship as 
well as the acknowledgement of internal national complexity and plurality (Ozgunes 
and Terzis, 2000). 
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CHAPTER 6: OPENING THE BORDER IN 2003 
Introduction 
The opening of the buffer zone in April 2003 was one of the developments that brought 
many changes to Cyprus. Having had no contact since the division of the island in 1974, 
the opening of the border by the Turkish Cypriot administration allowed both 
communities to cross to the `other' side for the first time in 29 years and meet the people 
they regarded as their `enemy'. 
The developments that followed the opening of the border dominated the media. This 
part of the study analyses the news texts of the three newspapers during the first week of 
the border opening to find out who was included in the reproduction of the national 
community by the media. It examines the news discourses about the border crossings to 
see which concepts of identity these newspapers reflected. 
The Setting - Brief Description of the Context within Which the Borders Opened 
The border that separates the island into the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot sides 
is called the Green Line. The buffer zone which extends along the Green Line is under 
the control of the United Nations. Deserted, apart from two armies and a UN force, it is 
also called the Dead Zone (Papadakis, 2005). On either side of this zone there are 
Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot barricades and checkpoints. Until the 23`d April 2003 
these barricades and checkpoints acted as a hindrance to the crossing of the border but 
on that day they became the gates that opened to the `other' side. 
The restrictions regarding the crossing of the border that separated the Turkish Cypriot 
and the Greek Cypriot side of the island were relaxed on the 23v" April 2003 by the 
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Turkish Cypriot government'. This meant that people were able to cross in both 
directions without the requirement for any special permission, as was the case before, 
simply by showing their passports or identity cards. Following the meeting of the 
Turkish Cypriot Council of Ministers on the 21st April, 2003, the Tourism and 
Environment Minister, Serdar Denktab, who was also the spokesperson for the cabinet, 
announced that crossing between the north and south of Cyprus would be `normalised' 
(Kibris, Hal an Sesi, and Yenidüzen, 22 April, 2003, p.! ). The decision was published in 
the official Gazette on the 22nd April, 2003 and the next day Turkish Cypriots and 
Greek Cypriots were allowed to go through the checkpoints to the `other' side. 
Thousands of people from both sides flooded to the border for the first time in 29 years. 
Many went to the towns and villages where they had lived and visited their old homes 
and family graves. Many stories of the meetings of old friends and neighbours appeared 
in the media. 
When the border was opened, Cyprus had already been going through some changes. 
The UN had proposed a new settlement plan to reach a solution in Cyprus. The majority 
of Turkish Cypriots were in favour of this plan, also known as the Annan Plan, and had 
organised very large-scale demonstrations to express their support for the plan. Groups 
opposing the plan also staged protest marches, claiming that they supported a peaceful 
solution in Cyprus but not the one suggested by this plan. Hopes of finding a solution to 
the Cyprus Problem had had been crushed when the negotiations between the two sides 
on this UN brokered plan collapsed in the Hague in March 2003, to the disappointment 
of many Turkish Cypriots. 
The decision to allow free crossing of the border came as a surprise to everyone as there 
was no indication of such a decision. The Turkish Cypriot government was a nationalist 
one which always claimed that Greek Cypriots still wanted enosis and that their 
atrocities towards Turkish Cypriots should not be forgotten. The TRNC President of the 
time, Rauf Denktab, also opposed contacts between two communities and therefore was 
I Previously, crossings across the border were strictly limited. Anyone who wanted to cross the border had 
to apply for permission from the security forces. 
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seen as one of the main obstacles to the peace process. As both, the government and the 
President had been campaigning against the Annan Plan, the opening of the border was 
an unexpected move. The opposition interpreted it as a consequence of pressure from the 
Turkish Cypriot people as well as the new government in Turkey that seemed to want to 
eliminate the Cyprus Problem which had become one of the obstacles in its efforts to 
join the EU. 
Soon after the Turkish Cypriot authorities opened the border, it became clear that it was 
semi-porous and not open to everyone, only `Cypriots'. The Greek Cypriot 
administration was anxious to stress at every opportunity that any settlement in Cyprus 
should not involve giving rights to immigrants from Turkey ('colonists' in its 
vocabulary) and refused to let any Turkish-born TRNC citizens into the areas under its 
administration. Anyone who arrived in North Cyprus after 1974 and subsequently 
became a citizen was not allowed to enter the territory of the Republic of Cyprus by the 
Greek Cypriot authorities. This was a big disappointment, especially to the young 
generation born to parents of Turkish origin in North Cyprus and regarding themselves 
as Turkish Cypriots. At a later date, having slightly modified its rules, the Greek Cypriot 
government let people cross to the south whose place of birth was Turkey, if one of their 
parents were born in Cyprus or were married to a person of Cypriot origin. 
The event was described as the `opening of the border' by the media and the general 
public. I have also adopted this popular description in this study and defined the process 
as an `opening' action. Actually, the expression `opening the borders' did not mean that 
the border was abolished totally but that the travel restrictions between the north and the 
south of the island were relaxed, allowing people to cross to other side at particular 
checkpoints. Before, such crossings were strictly limited and required permission from 
the security forces. Also, as the term border referred to the checkpoints as well, it was 
employed in plural form in the texts. 
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The Position of the Newspapers 
Similarly to the previous case study, the analysis aimed to include a week before and 
after the opening of the border on 23 April 2003. However, no news story related to the 
border crossings appeared in the newspapers until 22 April 2003, which limited the 
period studied to 22-30 April 2003. The study included around 160 texts. 
During the period under study, Kibris was still a highly circulated newspaper but had 
shifted its allegiance from the nationalist position to one that favoured the plan. 
According to research that studied the media environment during this period, Kibr: s' 
empathy with the masses was so close to propaganda that `the chief editor Süleyman 
ErgUglü admitted that the editorial board was internally conflicted over professional 
ethics' (Ridder/Braden et. al, 2005, p. 22). 
Having changed its editorial team, Yenidüzen concentrated on becoming a newspaper 
with a broader appeal rather than being a mouthpiece of CTP (Cumhuriyetci Türk 
Partisi- Republican Turkish Party). However, CTP's influence was still apparent in the 
paper. Under the management of the new editor in chief, Cenk Mutluyakali the 
newspaper changed its image to a more popular one and succeeded in increasing its 
circulation. It supported the Annan Plan and advocated a solution on the island within 
the framework of the plan. 
Halkin Sesi, a conservative and nationalist newspaper, was sceptical of the Annan Plan. 
Even though its editor, Emin Akkor claimed that the newspaper stayed neutral in 
relation to the Plan (Hanger, 2006), its stance appeared to be oppositional. However, 
compared to the other daily newspapers that were against the Annan Plan, research on 
the media environment at that time suggests that Hallan Sesi was more balanced 
(RidderBraden et-al, 2005). 
160 
Analysis of Journalistic Practices and the Structure of the News 
The discourse and the representation of the events related to the opening of the border 
were mainly positive in the three newspapers analysed: Yenidüzen presented the opening 
as the `victory of the people' (Yenidüzen, 23 April, p.! ) echoing the leftist ideology of 
the party it was affiliated to. Kibris emphasised the historical importance of the event: 
`the first time after 29 years' (Kibris, 23 April, p. l) and `a historical day' (Kibris, 24 
April, p.! ). Hal/an Sesi was a bit cautious initially but still reported that the people 
crossing in both directions were `pleased' (Hallam Sesi, 24 April, p. 1). Compared to the 
previous case study, the similarities in the discourse and representation of Kibris and 
Hal/an Sesi were not that many. 
Another difference was the inclusion of many news articles concerning the experiences 
of ordinary people. The statements and announcements of the state authorities still 
existed in the form of news texts. Nonetheless, rather than journalism that was 
dominated by the press releases of state officials, politicians or powerful groups, the 
stories that filled the pages consisted mostly of interesting coincidences that Turkish 
Cypriots experienced when they met Greek Cypriots, their emotional visits to the places 
they used to live and problems experienced at the checkpoints. The image of ordinary 
people produced an image of society as a happy one and the news stories were 
constructed around the concepts of joy, tears and hope for a peaceful settlement in 
Cyprus. 
As in the previous case study, identical stories appeared in the newspapers due to the 
source journalist relationship and the dependency of the news media on externally 
produced texts, mainly news agency dispatches. Yet there was an increase in the number 
of news reports based on journalists' reflections. They reported their observations of the 
checkpoints, especially at Ledra Palace, the main checkpoint in Lefkoýa (or Nicosia)2 . 
They travelled with both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to their old towns and 
2 Nicosia is the English name of the divided capital city. Lefko§a is the Turkish name and Lefkosia is the 
Greek one. To avoid confusion I will use the Turkish name, Lefko§a rather than Nicosia, in this research 
to refer to the northern part in which Turkish Cypriots live. 
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homes and witnessed religious rituals on the `other' side. Although direct descriptions of 
an ongoing event is a strategy used to emphasise the factual nature of events (van Dijk, 
1988), in the Turkish Cypriot newspapers the description or the narration of the events 
were not devoid of the journalist's emotional involvement in the events. Some news 
texts were more about expressing the opinions and comments of the journalists rather 
than any factual information. 
Numbers in the form of statistics about those crossing the border were employed a great 
deal to increase the effectiveness of the news stories. Numbers generally suggest the 
truthfulness and precision of a story. However, despite using the same source, the police 
press office, the numbers announced in the newspapers did not match each other. This 
was because the crossings at the checkpoints were very intense and continued all 
throughout the day. The figures varied from paper to paper depending upon the time of 
the day the numbers were acquired. Therefore, to suggest the precision of their news 
reports, sometimes the newspapers stated what time of the day they had received their 
figures. For example, Hallan Sesi stated that the `until 21.00 last night, 1,246 Greek 
Cypriots crossed to the North while 2,659 Turkish Cypriots to the South' (Halkin Sesi, 
24 April, p. l). Yenidüzen also published the number of people who had crossed the 
border on its front page: `from the North to the South 2,659 persons, from the South to 
the North 1,246 persons crossed (by 19: 00 o'clock)' (Yenidüzen, 24 April, p. 1). 
According to the figures these two newspapers gave, no one went over the border for 
two hours which was hard to believe considering the long queues of people on both 
sides. Kibris, on the other hand, reported that 3,268 Turkish Cypriot visited South 
Cyprus while 1,476 Greek Cypriot crossed to the north the day before (Kibr: s, 24 April, 
p. 1). 
Discourse Analysis 
In this case study, five themes (as outlined earlier) occurred in the news texts. These 
were the linguistic construction of different understandings of nation, common culture 
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and common past as well as national space and common political future. The 
categorisation between `us' and `them' was less severe. 
On the Concept of Nation 
Citizenship became a debated issue, especially when TRNC citizens born in Turkey 
were not allowed to cross to the south side by the Greek Cypriot authorities. The 
restriction was not merely directed at these Turkish-born TRNC citizens3 but also at the 
younger generation of Cyprus-born immigrant descendents. In other words, it was not 
one's place of birth that mattered but also the parents' as well. The exclusion of these 
people by the Greek Cypriot authorities, preventing them from joining in the transitional 
period Cyprus was going through, turned the issue of citizenship into a dispute between 
the two sides. The Turkish Cypriot state authorities, as well as the opposition, reacted 
against this policy. They argued that the immigrants from Turkey and their Cyprus-born 
children were part of the Turkish Cypriot nation and that the Greek Cypriot authorities 
were discriminating against them. 
The news texts reflected these political arguments. All three newspapers published 
articles that included statements by the Turkish Cypriot state authorities criticising the 
Greek Cypriots' policy of not permitting these people into the areas under their 
administration. The official discourse on the issue, that regardless of their place of birth 
these Turkish-born immigrants were `our' citizens and should be treated as equal to ones 
born in Cyprus, was integrated in the news discourses. 
Along with the official discourse of the state authorities, the newspapers also included 
the critical attitude of the opposition especially that of the main opposition party, to the 
Greek Cypriot government's exclusion of Turkish-born citizens. The meetings and the 
negotiations of Mehmet Ali Talat, the leader of the main opposition party (CTP) at the 
3 In this research I will use the terms Turkish-born or Turkish-origin citizens not to describe their ethnicity 
but their country of origin. 
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time, with the Greek Cypriot authorities to allow these TRNC citizens to travel to the 
south got coverage in all the newspapers (Kibris, Halkin Sesi, & Yenidüzen, 27 April, 
p. 3). The news texts concerning CTP's efforts to convince the Greek Cypriot authorities 
to lift the restrictions for Turkish-origin citizens were significant as they showed their 
inclusion to the Turkish Cypriot nation. In the past, CTP was labelled as `anti-Turk' 
because of its opposition to Turkey's power in the country and the arrival of immigrants 
from Turkey to North Cyprus for work. In the mid 1990's, it was not just CTP but the 
parties of the political left in general that saw immigrants in North Cyprus as 
representative of Turkey's dominance and the main supporters of the nationalist 
government. However, in recent years things had changed and particularly the younger 
generation of Cyprus-born immigrant descendents, having aligned themselves with the 
left, supported the Annan Plan for a settlement in Cyprus (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005). 
The references to the people from Turkey in North Cyprus in relation to their TRNC 
citizenship varied in the news texts: `Turkish-born citizens who have the TRNC identity 
card' (Kibns, 24 April, p. 4), `People from Turkey (Türkiyeliler)' (Kibris, 24 April, p. 7), 
`Turkish origin' (Kibru, 26 April, p. 3), `Turkish citizens' (Yenidüzen, 24 April, p. 3), 
`people who were born in Turkey and not regarded Cypriot origin' (Yenidüzen, 24 April, 
p. 3), `citizens who came from Turkey' (Yenidüzen, 23 April, p. 1), `Turkish origin TRNC 
citizens' (Yenidüzen, 27 April, p. 3) and `people who were born in Turkey and gained 
TRNC citizenship later' (Hal e Sesi, 24 April, p. 2). The discourse of `citizenship', 
which acted as a unification strategy, categorised Turkish Cypriots and Turkish-born 
citizens, who were excluded by the Greek Cypriot authorities, as one group. Yet the 
categorisation was not based on ethnicity but on political belonging to the nation which 
showed that the nation was conceptualised as a Staatsnation rather than a Kulturnation. 
The concept of `citizenship' characterised membership of the TRNC nation on the basis 
of political will, regardless of the place of birth and collectivised Turkish Cypriots and 
mainland Turks into one nation. On the other hand, stating the origin of these people as 
`Turkish' or `from Turkey' not only failed to acknowledge them as a heterogeneous 
population with social, cultural and ethnic differences within themselves but also 
suggested a differentiation from Turkish Cypriots. 
164 
Yenidüzen and Kibns's coverage of the exclusion of Turkish-origin citizens was similar. 
They both printed short news texts about these citizens who were not able to cross the 
border and had to watch the others who could. Highlighting their plight, Kibris wrote: 
Because Greek Cypriot officials allowed only Turkish Cypriots to pass, Turkish 
nationals had to watch the occasion from the top of the city walls. Those who could not 
cross to the Greek side watched those who crossed throughout the day with their 
families from behind the wire fences (Kibris, 24 April, p. 7). 
Like Kibrss, Yenidüzen also noted that Turkish-born citizens were both sad and angry, 
not only at the Greek Cypriot administration, but also at the Turkish Cypriot government 
and Denktag, for not being allowed to cross the border (Yenidüzen, 24 April, p. 3). In 
contrast to Yenidü en and Kibris, Hallan Sesi's reflection of the issue was limited to a 
short paragraph within a story about the crossings (Halkin Sesi, 24 April, p. 2) and to the 
official statements that not allowing Turkish-origin TRNC citizens to cross the border 
was discrimination among their citizens (Halkin Sesi, 30 April, p. 2). 
Interestingly, even though it was these citizens who were being discriminated against, 
none of the newspapers included their views and emotions. While Cyprus-born TRNC 
citizens, who could cross the checkpoints, appeared in the newspapers expressing their 
joy at being able to do so, no citizen of Turkish-origin appeared in the newspapers 
expressing their feelings or experiences at the checkpoints during the period studied. The 
newspapers published the opinions and efforts of the state authorities and the opposition 
parties about the unfair treatment these citizens had been receiving from the Greek 
Cypriot government but did not give any voice to them in their news articles. In a way, 
these people were not only excluded by the Greek Cypriot authorities from the south 
part of the island but also from the Turkish Cypriot public sphere by the media that 
`reproduced a symbolic form of nation' (Morley, 2000). It meant that in the mediation of 
the nation, they were not fully included in the symbolic representation of the nation. 
Even though they appeared within the political discourses that Turkish-origin citizens 
belonged to `our' nation state, in the construction of public life or the reflection of the 
nation they were not present. Instead, Turkish Cypriotness or Cypriotness was the 
dominant characteristic of the public sphere that was provided by these newspapers. 
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Even Yenidüzen, the only newspaper that brought the issue to its front page with a 
headline that said `is it a crime to be from Turkey? ' (Yenidüzen, 25 April, p. 1), did not 
include any views or experiences of these people in their own words. The text it 
published on its front page was limited to the opinion of the newspaper on the issue 
rather than including the voices of these citizens: 
The children who were bom and grew up in Cyprus and shouted `peace' in public 
squares.. . are being turned away from the border checkpoints because their parents or 
just their fathers are from Turkey. People who came from Turkey and have been living 
on the island, who have set up their businesses and earn their living (here) are being 
treated as second-class citizens because they are not of `Cypriot origin' (Yenidüzen, 25 
April, p. 1). 
It also linked the whole process to the collapse of the negotiations regarding the Annan 
Plan. Speaking on behalf of these Turkish-born citizens, Yenidiizen wrote: 
The borders are open, `excluding Turkish nationals'. Some of the people who were 
misled by the words `they will send you back under the Annan Plan' can now see the 
facts much better (Yenidüzen, 25 April, p. 1). 
Yenidüzen's argument was that if the Annan Planwas implemented, Turkish-origin 
TRNC citizens would have been citizens of the new entity and would have had no 
problem travelling anywhere on the island. In the text, it was not stated openly who 
`deceived' the people from Turkey, yet it pointed the finger at the Turkish Cypriot state 
representatives who refused to accept the plan because in another part of the news text 
the newspaper defined them as the `people who pushed the plan away with the back of 
their hands' (Yenidüzen, 25 April, p. 1). In contrast to `their' act of deception, the 
newspaper printed the relevant parts of the plan about the status of Turkish-born citizens 
as evidence of the truthfulness of its claim. By publishing these parts of the plan, 
Yenidüzen not only aimed to increase the impact of its news story but also accused the 
government and the President, who opposed the Annan Plan, of causing the problem 
encountered by these citizens. 
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In the mediation of the nation, the representations of the dominant or the majority were 
reflected as the image of the nation. For example, joy and excitement were the dominant 
emotions reflected on the front pages of the newspapers and everyone was reported to be 
happy. Hallern Sesi noted that `the one who goes (to the south) and the one who comes 
(to the north) are pleased' (Halkzn Sesi, 24 April, p. 1). The emotions of the majority 
were extended to the whole nation and generalised to include all the people living in the 
TRNC, even though citizens born in Turkey were excluded. Ethnic minorities such as 
the Maronites and Greek Cypriots living in the TRNC were also absent from the 
mediated nation and the impact of the developments on these communities did not 
appear in the newspapers. Confined to their private sphere, the views of ethnic 
minorities were missing from the image of the nation in the period studied. The only 
reference to the Maronites that appeared in Kibris was a short photo caption that showed 
a group of people sitting in a garden: 
... While the north and the south of Cyprus go through historical days following the free 
crossings after 29 years, the Maronites in the north also had a different weekend. 
Entertaining their guests from the south, the Maronites lit their ovens, made kebab on 
barbecue' (Kibrss, 28 April, p. 9). 
The Greek Cypriots living in North Cyprus were also excluded from the representation 
of the nation by the newspapers. There was no mention of the impact of the border 
crossings on this group, even though it made it easier for many Greek Cypriot families 
from the south part of the island to visit their relatives in the northern part and vice 
versa. The lack of representation of ethnic minorities contributed to the 
conceptualisation of the nation on the basis of cultural and ethnic elements of Turkish 
Cypriotness, which created a contrast with the imagining of the nation as Staatsnation. 
In general, a Cypriot identity, based on common features, was stressed more in the news 
texts than a Turkish one. There was an implicit reference and linguistic construction of 
an essentialist understanding of Cypriotness. Following Wodak et al's (1999) description 
of the essentialist understanding of national identity, it could be argued that such a 
reproduction of Cypriot national identity reduced the differences between Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots as well as forging similarities in terms of emotional 
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attachment to Cyprus, national mentality and behaviours. The linguistic representation 
of these two communities as Cypriots was useful in drawing analogies between them 
and assigning them a national character. It was Yenidüzen that most often used the term 
Cypriot in that essentialist understanding: `thousands of Cypriots' (Yenidüzen, 24 April 
p. 4), `they both were Cypriot: one from the north and the other from the south' 
(Yenidüzen, 24 April p. 3) and `thousands of people who regard Cyprus as the homeland' 
(Yenidüzen, 24 April p. 3). Even though the last expression seemed to include Turkish- 
origin TRNC citizen as well, it actually did not as the rest of the story told of the people 
who were permitted to cross the border. In general, Yenidüzen employing unification 
strategy, which is a part of construction strategy, highlighted common characteristics 
and experiences rather than differences in order to categorise both communities as 
Cypriot. 
Another headline in Yenidüzen, `now the one who comes and the one who goes is 
Cypriot' (Yenidüzen, 29 April p.! ), reminded readers of one of the most debated 
statements of President Denktab in relation to the emigration of Turkish Cypriots and the 
immigration of Turkish nationals: `the one who leaves is a Turk, the one who comes is a 
Turk'. It was a statement that denied the existence of a culturally and ethnically distinct 
Turkish Cypriot and also indicated indifference towards the emigration of Turkish 
Cypriots due to economic hardship, rising unemployment and partisanship. By stating 
that Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots who crossed in both directions were Cypriots, 
Yenidüzen challenged Denktaý's statement as well as categorising both communities 
under the identity of Cypriot. In contrast to the secrecy surrounding the number of 
Turkish immigrants in North Cyprus, Yenidüzen also proclaimed that `30 thousand 
Greek Cypriots arrived in one day' (Yenidüzen, 29 April, p. 1). 
The concept of Cypriotness also appeared in Kibris but less frequently compared to 
Yenidüzen: `foreigners were not allowed, only Cypriots' (Kibris, 24 April, p. 6). In 
Kibris' reproduction of identity, the term Turkish Cypriot was used more often. In 
Hal/an Sesi, an emphasis on Turkishness in relation to the Greek Cypriots was present. 
In two separate news texts it interchangeably referred to the Turkish Cypriots living in 
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the south as the `Turks living in the South' (Halkin Sesi, 24 April, p. 5) and `Turkish 
Cypriots' (Halkin Sesi, 28 April, p. 4). Having crossed the border illegally before it was 
opened, these people were not allowed to go back to the north. Even though Halkin Sesi 
did not highlight the cases of citizens of Turkish-origin, it was the only newspaper that 
included the views and expectations of Turkish Cypriots in the south about a change in 
the rules which would allow them to revisit the north again. 
The representation of both communities as Cypriots strengthened the imagining of a 
Cypriot nation but divided. Such conceptualisation in Yenidüzen was not surprising in 
that it had been promoting the concept of Cypriotness since the 1990's. There were 
traces of similar thinking in Kibris, although it was not as frequent as in Yenidazen. 
Reflecting the opinions and emotions of the people who had went across the border, 
Kibris generalised the view of one person to all: `Turkish Cypriots who say what an 
indescribable feeling it is to enter the separated part of the country in which they have 
been living for 20 years ... ' (Kibris, 24 April, p. 3). 
Newspaper reports about who really was behind the decision to open the border were 
conflicting. Although they all announced the decision as being the TRNC's Council of 
Ministers' (Kibris, Halkin Sesi, & Yenidüzen, 22 April, p.! ), Yenidüzen and Kibrts later 
suggested that the Turkish government was the real decision-maker in this matter. 
Yenidüzen expressed this view openly in one of its headlines: `not the government but 
the instructions opened the border crossings' (Yenidüzen, 23 April, p. 6). While the 
'government' referred to the Turkish Cypriot one, the `instructions' pointed a finger at 
the Turkish government. It meant that having decided to relax the crossing restrictions in 
Cyprus the Turkish government had instructed the Turkish Cypriot authorities to 
implement it. Neither the headline nor the main part of the text, which consisted of the 
accounts of speeches delivered in a parliamentary session, clarified whose instruction it 
was. It kept the Turkish government hidden as the responsible agent and left it to the 
readers to construe the responsibility of the Turkish government for this. In contrast, 
Kibris quoted President Denktab as saying that the decision to open the border was taken 
together with `Ankara and the Foreign Ministry' (Kibris, 28 April, p. 7). Highlighting the 
169 
source of the change in Cyprus as Turkey rather than the TRNC authorities not only 
increased doubts about the sovereignty of the TRNC but also reinforced the image of it 
as a protectorate and Turkey as the state holding the power. It reduced the TRNC state to 
an entity that merely followed Turkey's instructions. In a departure from the other two 
newspapers, Hal kn Sesi announced that `Ankara welcomed the decision' (Hal/an Sesi, 
23 April, p. 4). The statement portrayed the TRNC as a sovereign country whose 
decision was welcomed and respected by the other one. In these texts, Ankara, the 
capital of Turkey, was employed as a metonym to refer to the Turkish government. 
Regardless of whose decision it really was, according to Yenidüzen it was also public 
pressure on the nationalist governing groups that led to the change. Representing the 
opening of the border as the `victory of the people' (Yenidüzen, 24 April, p. 1), 
Yenidüzen wrote that it was `Turkish Cypriots' determination that brought freedom of 
travel after 30 years' to the island (Yenidüzen, 24 April, p. 1). The discourse of `the will 
of the people' shifted the power behind the transformation from state authorities to 
citizens, which also reflected the leftist ideology of the newspaper. The term `people', 
acting as a generalising synecdoche, also suggested a sense of consensus which 
illustrated Turkish Cypriots as united in their determination to make a change in the 
`status quo'. Yet, `people' referred only to the ones who supported the Annan Plan. 
Next to the story of the announcement that `the border is opened' Yenidüzen published a 
photo that showed a crowd of people from one of the mass demonstrations in favour of 
the Annan Plan. Underneath the photo, in bold characters, it said `the power of the 
people will make you do more "on your way out"' (Yeniditzen, 22 April, p. 1). The 
expression suggested further changes in the political future of the TRNC and again there 
was an emphasis on the `power of the people' as the cause of change. In a way, by 
positioning `people' opposite the governing groups that represented the `status quo', the 
newspaper implied that people would soon change the government and also the status 
quo. `Status quo' was a metonym that Yenidüzen frequently employed to refer to the 
nationalist governing groups that included the government and the president. Portraying 
them as the `other', the newspaper also personified it: `the status quo had a first slap on 
its face' (Yenidüzen, 24 April, p. 1). 
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In contrast with Yenidüzen's discourse of `people', Hallan Sesi's coverage of the 
developments was dominated mainly by official representations and discourses. The 
stories of ordinary people that appeared in Yenidüzen and Kibris were less evident in 
Halkin Sesi. Instead, the news texts were mostly based on the views of the government 
officials as well as the president whose statements were published in more detail 
compared to the other two newspapers. 
Conceiving of the nation as a bordered space where a political administration governed 
over the population within the boundaries was evident in the news texts. All the 
newspapers described the administration in the north as the `TRNC' and referred to the 
one in the south as the `Greek Cypriot Administration', as in the Turkish Cypriot official 
discourse. In the news texts about the border crossings, the newspapers noted that Greek 
Cypriots crossed to `North Cyprus' or the `TRNC' while Turkish Cypriots crossed to 
`South Cyprus' or to the `Greek Cypriot side'. For example, Hal/an Sesi stated that `on 
the 4th day of the free crossings, despite the rain and hail, the number of Greek Cypriots 
that crossed from South Cyprus ... On the other hand, from the TRNC 7 thousand Turk 
went to South Cyprus' (Hallam Sesi, 27 April, p.! ). The same expressions were also 
employed in both Kibris and Yenidüzen. Both depicted Greek Cypriots as crossing to the 
TRNC while Turkish Cypriots were shown as crossing to South Cyprus or the Greek 
Cypriot side, but never to the Republic of Cyprus. The name of the Republic of Cyprus 
appeared only once in Yenidüzen and this was to compare and challenge the 
functionality of the TRNC (Yenidüzen, 25 April, p. 1). Apart from this exception, the 
portrayal of the administration in the north as a state and referring to the one in the south 
as only an administration contributed to the legitimation of the TRNC in the eyes of their 
readership. It also implicitly portrayed Greek Cypriots as crossing to the territory of a 
state that they opposed strongly. The terms `north' and `south' were two metonyms that, 
as well as pointing at the north and the south sides of the island, also referred to the 
political administrations that governed each side of Cyprus. 
The concept of nation was used synonymously with the concept of `home'. In the 
official discourses, the TRNC was reconstructed as the home of Turkish Cypriots while 
171 
Greek Cypriots visited it as `guests'. The notion of neighbourly relationships enhanced 
the idea of the existence of each community within their own territory and next to each 
other as separate states. Such representation and discourses were mostly employed and 
integrated in the news texts by Kibris. Proclaiming the new regulations regarding the 
border crossings, Kibris reported the Tourism and Environment Minister of the time, 
Serdar Denktab, as saying `we are ready to entertain our Greek Cypriot guests' (Kibris, 
22April, p. 1). In the news reports of the same statement in Hallan Sesi and Yenidüzen, 
who used TAK's news dispatch, the term `guests' did not appear (Yenidiizen, 22 April, 
p. 2; Hallan Sesi, 22April, p. 6). In another statement, Serdar Denktab described the Greek 
Cypriots arriving to the north as `our tourist neighbours' (Kibris, 26 April, p. 3), which 
Kibris quoted as a subheadline within an article. The presentation of Greek Cypriots as 
`guests' appeared in another headline of the same newspaper about improvements in 
Kyrenia: `Kyrenia is ready for the guests from South Cyprus' (Kibris, 26 April, p. 8). 
The Prime Minister Dervi§ Eroglu's words in a press release that `living side by side is 
the best solution' (Kibris, 28 April, p. 8) also supported the existing division and the 
guest- neighbour relationship. The text did not appear in Yenidüzen, an ardent critic of 
the status quo. 
Hal/an Sesi did not define Greek Cypriots as `our guests' but merely `Greek Cypriots'. 
Its representation and discourse of the border opening was very similar to official ones. 
The press releases issued by state officials appeared more frequently and in more detail 
in Halkin Sesi compared to the other two newspapers. For example, a statement by 
President Rauf Denktab, in which he expressed his satisfaction with the crossings but 
criticised the opposition on other issues, was given in detail in Hallan Sesi while in 
Kibris only a short part of it appeared and excluded the critical part. It could be that with 
the change of its allegiance in favour of the Annan Plan that was supported mainly by 
the opposition left-wing groups, Kibris chose not to publish those sections of his 
statement. The statement was not reported in Yenidüzen at all. It was again only Halkin 
Sesi that printed a news text about the Tourism and Environment Minister Serdar 
Denktab stressing that there was no change in the views and policies of the Turkish 
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Cypriot administration in relation to the Cyprus problem, which indicated the 
continuation of the existing status quo, while no such report appeared in the others. 
In contrast to the concept of `home', Yenidüzen described the TRNC as a `prison'. 
Reporting 'a statement by the opposition party leader Mehmet Ali Talat, Yenidüzen used 
the headline was `we are free from the prison, we will also be free from a lack of 
solution' (Yenidüzen, 30 April, p. 1). The speech marks the newspaper used in the 
highlights on its front page indicated that they were quotes from Talat. Yet, in the 
headline of the story which claimed that the TRNC was a prison there was no such 
marks. It could be argued that the lack of quotation marks showed corroboration by the 
newspaper of the notion expressed in the statement that Turkish Cypriots were 
imprisoned in the TRNC. In a way, by using the deictic expression `we' in the statement, 
Yenidüzen presented the conceptualisation of the TRNC as a `prison' as the view of the 
newspaper as well as the readers' it addressed. 
The rhetoric of `prison' was employed to stress the feeling of being trapped in a place 
rather than being locked-away for any wrongdoing. It suggested that it was the decisions 
and policies of the Turkish Cypriot state representatives that made Turkish Cypriots feel 
as if they were imprisoned in their own country. Apart from the exclusion of the 
international world, the description of the TRNC as a `prison' referred to the difficulties 
Turkish Cypriots had been facing in travelling abroad. As the TRNC was not an 
internationally recognised legal state, its passports were not accepted as valid travel 
documents by any other states apart from Turkey and this made it hard for Turkish 
Cypriots to travel out of North Cyprus4. `Getting out of prison' highlighted the sense of 
getting out of this country as a consequence of the change that started with the border 
crossings. One impact of this was that many Turkish Cypriots who were eligible for 
citizenship of the Republic of Cyprus obtained its passports or identity cards that 
allowed them to travel abroad. With these documents, Turkish Cypriots also benefited 
4 Turkish Cypriots who want to travel abroad can obtain the passports of Republic of Turkey as the TRNC 
passports are not recognised as valid travel documents by the international world. 
173 
from other services the Greek Cypriot state provided to its citizens. Highlighting this, 
Yenidüzen criticised the TRNC's status as a legal state: 
Half of the population with the Republic of Cyprus' and the other half with the Republic 
of Turkey's passports and identity cards are starting a new life. The TRNC is a state 
whose passport and identity card are not needed (Yenidilzen, 25 April, p. 1). 
Whether imagined as a `home' or a `prison', the nation was conceived as a bounded 
space with some `gates'. The term `gates' actually referred to the border checkpoints, 
which are also called the `border gates'. Thus, the relaxation of the restrictions on 
crossing between the two sides was reported as the `gates are opened' (Ha11hn Sesi, 22 
April, p. 1). The expression was common throughout the news articles of all the 
newspapers. At the time there were only three checkpoints where crossings were taking 
place but they were portrayed as the `borders' in general. Yenidüzen also employed the 
word `barricade' for the checkpoints which blocked the crossings: `the Council of 
Ministers lifted the barricades' (Yenidüzen, 30 April, p. 1). 
In contrast to the previous case study in which the official nationalist representation of 
Greek Cypriots was as the eternal enemy of Turkish Cypriots, the depiction of Greek 
Cypriots in the news texts during this period was positive. Especially in Yenidüzen and 
Kibris, the representation and discourse of the border crossings were reproduced as 
peaceful events and pointed at a positive common political future for both communities. 
For example, Kibris highlighted a quote from a Greek Cypriot family visiting their 
house in the north in its headline as, `we want peace' (Kibris, 26 April, p. 2). The 
discourse of `peace' was dominant especially in Yenidüzen. Suggesting that `the 
crossings have led a strong wind of peace to blow on the island', Yenidüzen reported that 
a friendship had started `between the Greek Cypriot motorcyclists and the young people 
from the north' (Yenidüzen, 26 April, p. 4). It also described the coach service that was 
provided by the Greek Cypriot authorities to take Turkish Cypriots to Limassol as `a 
peace coach' (Yenidüzen, 29 April, p. 4). The discourse of peace not only supported the 
argument that `things will be better in future' (Kibris, 30 April, p. 5) but was also an 
emphasis on the discontinuity of the existing situation. Such discourse was not employed 
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in Halkin Sesi, probably because it supported the state ideology that the peace had 
already existed. 
The Construction of a Common Past 
In the production of the news articles about the crossings to the `other' side, the 
newspapers benefited from the past to highlight its importance in the present. There 
were frequent references to the past, especially to the year 1974, a turning point in 
history for the people on the island. It was in 1974 that Turkey's military intervention 
divided the island into north and south and until April 2003, crossings were restricted. 
The significance of 1974 differed in the three newspapers analysed. Describing the day 
the border crossings commenced as an `historical day', Kibris stressed that it was `the 
first time after 29 years' (Kibris, 23 April, p. 1) that people from both communities 
started to cross in both directions. The numerical rhetoric of `29 years' referred to the 
length of time since such social interaction between the two communities had taken 
place. It also reminded one of a time in the past when there was neither a border nor 
checkpoints and when travelling from one part of Cyprus to the other was not described 
as `going to the other side'. Linking the experiences of crossings 29 years ago with the 
developments of today, Kibris announced that `Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots are 
visiting North Cyprus and South Cyprus after 29 years' (Kibris, 23 April, p.! ). Using a 
strategy of perpetuation in combination with the strategy of transformation, the 
newspaper implied the continuity of the situation for `29 years', which had just changed 
or signalled a certain transformation. However, despite the hint of transformation, there 
was no indication of conceiving of the national identity as threatened by this change. 
Another significance of the numerical rhetoric of `29' was to increase the news value of 
the story and to make it more striking. Stating that something was happening for the first 
time in 29 years indicated that the event was extraordinary which no doubt fuelled 
readers' interest. 
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Accordingly, Yenidüzen also drew similarities with the past and the present. Comparing 
the present time to the past, when there was no border, it published on its front page that 
`it has become similar to the state before 1974. This was the situation in 74, furthermore 
there was no time limit' (Yenidüzen, 22 April, p.! ). The temporal reference of 1974 was 
a metonym employed to represent the military and political actions that took place in 
that year and its aftermath that had changed and shaped the political situation on the 
island since. Yenidüzen, benefiting from the strategy of perpetuation, emphasised the 
similarity between the past and the present, implying that the time in between was a 
disruption in political continuity. Reminding one of the situation pre-1974, it evoked the 
time when both communities lived together, which was also consistent with its 
conceptualisation of a united Cypriot nation and national identity. It indicated the 
possible restoration of a co-existence which had been suspended in 1974. However, the 
present transformation was not exactly the same as the past. For example, border 
movements had a time limit, which meant that everyone was required to return back to 
their side of the island before midnight, or be fined. In the text, this condition was given 
in inverted comas to highlight and probably to mock it, as it was reminiscent of the fairy 
tale, Cinderella: `with the condition of returning back at 24: 00' (Yenidfizen, 22 April, 
p.! ). 
Halkin Sesi's discourse of `1974' was different than the other two newspapers. It defined 
1974 as the date of the `Happy Peace Operation', as it was referred to in the nationalist 
discourses. Such representation of 1974 connoted the conflict between the communities 
in the past and the sufferings of Turkish Cypriots. Even announcing the start of the 
border crossings, Halk: n Sesi reflected this nationalist ideology by linking the 
development to 1974: 
In Cyprus island, that was divided in two zones as the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus and South Cyprus Greek Cypriot Administration following the 20 July 1974 
Happy Peace Operation, free crossing between sides was allowed yesterday for the first 
time in 28 years (Halktn Sesi, 24 April, p. 2). 
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There was confusion in Halkm Sesi's representation of how many years since crossings 
took place. The text above stated it as the first time in `28' years but the one on its front 
page on the same day stressed that `after 29 years Greek Cypriots were rushing to the 
north and Turkish Cypriots to the south' (Halkin Sesi, 24 April, p. l). Either prepared by 
two different people who had calculated the number of years differently or simply a 
typing mistake, the newspaper's attempt of showing its precision and exactness by using 
numerical information was undermined by the confusion or indecisiveness about the 
number of years which was also a crucial part of the story. 
Halkan Sesi also stated that Greek Cypriots saw Lefkoýa, the north of Nicosia, for the 
first time after 40 years (Halkin Sesi, 24 April, p. 1). However, the newspaper did not 
explain further why Greek Cypriots had not crossed to the north of the city for 40 years 
if the border was established only 29 years ago in 1974. Expecting the reader to know 
the reason, Halkin Sesi treated that piece of historical information as general knowledge. 
The 40 years period was a temporal reference to 1964 when Lefko§a was divided by the 
so-called Green Line after the increasing tension between the two communities turned 
into armed conflict. By highlighting the length of time as 40 years to indicate the 
continuity of the present situation, Halkin Sesi employed a strategy of perpetuation that 
emphasised the difference between then and now as a justification. 
People from both communities were reported to have crossed the border to see the 
towns, villages and houses they were forced to abandon in 1974. The newspapers were 
full of news articles about such visits and the reencounter of old friends and neighbours 
of both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Journalists accompanied people from both 
communities during their visits to their old home town, houses or family graves to 
reflect their emotions, views and experiences. The analysis showed that the past was not 
represented by hatred or fear and the narrative of the past was not based on the 
memories of the conflict and suffering but, on the contrary, on nostalgic memories of 
family homes and neighbours. For some, there was clear longing for life in the past. 
Reporting a Greek Cypriot couple's visit to Kyrenia (Girne) where they used to live, 
Kibris quoted one of them as saying: 
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I am from Kyrenia. We're going to the north, to Kyrenia for the first time in 30 years. 
I'll go to the church and light candles. I'll light my candles for peace, for us to go back 
to our pre-1974 places and live together' (Kibris, 24 April, p. 6). 
Despite the suffering and the unpleasant circumstances that forced people out of their 
homes, people in the centre of such features were reported to be happy rather than angry. 
The story of an old woman called Hatice Attillaogullari was reproduced in this manner: 
The flowers she had picked from her house in Akincilar village were for her 
grandmother's grave, left forlorn for 40 years. When the first troubles started in 1963, 
they were taken hostage and were treated cruelly. Leaving their big citrus orchards 
behind, they resettled in Akincilar village. On the returnjourney that her old body had to 
endure with difficulty, she was happy. Having prayed at the neglected graves, she was 
welcomed in her village. On the way back, she had flowers from the house she used to 
live in 40 years ago (Yenidazen, 29 April, p. 5). 
Written in a human-interest news style, these texts included people's accounts of the 
past and their feelings as they remembered them in the present, along with the 
observations of the journalists. The news text about the search of two Turkish Cypriot 
women for their homes in Larnaca was one such news story: 
Ay§e Affaroglu, who walking in the streets of Larnaca and showing excitedly the places 
she used to live to her daughter and son in law who have come to Cyprus from London 
for a holiday, said `these places are where we lived our childhood'. Naile Akalin, who 
pointed at a shop and said `this used to be Uncle Ahmet's grocery shop', seemed like 
reliving her childhood days there one more time. As they approached their house in Haci 
Ibrahim Street, the excitement of both the Akalin and Affaroglu families increased. But 
when they arrived where their house used to be and saw that there was an apartment 
block with shops at the bottom and flats at the top, they could not stop their tears 
(Kibrts, 29 April, p. 3). 
It was not just the houses that were being visited but also work places, family graves and 
religious places. As places of importance they became symbols and the embodiment of 
the past and also their identity. Houses, towns or villages that were conceptualised as 
`home' were also a source of a sense of belonging for people and provided a basis for an 
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identity. The articles about such visits functioned like links back to the past and depicted 
them as precious things that were lost in the past and searched for in the present. 
It was not just homes that were once lost and now found but also personal collections 
such as photographs. Halkin Sesi published a picture of a smiling couple holding their 
wedding photos from 29 years ago (Hal/an Sesi, 29 April, p. 1). The only text regarding 
this event appeared as a photo caption that consisted of the names of the couple (not 
even their surnames) and stating that they had found the photograph in their old house in 
a village but without any further details. There was a similar story, treated in a similar 
way in Yenidüzen showing a woman holding a wedding photograph (Yenidüzen, 29 
April, p. 1) again without any details as to how it happened. The importance of stories 
about finding personal items after 29 years was an indication that the people who had 
kept these items believed or hoped that their owners might return. Indirectly, it reflected 
an expectation of a change which would allow people to return to their old places and 
reclaim their belongings. The news text of a Turkish Cypriot family's visit to the house 
they had owned in Limassol before 1974 was representative of the extent of this belief: 
Even her cupboards were there. They asked Üstündag to open the drawer of the 
cupboard from 29 years ago. She couldn't believe the contents of the drawer she had 
opened shyly. Photographs from when she was a young girl and the bairams greeting 
cards from her older sisters which she had received decades ago were still in the drawer 
she had left. They even kept the butterflies which she had made out of paper because 
they believed that one day she would return (Yenidiizen, 29 April, p. 5). 
The evocation of the past through valuable personal items rediscovered in the present 
also enforced the representation of the past in a nostalgic way, which highlighted the 
positive aspects of the past rather than the difficulties of it. Why and under what 
conditions people had left their homes and hometowns was rarely mentioned. Not the 
atrocities and sufferings of the past but a longing for the things that were left behind and 
the joy of finding them were stressed. Greek Cypriots who were the `enemy' in the 
nationalistic discourses were being humanised and portrayed as long lost friends and 
5A Muslim religious festival. 
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neighbours. This practice was especially common in Yenidüzen. The day after the 
borders were opened, Yenidüzen reported on the meeting of `old Cypriot friends' at the 
Ledra Palace checkpoint, the main checkpoint in Nicosia, as an event worth seeing 
(Yenidüzen, 24 April, p. 4). 
The past was not the same though. Going back to the houses they once owned created an 
ambivalent host-guest situation for the people: The ones who had owned the house in the 
past were now in the guest position. Papadakis (2005) described this confusing situation 
as follows: 
Many people wanted to go back and thousands tried it. Instead, many came to 
understand this could not be because they were not the people who left - they were not 
the same people, nor were the places the same..... Knocking on the door of their home to 
be allowed in, often welcomed and treated as guests, almost relatives, allowed to walk 
through every room and check the trees in the garden. They met the family now living 
there, understanding how this was now their home too, what it would mean to them too, 
if they had to leave (p. 245). 
This ambivalence of the owner-guest relationship existed within the news texts. The 
belief that these houses actually belonged to the people who had owned them before 
1974 was integrated into the news discourses of all the newspapers. The definition of 
houses previously owned by Greek Cypriots as `theirs' was frequent in the news texts 
and showed that the information was treated as normal. Despite the gap between the 
present and the past, the term `their houses' indicated continuity in that these properties 
were seen as belonging to the people who had owned them before the division but at the 
same time to the people who had been living in them. The discourse was evident in some 
of Kibris' headlines: `Visited his house he had abandoned at 8 years old' (Kibris, 26 
April, p. 2), `He found his home with his mother's description' (Kibris, 26 April, p. 2) 
and `Kullos who was born after 1974 visited his family's house' (Kibris, 25 April, p. 2). 
Yenidüzen, on the other hand, highlighted the ambivalent situation of guest-host 
relationship: `Greek Cypriots entertained the "owners of the house" in their house' 
(Yenidüzen, 28 April, p. 2). The inverted comas indicated the awareness of the 
ambiguous situation. Yenidüzen was consistent with its description of `the owners of 
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their house' as it repeated the same term in another article (Yenidiizen, 29 April, p. 4). In 
a similar way, Halkin Sesi also referred to the originally Greek Cypriot owned houses as 
`their' houses but in some cases it added that they were their `old' houses (Halkin Sesi, 
24 April, p: 5). 
Identifying the `Other' 
The discursive construction of `us' and `them' was not as distinct as it was in the 
previous case study. The border crossing had created a positive atmosphere between the 
two communities which enhanced a sense of reconciliation rather than conflict 
enforcement. The news discourses were dominated by ideas such as `peace in Cyprus' 
and 'sisterhood/brotherhood of both communities' which gave the impression that not 
only the physical borders but also the imagined ones were disappearing. 
Greek Cypriots were no longer cast as the enemy and attributions to them were no 
longer derogatory. Instead, the similarities and friendship between Turkish Cypriots and 
Greek Cypriots were stressed. For example, both were characterised as hospitable. The 
newspapers reported how well Turkish Cypriots welcomed their Greek Cypriot guests 
and vice versa. According to the news reports, serving them traditional food and drinks, 
hosts from both communities tried to make their guests comfortable in the houses which, 
in some cases, had belonged to their guests years ago. The newspapers even attributed 
some practices as a common characteristic of both communities. For example, an 
everyday activity like the parking of cars was presented in terms of cultural similarity. 
Kibris quoted the first impression of a group of Turkish Cypriots who had crossed to the 
Greek Cypriot side: `We saw that Greek Cypriots park their cars on the pavements like 
(we do) in the TRNC. It looks like we are similar to each other on this issue' (Kibris, 24 
April, p. 4). 
Forging resemblances between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots helped to 
categorise them under the identity of Cypriot with an emphasis on the cultural coherence 
of both communities. Such thinking was visible especially in Yenidüzen as it accentuated 
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the similarities and had a discourse based on an idealised Cypriot identity. In a way, by 
following a construction strategy it renegotiated a Cypriot national identity. The concept 
of `us' as Cypriots included Greek Cypriots as well as Turkish Cypriots and a positive 
self-representation applied to both. Perhaps not to cast Greek Cypriots in a negative 
light, Yenidüzen did not report the attack by a Greek Cypriot family on a Turkish 
Cypriot one when the latter went to see their old house. A report of the incident appeared 
in Kibris and Halkin Sesi but not in Yenidüzen (Kibris, 29 April, p. 2 & Hallten Sesi, 29 
April, p. 11). 
In Kibris, the distinction between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots was maintained, 
forging an `us' and the `other' group. However, the `other' group was not cast as the 
enemy or a threat but as a group equivalent to the Turkish Cypriot one. The differences 
and likeness between `us' and `them' were blurred: Even though `they' were not exactly 
like `us', `they' were not so different either. As well as acknowledging shared cultural 
habits, contrasts in cultural values and practices between these two groups were also 
mentioned. Unlike Yenidüzen, the collective representation of both communities in 
Kibris was not essentialised under the identity of Cypriot, even though, like Yenidüzen, 
it also acknowledged certain Cypriot characteristics. 
For Hal/an Sesi, Greek Cypriots existed as the `other' group. It described the Greek 
Cypriot crowds arriving in North Cyprus in `surges' (Halkin Sesi, 26 April, p. 1). In 
Halkin Sesi the discourses that emphasised the similarities between the two communities 
were limited. It focused more on official discourses and actions rather than the stories of 
ordinary people. It also continued to publish a summary of the news from the Greek 
Cypriot press about this recent development. As mentioned before, this section of the 
newspaper published anything that showed the Greek Cypriot side as corrupt and bad. 
Although the news chosen in this period was not so negative, it still included reports 
from the Greek Cypriot dailies that cast them in a less than positive light: `Greek 
Cypriots: we are caught unaware' (Halkin Sesi, 27 April, p. 19), and `the Greek Cypriot 
press is now putting forth accusations of smuggling to have negative effects on bi- 
directional crossings' (Halkin Sesi, 26 April, p. 19). Meanwhile, in a positive self- 
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representation, Hal/an Sesi quoted some Greek Cypriots as saying that Turkish Cypriots 
had treated them really well during their visits to the north (Hallan Sesi, 24 April, p. 5). 
The opening of the border was presented as a positive action of `our' government in 
Hal/an Sesi and Kibris. In Kibris, Greek Cypriots (Kibris, 24 April, p. 8) and in Hallan 
Sesi, Turkish Cypriots were reported as thanking the Turkish Cypriot authorities for 
opening the border (Halkin Sesi, 24 April, p. 2). In contrast to the goodwill of the Turkish 
Cypriot authorities, the Greek Cypriot ones were portrayed as the opposite, as creating 
obstacles for the interaction of the two communities. The blame for obstructing Turkish- 
origin TRNC citizens from going to the south and also Turkish Cypriots travel across the 
border with their cars, as the Greek Cypriots had been doing, was put on the Greek 
Cypriot government. Furthermore, reports of the Greek Cypriot authorities trying to 
discourage their people from crossing to the TRNC by claiming that it would lead to its 
recognition, enforced negative perceptions about them: `the Greek Cypriot politicians, 
who could not hinder their citizens crossing to the TRNC, are talking about the risk of 
indirect recognition of the TRNC' (Kibris, 25 April, p. 5). In summary, the Greek 
Cypriot rather than Turkish Cypriot authorities were cast as the ones creating obstacles 
for the people of both communities to meet and blend together. It was also in this 
discourse that the responsibility for causing any rift between the communities was 
shifted from the people to the authorities. Ordinary Greek Cypriots, who were shown as 
crossing to the north despite the warnings of their politicians, were positioned in 
opposition to their state authorities. Such depiction also enforced the perception that 
Greek Cypriots did not support the policies of their own administration on this matter. 
They were even reported as arguing with their own police at the checkpoints for not 
being helpful to them (Kibris, 29 April, p. 5 & Yenidüzen, 29 April, p. 2). In contrast, the 
Turkish Cypriot police, or `our' police, were described as `working without avoiding 
any sacrifice' at the checkpoints (Kibris, 27 April, p. 4). 
In Yenidüzen, the Turkish Cypriot authorities were not exempt from similar accusations. 
It categorised the nationalist governing groups such as the coalition government of 
Ulusal Birlik Partisi (UBP- National Union Party) and Demokrat Parti (DP - Democrat 
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Party), as well as President Rauf Denktab, within the `other' group and depicted them in 
a negative way. According to the newspaper, `UBP-Denktab duo and their supporters for 
years prevented both communities in Cyprus from coming together, getting closer' 
(Yenidüzen, 28 April, p. l). The newspaper also criticised the President for continuing his 
negativity despite the positive and peaceful atmosphere on the island (Yenidüzen, 26 
April, p. 4). Therefore, without stressing the role of the Turkish Cypriot authorities in 
opening the borders, Yenidiizen depicted the development as an action of `the people' 
that had a negative impact on the dominant nationalist groups. The day the borders were 
opened, rather than reporting the official announcement on its front page, Yenidüzen 
chose to say that `the power of these people will make you do more things "on your way 
out": the status quo will collapse' (Yenidüzen, 22 April, p.! ). The Turkish word 
`cökecek', which means `will collapse', was written with dashes as 'V6-ke-cek' to 
emphasise it. Affiliated with the main opposition party, Yenidiizen was critical of the 
governing groups and associated them with the problems of the present time by calling 
them the `status quo'. Claiming that Turkish Cypriots wanted more substantial changes 
within their country, Yenidüzen pointed at their expectations for the future: 
Those who think Turkish Cypriots are `their toys' have opened the borders `for the time 
being'. But Turkish Cypriots want more, much more than that. More than just `touring', 
Turkish Cypriots are waiting for the day when they would have an identity in the world 
(Yenidüzen, 22 April, p. 1). 
As seen in the statement above, by employing a strategy of transformation, Yenidüzen 
indicated a change in the political situation in the future as well as a re-imagining of 
national identity. 
Yenidüzen, using the argument of usefulness for the visits of Greek Cypriots to the north, 
justified the action of opening the borders with economic benefits. It claimed that the 
Greek Cypriots' arrival boosted the country's economy `90 thousand Cyprus pound' in 
six days (Yenidüzen, 30 April, p. 1). Yet, there was no mention of how much money 
Turkish Cypriots contributed to the South Cyprus economy. Comparison based on 
wealth existed within many news texts in which Greek Cypriots were depicted as 
wealthier than Turkish Cypriots. For example, news reports about the visits of Turkish 
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Cypriots to Limassol included their impression of it as being as developed as a 
`European city', especially when compared to the north. However, the modernity and 
wealth of the city did not spread to the Turkish quarter of the city as Yenrditzen journalist 
observed that it was full of neglected buildings (Yenidüzen, 28 April, p. 2). Reflecting the 
public's feelings and thoughts about the crossings, Halkin Sesi also quoted someone 
describing Lefkosia (South Nicosia) as `more developed than our side' (Halkin Sesi, 24 
April, p. 2). 
The discourse in the newspapers gave the impression that more Greek Cypriots went to 
the north side of the island than Turkish Cypriots to the south. Kibris and Halkin Sesi 
especially expressed their surprise regarding the Greek Cypriots' enthusiasm in crossing 
to their side. Both reported that, contrary to expectations, a great number of Greek 
Cypriots had crossed to the TRNC (Kibris, 24 April, p. 4; Halkin Sesi, 26-27 April, p. 2). 
Their amazement revealed that in the wake of years of anti-Turk propaganda as well as 
the recent warnings of the Greek Cypriot government against an indirect recognition of 
the TRNC, they did not expect such large numbers of Greek Cypriots to go to the north. 
To stress the interest Greek Cypriots had been showing in North Cyprus, Halk: n Sesi 
described them as `surging in crowds'. The newspaper reported that `due to the 
increasing demands of Greek Cypriots, great crowds formed on the third day of the 
crossing' (Halkin Sesi, 26 April, p. l). Kibris also noted in one of its headline that there 
was a `big interest' (Kibris, 25 April, p. 1). Even though it generalised the big interest to 
both sides, it stated that `especially Greek Cypriots had formed long queues with their 
vehicles at the Ledra Palace and Beyarmudu checkpoints' (Kibris, 25 April, p. l). 
Yenidüzen also remarked that the interest and the crush Greek Cypriots created at the 
checkpoints did not wane but increased (Yenidüzen, 29 April, p. 2). 
The Linguistic Construction of Common Culture 
Culture, another significant element of national identity, acts as a source in its 
production. Cultural symbols can have various meanings and can be interpreted 
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differently. Despite this, shared meanings, habits, rituals and ways of speaking are 
resources for establishing a sense of belonging (Edensor, 2002). National identity is 
produced and reproduced depending on the invention and the circulation of these 
cultural materials. 
In the news texts analysed, cultural materials were employed to draw similarities 
between the two communities as well as to state their differences. Both communities 
were imagined with certain qualities associated with them which were not just 
traditional ones but also the habits of everyday life that are embedded in the practices of 
daily social interaction. For example, both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots were 
described as being very hospitable. People from both sides were reported to have 
welcomed their guests and invited them for coffee (Kibris, 29 April, p. 3; Halkin Sesl, 28 
April, p. 4; Yenidüzen, 29 April, p. 5). In their accounts of meeting the `other', people 
kept mentioning how they were invited in to drink coffee when they were on the `other' 
side. The shared practice of drinking coffee was not treated as anything unusual since it 
was a habitual performance of everyday life for both communities. This form of habitus 
provided a shared form of identity between the two communities, linking them together 
through this daily habitual practice and creating a culture of coherence amongst 
Cypriots. As well as coffee, food was another form of representation of cultural 
similarity. For example, ceftali, a certain type of kebab common in Cyprus was 
described as `Cyprus' well known dish' (Kibris, 24 April, p. 4). The circulation of feftali 
as a Cypriot dish rather than Greek or Turkish represented it as another shared cultural 
feature, maintaining the notion of a common Cypriot cultural identity. 
Music, another cultural ingredient that can be associated with national identity also 
appeared in the news texts as another uniting component of Cypriot culture. In a 
romanticised description, Kibris noted that some Turkish Cypriots walked through the 
streets of Larnaca where `Cypriot folk music' echoed (Kibris, 29 April, p. 3). Folkloric 
music stresses national distinctiveness and authenticity. Describing the music as 
`authentic' and `Cypriot' in the news texts reproduced it as a shared cultural component 
of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The circulation of such representations sustained 
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the concept of a Cypriot identity. Yenidüzen also published an article about the 
performance of the bi-communal choir and folk dance group on its front page. This bi- 
communality of the choir and folk dance group implied common characteristics in the 
songs sung and the dances performed (Yenidüzen, 28 April p. 1). 
Along with shared cultural features, some cultural materials were treated as the national 
cultural symbol of only one group which highlighted the differences between the 
communities. Food and drink were two categories that induced such separation. One 
such example was a desert called ekmek kadayifi, a Turkish Cypriot speciality which the 
newspapers claimed Greek Cypriots longed to taste. Linking ekmek kadayifi together 
with the Greek Cypriots' homes in the north, Yenidüzen wrote that `they have not 
forgotten the house and ekmekkadayifi (sic)' (Yenidüzen, 26 April, 2003, p. 6). On the 
other hand, a beer called KEO, a brandy known as 31 and wine were the drinks Turkish 
Cypriots associated with Greek Cypriot culture. According to K: bras, having crossed to 
the Greek Cypriot side, 
Some Turkish Cypriots went to a bar and did not forget to taste KEO and Greek 
Cypriots' renowned red wine. It was also noticed that, on the way back, many Turks 
carried `31' in their hands, the famous drink of the Greek Cypriot side (Kibris, 24 April, 
p. 4). 
Language, another cultural ingredient of national identity, also signified a difference 
between the two communities. In Cyprus, following the division in 1974, the physical 
boundary also acted as a boundary for the languages spoken predominantly on either 
side of the island; Turkish in the northern part and Greek in the southern part. Having 
crossed to the `other' side, Turkish Cypriots became aware that the boundary of Turkish 
language on the island was not limited to the TRNC borders and that Turkish still 
existed in the Greek Cypriot part of the island. The newspapers reported that Turkish 
Cypriots who went to Limassol were surprised to see some posters on the walls in 
Turkish and heard some people speak to them in Turkish, mostly the Turkish Cypriots 
who lived in the Greek Cypriot side. The articles also stated that some of the street 
names where Turkish Cypriots used to live were kept in Turkish. These observations 
confirmed the role of the Turkish language as a source of national identity for Turkish 
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Cypriots which had enhanced imagining themselves as a separate national group from 
Greek Cypriots in the past as well as in the present. 
National Space 
Conceptualising a nation in spatial terms also contributes to the production of national 
identity. Edensor remarks that places and spaces that are regarded as national contribute 
to a sense of national identity with their cognitive, sensual and habitual impact (Edensor, 
2002). Sometimes these places symbolise the combination of ethnic, religious and 
cultural characteristics of the nation. 
In the news texts analysed, the link between national space and national identity was 
based, for the most part, on the `other' rather than `us'. Landscapes that were 
symbolically and ideologically important for the `other' emphasised the differences 
between the two communities. Highlighting certain areas in the north as significant 
places for Greek Cypriots, in terms of religion, was one such example as religion was 
another signifier of national identity in Cyprus. In the past, the communities were 
defined by their religion as Christian Orthodox and Muslim rather than as Greek Cypriot 
and Turkish Cypriot. It was with the development of nationalism that national identities 
superseded the religious ones, yet religion kept its importance in the definition of 
national identities. The division of the island had brought religious division as well. The 
majority of people in the north of the island mainly follow the faith of Islam with very 
few Greek Cypriots or Maronites who share the Christian faith. In the south, it is the 
reverse. Therefore, many spiritual, religious and sacred places of both communities were 
left isolated following the movement of populations from one part of the island to the 
other after 1974. 
Some of the significant places for Greek Cypriots were in Karpas (Karpaz), the 
peninsula in the north. Apart from the churches and monasteries that are spiritually 
important to the Orthodox Greek Cypriots, the presence of a small Greek Cypriot 
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community that stayed in that part of the country even after the division made it easy to 
associate the area with Greek Cypriots. Two newspapers, Kibris and Halkin Sesi, 
included news stories about Greek Cypriots visits to Apostolos Andreas, one of the 
monasteries in the Karpas area for their Easter service (Kibris, 28 April, p. 1). Yenidazen 
only mentioned that a high number of Greek Cypriots crossed to the north during the 
Easter break (Yenidüzen, 28 April, p. 3). Kibris, especially, highlighted the religious 
rituals the Orthodox Greek Cypriots performed in churches and monasteries in Karpas 
with big colourful photos. The news of the Easter Service in the Monastery of Apostolos 
Andreas and the baptism ceremony of a baby in another church in Karpas appeared on 
the front pages of Kibris on two consecutive days (Kibris, 28 & 29 April, p. 1). As well 
as representing the Orthodox religion as a national signifier of Greek Cypriots, these 
texts in Kibris also portrayed these places as the symbol of their ethnic, religious and 
cultural traditions. In contrast, there was no such report of Turkish Cypriots visiting 
religious places in the south side. Unlike Greek Cypriots, in the first week of the opening 
of the borders (which is the period this study focused on) Turkish Cypriots were not 
allowed to cross to the south with their vehicles which made it difficult for them to 
explore anywhere outside Lefkosia. It was only when the Greek Cypriot government 
organised coach services to the main towns in the south that Turkish Cypriots were able 
to go to these places as well. 
Apart from Karpas, the newspapers also depicted Kyrenia (Girre), another town in 
North Cyprus, as a significant place for Greek Cypriots in which they showed great 
interest and visited in crowds. Considering that it was the home of many Greek Cypriots, 
this interest was not surprising and the newspapers treated it as normal. Yenidüzen 
reported that `Greek Cypriots also crossed to the North... and many ran to Kyrenia' 
(Yenidüzen, 24 April, p. 2). Halkin Sesi also reported that `Greek Cypriots rushed to 
Kyrenia and villages' (Halkin Sesi, 24 April, p. 2). Carrying a news report accompanied 
by a photo from Kyrenia, Kibris informed its readers that `With the opening of the 
borders, Kyrenia, the capital of tourism, faced a rush from many Greek Cypriots' 
(Kibris, 26 April, p. 8). There was no similar report about any other town in North 
Cyprus and this could be explained by two reasons. One, positioned next to the sea, 
189 
Kyrenia, its harbour in particular, was always seen as a beautiful spot and a tourist 
attraction. As stated above, Kibris described it as `the capital of tourism', which was 
why Greek Cypriot excursions there were not thought of as unusual. 
The second reason could be linked to the naturalising tendencies of nationalist 
ideologies. Over the years, the nationalistic discourses of Greek Cypriots implied their 
desire to return to Kyrenia, which symbolised a return to the pre-1974 situation. The loss 
of Kyrenia was associated with humanitarian, nationalist and economic factors as it was 
the capital of Cypriot tourism before and thus took a central position in the Greek 
Cypriot discourses. In contrast, the Turkish Cypriot official nationalistic discourses 
pointed to such discourses of the Greek Cypriot officials as evidence of their continuing 
ambition for enosis. In both discourses, Kyrenia appeared as the dream of every Greek 
Cypriot and as the place where Greek Cypriots longed to go. The nationalist ideologies 
adopted by both communities made these discourses look `natural'. Embedded in the 
public consciousness, it seemed normal that every Greek Cypriot wanted to go and see 
Kyrenia. When the Greek Cypriots filled the streets of Kyrenia or the touristy harbour, 
the newspapers treated this as if it were to be expected. 
Whatever meaning Greek Cypriots assigned to it, Kyrenia had a different significance 
for Turkish Cypriots, which shows how difficult it is to affix national meanings to 
national spaces. During the years after 1974, Kyrenia had been a landscape which 
acquired a national importance for Turkish Cypriots. The pictures of Kyrenia harbour 
had become the predominant image of the TRNC for tourist campaigns, together with 
other images that symbolised Turkish Cypriot culture. It was an example of a local place 
becoming an image that represented the national space. The photographs of Kyrenia 
harbour in the newspapers with some Greek Cypriot tourists showed familiar spatial 
features to Turkish Cypriot readers and reproduced it as a national space that they 
identified with. 
In Cyprus, the houses, home towns or villages left behind because of the division were 
the other spaces that acted as a source of identification for the members of both 
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communities. Home, like nation, is a bounded space that encloses memories, emotions 
and gives a sense of belonging and security. The concept of home means not merely a 
physical dwelling but also signifies the familial relationship or sometimes the 
community. Therefore, the concept of home may extend beyond the physical structure 
and include locality so that one can feel at home in the neighbourhood, town or city. The 
news stories about going back to the houses owned before the 1974 division appeared in 
all three newspapers. They reported that the first place Greek Cypriots visited when they 
crossed the border to the north was the homes they had left behind. Turkish Cypriots, on 
the other hand, were not allowed to cross to the south with their cars in the first week, 
which restricted their trips to the places that could be reached with the coach services 
provided by the Greek Cypriot authorities. The newspaper reports on people visiting the 
homes they had left nearly 30 years ago stressed the value and the attachment they felt 
towards them. The meaning of home was also extended beyond the buildings to 
neighbourhood and hometown and they were depicted as the places of memories, 
emotions and relationships. The reflection of these visits to these places was in the form 
of nostalgia. Hal/an Sesi summarised the emotions that dominated these trips as `joy and 
sadness': 
Going around the streets with the excitement of seeing the house he spent his childhood 
and sharing his memories with his children, a father was getting ready to see his house 
when he found an empty field in its place. The rest of the visit past with sadness for the 
ones who encountered such bad surprises while for the ones who found their houses and 
walked around the rooms and garden the happiness reached at its peak (Halkin Sesi, 8 
April, p. 4). 
Kibris also quoted a Greek Cypriot woman who had gone to see the house that she had 
abandoned nearly 30 years ago and who described it as a place of memories and familial 
relationships: 
I wanted to see my house. I got married here. My children were born here. I have 4 
daughters and 6 sons. Apparently the house owner is abroad at the moment. I used to 
live opposite to my daughter. My daughter visited her house but I was deprived from 
that. That is my fate. I became a migrant when I was 40. I am both happy and sad to be 
here (Kibris, 26 April, p. 10). 
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As the example above suggested, the individual and collective narratives were 
constructed around these houses as they were symbols of an identity, community and 
tradition that people had identified themselves with in the past. As well as describing 
themselves a Turk or Turkish Cypriots, people also identified themselves with local or 
regional characteristics, as being from Limassol or Larnaca. The houses formed a link 
between these concepts and also gave them a sense of attachment to those places. 
Therefore, they meant more than a place of residence but a bounded space that embodied 
values and meanings that were integral to the existence of the group and its identity. 
During the nation building process, especially after the division, any internal differences 
in the conceptualisation of local or regional identities were suppressed and made part of 
the national identity. 
Conclusion 
Focusing on the content, the analysis found that five themes suggested by Wodak et. al 
(1999) were employed in the discursive construction of the national identity. The 
analysis found that even though the themes of linguistic construction of common 
political past, common culture and national space occurred more often, there were also 
references to the themes of a common political present and an essentialist understanding 
of Cypriotness. The analysis also revealed that there were overlapping discourses of 
identity which existed within the news texts such as Turkish Cypriot identity co-existing 
with Cypriot identity. The overall analysis of the data supported the argument that rather 
than a single essentialist identity, there was an ongoing process of production of 
different identities and, depending on the context and the newspaper, the characteristics 
of national identity changed. In some cases, Turkish Cypriots were constructed as a 
separate group in opposition to Greek Cypriots, creating a `national we' group that also 
included Turkish origin citizens. At other times, the cultural similarities of both 
communities were highlighted and their differences were suppressed to construct a 
common Cypriot identity. 
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The characterisation of the nation as both Staatsnation and Kulturnation co-existed in 
the coverage of the event in all the newspapers. Thus, as well as characterising national 
belonging on the basis of citizenship there was also characterisation of the national 
identity based on cultural similarities. The conceptualisation of the nation as 
Staatsnation was evident especially in the news texts about Turkish-origin TRNC 
citizens. Using the argument that they were TRNC citizens and should be treated as 
equals to Cypriot-born ones, the newspapers represented the concept of nation based on 
citizenship. Even though it seemed like a concern for democratic society and citizenship, 
in the mediation of the issue neither Turkish-born citizens nor other ethnic minorities 
were given any means of expression. The emphasis on Turkish Cypriots' excitement 
pushed the expressions of others' to the background. National self-perception based on 
cultural definitions was also evident in the news articles of Yenidüzen and Kibris in 
particular. Even in Halkm Sesi, it was hard to apply a strict dichotomy of national 
identification based on Staatsnation and Kulturnation since the features of both could be 
found in its news texts. 
Like the definition of `we' group, the representation of the `other' also shifted depending 
on the context and the newspaper. Having positioned `people' versus `the nationalist 
governing groups', Yenidiizen treated the latter as the `other' and portrayed it as the 
adversary of the `people'. It treated Turkish origin citizens as part of the nation based on 
the model of Staatsnation but also drew on cultural analogies with Greek Cypriots. A 
similar constructive strategy was discernible in Kibris, yet Kibris kept the dichotomy 
between the two communities by reflecting their cultural differences as well. In Hallan 
Sesi, whose representation of the issue was dominated with the official discourses, 
Greek Cypriots maintained their position as the `other'. 
The rhetoric of `home' was used in the newspapers in two different concepts. One was 
the reproduction of the official discourse that referred to the TRNC as `home' and Greek 
Cypriots visiting it as `guests'. The second was pointing at the places that signified 
familial and community relationships in the past. The individual and national narratives 
were constructed around the images of these houses and their surroundings that were 
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defined as `home'. The host-guest relationship kept its ambiguity but at the same time 
challenged the official discourse, which claimed that the houses abandoned during and 
after 1974 belonged to whoever owned them after the separation. 
The year 1974 was a turning point in the history of Turkish Cypriots and the past came 
to mean the times before 1974. People revisited the houses they had lived in and 
searched for their neighbours and friends they had last seen before moving to the 
Turkish Cypriot or the Greek Cypriot side. The news articles about the visits to these 
places and the meeting of old acquaintances contributed to the reconstruction of the 
common experience these communities had in the past. The inclusion of such narratives 
of the past within the news stories also reinforced the nation's cultural memory. Not 
merely the common past but also a common political future existed within the news 
discourses. Yenidüzen, especially, adopting strategies of transformation and dismantling, 
emphasised the discontinuity of the status quo and the necessity for a change in Cyprus, 
especially for Turkish Cypriots, between the present time and the future. Reporting the 
recent changes within the country, Kibris also implicitly employed a strategy of 
transformation, while Halkin Sesi used the strategy of perpetuation to stress the positive 
continuity of the existing situation that supported the nationalist approaches. 
The role of the newspapers in reflecting the `other' changed with the opening of the 
border. Before the crossings had started, the media was one of the means of getting the 
news on the `other', which was largely controlled by state officials. The opening of the 
border not only made the communication of these groups unnecessary but also gave a 
chance for the media institutions to collect data for themselves rather than being 
provided by the official sources. In other words, rather than mediating the `other' 
through these sources, having met and observed the `other', the media controlled the 
method of transmission to the public. Meanwhile, the `other' was no longer an abstract 
entity for the people or the readers but materialised through their encounters in everyday 
life. Therefore, the newspapers were not just mediating strangers to their readers but 
reflecting an issue that had become part of their daily life, especially in the first week of 
the border crossings. 
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There were differences in journalistic practices which were reflected in the news 
discourses. Rather than relying only on the externally produced texts and news agency 
dispatches, which they still continued to benefit from, the newspapers also carried out 
their own newsgathering practices. Journalists' observations were integrated more into 
the news texts, even though in some cases the comments of journalists replaced the 
facts. Along with the press releases of the state and the government authorities, the 
stories of ordinary people appeared more in the news articles. Such stories were more 
frequent in Yenidüzen, a newspaper that adopted the concept of `people' in its discourse 
and representation. They were covered less in Hallern Sesi as it mostly used the official 
representation and discourse in its coverage of the developments. On the other hand, 
Kibris tried to amalgamate both. As Yenidüzen and Halkin Sesi kept their ideological 
positions in relation to the previous case study, Kibris shifted its stance from a 
nationalist one to one favouring a solution. Thus, compared to the previous case study, 
the similarities in the discourse and representation of Kibris and Hallern Sesi were less. 
The routines of everyday life, which also reproduced and naturalised nationalism were 
embedded within the news texts. The circulation of the images of family homes not only 
mediated the domestic space but also linked private lives with the national public one, 
creating a sense of unity. The reflection of the similar habits and nationally shared 
cultural norms and values of Turkish Cypriots within the news reproduced a sense of 
similarity and togetherness. Identification with these quotidian ways provided a way of 
seeing the world and their mediation by the media helped them to be internalised and 
treated as common sense. 
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CHAPTER 7: LOKMACI CRISIS IN 2007 
Introduction 
The third case study focuses on the news texts concerning the removal of an overpass 
built at Lokmaci, one of the military barricades in Leflcoýa. The overpass, or footbridge, 
was erected to act as another border crossing between the northern and the southern 
parts of central Nicosia in December 2005. Contrary to the purpose of its construction, 
which was to bring both communities closer together by reuniting the divided city of 
Nicosia, the bridge became a symbol of the division. When it was first built, the Greek 
Cypriot government objected to the idea of an overpass for civilian use over a military 
area and refused to open the Lokmaci crossing' until it was demolished. Later, when the 
Turkish Cypriot administration announced that it would remove the footbridge, the 
Turkish military that controlled the area then objected. 
This part of the research examines the news discourses of the three newspapers to 
discover which concepts of national identity were articulated through the discussions 
surrounding the Lokmaci footbridge. It studies the way Turkish Cypriots conceptualised 
themselves and articulated their identity, having received a rejection from the Greek 
Cypriots to cooperate in an action they considered to be positive and also when a 
Turkish military Chief of Staff interfered with their internal affairs. 
The Setting - Brief Description of the Context within Which the Bridge was 
Removed 
Attempts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem failed when the Greek Cypriots 
rejected the Annan Plan in a referendum on 24`x' April 2004. The result disappointed the 
1 Greek Cypriots refer to this crossing as the 'Ledra crossing' or Ledra Street crossing'. 
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64.9%2 of Turkish Cypriots who voted in favour of the plan, crushing their hopes for a 
solution to their longstanding problems that were related in a way to the unsolved 
Cyprus Problem. The relationship between the two communities also seemed to be 
drifting apart after the referendum. Research on the relationship between the two 
communities revealed that neither community trusted the other (Lordos, 2005). 
Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriots' entry into the EU, despite having rejected the 
settlement plan, made Turkish Cypriots feel let down by the EU which also eroded their 
trust in it. 
There had also been changes in the political dynamics in the TRNC. The nationalist 
coalition government of Ulusal Birlik Partisi (UBP - National Unity Party) and 
Demokrat Parti (DP - Democrat Party) was replaced first by the CTP and DP coalition 
government but then by Cumhuriyetci Türk Partisi (CTP- Republican Turkish Party) - 
Özgürlük ve Reform Partisi (ÖRP- Independence and Reform Party) coalition 
government. CTP's leader Mehmet Ali Talat had also been elected as the TRNC 
President in the presidential elections in 2005, replacing the nationalist leader, Rauf 
Denktab. 
A total of five checkpoints had been functioning as crossing points on the island since 
2003. Nevertheless, the opening of the Lokmaci barricade was seen as a step to build on 
the mutual trust of both communities by increasing contact between them. The Lokmaci 
checkpoint would have connected the centres of both cities, making it easier for people 
to cross from one part to the other. The barricade was set on a long shopping street 
called Ledra Street (or Uzun Yol by Turkish Cypriots) in the centre of Nicosia. When the 
armed conflict between the two communities flared in 1963, Turkish Cypriots set up a 
barricade there called Lokmaci, which was the first division between Turkish Cypriots 
and Greek Cypriots. Later, both sides erected walls on Ledra Street that not only divided 
the street but also became a symbol of the division3. 
2 75.83% of Greek Cypriots voted `no' in the referendum. 3 The Greek Cypriot side turned the wall into a memorial of the division by putting windows from which 
one could peek into the Turkish Cypriot side. 
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Shopkeepers in the north campaigned for a crossing to be opened at Lokmaci. The 
retailers in the Asmaalti and Arasta areas4, surrounding the Lokmaci barricade, 
considered the opening a crucial step in reviving their businesses. They argued that it 
would make it easier for Greek Cypriots to cross to the north and would also encourage 
tourists from the south to come and shop in Lefko§a. 
In December 2005, the Turkish Cypriot administration pulled down the defensive wall in 
the north side of the border to turn the Lokmaci barricade into a crossing gate. However, 
the area being a military zone as well as a shopping street, this created a potential 
problem that people crossing through the checkpoint might encounter the activities of 
Turkish troops stationed there. To overcome this problem, the Turkish Cypriot 
government built an overpass that would carry people over a road used by the Turkish 
military. The move angered the Greek Cypriot leadership. Arguing against the idea that 
Greek Cypriot civilians should cross over a Turkish military zone, it demanded the 
demolition of the footbridge as a precondition for any further negotiations on the 
reopening of Ledra Street or the Lokmaci gate. As a result, the Lokmaci crossing 
remained closed. 
On 28 December 2006, TRNC President Mehmet All Talat announced that the 
footbridge in the Lokmaci barricade would be removed. His spokesperson explained on 
behalf of the President that `he decided for the demolition of the footbridge, which was 
claimed to have been an obstacle for the opening of Lokmaci Border Gate, with the aim 
of contributing to the decision of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot sides to resume the 
comprehensive negotiations in the first quarter of 2007 and to aid the development of 
cooperation between the two peoples' (TRNC President's Office, Official Web site 
accessed 2008). The move was also a good will gesture to facilitate talks and revive the 
peace process on the island following an agreement reached by two community leaders 
in a meeting with the UN Under-Secretary General Ibrahim Gambari (Aydin, 31 
January, 2007). However, the decision sparked a heated debate within the country as 
I Arasta and Asmaalti are the names of two shopping areas that surround the Lolanaci barricade in 
LefkoM North Nicosia. 
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well as Turkey and South Cyprus. Talat's pronouncement on dismantling the bridge he 
had built just a year before was criticised by the Turkish Cypriot rightwing opposition as 
giving in to the demands of the Greek Cypriot authorities. Meanwhile, not satisfied with 
the demolition of the footbridge, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Tassos 
Papadopoulos, insisted that the area should be demilitarised, cleared of mines, derelict 
buildings repaired and symbols of the TRNC removed before the Greek Cypriot 
authorities would open the passage for public crossings. Otherwise, he announced, the 
Greek Cypriot side would not reciprocate in the removal of the bridge. This meant the 
wall that acted as a barricade on their side of the border would not be removed. 
The Turkish military, having control of the area, also criticized the decision. According 
to the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, Ya§ar Büyükanit, who opposed the 
dismantling of the bridge, such steps should be taken and implemented at the same time 
as the Greek Cypriot administration. A picture of a crisis began to emerge, which Kibris 
labelled as the `Lokmaci crisis' (Kibris, 5 January, p. 1). Furthermore, BUyükanit 
disproved of public a statement that TRNC President Talat had made after a meeting in 
Ankara with the Turkish Foreign Minister and Büyükanit himself. In his speech after the 
meeting on the 5th January, Talat had denied having discussed the Lokmact Bridge with 
them. But the General's statement contradicted him, revealing that the TRNC President 
lied to public concerning the topic of their meeting. Nonetheless, after some 
negotiations, a consensus was reached and the removal of the Lokmact Bridge went 
ahead. 
In the TRNC, people organised public demonstrations to express both their support and 
opposition to Talat's decision. A group of retailers from the Asmaalti and Arasta areas, 
with the support of some right wing nationalist political parties, rallied against the 
removal of the bridge before the Greek Cypriot government pulled down the wall on 
their side. The demonstration caused a conflict with another group which claimed to be 
the real representative of the merchants and accused the first group of not acting in the 
merchants' interest. Meanwhile, another demonstration came from a group of civil 
society organisations that were outraged by the way TRNC President Talat was treated 
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by the Turkish military General Staff. They organised a protest march to express their 
support for Talat on the Lokmaci issue. 
The footbridge was pulled down on 9 January 2007. The UN and the EU approved the 
move and described it as a contribution to the opening of the crossing. Yet, the crossing 
remained closed. The Greek Cypriot leadership continued to claim that the dismantling 
of the footbridge was not enough and other conditions such as the demilitarisation of the 
area and the removal of TRNC symbols should be met before they would demolish the 
wall on their side and open a border gate. The Turkish Cypriot side refused these 
demands5. 
The Position of the Newspapers 
This part of the research covers the period between 2-16 January 2007 which is a week 
before and a week after the removal of the footbridge in Lokmaci on the 9`h January. The 
number of texts included in the analysis was over 200. A large proportion of these texts 
is identical but is still included in the count as they appeared in each newspaper 
separately. 
There had not been much change in the editorial teams of the three newspapers but their 
political positions had altered. As CTP, the political party Yenidüzen was linked to, came 
to power, Yenidüzen's position shifted from being part of the opposition to being pro- 
government. This transformation influenced the newspaper's discourse that continued to 
frame the issues from the perspective of CTP despite its attempts to change its image to 
a newspaper with a broader appeal. 
Hallern Sesi was consistent in its political position in that it supported the nationalist 
groups and right wing political parties which were in opposition. Therefore, Halkin. 
s Lolanaci crossing opened to public crossings on P April 2008. 
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Sesi's representation of the events reflected a degree of opposition to the governing 
groups. 
Kibris continued its publication with the same editorial team and policy. Although, its 
coverage included the views and actions of various groups, its support of the 
government and the president was also discernible. It was Kibris that first described the 
situation regarding the footbridge as the `Lokmaci crisis' (Kibris, 5 January, p. 1). 
Analysis of Journalistic Practices and the Structure of the News 
An overall analysis of the coverage of the `Lokmaci crisis' showed that the majority of 
the news reports which appeared in the three newspapers was based on externally 
produced texts such as written press releases and the press conferences of state 
authorities, opposition parties and non-governmental organisations. The journalists' role 
in the coverage of the issue was reduced mainly to processing the information provided 
for them by the source, rather than originating the news texts, which suggests that the 
story construction was determined by sources rather than journalists. The argument is 
not to deny any involvement of journalists in the production process of the news. They 
certainly reported from the parliament meetings in which the Lokmaci issue was 
debated, interviewed politicians and reflected the views of some shopkeepers in the area 
on this matter. The attempt is to highlight the dominance of the views of sources 
compared to any news output originated by journalists. As a result, many similar news 
texts appeared in all three newspapers that did not go further than simply reflecting the 
views of the sources and therefore failed to provide definition and guidance to increase 
the understanding of the text. 
The resemblance in the texts also suggested that the press releases or news agency 
dispatches were either published with little editing or were copied as they were. The 
heavy reliance on news agency dispatches or press releases not only contributed to the 
centralisation and control of information in the public sphere but also limited the 
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diversity in the discourse and representation of the events within the media sphere 
affecting the public one. The news texts that originated from such sources were easy to 
spot as they were identical and appeared in the three newspapers. Yenidüzen was the 
only one that indicated the source of the news article as `TAK' or `Anadolu News 
Agency' or `Greek Cypriot Press', at the end of its texts. 
Another consequence of using given information without putting it through the 
journalistic process was that many news items failed to include information that would 
help readers to understand the issue in detail. Thus, it forced readers to bring in their 
own knowledge about the issue as the texts sometimes did not even provide the crucial 
information. One such example was the news about the demonstration for the opening of 
Lokmaci/Ledra gate. Even though it was stated in the newspapers that a Greek Cypriot 
organisation called `Citizens for Opening of Ledra' was going to demonstrate in favour 
of its opening, the reports of the event announced that it was staged by a bi-communal 
`Open the gates initiative'. However, all failed to explain how a Greek Cypriot 
organisation suddenly became a `bi-communal' one and changed from being `Citizens 
for Opening of Ledra' to `Open the gates initiative' (Kibris, Yenidüzen & Halkin Sesi, 14 
January, p. 1) which showed that they all accepted the information provided by the 
sources without questioning or researching it further. 
As well as processing the information sent by the sources, the newspapers also included 
articles from the other news media organisations and particularly from the Greek 
Cypriot and the Turkish press. The Turkish Cypriot media relied on the Greek Cypriot 
press to reflect the views of the Greek Cypriot authorities on the issue. Despite the fact 
that crossing to the Greek Cypriot side was possible and the communication lines 
between both sides were open, the journalists from the north chose to quote the Greek 
Cypriot press rather than gathering the information themselves. This could be explained 
by various reasons such as language barriers, lack of motivation or reluctance of the 
Greek Cypriot sources to speak with Turkish Cypriot journalists. 
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The articles from the Turkish media were useful in reflecting the related views and 
debates in Turkey as the issue also involved the Turkish government and military 
authorities. Interestingly, instead of simply reporting that they included features about 
Lokmaci, the Turkish Cypriot newspapers published the articles as they had originally 
appeared, without making any changes in them. This practice was common, particularly 
in Yenidüzen, although Hal/an Sesi employed it as well. For example, Halk: n Sesi 
published an article that included a statement by the General Staff which had already 
appeared in a Turkish daily, Milliyet (Hallen Sesi, 8 January, p. 2). Such practices 
revealed a lack of motivation on the part of the Turkish Cypriot press to be exclusive or 
original. Yenidüzen also circulated an article about the `Lokmaci crisis' on its front page 
that was written by a well known Turkish journalist from the Turkish daily, Radikal. Yet 
it announced that it was written for both newspapers, Radikal and Yenidilzen (Yenidüzen, 
8 January, p. 1). 
Interestingly, Kibris newspaper turned a routine newsgathering effort into a front page 
news story. The visit by a group of well-known columnists and editors from the 
newspaper to Ledra Street in South Nicosia and reports that they had conducted 
interviews with Greek Cypriot shopkeepers became the lead story that occupied the first 
three pages of the newspaper. Their move, as explained in the text, was to find out the 
feelings and views of the Greek Cypriot people and especially the shopkeepers on Ledra 
Street (Kibris, 12 January, p. 1-3). It was a case of an ordinary news gathering practice 
being turned into a media event by the newspaper itself. It contributed to the cultivation 
of star journalists and also enhanced the image of the newspaper as holding the views of 
the ordinary public as important. 
Either because of a lack of journalists or of other resources, Hallern Sesi produced few 
news stories itself on the issue but relied heavily on other sources such as news agencies 
or press releases. Therefore, many of the stories in Halkin Sesi were the same as the ones 
in the other newspapers and an original story rarely appeared in it. In one case, Halkin 
Sesi even published an interview the Democrat Party leader, Serdar Denktab, had given 
to another Turkish Cypriot newspaper, Vatan. Without any explanation, Halkin Sest 
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printed the interview that had appeared in Vatan a day before. Considering that it was an 
interview the newspaper itself could have easily gotten, it is hard to explain the reason 
behind Halkin Sesi's decision to print the piece (Hallern Sesi, 12 January, p. 3). 
As in the previous cases, the newspapers benefited a great deal from other texts such as 
press releases from different individuals and groups, propaganda from political groups 
and statements from privileged sources. The written press releases of many 
organisations, such as trade unions or associations, appeared in the newspapers, 
disguised in the form of a news article. The newspapers were also full of texts of party 
political propaganda, concealed in the news article which also reproduced their 
arguments. Such an intertextual relationship was discernible in many articles in the 
newspapers. One such example was the account of the Turkish General's statement in 
the newspapers which was intertextually related to the TRNC Constitution. The relation 
aimed to enhance the truthfulness and persuasiveness of the statement. The interviews 
conducted by the newspapers were another form of `intertexts' (Fowler, 1991, p. 229). 
The ones Kibris and Yenidüzen carried out with Mehmet Ali Talat were not only 
regarded as newsworthy and were reproduced as news features, but also attributed to 
him a personal importance as well as rendering his speech significant. 
Discourse Analysis 
In this case study, of the themes devised earlier, there appear mostly the understanding 
of nation and the construction of `us' and `them' categories based on national interest 
with a focus on the differences on the representation of the `other'. The linguistic 
construction of a common past and the question of the future are the other two themes 
that occurred in the news discourses. 
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On the Concept of Nation 
The developments that turned the demolition of the footbridge into a `crisis' were related 
to the issue of the political sovereignty, statehood and respectability of the TRNC. The 
objection and the obstruction of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces to the 
removal of the footbridge, a decision announced by the TRNC President, brought the 
civil power in North Cyprus and Turkish military authorities into conflict. The Turkish 
General Büyükanit's statements, in which he emphasised that the area where the 
footbridge stood was under the authority of the Turkish military, added to the tension. It 
meant that the civil power or the people's elected representatives had no control over the 
area under dispute or over the rest of the national borders of the TRNC. Furthermore, the 
General Staff accused TRNC President Talat of lying to the public. Talat, who had a 
meeting with Turkey's Foreign Minister and Turkish military General Staff in Turkey 
about the footbridge in Lokmaci, denied that they had discussed the issue. The General 
Staff Büyükanit contradicted Talat's words in his media interviews and statements, 
leaving the president in a difficult position. Later, Talat explained that he had spoken 
like that so as not to give an impression of a rift within the Turkish side over the issue 
(Yenidüzen, 10 January, p. 6). As a result, the whole development created a picture of a 
crisis between the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey's military authorities, as well 
as undermining the authority of the civil power in North Cyprus and damaging the 
personal image of the TRNC President. Elected by the people, President Talat was 
identified as the representative of the people's will in the TRNC. But the attitude of the 
Turkish Army General showed the will of people could be challenged and that power 
was not only with them but also in the hands of the Turkish army, especially with regard 
to security issues. The whole situation increased doubts about the statehood of the 
TRNC. The word `increased' underlines the fact that Turkish Cypriots themselves did 
not fully believe such claims as they were aware that `an official discourse of Turkish 
Cypriot "independence" glosses over political and economic dependence on Turkey' 
(Navaro-Yashin, 2003, p. 1 12). Yet, in this case, Turkey was rarely referred to as the 
`motherland'. 
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Despite the ambivalent situation concerning the status of the TRNC, the Turkish Cypriot 
nation state was still depicted as a genuine one with an emphasis on its elected 
representatives. Yenidüzen and Kibris portrayed the president as the head of civil 
authority in the TRNC, resolute in his decision, having managed to resist the objections 
of the Turkish army. Reporting the outcome of the meeting in Ankara, Kibris attributed 
a determined tone to the President: `the bridge will be removed' (Kibris, 6 January, p. 4). 
Yenidüzen, having announced that the problem about the bridge was solved, noted that 
Talat had not taken a step back in his decision. The text underlined his status as the 
TRNC President, which also helped to legitimise the state. Referring to the meeting in 
Ankara that Talat had with Turkey's Foreign Minister, Yenidüzen wrote: 
The Foreign Ministry told Talat that Lokmaci Bridge had not only symbolic but also 
logistical importance. But Talat, stating that he had taken the decision for the demolition 
of this bridge as the TRNC President and would not change his decision, indicated that 
he might resign (Yenidiizen, 6 January, p. 8). 
Reproducing the official discourses about the footbridge at the Lokmaci barricade in the 
news texts not only enhanced the hegemony of this discourse but also justified the 
actions of the governing groups. The three newspapers used the same official 
explanation that `Talat has decided on the demolition of the footbridge, which was 
claimed to have been an obstacle for the opening of Lokmaci Border Gate, with the aim 
of contributing to the decision of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot sides to resume the 
comprehensive negotiations in the first quarter of 2007 and for the development of 
cooperation between the two peoples'. Interestingly, while the decision was initially 
portrayed as being `the Turkish Cypriot side's' (Kibris, 4 January, p. 6; Halkin Sesi, 4 
January, p. 2; Yenidüzen, 4 January, p. 7), following the conflict between the President 
and the Turkish military, it was stressed as being `Talat's decision'. For example, the 
day after the footbridge was dismantled, a news text about the removal of the bridge 
appeared in all three newspapers that emphasised Talat as the decision-maker: `the 
Lokmaci Bridge which was removed by President Mehmet Ali Talat's decision ... ' 
(Kibris, 11 January, p. 4; Hallan Sesi, 11 January, p. 3 and Yenidüzen, 11 January, p. 9). In 
a way, Talat's power as the President of the state was still being highlighted even after 
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the bridge was removed. The underlying reason for this change could be to reinforce and 
emphasise the power of the civil authority in North Cyprus in the eyes of public, 
especially as it was challenged by the Turkish military. Interchangeable references to the 
decision as the `Turkish Cypriot side's' and `Talat's' also reinforced the equation of the 
nation with the image of the President of the state. 
Depending against whom it was constructed, the national identity of Turkish Cypriots 
changed: When positioned opposite Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots were frequently 
referred as Turk rather than Turkish Cypriot but in relation to the Turkish military, the 
term Turkish Cypriot was employed. There were constant shifts between these identities. 
Even in Yenidüzen which adopted the discourse of Cypriot in the previous case studies, 
the identification in relation to Greek Cypriots was based on Turkishness. In a front page 
story about the views of the shopkeepers on both sides of the Lokmaci barricade, 
Yenidüzen categorised them according to their nationality as `Turkish' shopkeepers and 
`Greek Cypriot' (Rum) shopkeepers (Yenidi_en, 5 January, p. 1). In another news feature 
that also reflected the reactions of people to the issue, YenidiLen generalised their views 
with `the Turkish side has taken another positive step' (Yen1düzen, 10 January, p. 10). 
Unlike the previous cases, there was not much emphasis on Cypriotism as an imagined 
national identity in the paper. Even when positioned opposite the Turkish army, the 
concept of Cypriot, as an expression of distinction, did not emerge. In this way, Cypriot 
identity was downplayed and a discourse of bipolarisation was adopted instead, 
especially in relation to the Greek Cypriots. 
The bipolarising discourse of Turk and Greek Cypriot was adopted also in Kibris. In a 
front page story, Kibris noted that the `Turkish side' applauded the removal of the bridge 
(Kibris, 10 January, p. 1). The word 'Turkish' was sometimes employed as the shortened 
version of `Turkish Cypriot'. One such example was a statement issued by the TRNC 
President's Office in which the term `Turkish Cypriot' was used, yet in the headline it 
was changed to `Turkish' (Kibris, 5 January, p. 8). The exclusion of the word `Cypriot' 
was clearly to shorten the headline but this also showed that it was acceptable for the 
newspaper to interchangeably refer to Turkish Cypriots as 'Turkish/Turk'. It also 
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indicated that the demarcation between Turkish Cypriots and Turks as two separate 
nations was not viewed as starkly, particularly when in conflict with Greek Cypriots. In 
Halkin Sesi, the term `Turkish Cypriots' rather than `Turks' was usually used, which 
could be explained with its reliance on the official sources, whose statements the 
newspaper reported with few changes. 
The Turkish military's General of Staff, Yaýar Büyükanit, justified and legitimised the 
Turkish army's actions in the country by referring to the TRNC Constitution. Pointing at 
Article 106, which gave authority to the Turkish Armed Forces on national security 
issues, the General emphasized the legal basis of its power in a press statement. Both, 
Yenidüzen and Kibris reported on the announcement on their front pages. Kibris drew 
attention to the authority issue and pointed at the power the TRNC Constitution gave to 
the Turkish army over its national borders, which included the area where the Lokmaci 
Bridge stood. In its headline `the authority is ours' (Kibris, 7 January, p. 4), the word 
`ours' referred to the Turkish Armed Forces and illustrated the point that they had the 
power to make decisions regarding the Lokmaci Bridge rather than the Turkish Cypriot 
leadership, although this part was not clearly stated. Highlighting the section that 
contradicted Talat's aforementioned press pronouncement in a separate text box, the 
newspaper quoted the general as stating `it reflected or was made to reflect incorrectly in 
the press' (Kibris, 7 January, p. 4). While the first part of the statement put the 
responsibility on the media, the second part was an expression that shifted the blame 
onto the TRNC President. Even though Kibris was one of the newspapers that had used 
the discussed statement of Talat, it did not comment or challenge the general's criticism 
of the media for wrongly reflecting the issue. Instead, it simply reported the press release 
without including any other information or making changes which, it could be argued, 
helped reflect the official discourse of the military. On the other hand, having quoted 
6 Transitional Article 10: The provisions of Article 117 of this Constitution shall not come into force as 
long as the defence and internal security of the Turkish people of Cyprus and the international situation so 
necessitate. All forces used in, providing the external and internal security on the date of the coming into 
operation of the Constitution, shall continue to be so used, and the procedure and provisions being 
implemented regarding such forces and the bases of cooperation accepted and to be accepted in respect of 
these matters shall continue to be implemented. 
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most of the statement, the newspaper tried to distance itself from the views expressed in 
it. 
The news article in Yenidüzen also highlighted Article 10 of the TRNC constitution, 
which gave the authority to the Turkish Armed Forces. Suggesting that the article was in 
conflict with the notion of democracy, Yenidüzen challenged the army's presence in the 
country: 
The transitional article 10 of the TRNC Constitution, which came on the agenda 
numerous times during the struggle for democracy in the north of Cyprus, but could not 
be abolished due to `the existing security conditions' of the island once more appeared 
on the agenda due to the bridge at Lokmaci. (All the same it has been learned that the 
bridge will be demolished starting tomorrow) (Yenidüzen, 7 January, p. 6). 
Article 10 in the constitution creates an ambivalent situation in terms of sovereignty of 
the nation. The right and the authority it gives to Turkey's Armed Forces to guard the 
national borders also imposes restrictions on the civil governing power over security 
issues. Yet none of the newspapers raised strong criticisms of this article in the 
constitution, even when it emerged that it caused a conflict between the civil power and 
military authorities. Perhaps having accepted and internalised Turkey's domination in 
the north (and the north's dependence on Turkey) as normal, or perhaps reluctant to 
challenge this powerful institution of Turkey, the newspapers did not treat the 
involvement of the Turkish military general staff in their internal affairs as 
extraordinary. 
Stating that the authority belonged to the Turkish Armed Forces `until the conditions 
have changed (or were appropriate)', Yenidüzen voiced an expectation of a change, in 
terms of a peaceful settlement in Cyprus, and the phrase pointed at a time in the future 
when there would be no need for the presence of the Turkish army. It was a strategy of 
transformation that stressed a positive difference in the political situation of the nation 
state now and in the future. At the same time, it also naturalised and justified the power 
and the presence of the Turkish army in the country until that change took place. The 
newspaper reported that the General Staffs statement was construed as a reminder of the 
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legal basis of its presence in Cyprus (Yenidüzen, 7 January, p. 6), but it did not reveal by 
whom. Thus, to inform its readers about the content of Article 10, rather than rely on 
their knowledge of it, Yeniduzen published the details of the article in a separate textbox 
as background information. It can be argued that in this context it was an attempt to 
make its readers aware of this undemocratic article in the constitution that had given 
authority to the Turkish military over their elected representatives. The details of Article 
10 also appeared in Halkm Sesi but were integrated into the news text rather than 
appearing separately. The story linked President Talat's debated press announcement as 
the reason for the press release issued by the General Staff (Hal/an Sesi, 7 January, p. 2). 
In this context, the integration of the details of the constitutional article seemed to 
support the legitimacy claims of the Turkish army. 
The national official discourse defining the Republic of Cyprus as the `Greek Cypriot 
Administration' was again embedded into the news discourses of the newspapers. As 
part of this discourse, Mehmet All Talat was described as the `TRNC President', while 
the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, was referred to as the 
`Greek Cypriot leader', the `Greek Cypriot community leader' or the `leader of the 
Greek Cypriot administration'. None of the newspapers described him as the President 
of the Republic of Cyprus. For example, reporting a declaration by Tassos 
Papadopoulos, Yenidüzen referred to him as the `Greek Cypriot leader' while in the 
same text described Mehmet Ali Talat as `the President' (Yenidüzen, 13 January, p. 9). In 
a similar way, Kibris described him as the `Greek Cypriot community leader' (Ktbris, 12 
January, p. 10) and Hallen Sesi `the Greek Cypriot leader' (Hal/an Sesi, 10 January, p. 2) 
while both called Talat `the President'. Accentuating the presidency of Mehmet All 
Talat in relation to the Greek Cypriot president not only reinforced the political 
legitimacy of the TRNC in relation to the `other' state but also strengthened the role of 
the nationalistic official ideology in discrediting the legitimacy of the Republic of 
Cyprus. Not surprisingly, the territory of the Republic of Cyprus was depicted as the 
`Greek Cypriot side' while the north was identified as the `TRNC'. A news item from 
TAK concerning a demonstration organised in Lefkosia (the south side of Nicosia) 
reported that some politicians from the `Greek Cypriot side' and some trade unions, 
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organisations and groups from the `TRNC' supported the event (TAK, 13 January, 
2007). The text appeared in the three newspapers but in YenidiLen the term 'TRNC' was 
replaced with `North Cyprus', probably in an attempt to equally represent both sides. 
In the coverage of the developments regarding the Lokmaci Bridge, the concept of 
citizenship was employed frequently. For example, K: br: s chose to call the people 
watching the destruction of the bridge as `citizens' (Kibris, 10 January, p. 4), while 
Yenidüzen described the ones whose views it reflected as `citizens' (Yenldi-en, 10 
January, p. 10). In Halkin Sesi, the word citizen did not appear in the articles originated 
by the newspaper itself but in the texts copied from other sources and also in the 
captions of two photos, again to refer to people in general. But the way the word citizen 
was used created confusion about its meaning. As well as the general public or ordinary 
people, anyone who was not categorised by occupation or other social grouping was 
referred to as a citizen. For example, Yenidüzen described a group of people who had 
gathered to watch the destruction of the bridge as `a crowded group that consisted of 
mostly citizens, Arasta people/residents, shopkeepers and journalists' (Yenidi. en, 10 
January, p. 1 1). The newspaper grouped the `Arasta people, the shopkeepers and 
journalists' in a separate group from the `citizen' category as if being a journalist or a 
shopkeeper was different than being a citizen or that one cannot be both. In other words, 
the term `citizen' was used as a general term to describe ordinary people who could not 
be identified as belonging to a group based on occupational or other social category. A 
similar classification existed in another feature in the same newspaper. Reflecting the 
views of some shopkeepers and other individuals on the removal of the Lokmact Bridge, 
Yenidüzen again categorised its interviewees as `shopkeepers at Arasta' and `citizens' 
(Yenidüzen, 10 January, p. 10). 
The other two newspapers also employed the term citizen as a means of categorisation. 
Kibris, illustrating the scene at the Lokmaci barricade after the removal of the bridge, 
wrote, `some citizens and the press who wanted to see the barricade without the 
bridge... ' (Kibris, 11 January, p. 4). Also a person who protested against the demolition 
of the bridge as it was being taken apart was referred to as a citizen. This person, 
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Makbule Ötüken, who was a well-known personality in the country because of her 
column in a nationalist newspaper and from other political actions, was referred as a 
citizen rather than any of her other identities (Kibris, 10 January, p. 7). With a strategy of 
minimisation, the importance and the impact of her actions was mitigated because they 
contradicted the newspaper's position. Benefiting from the ideology of consensus in the 
representation of these events, the newspaper singled her out as the only person creating 
conflict. Halkin Sesi also separated the citizen from some political and civil 
organisations by saying that, `Many political and civil organisations and citizens 
attended the demonstration' (Halkan Sesi, 6 January, p. 3). All these examples suggest 
that although in these contexts the word citizenship did not emphasize membership of a 
nation state, it still indicated a form of belonging to the national community. The 
identification of belonging to the national community on the basis of citizenship depicts 
the national community based on the democratic participation of people and the exercise 
of citizens' rights rather than cultural qualities (Jenkins & Sofos, 1996). Thus, it can be 
argued that such depiction indicated the conceptualisation and the reconstruction of the 
nation as Staatsnation within the news discourses. 
The image of society as a nation state (Billig, 1995; Edensor, 2002) was discernable in 
the news texts. The representation of the views of citizens, non-governmental 
organisations or Members of Parliament contributed to the reproduction of the image of 
society, which also mirrored the image of nation. In a way, by printing the press releases 
and public announcements of different individuals and groups, three newspapers 
attempted to reflect the spectrum of opinion within the Turkish Cypriot nation, which 
also supported their claim to be a democratic platform of free expression. Yenlditsen in 
particular, through the reactions of the political party leaders, trade unions, civil 
organisations and business people claimed to ascertain the views and emotions of 
different segments of the society about the Lokmaci Bridge (YenldiLcn, 6 January, p. 1). 
By presenting the views of different sections of the society, Yenfdüen reconstructed the 
Turkish Cypriot nation in relation to the Lokmaci issue and the debates surrounding it 
and reconstituted its readers as the members of the society as well as the nation. The 
other two newspapers, Kibris and Halkm Sesi, also published similar public 
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announcements and statements but they limited their reports to the ones that reached the 
newsroom rather than presenting any other views. When it came to reflecting the 
public's view, Kibris chose to give Greek Cypriot opinions on the issue rather than 
Turkish Cypriot. It published two features about the views of shopkeepers on the south 
side of the barricade but none from the north (Kibris, 5 January, p. 4 & 12 January p. 2-3). 
In Hallam Sesi, neither community's views about the issue were reported. 
Pointing at the role the media play in daily flagging the nation, Billig (1995) notes that 
unless otherwise stated, the context of the news texts is understood to be the nation and 
readers assume that the story they are reading concerns their nation or that it happened 
within its boundaries. For example, unless specified otherwise, `the Prime Minister' 
means the prime minister of the country. However, this was not the case in the news 
articles in both Halkin Sesi and Yenidüzen regarding Talat's meeting in Ankara. Even 
though the readers of the news texts were in North Cyprus, both newspapers, having 
used the same news article, called Turkey's Foreign Minister `the Foreign Minister', the 
Turkish Foreign Ministry `the Foreign Ministry' and the Turkish General Staff the 
General Staff' Hal/an Sesi, 6 January, p. 5; Yenidüzen, 6 January, p. 9) as if they also 
represented the TRNC. Such use of the definite article `the' for the Turkish authorities 
was common in Yenidüzen, especially in texts produced by a reporter in Turkey. One 
such example was written by a journalist in Ankara in which s/he stated Talat's status as 
the `TRNC President', but described Turkey's Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and 
General Staff with the definite article `the', without stating that they were Turkish: the 
Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the General Staff (Yenldüzen, 6 January, p. 8). 
The same article also cited Ankara as `the capital' as if the readers were in Turkey. 
Another news article from Ankara also referred to Talat as the `TRNC President' while 
Turkey's Prime Minister was called `the Prime Minister' (Yenidiizen, 11 January, p. 8). 
All of this could be explained as a mistake on the part of the reporter in Turkey or 
because the news text was prepared for the Turkish media. Yet, it still does not explain 
the reason for the newspaper publishing it without making necessary changes or editing 
it for its readers. A similar practice was also visible in another text in the newspaper. In 
an article that summarised the developments in the Lokmaci issue, Yenldiizen reported 
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that `Talat, first met with the General Staff who had objected to the decision of the 
demolition of the bridge and then with the Foreign Minister Gal' (Yenidüzen, 8 January, 
p. 8) meaning Turkey's Foreign Minister and General Staff. The treatment of Turkey's 
ministers and authorities in the news discourses as `the' revealed their comprehension as 
normal and common sense. It also strengthened the notion of dominance and governance 
of the Turkish Cypriot state by the Turkish one. Contrary to the other two newspapers, 
Kibris was careful to use the proper titles for everyone, such as the `Turkish Prime 
Minister' and the `Turkish Foreign Minister' and so on, even though it also benefited 
from the same news text as Hal/an Sesi and Yenidüzen (Kibris, 6 January, p. 4). On the 
other hand, the members of the Greek Cypriot government were referred as `the Greek 
Cypriot government spokesperson' or `the Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister'. 
Nations are sometimes personified by their leaders, governments or the capitals of their 
state. In many news discourses, Mehmet Ali Talat's name and image stood for the 
Turkish Cypriot nation. For example, his decision to remove the bridge was generalised 
as the decision of the Turkish Cypriot nation: `President Mehmet Ali Talat announced 
his decision to dismantle the bridge at Lokmaci barricade as a good will gesture of the 
Turkish side... ' (Kibris, 9 January, p. 4). Although the three newspapers studied did not 
employ the personification strategy for Talat as much, it still appeared in them when 
they included reports from other nations' media. Especially in Yenidüzen, which 
included more news texts from other media compared to the other two, the 
personification of the nation through the President appeared frequently: `Radikal 
newspaper: Talat has overcome Lokmaci' (Yenidüzen, 7 January, p. 7), `Financial Times: 
Talat's position strengthened' (Yenidüzen, 13 January, p. 8) meaning the Turkish 
Cypriots', `the Greek Press: Talat - Ankara conflict because of the bridge' (Yenldüzen, 7 
January, p. 9). In all these cases, although Talat was portrayed as a single actor, he 
actually symbolised the civil authority in the TRNC. In a similar way, the President of 
the Republic of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, stood for the Greek Cypriot nation: `even 
if the bridge is removed, Papadopoulos will not pull the wall down' (Yenidüzen, 9 
January, p. 9), `Talat reacted to Tassos Papadopoulos, the leader of the Greek Cypriot 
Administration who put the clearance of the symbols as a precondition for opening the 
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crossing gate' (Kibris, 10 January, p. 10) or `Papadopoulos wants to prevent the opening 
of Lokmaci by new provocations' (Halk: n Sesi, 13 January, p. 3). Again, in these 
expressions, although Papadopoulos was presented as a single agent, his name replaced 
the policies and actions of the Greek Cypriot government, which was an indirect 
metonym that stood for the Greek Cypriot nation. 
The governments or capitals of the states were also employed in place of the nation. 
Ankara, the capital of Turkey, where its parliament and government are based, was 
employed as a metonym replacing the Turkish government. Headlining an article as 
`Approval also from Ankara: The bridge should be removed' (Yenidilzen, 6 January, 
p. 8), Yenidüzen illustrated Turkey as a state respecting and approving the decision of 
another and equal state. In the same text, Yenidüzen used `Ankara' to refer to the Turkish 
government several times: 
" After the tension on Ankara- Lefko§a line following the TRNC President Talat's 
decision to remove the Lokmaci overpass, yesterday there was Cyprus 
(diplomacy) traffic in the capital. 
" Ankara that does not want any tension in the TRNC.... 
" Ankara that does not want to leave Talat in a politically difficult situation and 
cause turmoil in the TRNC.... (Yenidilzen 6 January, p. 8) 
Lefkoýa, the capital of the TRNC, was employed only once as a metonym for its 
government and this was in the text quoted above. 
The discourses about the Lokmaci Bridge had an interdiscursive relationship with the 
discourse on national security that was integrated into the news. The press statements of 
the Turkish General Staff and also the Turkish Cypriot opposition, especially UBP, 
employed the discourses of national security in relation to the Lokmaci Bridge. For 
example, the opposition argued that President Talat's decision had overlooked security 
issues (Kibris, 5 January, p. 7; Halkin Sesi, 5 January, p. 3). The statement of the 
military, pointing to the TRNC Constitution, argued that the institution had given the 
authority for national security to the Turkish Armed Forces, which included the area 
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where the Lokmaci Bridge stood (Kibris, 7 January, p. 4; Yenidüzen, 7 January, p. 6; 
Hal/an Sesi, 7 January, p. 2). 
National Interest and the Categorisation of `Us' and `Them' 
The developments regarding the Lokmaci Bridge situation were presented as conflict. 
For example, the disagreement between TRNC President Mehmet Ali Talat and the 
Turkish General, Büyükanit over the fate of the footbridge was named as the `Lokmaci 
crisis' (Kibris, 5 January, p. 1). President Talat and the Greek Cypriot leader, Tassos 
Papadopoulos, were also portrayed as being in conflict about the opening of the 
Lokmaci crossing. On a public level, the shopkeeper's demonstration was depicted as a 
conflict between the group that claimed to be the `real' representatives of the 
shopkeepers and the one which organised the rally. The construction of the 
developments as conflicts enhanced the boundaries between `us' and `them'. Therefore, 
binary categorisation with the positive self-presentation and negative portrayal of the 
`other' was common in the news discourses. 
The deictic expression of `we' as an expression of self-presentation of nation rarely 
occurred in the news articles. It appeared in Yenidüzen only once in the expression, `our 
country's agenda', referring to the nation (Yenidüzen, 10 January, p. 10). Otherwise, the 
`we' group was implicitly embedded in the selection and construction of the news texts. 
In many contexts, it constituted the Turkish Cypriot nation and in some cases referred to 
the group expressing an opinion. At times, who it referred to was unclear. As an 
example, Halkin Sesi quoted Talat in its headline as saying `We have no problem with 
the General Staff' (Hal/an Sesi, 6 January, p. 1) without indicating whether `we' stood 
for the President's Office or the Turkish Cypriot nation. The same ambiguity existed in 
Yenidüzen's headline, a quote from an interview with President Talat, `We have been 
wounded' (Yenidüzen, 10 January, p. 1). Again, it was vague whether these were the 
words of the newspaper or the person interviewed, Mehmet Ali Talat, or if the word 
`we' referred to the President or the Turkish Cypriot nation. 
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The representation of the `other' group varied depending on the newspaper and the 
context of its construction. It appeared frequently and the identity of the group it referred 
to was clearer. For example, `they' meaning the Greek Cypriot government Kibris 
wrote, `they are looking for excuses not to knock the wall down' (Kibris, 4 January, 
p. 6). Putting the leaders of Turkish Cypriot opposition parties in the position of `they', 
Yenidüzen, a newspaper that backed the government, claimed that `they bumped (or hit) 
against the wall' (Yenidüzen, 6 January, p. 1). 
The concept of national interest plays a role in the construction of `us' and `them' 
groups. Reicher and Hopkins (2001) note that the inclusion of the `we' group and the 
`other' group is based on the concept of national interest. Far from being a fixed notion, 
national interest changes and also determines the treatment of the `other'. 
If say, they enhance the national interest, they are to be embraced; if they threaten the 
national interest they are to be rejected. This means that one can view others positively 
as well as negatively and also that one can view some others positively while viewing 
different others negatively. All depends upon the way in which the national interest is 
construed, the way the other is construed and hence the nature of the relationship 
between the two of them (p. 77). 
Therefore, the different national interests supported by the newspapers determined who 
the `us' and `other' were in this case as well. Even though all the newspapers reported 
the views of various groups within the society, the ideologically close ones were given 
preferential treatment depending on the newspaper's conceptualisation of the national 
interest. For example, Yenidüzen and Kibris' coverage of the issue favoured the removal 
of the bridge and represented it as being in the interest of the nation and depicted the 
groups who opposed or obstructed it as the `other' group. In contrast, Halkin Sesi backed 
the groups that saw the move as a concession to the Greek Cypriot government's 
demands. In short, whether the groups defended or opposed the removal of the bridge 
defined the `us' and `them' groups for the newspapers. 
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Yenidüzen 
In Yenidüzen, the image of the Turkish Cypriot nation was shown as being synonymous 
with the image of President Talat. Interviewing him on the Lokmaci issue, including the 
disputes he had with the Turkish Military authorities, Yenidüzen printed the interview on 
its front page with a headline: `We have been wounded' (Yenidüzen, 10, January, p.! ). 
Neither who `we' referred to nor if these words belonged to the newspaper or the 
President were clear. Only a closer examination showed that these were not Talat's exact 
words but an interpretation of them by the newspaper. According to a transcript of the 
interview which was published by the newspaper, Talat had used the word `wounded' on 
two occasions: First, `Contrary to all these developments, we should have shown that 
Turkish Cypriots are the ones making decisions and carrying them out. Has this process 
left me in a difficult situation, wounded me? Yes, it left me in a difficult situation and 
wounded me' (Yenidüzen, 10 January, p. 6). Second, `If you look at who is wounded by 
this event, according to me, everyone got wounded. First of all, the Cyprus cause got 
wounded' (Yenidüzen, 10, January, p. 7). The newspaper replaced the expression 
`everyone' with `we'. Yenidüzen, in the highlights on the front page, also quoted Talat as 
saying it was the Turkish side which was wounded but these words did not appear in the 
main interview text. The omission or the differences in certain words could be the result 
of the reproduction process. Some words may be left out of the text as part of the 
summarising process of the reporter who was actually the Editor-in-Chief of the paper, 
Cenk Mutluyakali. 
Supportive of the Turkish Cypriot leader's decision, Yenidüzen printed more news 
articles favouring the idea of dismantling the footbridge. Although the views of the 
opposition also appeared in the paper, most of the stories in Yenidüzen were the opinions 
of different groups and organisations in the TRNC which backed its removal (Yenidüzen, 
6 January, 2007). The news reports involving the opposition groups showed more 
variation than the ones that supported it and carried a certain degree of sarcasm. For 
example, when a group of shopkeepers called Asmaalti and Arasta Retailers Association 
demonstrated against the bridge being removed before the Greek Cypriot government 
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knocked down the wall on their side, Yenidüzen reported the event very briefly. During 
the protest march, which was also supported by the rightwing political parties with a 
nationalist stance, the group came into a conflict with another association called the 
`Union of Turkish Cypriot Retailers and Artisans'. The latter accused the first one of 
being fake and therefore not representing the interests of the shopkeepers in the area. In 
its coverage of the demonstration, Yenidüzen was not very sympathetic to the 
demonstrating group and supported the idea that they were `fake': `during the 
"demonstration" there were arguments between the real retailers and the group that calls 
itself "Asmaalti and Arasta Retailers Association" which had actually come there from 
outside Lefko§a' (Yenidüzen, 6 January, p. 8). In the two photographs of the event, the 
chairman of the Union of Turkish Cypriot Retailers and Artisans, the group which 
opposed and interrupted the rally, was in focus rather than the demonstrators. 
Meanwhile, by putting the word `demonstration' in quotation marks, Yenidüzen 
questioned the definition of their action as a demonstration. 
Yenidüzen's treatment of the opposition political parties was no different. Having 
announced that the conflict over the footbridge was resolved, Yenidüzen, on it front 
page, criticised two right-wing, opposition political party leaders who had opposed Talat 
over the overpass issue: 
The opposition leaders who are not supporting Talat and who have been reinforcing the 
`civil authority- military unrest/tension' with their statements hit a wall yesterday when 
the Military opposed the abolishment of the bridge at Lokmaci barricade and Talat who 
is in office with the support of the majority public gave signals of resignation. 
Ertugruloglu, the leader of UBP and Denkta§, the leader of DP, succeeded once more in 
falling contrary to the will of Turkish Cypriots. (Yenidilzen, 6 January, p. 1). 
There were no further details or references to this long statement anywhere else in the 
newspaper. The colloquial phrase of `hit a wall' not only meant that both politicians 
made a significant error but also, evoking the wall on the Greek Cypriot side, also 
portrayed them being as uncompromising as the Greek Cypriot leadership. The text 
appeared on the same day that the newspaper announced a consensus had been reached 
about the removal of the bridge. Equating the `support of the majority of the public' with 
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the `will of Turkish Cypriots' and reproducing their national interest as the same as 
Talat's decision, Yenidüzen portrayed the two politicians as the `other' who were 
working against the national will and the interest of the Turkish Cypriot nation. In other 
words, by defining the dismantling of the Lokmaci Bridge as being in the national 
interest, national identity was invoked in the argument against the interests these two 
politicians represented. The discourse also created a sense of consensus in which the 
interest of the public was given as the same and undivided. Benefiting from the ideology 
of consensus to create backing for the President, the newspaper not only implied that 
everyone agreed with it on the issue but also showed it as if the public's interests were 
the same as the actions and policies of the state authorities. By doing this, the newspaper 
gave an impression of public support to the governing groups, which strengthened their 
authority and position in power. On the other hand, by employing the expression `one 
more time' for the actions of the opposition, the newspaper suggested that what they had 
done had happened before, thereby establishing their behaviour as a trait. 
Yenidüzen's treatment of the opposition was not an isolated case. On its front page, 
Yenidüzen used headlines from two stories that involved statements from the leaders of 
two opposition parties, DP and UBP. Pointing at the DP leader, it combined his quote 
with its own comment: `Serdar Denktag still does not have any hope: is there anyone 
who believes that the bridge will be removed' and for the UBP leader it said 
`Ertugruloglu continued to accuse Talat: the President is at fault' (Yenidiizen, 7 January, 
p.! ). The words `still' and `continued' belonged to the newspaper and suggested a 
continuation in the behaviour of the opposition leaders. These expressions attributed the 
characteristic of `pessimism' to one, while showing the other as someone who was 
critical of the President. In short, employing a predicational strategy, the newspaper 
constructed both opposition leaders as social actors who belonged to the `out-group' and 
indicated them as having negative traits. Furthermore, juxtaposed alongside their 
statements was the news that the demolition of the bridge would start the following day, 
as if it to say, `whether you believe it or not, the bridge will be removed tomorrow'. To 
enhance the effect of its practice, Yenidüzen twisted Denkta§'s words by changing them. 
Having reported his words as being `is there anyone who believes that the bridge will be 
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removed' on its front page, the main text which appeared inside revealed that what he 
actually said was, `is there anyone who believes that the wall will be pulled down when 
the bridge is removed' (Yenidüzen, 7 January, p. 8). He was talking about the wall on the 
Greek Cypriot side of the border, not the Lokmaci Bridge. The layout of the stories 
inside also constituted a response to the leaders: next to the statements of both 
politicians there were two photos of signposts at the Lokmaci footbridge that said `to be 
opened soon' in Turkish, English, Greek and German (Yenidi&en, 7 January, p. 8). This 
clearly reflected the newspaper's perspective regarding the Lokmaci debate. 
The language used in the construction of the news texts which involved the opposition 
groups was also different from the one used for the governing groups. While anything 
the state officials said was constructed as the `truth' and the verbs such as `noted', 
`stated', `said', `emphasised' were used to mark it, the statements of the opposition were 
given as `claims', `suggestions' or simply as expressing their opinions rather than 
pointing at facts. Such use of language not only discredited the statements of the 
opposition but also reinforced the power of the governing groups and their portrayal as 
the `authority'. Authoritarian tones of the official discourses in the news texts were also 
employed to increase the factuality of what was being reported while it left the others as 
mere suggestions. 
The Greek Cypriot administration was also characterised as the `other'. In contrast to the 
positive image of the Turkish Cypriot administration, whose actions were presented as a 
contribution to the settlement process, and contributing to an improvement in relations 
between the two communities, the actions of the Greek Cypriot administration were 
depicted as obstructive. Yenidüzen depicted the Greek Cypriot government's policies as 
being threatening and against the national interest of Turkish Cypriots. It described the 
government as `unwilling' (Yeniduzen, 6 January, p. 8) to open the Lokmaci crossing and 
accused it of wanting `more', `No news of the wall but!.. the Greek Cypriot 
Administration wants even more' (Yenidüzen, 11 January, p. 5), meaning more 
concessions. The paper was also critical of the Greek Cypriot government benefiting 
from the conflict between the TRNC President and the Turkish Army General in their 
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propaganda against the TRNC and its leadership: `Turkey's General Staff's attitude 
about the Lokmaci gate has been turned into "material" by the Greek Cypriot 
administration' (Yenidüzen, 9 January, p. 13). It also mocked the Greek Cypriot 
government spokesperson, Christodoulos Pashardis, for repeating his statement about 
Talat having no authority: `Pashardis' record has got stuck again' (Yenidüzen, 11 
January, p. 8). Yenidüzen described the demands of the Greek Cypriot government for all 
symbols belonging to the TRNC to be removed as a `new obsession in Lokmaci' 
(Yenidüzen, 4 January, p. 7). 
Kibris 
Ktbris' categorisation of the `us-group' and `them-group', as in Yenidiiaen, was based on 
who supported and who opposed the removal of the bridge. The analysis revealed that 
Kibris also backed Talat's decision and hence provided a positive representation of him. 
For example, following the conflict with the military, it quoted Talat with a firm 
expression that showed his determination: `the bridge will be removed' (Kibris, 6 
January, p. 1). Along with that story, the paper also had four news articles that supported 
the decision to remove the overpass. On another occasion, quoting Talat in its headline 
concerning the wall on the Greek Cypriot side, Kibris again attributed a determined 
voice to him, `That wall will be pulled down' (Kibris, 2 January, p. 1), which portrayed 
the President as being resolved in his decisions. Publishing reports that some Greek 
Cypriots, or the members of the `other' group, supported the dismantling of the bridge 
strengthened the perception of Talat's pronouncement as a positive one. Reflecting the 
views of Greek Cypriot shopkeepers in favour of opening the Lokmact crossing was one 
such example. Another was the report about a Greek Cypriot opposition party which 
praised the removal of the bridge as `a very brave step', (Kibris, 10 January, p. 5). 
In contrast, the construction of the news article about the rally organised by a group of 
shopkeepers to protest against the removal of the Lokmaci footbridge aimed to discredit 
the group and the event. Having used a news agency dispatch as well as its own 
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reporter's notes, the newspaper marked the event as not representing the interests of the 
shopkeepers and accused the demonstration and the demonstrators of being `fake' and 
`remote controlled' (Kibris, 6 January, p. 7). Informing its readers that the Asmaalti and 
Arasta Retailers Association demonstrated at Lokmaci, Kibris immediately added that 
the retailers in Asmaalti and Arasta did not join the event, which implied that they did 
not support it. According to the paper, most of the demonstrators consisted of uniformed 
policemen and military personnel. The term `remote controlled' was an expression used 
by the other association that had claimed to be the real representatives of the 
shopkeepers and Kibris employed it in its text. Yet, despite the strong tone of this 
accusation, the paper employed a linguistic exclusion to the people it claimed were 
controlling the demonstration and did not raise questions about their identity in the text. 
Like Yenidüzen, Kibris also benefited from the idea and discourse of consensus to 
illustrate the Turkish Cypriot nation as united in their support of the president's decision: 
`As the Turkish side applauds the abolishment of the bridge with a wish for the 
demolishing of the wall, now the discussion is as to what the Papadopoulos 
administration will do' (Kibris, 10 January, p.! ). The `Turkish side' not only included 
the representatives of the nation but the nation itself. Further down the page, the 
newspaper announced that `everyone was there' to watch the bridge being taken apart. 
`Everyone' included the state and government authorities, the representatives of foreign 
countries, civil society organisations and citizens. The expression also implied 
consensus within society on the issue, as well as international support for the removal of 
the bridge. 
Nor was the attitude towards the Greek Cypriot shopkeepers who were supportive of the 
Greek Cypriot government positive. Discovering that the views of the Greek Cypriot 
shopkeepers were the same as their government, Kibris cast them as being under the 
influence of their administration rather than as individuals with free will: 
In Ledra Street where the Greek Cypriot National Council's view is dominant, the 
opening of the Lokmaci gate by Turks is supported only if the conditions put forward by 
the Greek Cypriot leader Tasos Papadopulos are met (Kibris, 12 January, p. 3). 
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Halkin Sesi 
Hal/an Sesi gave more coverage to views that opposed the removal of the bridge. A 
study of the accessed sources in Halkin Sesi indicated that even though there was a 
reflection of diverse views, wider coverage was given to the opinions of the opposition 
and nationalist groups that contested the decision and described it as giving in to the 
Greek Cypriot government. For example, the press statements by Serdar Denktab, an 
opposition party leader, were reported in length. Halkin Sesi even published a 
photograph showing him climb up the footbridge in the centre of its front page, even 
though there was no story that involved him on that page. The story underneath the 
photograph was totally unrelated to him but was about the demonstration of the 
shopkeepers (Hal/an Sesi, 5, January, p. 1). 
Halkin Sesi reflected the rally organised by the Asmaalti and Arasta Retailers 
Association differently. It did not mention the allegations of the association about the 
demonstration being `fake' and `remote controlled' or the conflict between the two 
groups which occurred during the rally. On the contrary, it represented the event as if the 
retailers in Asmaalti and Arasta had attended it in general (Hal/an Sesi, 6 January, p. 3). 
The story also appeared on its front page, with some photographs of the demonstrators 
carrying Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot flags. The demonstration was portrayed as a 
call to the Greek Cypriot people to pull the wall on their side down rather than a protest 
against the removal of the Lokmaci Bridge (Halkin Sesi, 6 January, p. l). This cast the 
action as a peaceful call to the `other' rather than as opposition to the President. 
The representation of Talat in Halkin Sesi was also dissimilar to that of Yenidüzen and 
Kibris. Although the news article about Talat's meeting in Ankara was the same as 
Yenidüzen's, Halkin Sesi's transformation of the story created a different effect. Rather 
than highlighting that he and the General Staff had reconciled their differences regarding 
the Lokmaci issue and therefore the bridge would be removed, Halkin Sesi chose to 
draw attention to Talat's denial of claims that a conflict existed between them: `we have 
no problem with the General Staff (Hal/an Sesi, 6 January, p. 5). Since no news report 
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about the conflict between the President and the General Staff had appeared earlier in 
the newspaper, the headline created a question mark about the relationship between 
these two institutions. Neither did the paper offer any explanation as to whether `we' 
referred to the Turkish Cypriot nation or the Presidential Office. 
Hallan Sesi's treatment of Talat's statement after the meeting in Ankara is also worth 
some scrutiny. Having published the news article that included what Talat had said 
regarding the outcome of the meeting, Hallan Sesi inserted a separate text box in the 
middle of the main article. Inside the box, it published two statements written in passive 
sentences that gave the impression that they were allegations made by other sources 
rather than by the newspaper. Yet, their aim was to raise doubts about Talat's decision 
and whether it was approved by Turkey: 
It's been alleged that the `Lokmaci Barricade' gate that is planned to be opened to the 
Greek Cypriot side caused disagreement between President Mehmet Ali Talat and the 
army in North Cyprus. 
It's also been said that the reason for Talat's hasty visit to Ankara to meet the General 
Staff Ya; ar Bilyükamt and Foreign Minister GUI was to overcome this problem (Halkin 
Sesi, 6 January p. 5). 
Both statements, written in passive sentences, hid the responsible social actors behind 
the remarks. Their passive structure enhanced the impression that they were rumours 
which helped the paper to distance itself from them. 
Differences in the Representation of the `Other' 
The President's announcement about the removal of the Lokmaci footbridge 
encountered opposition from inter-national and intra-national groups. Yet, the treatment 
of these groups changed depending on the newspaper. Although both the Turkish 
military and the Greek Cypriot government made some demands regarding the Lokmaci 
footbridge, the Greek Cypriot ones were denounced strongly as interfering in the 
TRNC's internal affairs while such criticism against the Turkish military was 
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downplayed. The differences in the attitudes towards these groups were obvious: on the 
one hand, the institution of Turkey, a country on which the TRNC's existence depends 
and had a relationship based on dominance and dependence which was taken for 
granted. On the other hand was the country not only cast as the `enemy' for years but, as 
its government consisted of nationalist forces, was regarded to be working against the 
national interests of Turkish Cypriots in particular by not opening the Lokmaci gate. 
Thus, while none of the newspapers raised questions about the dispute between the 
Turkish Cypriot leader and the Turkish military authorities, they all reproduced the 
statements of TRNC state representatives reacting angrily to the preconditions put 
forward by the Greek Cypriot government. For example, Yenidüzen, adopting a 
colloquial style, criticised the Greek Cypriot government: `there is no news of the wall 
(no development regarding the wall- SS) but!.. The Greek Cypriot administration wants 
"even more"' (Yenidüzen, 11 January, p. 5). The translation does not reflect the real 
denotation and sarcasm in the expression but it expresses that the Greek Cypriot 
government's demands were unreasonable. 
The dispute between powerful institutions such as the Presidency and the Turkish army 
was also reflected differently than that between the opposition and government. Kibris 
showed the Turkish military to be the cause of the obstruction of the bridge demolition 
process: `the military authorities are obstructing the removal of the bridge in Lokmaci' 
(5 January, p.! ). Describing the whole issue as a `bridge crisis' on its front page (Kibris, 
5 January, p. 1), Kibris pointed the finger at the Turkish military for objecting to the 
removal of the footbridge: `the army is against it' (Kibris, 5 January, p. 1). Yet, by 
employing the general term `army' as a generalising synecdoche to refer to the General 
Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, the newspaper avoided targeting anyone specifically. 
Nor did it specify the military authorities as Turkish, as it treated the information that the 
TRNC's national territory and borders were guarded by the Turkish Armed Forces as 
common sense. Yet, it approached the press statement issued by the General Secretary's 
Office more cautiously. It published the statement which identified the control and 
authority of the Lokmaci area as belonging to the Turkish Armed Forces with the same 
official discourse used in the statement. The only difference between the news article 
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and the press release was the personification of the Armed Forces in the headline, in 
comparison to the impersonalised style of the official discourse: `We have the authority' 
(Kibris, 7 January, p. 4). Through a strategy of personification, the Turkish Armed 
Forces were put in a subject position. Used to give a human form to such an entity, this 
strategy helps people to identify with it but also against it (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). As 
the `we' in this expression was inclusive of the Armed Forces and exclusive of the civil 
authority the newspaper sympathised with, the expression was not meant to encourage 
its readers' identification with the armed forces. On the contrary, it created a feeling of 
exclusion. 
Yenidüzen's construction of the military as the `other' was different from its treatment of 
the political opposition in the country. It seemed cautious in its coverage of the General 
Staff's role in the dispute and avoided the criticism it applied to the intra-national 
opposition. Nevertheless, in its reproduction of the statement released by the Turkish 
General Staff, the newspaper linked democracy discussions within the country to the 
TRNC Constitution that gave a legal basis to the Turkish Armed Forces' authority in 
North Cyprus. By invoking the debates regarding the undemocratic nature of the article, 
Yenidüzen implied that despite the constitution, the presence of the Turkish army in the 
TRNC was not very democratic and was not welcomed by democrats in the country 
(Yenidüzen, 7 January, p. 6), which suggested indirect criticism of the presence of the 
army in the TRNC. 
Nonetheless, both newspapers were cautious overall and avoided writing anything 
challenging about the Turkish army. This could also be the underlying reason why both 
newspapers adopted an impersonal voice to report the protests of some civil 
organisations against the Turkish general's behaviour, which was perceived as 
undermining Talat's authority and indirectly dishonouring the free will of Turkish 
Cypriots. Copying the news agency dispatch with very little editing (Yenidüzen 
shortened it) both newspapers distanced themselves from the event. Yenidüzen chose not 
to include the story on its front-page, as Kibris and Halkin Sesi had. Kibris' headline was 
`Protest against violation of free will', without specifying whose will it was. It put the 
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words `violation of free will' in quotation marks, supposedly to highlight them, but did 
not add that it referred to the will of Turkish Cypriots (Kibris, 9 January, p.! ). 
Yenidüzen's headline was only a quotation from the declaration that was read during the 
rally: `we protest against the violation of the free will of the people' (Yenidüzen, 9 
January, p. 8). The paper was careful to attribute these words to the organisers. In 
contrast, Hallan Sesi's headline stressed the name of only one organisation in the 
demonstration, even though it was a joint effort by three organisations, with some 
shopkeepers in the area joining in as well: `Demonstration by This Country is Ours 
Platform to support Talat' (Hal/an Sesi, 9 January, p. 3). 
Compared to the other two newspapers, Halkin Sesi reflected in more detail the Turkish 
army's perspective on the Lokmaci dispute. As well as publishing a press release from 
the military office, the newspaper also speculated that the General himself would 
publicly announce his disapproval of the demolition of the bridge a day before such a 
statement was issued (Hallam Sesi, 7 January, p. 1). There were no further details as to 
the newspaper's prediction in the inner pages but the next day it published a news article 
that had appeared in Milliyet, a mainstream Turkish daily newspaper, that included an 
account of the General Staff Biiyükanrt's views that proved the paper right. It was only 
Halkin Sesi that printed the article in detail. While the story did not appear in Kibris at 
all, Yenidüzen summarised and integrated it into another article about recent 
developments on the issue (Yenidüzen, 8 January, p. 8). 
The announcement that a group called `Citizens for the Opening of Ledra', which was 
set up by Greek Cypriots campaigning for the opening of Lokmaci, got front page 
coverage in the newspapers. It was a case of the `other' expressing support for an issue 
that was seen as being in the national interest of Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, it got 
positive coverage from the newspapers as it reinforced the official discourse that the 
opening of Lokmaci was for the mutual benefit of both communities. Having labelled 
the wall on the south side as a `wall of shame', Yenidüzen stated that the demonstration 
was organised by a group called `Citizens for the Opening of Ledra', comprised of 
Greek Cypriots campaigning for the opening of the Lokmaci crossing gate (Yenidiizen, 
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12 January, p. 1). It framed the group as being supportive of the Turkish Cypriots' 
demand for the opening of the crossing. Similarly, Halkin Sesi also reported that `the 
Greek Cypriots who wanted Lokmaci to be opened' were going to demonstrate for it. 
Kibris announced that `Citizens for the Opening of Ledra' was going to demonstrate in 
front of the Lokmaci barricade on its front page, without defining them as Greek 
Cypriots (Kibris, 12 January, p. 1). It explained in its inner pages that it was a Greek 
Cypriot group who supported the opening of Ledra Street. 
While the removal of the bridge at Lokmaci was shown as a sign of the Turkish 
Cypriots' resolution for peace and readiness to take steps towards it, the existence of the 
wall in the south side was used to portray the Greek Cypriot administration as the 
opposite. All the newspapers employed the derogatory names produced for the wall in 
the official discourses such as the `wall of shame' used by the TRNC Prime Minister 
Ferdi Sabit Soyer on many occasions (Kibris, 6 January, p. 8, Halkin Sesi, 6 January, p. 4; 
Yenidüzen, 11 January, p. 4). Yenidüzen used the phrase in relation to the demonstration 
by `Citizens for the Opening of Ledra': `Demonstration against the wall of shame' 
(Yenidüzen, 12 January, p.! ) as well as defining it as `Papadopoulos' wall of shame' 
(Yenidüzen, 14 January, p. 1). A likeness between the wall in Nicosia and Berlin was also 
produced within the official discourses and was again adopted in the news discourses. 
All the newspapers reported the Prime Minister's speech in which he had described it as 
`a wall of shame like the Berlin Wall' (Kibris, 12 January, p. 5, Halkin Sesi, 12 January, 
p. 2; Yenidüzen, 12 January, p. 8). The comparison with the Berlin Wall appeared in 
Yenidüzen once more, when some German tourists talked about the similarity between 
the walls (Yenidüzen, 9 January, p. 9). 
The Linguistic Construction of a Common Past: the Time before the Lokmac: 
Barricade 
The reference to a common past rarely occurred in the data analysed as the newspapers 
did not often reconstruct the past in their news articles. One such reflection was in the 
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reproduction of the speech that the TRNC Prime Minister Soyer made. Pointing out that 
Lokmaci was the first place where the division between both communities had occurred, 
Soyer described the barricade as the first one set up by Turkish Cypriots to protect 
themselves and to resist the enosis movement. Referring in his speech to the conflict 
years of the past, Soyer depicted the wall on the south side of Ledra Street as a symbol 
of the Enosis movement and claimed that it had no place in today's Cyprus (Kibris, 12 
January, p. 5, Halkm Sesi, 12 January, p. 2; Yenfdüzen, 12 January, p. 8). Illustrating the 
past as conflict and the present as peaceful reinforced the image of the Turkish Cypriot 
administration being the pro-solution side in contrast to the Greek Cypriot side. 
In the newspaper texts, the common past occurred only twice. The first was when 
Yenidüzen integrated the history of the Lokmaci barricade into the definition of the 
bridge: `it is still unknown what will happen to the footbridge on Ledra Street that used 
to function as a single street before Cyprus was divided into two zones in 1963' 
(Yenidüzen, 8 January, p. 8). Further down the text, it reminded readers that strife 
between the two communities was the reason for the Lokmaci barricade being 
established: `the first barricade that was set up between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot 
streets in 1963 when the inter-communal conflict started in Cyprus ... ' (Yenidüzen, 8 
January, p. 8). 
The second remark about the past appeared in Kibris when its editorial team visited 
Ledra Street to get the views of Greek Cypriot shopkeepers. The article reported that 
Greek Cypriots `expressed their wish to live as in the past when there were no borders 
and checkpoints in Cyprus' (Kibris, 12 January, p. 3). 
Recent history, based on the actions of the `other', was also embedded in the news 
discourses. The newspapers used the majority Greek Cypriot `no' vote in the referendum 
on the Annan Plan as a metaphor for their political attitude. Pointing to the Greek 
Cypriot political parties that campaigned for a `no' vote in the referendum, Kibris wrote, 
`starting with the Greek Cypriot community leader, Tassos Papadopoulos, all the 'pro- 
no' political parties ... ' (Kibris, 12 January, p. 10). Yenidüzen also alluded to the 
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referendum by saying that `this time the sound of "oxi (no) to the barricades" came from 
the South' (Yenidüzen, 14 January, p. 1). By employing the Greek word `oxi' in its text, 
which frequently had appeared in the Turkish Cypriot media to reflect the opinion of the 
majority of Greek Cypriots on the Annan Plan, Yenidüzen referred to common 
knowledge of the recent past. 
Future: Will the Wall be demolished? 
In the coverage of the Lokmaci issue, there were three main issues that reflected 
concerns about the present and the future. These were the national security conditions, 
the image of the Turkish Cypriot nation state as a sovereign one and the future of the 
wall. 
Reporting on the dispute between the TRNC President and the Turkish military 
authorities over the footbridge, Yenidüzen highlighted the fact that the national security 
of the country was under the authority of the Turkish Armed Forces `until the conditions 
are appropriate' (Yenidüzen, 7 January, p. 6). As well as justifying the military's presence 
at present, the phrase also voiced an expectation of a change in the future when there 
would no longer be a need for the Turkish army to remain on the island. 
The opposition of the Turkish military authorities to Talat's decision to dismantle the 
overpass was portrayed as damaging to the image of Turkish Cypriot sovereign 
statehood. Such a depiction was discernible in both Yenidüzen and Kibris but was 
particularly strong in Yenidüzen's interview with Talat, in which he expressed the 
opinion that the nation's image had been injured. It also exposed the limitations of the 
authority of civil state representatives in matters of national security. 
The future of the wall in South Nicosia was also transformed into a national expectation. 
Its destruction was given as the only obstruction to the opening of the Lokmaci crossing. 
Especially after the removal of the footbridge, all the newspapers turned their attention 
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to the fate of the wall which acted as a barrier between the two sides. Benefiting from 
the public declarations of politicians and government representatives, the demolition of 
the wall was illustrated as a step that would bring both communities closer together. 
Conclusion 
The case study revealed that after the referendum on the Annan Plan, the dominant 
national self-perception was similar to the one shaped officially, which was mainly as 
Turkish Cypriot and Turk. Unlike the previous two cases, there was no emphasis on 
Cypriot identity but more on a Turkish Cypriot one. Turkey and the TRNC continued to 
be categorised as the Turkish side in relation to the Republic of Cyprus. In other words, 
in a conflict with Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriot newspapers had adopted the Turkish 
identity and therefore the term, the Turkish side was employed frequently to emphasise 
their distinction from them. The practice was not only noticeable in Hallern Sesi which 
continued with its nationalist discourse but also in Yenidüzen and Kibris. Yenidüzen's 
adoption of Turkish discourse in relation to Greek Cypriots was interesting as over the 
years it had been promoting a Cypriot identity which highlighted the common 
characteristics of the two communities. The identity of Turkish Cypriots became a topic 
of debate, not only in relation to Greek Cypriots but also to Turks as well. The national 
identity that was defined as Turkish when constructed in opposition to Greek Cypriots, 
was switched to Turkish Cypriot when renegotiated in relation to the Turkish army. In 
other words, despite the discourse of unity with Turks, Turkish Cypriot identity still 
stressed a divergence. As a result, an articulation of Turkish Cypriot identity, which 
emphasised a distinction between the Turkish nation and Greek Cypriots, was 
discernible in the newspaper discourses. All this confirms that the conceptual isation of 
national identity was context bound. 
The underlying reason behind downplaying the identity of Cypriot could be explained 
by two factors: First, the Greek Cypriots' rejection of the Annan Plan in the referendum 
in 2004, in contrast to Turkish Cypriots' vote in favour of the plan, had caused much 
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disappointment, especially among the groups who supported the concept of a Cypriot 
national identity. From the Turkish Cypriot's point of view, with their `no-vote' in the 
referendum, Greek Cypriots not only rejected a settlement plan that would allow both 
communities peaceful existence on the island but also crushed the notion of Cypriotness 
as a collective identity that included both communities. 
Second, with the election of a new government and President, the political dynamics of 
the country had changed. Despite being from CTP, a political party on the left that had 
been a promoter of Cypriot identity, the government and the President integrated their 
political party discourse into the state one, which resembled that of the previous 
nationalist government. Yenfdüzen's affiliation and Kibris' sympathy towards the new 
government were reflected in their news discourses and both newspapers embedded its 
official discourse into their news texts. As the formal discourse stressed Turkish 
Cypriotness and also spoke of the Turkish side in relation to Greek Cypriots, both of 
these terms appeared more frequently in the newspapers when compared to Cypriotness. 
In summary, the overall analysis showed that the discursive construction of national 
identity was based on the concepts of Turkish Cypriot and Turkishness in all three 
newspapers. Having adopted the official discourse, none of the newspapers showed 
much variation in their national self-perception and the expression of it. Therefore, 
despite the differentiation along political lines, the construction of the nation did not 
show any deviation but, on the contrary, complied with the official one. Unlike the 
previous cases, there was no attacking of one nationalism in order to defend another 
(Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Each newspaper also benefited from the ideology of 
consensus to show their perspective of events was agreed upon by the general public. 
Using the language of consensus, the newspapers depicted the public as supportive of 
the national interest they promoted. Articulation of consensus, as if agreement had been 
reached, led to the perception that any differing view was a deviation from common 
sense. 
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Like the previous cases, there was positive self-presentation and negative `other' 
presentation in the newspapers. Yet, the context of the categorisation of `us' and `them' 
varied depending upon the newspaper and the context. For example, adopting the 
Turkish Cypriot leadership's discourse, the newspapers represented the removal of the 
bridge as a step towards increasing cooperation between the two communities in contrast 
to the Greek Cypriot government's obstruction of it. The Greek Cypriot government was 
pictured as the `other' in all three newspapers. 
When it came to internal politics, the categorisation of `us' and the `other' showed 
variation. Differentiation along political lines, in terms of national views and ideologies, 
played a role in the construction of the `in-groups' and `out-groups' of the newspapers. 
Yenidüzen and Kibris categorised the groups that supported the President in the 
`Lokmaci crisis' as `us' and presented them in a positive way while the opposition 
groups that disagreed with the decision were treated as the `other'. In Halkin Sesi, the 
situation was the other way round. Opposing views to the policies and actions of the 
President got extensive coverage throughout the period studied. These belonged to 
actors such as the main opposition parties and civil organisations with nationalist 
ideologies. Nonetheless, in the overall representation, two distinct discourses emerged: 
One was the discourse of the government and the President that the footbridge would be 
beneficial in facilitating relations between the two communities. The other was the 
discourse of the opposition groups and Turkish army officials which employed the 
discourse of national security. 
The dispute between two powerful institutions, the Turkish army authorities and the 
TRNC President was another issue that created a dichotomy of `us' and the `other'. Yet, 
neither got any strong criticism or negative representation. For example, none of the 
newspapers questioned why President Talat lied to the public about his meeting in 
Ankara, meaning that none of them perceived this as a problem. Only Yenidüzen quoted 
him in an interview, giving as an explanation for his behaviour that it was because he did 
not want to give the impression that conflicting opinions existed within the 
Turkish side 
(Yenidüzen, 10 January, p. 6). However, when the issue was being debated, none of them, 
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including Yenidüzen, challenged or questioned the President on his stance at the time. At 
the same time, even though the disagreement with the Turkish army over Lokmaci 
damaged the image of Turkish Cypriot statehood and attracted the criticism of those who 
protested its national autonomy, the military was not so strongly portrayed as the `other'. 
Seemingly, the newspapers were reluctant to criticise it. Therefore, strategies of 
avoidance and suppression of differences were employed and the consensus rather than 
conflict between these social actors was highlighted in the news articles. The criticism of 
the army was detectable only in Yenidüzen and Kibris, while in Halkin Sesi, which had 
argued in favour of Turkey's presence in North Cyprus for the security of Turkish 
Cypriots, support of the army was more obvious. 
There was no discursive practice based on the essentialist conception of national 
identity. Production of national identity based on cultural elements rarely occurred in 
the news texts. Instead, there was an emphasis on citizenship, which indicated the 
perception of the nation as Staatsnation. The debates over sovereignty also enhanced the 
picture of a state based on political membership of the nation. However, the meaning of 
citizenship was ambiguous in the newspapers as anyone outside particular social 
categories, such as occupational groups, were called citizens. The newspapers also 
frequently used the label citizens as a general term for individuals and groups to 
reinforce the impression that people in general were supporting the actions that the 
newspapers were reflecting. 
Embedding the nationalist discourses and their representations in their news texts, the 
newspapers contributed to their being internalised or treated as a matter of common 
sense. The relationship with Turkey, which is based on the TRNC's dependence and 
Turkey's dominance, shaped the construction of some stories and helped certain ideas 
and practices which emerged from this relationship to be taken for granted. One such 
example was the power of the Turkish army in the country and the article of the 
constitution which had given it this authority. Yenidüzen challenged them slightly but 
otherwise no voice was raised against it. 
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Generalising practices, especially synecdoche, were also frequently employed to create 
sameness between the people of the same group. In particular, some views of individuals 
were generalised as the attitude of the group they belonged to. For example, the opinions 
of a few shopkeepers or businesspeople about the issue were attributed to all 
shopkeepers or businesspeople. Such practices of generalisation helped the newspapers 
to create an impression that these groups were supportive of the same political interests 
as the papers. In contrast, mitigation strategies were applied in the reflection of the 
`other's view along with actions to reduce their effect and importance. 
The representation of many issues fell short of informing readers or encouraging them to 
question existing power relations; on the contrary, it naturalised and strengthened them. 
This was partly because ideological beliefs and practices were taken for granted and 
partly because the newspapers depended heavily on externally prepared texts. Powerful 
sources such as the President, government and political parties received wide coverage 
and their views shaped the agenda on the Lokmaci issue. As the newspapers took large 
parts of the statements or news agency dispatches and copied them directly, the articles 
in the papers were identical to the original one, forming an intertexual relationship. In 
particular, the news texts in Hallen Sesi were heavily based on information that came 
from outside sources rather than being generated by its own reporters, which often made 
it difficult to isolate its discourse form and the institutional voice. Studying the 
newspapers' transformation of these texts, the highlights and headlines chosen for the 
stories were sometimes the only means to distinguish the institutional voice of the 
newspaper. At the same time, differences in the representation of the same incidents in 
the press also confirmed that rather than reflecting reality, the news is represented or 




Overview of the Findings 
The analysis of the data holds light to the ongoing struggle to impose a legitimate 
mode of thought and expression about national identity and the role of the media in 
this. The research aimed to scrutinize the universe of discourse on national identity 
within the media or, as Bourdieu explains, the universe of things that can be stated 
and thought and the universe of things that are taken for granted (Bourdieu, 1977). 
Thus, the research not only studied stated expressions and thoughts but also 
undiscussed or hidden ones. 
The investigation confirmed that there are many commonalities in the representation 
and discourse of national identity. For example, the newspapers stayed within the 
boundaries of the universe of official discourse and did not challenge its nationalist 
expressions in which the `other' was treated as a threat and thus was propagated in 
negative terms. On the other hand, the differences between the newspapers were 
based on the degree of acceptance or rejection of nationalist rhetoric, their stance vis 
a vis civilian-military relations and a solution to the Cyprus issue. 
On Thematic Contents 
Nation, National identity and Differentiation 
The main objective of the study was to examine the role the news media play in the 
construction and articulation of national identity and to investigate the various 
discursive practices employed to mobilise readers around a particular national 
imagination. Therefore, the news texts of the three newspapers regarding three 
politically and culturally important incidents for the Turkish Cypriots were chosen 
and the data was tested based on the content, strategies used in the discursive 
construction of national identity and the linguistic means employed. 
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The key assumption of the research is that national identity is produced and 
renegotiated through discourse. Constructed through the discourse of `us' and `them' 
or in other words, through the discourse of difference and similarity, various 
definitions of national identity are employed to rally around different national 
projects. Contrary to the assertions that national identity is a natural phenomenon, the 
study confirmed that it is a product of the dialectical relationship between discursive 
acts and social practices. The discursive construction of national identity shifted and 
transformed with changes in the social, political and economic dynamics that were 
influential in its making as well as shaping these dynamics. For example, the 
articulation of Cypriot identity that developed as an alternative to Turkish identity 
was celebrated, especially when the border was opened for public crossings. Yet, it 
lost some of its appeal when Greek Cypriots rejected a solution plan with Turkish 
Cypriots and refused to open a new crossing in the divided city of Nicosia. 
In contrast to the nationalist discourses that stress the unique character of national 
identity, the research established that the constructions of national identity are 
diverse and context bound. According to the analysis of the data, different versions 
of national identity such as Turkish, Turkish Cypriot and Cypriot co-existed 
throughout the period studied. Although each presented itself as the real and natural 
identity, even within themselves these identities did not refer to a single collective 
definition, but on the contrary, had different meanings within different contexts. 
Depending on the setting, the newspaper and also the `other', different concepts of 
national identity were defined and renegotiated within the news texts. In general, the 
national identity was referred to as Turkish Cypriot, but Turkishness was highlighted 
in relation to Greek Cypriots and indicated categorisation of the mainland Turks and 
Turkish Cypriots in one group. In contrast, when identity was constructed in relation 
to the mainland Turks, and especially to assert a divergence between them, Cypriot 
identity or Turkishcypriot identity, which expressed certain distinctions from the 
other two, was highlighted. An essentialist understanding of national identity was 
also present in the reflections of the newspapers. According to this understanding, 
the national identity was presented as the authentic version with certain mental, 
character and behavioural dispositions attributed to it (Wodak et. al, 1999). For 
example, Turkish cultural symbols were utilised as `ours' to encourage self- 
identification of Turkish Cypriots with the Turkish nation and to emphasise Turkish 
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identity within the Turkish Cypriot community. In a similar way, certain traditions, 
mentalities and behaviours common to both sides of Cyprus were highlighted to 
forge a sense of Cypriot identity and to produce a perception of a Cypriot character. 
In either case, a commonality was implied and national identity was presented not as 
a social product but as a natural part of people. Meanwhile, the meaning of Turkish 
Cypriot identity also changed in time to be an entity of its own, following social and 
political developments on the island in recent years. The new meaning indicated a 
separate identity from Greek Cypriots and also Turkish people that carried the 
characteristics of both Cypriot and Turkish identity, as new research has confirmed 
(KADEM, 2007). 
The struggle for domination among these competing definitions of identity 
discourses was discernible during the periods the research focused on. Various 
discourses on national identity that embodied certain power relations and ideological 
assumptions had been battling for dominance. While Turkish identity provided a 
certain framework for understanding world relations, Cypriot identity required a 
different reality. During the struggle, the official discourse of national identity was 
sometimes challenged by the discourse of ordinary people. Yet, in some cases both 
discourses were equally present in the same newspapers. In 1996, the discourse of 
Turkishness was dominant in the news, which revealed its impact on popular 
discourses and its power as a state ideology while Cypriot identity appeared as its 
alternative. By 2003, the discontent with international isolation, the economic 
situation as well as increasing resentment of Turkey's control over the country 
encouraged Turkish Cypriot's identification with the concept of Cypriot which had 
gained more acceptance within the community. Thus, when the restrictions on 
crossing the border (in both directions) were relaxed in 2003, Cypriot identity, along 
with the Turkish Cypriot one, dominated the newspapers' discourses. This time, 
everyday discourses rather than official ones found a place in the media. However, 
the rejection of the UN Peace Plan by Greek Cypriots disappointed the supporters of 
Cypriotism which led to a renegotiation of identity. As Ramm puts it, this caused `a 
growing tendency to express identity in terms of a separate Turkish Cypriotness 
instead of a Cypriotness shared with their Greek Cypriot co-islanders' (Ramm, 2006, 
p. 531). Therefore, in the representation of the disputes and events surrounding the 
opening of another crossing in 2007, the newspapers highlighted the concept of 
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Turkish Cypriotness rather than Cypriotness. The other concepts did not cease to 
exist but a Turkish Cypriot identity, as a separate national self-perception apart from 
Cypriot and Turkish identities, was to be found in the news discourses. 
The ideological stance of the newspapers was another determinant in the national 
imaginings they represented. It should not be assumed that each newspaper wrote 
about only one version of nationhood, as there was no strict dichotomy between the 
identity discourses of the newspapers. Yet, the ideological positions and the political 
parties the newspapers were affiliated with provided the framework and was a factor 
in shaping their discourses. Even Kibris, a commercial newspaper, was not free from 
such political influence and its account of events reflected the political tendencies its 
ownership sympathised with at the time. Its attitude towards the Cyprus issue and 
definitions of national identity shifted over a decade in line with its support of the 
political power in the country from a nationalist to a more pro-solution attitude. 
Like national identity, the categorisation of the `other' also changed, including and 
excluding different groups at different times. In the nationalist discourses, the `other' 
was described through oppositional metaphors as being different than `us' and was 
cast as the enemy and a threat to the nation. The concept of enemy, as seen in the 
case of the demonstration in 1996, was attributed to the entire Greek Cypriot 
population and their intentions were described as wanting to deprive Turkish 
Cypriots of their state and sovereignty. Demonization of the `other' in such a 
homogenous way forges and forces the unity of the members of the national 
community without leaving much space to dissidents (Tsagarousianou, 1999) as well 
as increasing the conflict between co-existing and neighbouring communities 
(Ozgunes and Terzis, 2000). Thus, the domination of Turkish nationalism in official 
policies and discourses not only promoted the official representations of the events 
but also silenced internal dissidents, obstructing the formation of a pluralistic public 
sphere. On the contrary, the discourses that challenged official ones placed the state 
administrators that mainly consisted of the government and the president in the 
position of the `other'. They presented these groups as the adversaries of the Turkish 
Cypriot people. 
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The image of Greek Cypriots as the `other' was transformed from their being the 
`evil' ones into ordinary people like `us' when the crossing restrictions were relaxed 
on the island and contact between both communities increased. Then, the negative 
representation of the `other' shifted to both the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot 
administrations on the island for having prevented both people from doing so before. 
The picture became one of `people versus nationalist state administrators'. The 
political power groups governing both states were depicted as the adversary of 
people. Even though Hallern Sesi showed the Greek Cypriot government as the 
`other' more than the Turkish Cypriot one, the other two newspapers, Yenidüzen and 
Kibris put the responsibility on both governments. However, it should be noted that 
even though the newspapers shifted their blame to the state authorities, the views and 
representations of the authorities still prevailed, as they were the main news sources 
for the media. 
The situation was similar in the third case study, but here the attitude of the 
newspapers' towards the government shifted following the changes in political 
power. For example, when the state authorities were comprised of nationalist forces, 
Yenidüzen treated them as the `other' but when a left-wing political party took 
control of the government and the presidency, then it was Hal/an Sesi that regarded 
them as the `other', unlike Yenidüzen, which was affiliated with that party. The 
alteration illustrated how the discursive construction of `other' changed in relation to 
power relations and the ideological position of the newspaper. 
In addition to Greek Cypriots and state representatives, immigrants from Turkey in 
the TRNC were also treated as the `other'. Their representation also changed with 
time and the context but their treatment as a homogenous group did not. In contrast 
to the dominant nationalist narratives in the newspapers of 1996, nationalist Turks 
who were involved in the clashes with Greek Cypriots were cast as the `other' by 
Yenidilzen. They were portrayed as negatively as the Greek Cypriot demonstrators. In 
2003, when the border was opened to crossings only for `Cypriots', excluding the 
Turkish-origin TRNC citizens, they were then referred to as the members of the 
Turkish Cypriot state and were included in the imagined national community. The 
omission by the Greek Cypriot government of these TRNC citizens from the 
crossings was criticised as a challenge to the unity of the `national we'. Despite this, 
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failing to give any means of expression to these citizens showed that they were not 
fully included in the symbolic representation of the nation. In fact, in the 
reproduction of the nation by the newspapers, no ethnic minorities were included. 
Turkish Cypriots were the dominant group and their accounts were generalised as the 
nation's. 
In 2007, it was not the immigrants from Turkey but the Turkish army, representative 
of Turkey's power and domination in North Cyprus, that was implicitly treated as the 
`other' by mainly Yenidüzen and K: bris. Yet, the Turkish army, a powerful institution 
both in Turkey and the TRNC, was not cast particularly strongly as the `other'. The 
attempts of the state authorities to downplay the conflict between the President and 
the army authorities were reflected in the newspapers that used them as their news 
sources. Therefore, avoiding challenging the military institution, the newspapers 
adopted the strategy of downplaying the conflict and instead highlighted the 
consensus between these two powerful institutions. In a sense, they all followed the 
official representation and discourse in reporting developments. 
The characterisation of the nation was also context bound. As well as imagining it on 
the basis of a national culture that indicated an essentialist understanding of national 
identity, the idea of the nation as Staatsnation was also often implemented. The 
identification of the nation in the news discourses about the border clashes in 1996 
was mainly based on the concept of Kulturnation. The domination of nationalist 
narratives led to the perception of the nation as an entity based on cultural 
similarities and common ancestry. 2003 was a year when challenges to nationalist 
approaches found expression in the mass demonstrations that followed the 
introduction of the UN's Annan Plan. Mobilised to show their discontent with the 
government, these public demonstrations became a manifestation of a changing self- 
perception. In the midst of these developments, the opening of the border and the 
increasing contact of people with the `other' community brought a new perspective 
to the understanding of collective identity. The discourse of national identity was not 
only shaped by citizenship or political belonging to the nation but also included 
culture based elements. Thus, the concepts of Staatsnation and Kulturnation were 
amalgamated into the discursive productions of the nation. In 2007, because of the 
nature of the incident that was studied and also because of a change in collective 
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consciousness and self-perception within the Turkish Cypriot nation, Staatsnation 
was the dominant feature in the representation of the nation in the news. The case 
concerned an issue of the political legitimacy of the nation state and created an 
ambivalent situation: on the one hand, Turkey was criticised as the `colonial power', 
on the other its `guarantorship' status was stressed. The discursive practices 
surrounding this conflict illustrated the nation as Staatsnation which equipped it with 
political legitimacy and the support of its citizens. As these findings show that 
despite drawing a distinction in the construction of the nation based on different 
elements at different times, in the overall representation it was hard to talk about the 
existence of a strict dichotomy between these terms. In the three cases, these two 
models for the nation co-existed, revealing that Turkish Cypriots have been shifting 
their alliances and identity between citizen based and culture based identity. 
The use of the term citizenship associated with the civic model of nation was 
problematic. There was a lack of non-national definition of citizenship. Expressions 
such as `Turkish-origin citizens' implied a differentiation from Cyprus born citizens 
based on ethnic origin or place of birth. In other instances, the term citizenship 
appeared simply as a general name for individuals or ordinary people to distinguish 
them from the state authorities or other public figures or to assert that they belonged 
to neither. Therefore, categorisations such as `shopkeepers and citizens' were 
employed in some of the news articles. Meanwhile, citizens appeared in the 
newspapers mostly to express their views on the issues discussed. But, instead of 
promoting the involvement of citizens in political decisions, only opinions in line 
with the newspapers' positions on the issue were included, in order to strengthen the 
image of the newspapers as being the voice of the nation. The label of citizens was 
also used to give the impression that people in general supported the ideas and 
actions the newspapers favoured. As a result, the newspapers failed to represent the 
real interests of citizens in the issues they reflected. 
In events that involved `national security', intra-national differences were played 
down and the unity of the nation was emphasised. In particular, when the borders of 
the national territory were claimed to be under threat in 1996, almost no dissident 
voices were heard in the newspapers. Having contributed to the creation of a moral 
panic by their representation of the events, Halkin Sesi and Kibris newspapers 
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encouraged the public to unite behind the policies and actions of the national 
institutions and adopt their discourses. Yenidiizen, on the other hand, tried to distance 
itself from the dominant nationalist discourses and representations but without much 
success. The reports of the conflict between the Turkish army and the TRNC 
President about the national border and its security had similar features. This time, as 
well as forging the unity of Turkish Cypriots against the proclamations of the 
Turkish army authorities, there was also an effort to maintain an accord between the 
TRNC and Turkey. The discourse of this inter-national unity with Turkey, as well as 
the intra-national unity that was mediated by the newspapers, was not only for the 
consumption of the Greek Cypriot government, one of the actors involved in the 
issue, but also for the members of the nation state. Meanwhile, voices against the 
Turkish military were barely reflected in the newspapers. As a result, the dominant 
nationalist discourses, based on infra-national unity, limited the access of diverse 
discourses to the media. 
Throughout the period studied, the dominant discourses in the news supported the 
existence and the legitimacy of the TRNC. Yet, there were occasions when 
challenging discourses also found their way into the newspapers. The legality of a 
state that was not recognised by the international community was emphasised with 
references to its national autonomy, independence and the impassibility of its 
borders. It encouraged people to participate in the existence of the nation state by 
believing and identifying with it. The concept of `enemy' was another way of 
persuading people to imagine themselves as a nation within a bounded territory. 
Since the TRNC was established to provide security and safety to its people, the 
presence of an enemy reinforced this process. So when there was a threat from an 
`enemy' in 1996, the legitimacy and authority of the state was emphasised more 
strongly than at any other time in order to mobilize people behind the idea of the 
nation state. In contrast, when the border was opened, bringing the two communities 
together rather than casting them as opposite to each other, the sovereignty and 
legitimacy of the state were questioned, particularly by Yenidazen. Again, when 
doubts about the TRNC's statehood emerged as a result of the public statements of 
the Turkish military authorities in 2007, the newspapers adopted the official 
discourses aimed at mending the image of the state, not only in the eyes of its people, 
but also the outside world. As Billig argues (1995), because it is not enough to define 
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oneself as a nation but also requires recognition as such, gaining the 
acknowledgment of other nation states is important Yet, in the overall 
representation, the official discourses that promoted the TRNC as a legitimate nation 
state dominated the news discourses and representations. 
The concept of border played a role in the conceptualisation of national belonging. 
The Green Line, particularly, acted as a geographical barrier that divided both 
communities and for a long time severed their communication and interaction 
(Gumpert and Drucker, 1998) Even though the boundaries of the state were fixed, the 
meaning of the border which divided the island into two zones shifted in time over 
the period covered by this research. In the first case study, there was an emphasis on 
the border as a symbol of Turkish Cypriots' territorial integrity and as their national 
space. It not only separated the `national we' from the `other' but also aided in the 
imagination of the bounded area as the homeland needing protection from the 
intrusions and threats of the `other'. Such thinking justified the use of violence by the 
security forces in reaction to the violation of `our borders' by the `other'. The 
existence of the border acquired a new meaning with the crossings. It was not 
abolished but remained in its place and was only opened for crossing. This was an 
exception to the rule of division and separation. Even though it brought people from 
both communities together and there was a discourse based on cultural similarities, it 
also emphasised the separate citizenships of Cypriots on both sides of the border. 
The opening of the border, by discursively helping to reaffirm the statehood of both 
North and South indirectly, also stressed the existence of two separate states and 
citizenship. In the Lokmaci matter, the debate about who had authority over the 
TRNC's national security and borders brought the civil power and the Turkish 
military into dispute. In this case, the border became a symbol of the `sovereignty' of 
the TRNC, not to protect it from enemy threats but to show its autonomy. 
The Common Past 
History was used a great deal in the reproduction of collective identities. In the news 
regarding the motorcyclists' demonstration in 1996, the narratives based on the 
sufferings of Turkish Cypriots during the inter-communal conflict of the past were 
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emphasised to portray Greek Cypriots as a continuing threat. They also demanded 
the unity of the national community. In these national discourses, the past 
symbolised a time which was associated with negative experiences of bloodshed, war 
and a fear that no Turkish Cypriot would want to experience again. The collective 
memory reproduced in this manner did not refer to any positive aspect of the 
relationship between the two communities (Canefe, 2007). In contrast, the news 
reports about the border crossings used history to highlight the commonalities 
between the two communities. Again, the purpose was to establish a link between the 
past and the present but this time history was reproduced based on the narratives of 
ordinary people rather than official ones. Constructed in a nostalgic way, these 
narratives focused on the experiences of daily life. References to the similarity of 
some cultural traditions between the communities helped the renegotiation of a 
Cypriot identity. Depicting these traditions as the character of the people on the 
island hid their constructedness and presented them as historical facts. The discursive 
construction of the past in the Lokmaci matter rarely occurred. It was only 
reproduced in official speeches that referred to the conditions under which the 
barricade was built in the past. It helped to distinguish the present as peaceful 
compared to the conflict of the past. Instead, 2004, regarded as another turning point 
in the history of the island, was referred to in order to underline the position of Greek 
Cypriot state representatives as uncompromising. 
The Construction of a Political Future 
The construction of a common political future varied depending on the period 
studied. While Yenidazen stressed that a common future with Greek Cypriots in the 
shape of a solution in Cyprus was obstructed by the actions of the nationalist groups 
in 1996, the other two newspapers implied that the future for Turkish Cypriots was 
the continuation of the status quo with the `motherland' Turkey. In 2003, the 
linguistic construction of the future highlighted the expectation of two changes for 
Turkish Cypriots: One was a change in political power in the TRNC and the other a 
solution in Cyprus in which both communities could peacefully co-exist. During the 
events of 2007 it was again Yenidüzen that voiced the expection of a solution on the 
island in the future which would no longer require the protection of the Turkish 
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army. The statement `until the conditions are appropriate' (Yenidüzen, 7 January, 
2007, p. 6) signalled the possibility of transformation following an alteration in the 
political situation of North Cyprus as well as in the will of the Turkish Cypriots. 
On Turkish Cypriot Media 
The Newspapers and National Identity 
The study also confirmed that the newspapers acted as nationalising institutions by 
constantly reminding their readers of their nationhood. By embedding nationalist 
discourses in their news texts and reporting the nationalist proclamations of various 
sources such as the president, government and military officials, the newspapers 
replicated nationalist ideologies. Even ones that criticised nationalistic statements 
and policies cannot be said to have an anti-nationalist discourse as they replaced one 
form of nationalism with another or made their arguments against nationalism using 
nationalistic terms. Having internalised many nationalist discursive practices as 
common sense and as part of daily life, many times the news texts, rather than being 
critical of nationalist practices and discourses, actually enhanced them. For example, 
the killing of a Greek Cypriot for being disrespectful to the Turkish flag was treated 
as common sense. Therefore, none of the newspapers challenged the authorities 
about the way Solomos Solomou was stopped. His killing was justified as a patriotic 
action and went unquestioned by the three newspapers. Challenges to such 
discourses and other nationalistic discursive practices rarely occurred in the press. 
The role of the newspapers in normalising certain nationalistic discursive practices 
was not limited to the reflection of the nationalist views of the state authorities. As 
Billig emphasises, the power of nationalism comes from being obscure and also 
obvious at the same time (Billig, 1995). The representation of the routines of 
everyday life in the news also contributed to the self-perception. The banal 
representation of daily life, such as the circulation of images of family homes and the 
shared cultural norms and values of Turkish Cypriots, not only linked private lives to 
the national public sphere but their mediation through the newspapers strengthened 
their internalisation as national and rational. In other words, by showing the routines 
248 
and assumptions of everyday life, the newspapers presented it as the nationally 
organised way (Edensor, 2002) as if that way of living is a part of the national 
character of Turkish Cypriots. Thus, they reinforced the view that national identity is 
a natural product rather than a social one. It is also important to note that the media 
are not the only responsible agent in the dissemination of nationalism in society but 
part of a complex public sphere that forms and redefines national identity. The 
research showed the media (in this case the newspapers) did not only influence the 
nationalistic imagination in the society but was also shaped by the prevailing 
discourses of the society. 
The analysis also revealed that the discourses adopted by the newspapers attempted 
to mobilize their readers around certain political projects and national interests. 
Therefore, claiming to speak on behalf of and to the nation, the newspapers 
characterised the ideas they presented as the consensus of the nation. In line with the 
`consensual model' (Hartley, 1993), the society was depicted as united behind one 
perspective. Differences or challenges to this perspective were characterised as 
deviance from the norm. Such representations allowed the newspapers to collectivise 
their readers around the national interest they had been promoting. Benefiting from 
the notion of unity without any diversity helped the newspapers state these views as 
self-evident and a matter of common sense. This approach not only allowed 
nationalism to be embedded in the news discourses but also hid its constructedness. 
The dominance of nationalistic discourses in the news supported the unity of the 
nation without leaving much room for identity negotiations other than those for 
national identity. Hence, diverse and different identity discourses did not have much 
access to the public sphere through the newspapers. Even though regional identities 
were mentioned in 2003, when people crossed the border to see their homes, the 
dominant collective identity in the news articles was national identity. The mediation 
of the symbolic nation did not include any ethnic minorities, indicating their absence 
in the public sphere. The representation of women in the news also complied with the 
gendered representation of the nation. In the conflict between Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish Cypriots in 1996, women appeared in the newspapers mostly as `mothers'. 
When both communities started revisiting their homes, women were again portrayed 
within the dominant discourses and images of home and family life; as `wife and 
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mother' serving food to the guests or crying for their lost homes. In the Lokmaci 
case, which involved state politics and the military, women rarely appeared in the 
news. 
Consequently, the lack of negotiation and redefinition of various identities formed an 
obstacle for the development of a democratic citizenship. The dominance of 
nationalistic discourses not only limited the reflection of society as a pluralistic 
formation but also prevented it being one by restricting diverse and different 
representations and discourses about it. In a way, the media failed in their role in the 
production and circulation of the diverse information necessary for the development 
of an informed citizenry (Golding & Murdock, 1997) as well as failing to represent 
divergent interests in society. Whether critical or uncritical in their intentions, by 
relying on authoritative and politically powerful sources in the production of their 
news stories it led to biased interpretations of events in favour of these groups. The 
uniformity of the ideas and frameworks given to readers hindered the newspapers 
from fulfilling their democratic role in the formation of an informed citizenry and 
providing them with a pluralistic public sphere. 
Journalistic Practices 
In the case of the Turkish Cypriot media, the ideological orientations and political 
views that shaped the news texts were recognisable. The newspapers failed to detach 
themselves from the stance and the views of the political parties that they were 
affiliated or sympathised with and instead, reflected the issues from their 
frameworks. The discourses that aimed to encourage the participation and 
mobilisation of their readers around the national interests they supported were no 
different than the groups they were affiliated with or backed. For example, Yenidilzen 
in a way similar to CTP, the political party it was linked with, challenged the 
nationalistic discourses of the government in 1996 and 2003, although its defiance 
did not go further than contesting the policies and actions of the nationalistic groups. 
When CTP came to power, even this limited challenge disappeared as it adopted the 
official discourse. With no alternative or challenging discourses, the domination of 
nationalist discourse within the media provides a hegemonic framework for the 
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understanding and construction of a particular social reality (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 
2005). The Turkish Cypriot media became instrumental in this because they accepted 
and followed the dominant nationalist discourses. For example, none of the 
newspapers referred to the administration in the south of the island by its 
internationally recognised title, the Republic of Cyprus, but instead adopted the name 
given in the official national discourses, the Greek Cypriot administration. The 
newspapers rarely criticised the TRNC's dependence on Turkey or the power of 
Turkey over the Turkish Cypriot administration but instead treated this as normal, 
which helped to naturalise it. In either case, the arguments of the newspapers against 
the nationalistic discourses and actions were not free from nationalist terms. While 
criticising one form of nationalism, they promoted the alternative national projects 
that they identified with. Yet, in the overall process of their news production, the 
newspapers used language and cultural symbols to constantly remind people of their 
nationhood. Banal nationalism was common in the discourses of the newspapers and 
they flagged nationhood to their readers. 
When investigated, such practices are not independent from the broader socio- 
political and historical context of the media. In particular, the Turkish Cypriot press 
has always been a site where a struggle between different causes and interests has 
taken place. Thus, as well as informing public it has also been a central forum in 
winning the `political contest' (Wolsfeld, 1997). Owning and controlling the media 
meant controlling the information environment. In part, the media gained such a 
characteristic as a result of the polarisation on the island. Acting as one of the main 
public spheres, the press has reproduced and circulated information to create public 
opinion behind the causes they have been defending and to secure the public 
discourses. For example, during recent changes introduced by the Annan Plan and 
the opening of the border, the media were instrumental in expressing and leading the 
transformation of the dominant discourses within the community. 
The practices common in the Turkish Cypriot media also influenced the discourse of 
the news texts analysed. Relying on externally produced texts, such as news agency 
dispatches and press releases, as the sources of news and using these texts with 
minimal editing or merely copying them caused the appearance of identical news 
articles in the newspapers. Integration of the press releases of various groups and 
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organisations into the news discourse with little change created intertextuality which 
made the resulting news article very similar to the original document. In some cases, 
it also made it difficult to isolate the institutional voices and discourse forms of the 
newspapers. Such news stories, which gave only one perspective, were also far from 
reflecting a balanced and fair account of the events. Juxtaposition of different and 
sometimes conflicting accounts of stories without much guidance failed to provide 
clear information and understanding for their readers. 
All the newspapers reflected the views of various groups in their coverage of the 
issues. This is because, as van Dijk (1988) points out, the `truthfulness of events is 
enhanced when opinions of different backgrounds and ideologies are quoted about 
such events' (p. 85). Nevertheless, an analysis of the overall representation of the 
issues by the newspapers showed that, despite including diverse views, they 
supported one or the other idea, which again reinforces van Dijk's (1988) argument 
that `those who are ideologically close will be given primary attention as possible 
sources of opinions' (p. 85). By doing so, even though the opinions of different social 
actors and groups are included in the representation or linguistic inclusion, the 
advantageous or disadvantageous treatment given in the representation still creates 
inequalities (Reisgl & Wodak, 2001). 
On Strategies and Linguistic Means 
The main strategies in the discursive construction of national identity were 
constructive strategies as well as strategies of justification, transformation and 
perpetuation. In the news articles in 1996, the newspapers usually benefited from the 
strategies of construction and justification. Construction strategies were mainly used 
to collectivise and unite people within certain groups such as Turkish and Greek 
Cypriot. Thus, the binary division within the texts was strong and strategies of 
justification helped shift the blame for much criticised actions to the `other'. The 
nationalistic discourses that dominated the news in 1996 emphasised `our' actions as 
`patriotic' and `their' actions as being `crazy' or `irrational'. As well as the intra- 
national sameness and unity, the solidarity and similarity with the Turkish nation was 
accentuated. The main strategies used in the reports of the events in 2003 were 
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strategies of perpetuation and transformation. Going through a time of change, on the 
one hand, the political continuity between past and present times was emphasised, 
while on the other hand, a necessary and desired political change between now and 
the future was predicted. Constructive strategies were also employed to forge a unity 
within communities with a perception of Cypriotness as well as stressing Turkish 
Cypriotness. Yenidüzen also adopted a strategy of discontinuation to announce the 
end of the political power of the governing groups, which implied a change in the 
future. In the articles on the 2007 Lokmaci issue, a transformation strategy which 
implied a political change between now and the future was used. Justification 
strategies were also employed by the newspapers for the presence of the Turkish 
army in the north and also the removal of the much disputed footbridge. 
The news texts employed metonyms, synecdoche and personification to establish 
sameness between groups. While the capitals of the states were used as metonyms to 
refer to the governments, generalising synecdoche as a linguistic means was 
frequently utilised, especially to present a small group of people as the general 
population. Personification was another linguistic tool adopted in the discursive 
construction of Turkish Cypriot national identity. Personification of the nation was 
especially common in the articles published in the Lokmaci case in 2007. As well as 
using the image of TRNC President Talat to refer to the Turkish Cypriot nation, 
Turkish Army Forces were also given a human form, which helped people to identify 
with or against it. 
Conclusions 
The TRNC, a new state founded as a response to the insecurity of Turkish Cypriots 
and a challenge to the claims of sovereignty emanating from the south, offers a 
unique case to study national identity. Despite being a state that is unrecognised by 
the international world and whose existence and rationale for existence has been 
challenged, the TRNC has had a reasonably long life, a material and spatial presence 
and imprint on society. It has been a source of expressions and experiences of 
national identity as well as producing a sense of belonging for its people. 
Nevertheless, the new state has not managed to fix the meaning of national identity 
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but, on the contrary, has provided the context in which the various identity concepts 
of Turk, Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot have been debated, which confirms the dynamic 
and contested nature of national identity. Therefore, serious research into its media, 
as the significant contributors to the production and propagation of national identity, 
as well as challenging and modifying social imagination, was long overdue in order 
to study their role in the process. 
There is no doubt that further research into media content, linguistic means and 
strategies as well as journalistic practices is required. For example, further research 
into nation and identity using other media such as radio and, in particular, online 
media would be useful to broaden the understanding of the role of the media in the 
construction and renegotiation of identity. One of the aims of this study was to open 
a channel for more discussion on the issue rather than provide definitive answers. 
Raising awareness of not merely the conflicts and tensions produced by the identity 
construction processes but also discriminatory and exclusive practices committed for 
the sake of nationalism (Wodak et al., 1999) are the key aims of the study. 
As this research confirmed, particularly at times of crises or conflict, nationalistic 
opinions and discourses dominate the news without leaving any space for diverse 
views. As seen in the case of the Turkish Cypriot newspapers, either because of the 
manipulation of powerful sources or the fear of being labelled as traitors, the media 
avoid challenging the dominant nationalistic opinions at such periods. There is a 
spiral of silence, which quietens any challenging or opposing opinion (Noelle- 
Neumann and Petersen, 2004; Salmon & Glynn, 1996). 
The conflict between the two communities on the island has shaped the media 
environment and culture. Therefore, nationalist tendencies that are inherent in the 
media not only reproduce the myths, symbols and traditions which enhance loyalty to 
the nation but sometimes these tendencies cause the representation of events to be 
distorted so as not to let the `other' use it against `us' (Ozgunes and Terzis, 2000) or 
not to offend national sentiments (Wolsfeld, 2001). Despite this, the Turkish Cypriot 
media can play an important role in conflict resolution on the island. It is important 
that the media should recognise their responsibilities in the process and act in a way 
that would promote communication between the sides. The media should develop 
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norms and routines of news production that would encourage resolution rather than 
nationalist tendencies (Wolsfeld, 2001). Their impact on the peace process should 
also be researched and highlighted. 
One of the roles of the media in the development of a democratic society is to allow 
diverse groups and organisations to express their alternative views (Curran, 1997). 
Unfortunately, in North Cyprus, rather than generating pluralism in society by 
reflecting all citizens' interests, the media are acting as the mouthpiece of official 
and powerful institutions. Instead of giving access to different perspectives, the 
media have become a means of exercising power for powerful groups. Thus, rather 
than representing society, it can be argued that the media are reflecting the views of 
these groups. In order to achieve a democratic society, a democratic media system, 
which would allow diverse views, is required as well as a more critical journalistic 
approach towards power relations. 
For such a society it is also important that the media promote other identities such as 
gender and ethnic rather than just solely national ones. As well as encouraging the 
formation of a pluralistic society this will also help develop an understanding of the 
interests of different groups in the society. Therefore, the media should adopt a non- 
national definition of citizenship and also act as a public space where representation 
and negotiation of diverse identities can be carried out. Also, by highlighting the 
collective interests of citizens, the media can contribute to a peaceful co-existence of 
conflicting groups not only within the society but also their neighbouring societies. 
Journalists have an important responsibility in the improvement of the media 
environment and the journalistic culture in the TRNC, especially if they want to play 
a role in the establishment of a democratic society and in conflict resolution. By 
ridding themselves of political control and their dependence on official sources and 
applying professional norms and routines in the production process of the news, 
journalists will increase their credibility and influence within the society. It is a hard 
and slow process to change the journalistic culture, but journalists in North Cyprus 
can start scrutinising their relationship with their sources and question their 
newsgathering practices. Not taking given information for granted and making 
questioning and research a standard part of their professional routine would help 
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them gain a more objective approach in their news construction process, therefore 
fulfilling their role as the facilitators of pluralism and debate in society. 
Changing social, political and economic conditions as a result of increasing 
interaction, through the advancement in new communication technologies and 
mobility, not only render the concept of a homogeneous national identity impossible 
but also require a more inclusive or broad appeal. As the efforts to find a solution to 
the Cyprus problem encourage new social imaginings, which brings new challenges 
for the society, the media can play a crucial role in facilitating or hindering 
(depending on their positioning in the social/political landscape) these new re- 
articulations and conceptualisations of identity. Studying media practices and 
discourse in such a period of change is an important task, in order to understand 
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APPENDIX 
TIMETABLE OF EVENTS IN CYPRUS 
1571 The Ottoman conquest of Cyprus. 
1878 Britain was given the administration of the island by the Ottoman Empire. 
1914 The Ottoman Empire entered the First World War against Britain and in 
return Britain annexed Cyprus. 
1923 With the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey denounced its rights on Cyprus. 
1925 Cyprus became a British colony. 
1955 EOKA launched an armed struggle against the British Administration. 
1960 The Republic of Cyprus was established. 
1963 President Makarios put forward a set of proposals for changing the 
Constitution. 
In December inter-communal conflict started. 
1964 The first border as a ceasefire line called Green Line was drawn in Nicosia. 
1974 Turkey's intervention in Cyprus. 
1983 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established. 
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